Magdalena Bartłomiejczyk

FACE THREATS IN INTERPRETING

A PRAGMATIC STUDY OF PLENARY DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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Introduction

There is a time in the career of every academic when you are supposed to have authored a monograph. Although it is not an official requirement, it fits into the general "publish or perish" adage. The main problem with this, in my view, is the need to find proper balance between trying to publish mediocre works that have not been devoted enough blood, sweat and tears, and aspiring to create an *opus magnum*, something a scholar can genuinely be proud of as a pinnacle of his/her academic achievement. The latter option obviously seems much more noble; however, I have known some researchers so perfectionist in their attitude to writing that, due to endless additions and improvements, their books have actually never made it to the publishing house.

Mindful of this, I am aware of the need to consider a book finished at one point, and resist the temptations to still elaborate on this or that, and update the sources you are quoting to reflect the most current trends, and report on the newest article touching upon the field of your interest which has just appeared in a journal (or an older one that you have just stumbled upon), and triangulate your findings by means of yet another set of data or another research tool. Every author surely knows the feeling. Consequently, imperfect as it may be, this book is hereby declared finished. Certainly, it is far from exhausting the topic; however, it pictures my own state of knowledge at a certain moment in time (spring 2016, to be more precise, with some minor additions and alterations made throughout the second half of 2016). I explicitly refuse to treat it as my *opus magnum*, or even something remotely approaching the notion; rather, it is a milestone on a road which stretches far ahead. Hopefully, my academic career is not ending with this book, and I will still be able to elaborate on pragmatic aspects of interpreting in further works and to improve on my understanding of the topic. Although a few ideas and questions are already circulating in my mind, I particularly hope to find inspiration in possible feedback

from the interpreting studies community – and the only way to invite such feedback on any larger scale is to actually PUBLISH.

This book is not a compilation or reassessment of research that I have published elsewhere over years, although I have been presenting partial results and sharing my deliberations on the topic at some conferences in recent years and I am very grateful for insightful questions and comments (especially from the participants of *Interpreter-Mediated Interactions: Methodologies and Models* at LUSPIO University in Rome in November 2013) that helped to endow my fuzzy initial ideas with a more tangible form and reassured me that the topic was one arousing a lot of interest among the interpreting research community. Actually, my only previous paper that touches upon the topic is Bartłomiejczyk (2012), and the book is quite different from what I have been doing since the beginning of my academic career within the field of interpreting studies. I am therefore stepping out of my comfort zone, which could most succinctly be summarised as experimental research into simultaneous interpreting with interpreting trainees as participants (e.g., Bartłomiejczyk 2006; 2007; 2010).

The paradigm shift from experimental to observational research carried out on authentic interpreted discourse reflects my deep conviction gained over time that the latter can shed more light on simultaneous interpreting as a socially situated activity, inherently embedded in its communicative context. This view is shared by many professional interpreters, who worry about ecological validity of experiments, as they feel that, in the words of Daniel Gile (2000: 102),

> important determinants of the interpreter's behaviour are only found in the 'real' professional situation, including a sense of professional responsibility, the awareness of certain expectations from colleagues and listeners, visual and other feedback from the clients and the floor as well as visual and other input from the interaction between the floor and the speakers and within the floor.

Therefore, observational research can claim more explanatory power than experimental studies, which is particularly true of experiments with the participation of students, whose performance may be significantly different than in the case of professionals (cf. Gile 1994: 44), and many of whom never even make it to the interpreting booth after graduating from the university. This is not to say that such experiments are devoid of any scientific value, especially for the needs of interpreter training. However, I believe that at present there is more to be gained from explorations in conference halls than in university interpretation labs

– especially considering the difference observational studies (such as Wadensjö 1998) have made to our understanding of liason interpreting.

My evolution as a researcher is, to some extent, parallel to the development of the field as such, which started with experimental studies around 1960s, and only stretched to corpus-based observational research much later, around the beginning of the new millennium. As rightly pointed out by Setton (2002: 29–30), this sequence seems awkward: "as a first step towards understanding interpreting processes or factors in quality, or establishing a theoretical basis for training, it seems reasonable to begin by observing and comparing original discourse and its interpreted versions." In this sense, this book is something that I should have done some time ago (maybe at the point of writing my PhD thesis, defended in 2004) but was discouraged from actually doing by problematic accessibility of naturally occurring data (see, e.g., Shlesinger 1998). Once Poland entered the European Union and, some time afterwards, the European Parliament started placing its plenary debates on-line together with their interpretations into all the official languages, it became clear to me that this was the way to go.

In one of my favourite novels, *The Hundred-Year-Old Man Who Climbed Out of the Window and Disappeared* by Jonas Jonasson,[1] there is an episode in which the main character, Swede Allan Karlsson, by a strange turn of fate (one of so many in this delightfully hilarious novel) ends up in Moscow, having dinner with Stalin, the boss of the Soviet security Lavrenty Beria, and the head of the Soviet nuclear programme Yury Popov. Apart from the aforementioned, at the table sits "a little, almost invisible young man without a name and without anything either to eat or to drink" – the interpreter, and the others pretend he is not there at all, although he makes the friendly conversation possible in the first place. During the dinner, the amicable atmosphere is suddenly completely spoiled as Allan quotes an inappropriate, imperialist poet, and Stalin flies into a fury. Allan is immediately accused by his moody host of being a filthy capitalist and a long tirade results, which ends as follows:

> 'I've been thinking,' said Allan.
> 'What,' said Stalin angrily.
> 'Why don't you shave off that moustache?'
> With that the dinner was over, because the interpreter fainted.

[1] First published in Swedish in 2009; the quotations here are from the English translation by Roy Bradbury.

Why should the interpreter have fainted? After all, this insolent suggestion (undoubtedly classifiable as a face-threatening act, and not just because it relates to facial hair) was not his own, he was "only" supposed to transfer it to Stalin from the originator, that is, Allan Karlsson. Surely he had no reason to feel responsible for the offensive content? Or did he? As a matter of fact, the job of Stalin's non-fictional interpreters was indeed very dangerous, he is known to have had several of his interpreters executed by NKVD (Tryuk 2014: 9; Kahane 2007), although the reasons for this are far from clear.

The episode from Jonasson's amusing novel illustrates very well the main question I will try to answer in this study: except fainting, what can the interpreter do when s/he is required to voice a statement that may likely offend the addressee (damage his/her face) and is, in fact, intended to do just this? As the character of my work is descriptive rather than prescriptive, I would like to avoid, as much as possible, a related question, one that frequently gets asked by interpreting students: what should the interpreter do in such a situation? At the same time, I can only agree with Mona Baker (Chesterman and Baker 2008: 12) when she says that "there is an element of prescription in *all* theoretical writing, however descriptive and 'detached' it attempts to be" (original emphasis).

In the material investigated for the needs of my research, the addressee is not a bloody dictator (fortunately for the interpreters), but the context remains strictly political. In fact, some of the addressees are very major political players, heads of the main European Union institutions, and others are mainly politicians, too. The speakers, likewise, are also politicians: Members of the European Parliament. To phrase it in more scientific terms, the field of my interest is interlingual transfer of pragmatic meaning, that is, what House (2000: 64) describes as "interpersonal equivalence," and I focus on face-threatening acts and impoliteness.

Although parliaments are supposed to feature 'parliamentary' (i.e., polite, respectful, dignified, sophisticated) language, even casual observers of the political scene will realise that some speakers who take the floor there decisively fail to live up to this ideal. The European Parliament does not radically differ from various national parliaments as far as the content and the form of its plenary debates are concerned. It stands out, however, as a parliamentary assembly with extraordinarily many working languages, where participants of debates interact with each other with the help of numerous teams of simultaneous interpreters. It would be unreasonable to assume, therefore, that interpretation exerts no influence whatsoever on the debate as such.

The book starts with a general chapter meant to set the scene by briefly describing the European Union as a multilingual institution, with a special focus on translation and interpreting, their institution-specific character and the organisational units responsible for providing each of these services. In Chapter 2, the description narrows down on interpreting for the European Parliament, including such aspects of its plenary debates that may influence interpreting, either favourably or otherwise. In particular, this chapter is aimed to provide an overview of existing research on simultaneous interpreting in this very setting, independently of investigated language combinations and of research questions posed by the authors – although, naturally, more attention will be devoted to studies that explore pragmatic aspects. My ambition was to make this overview as exhaustive as possible, although I realise that some studies might have escaped me, especially unpublished theses (in spite of making every effort to trace all the developments, at least in the case of PhDs).

As you will notice by dates of publications reviewed in this chapter, research into various aspects of interpreting in the European Parliament, which a few years ago could easily have been called a niche topic, is a truly vibrant field at the moment, with many important contributions appearing very recently. Consequently, this book will probably not display as much originality as I hoped for when beginning to work on it. On the other hand, I am glad to know that it will be one of the many elements that quickly add up to form a multifaceted image of a unique setting that is likely to function as a paragon of simultaneous conference interpreting in many Europeans' minds.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the pragmatic background to my study, with the latter zooming in on pragmatics of interpreting. Both these chapters are much longer now than originally intended, and this is because as a newcomer to the field of pragmatics, I completely underestimated the complexity of the issues I was setting out to explore and the richness of relevant empirical research. Even in its present form, Chapter 3 hardly does justice to modern (im)politeness studies, but hopefully it is sufficient to shed light on the crucial concepts of *face*, *facework*, *face-threatening acts* and *impoliteness* that will continuously reappear in the analysis of my research material in Chapter 5. I also devote some attention to empirical research, of which research into cross-cultural pragmatics seems most relevant for translation studies. Finally, special emphasis is placed on selected pragmatically-oriented studies of parliamentary discourse, and I believe this is probably the only section that may contain anything novel for an average pragmatician. Otherwise, this chapter has been written more for the

sake of readers having a similar scholarly background as myself, that is, translation studies, and interpreting research in particular. Chapter 4, in turn, presents a review of existing research (on various modes of interpreting) dealing with facework as performed by interpreters, more likely to be old news to translation scholars than to linguists.

Chapter 5, by far the longest one, presents my own empirical study and therefore should be seen as the core of this book, offering the most "added value." It starts with a detailed discourse-analytic exploration of five speeches and their interpretations into Polish, to proceed to an analysis of a considerably larger corpus of face-threatening parliamentary discourse that focuses on two selected aspects: personal reference and impoliteness. What is probably apparent from the beginning of this chapter is my persistent struggle to supplement the qualitative analyses of facework (as performed by original speakers and interpreters representing them) with some quantitative aspects that would offer explanatory potential as regards the phenomena that, admittedly, are hardly measurable. No doubt, this nagging belief in the value of numbers and percentages has much to do with my experimental research background. Finally, I did include a few quantitative elements into my analyses; however, it must be highlighted that there is a certain asymmetry between the two approaches, with the qualitative one constituting the methodological mainstay of the study. Whereas the qualitative description of possible interpreter reactions to face threats present in the source texts is well-grounded in the material and supported with adequate examples, any conclusions of quantitative character as to the relative frequency of the pragmatic shifts under investigation must be treated with much caution, and surely they should not be hastily extrapolated to "simultaneous interpreting in general." In fact, given the limited representativeness of the corpus, I even hesitate to venture any generalisations going beyond the transfer of Eurosceptic discourse in the European Parliament by the Polish Language Unit.

As this book is no thriller, it will probably not qualify as a spoiler if I reveal now that the overall results point to a pronounced tendency towards mitigation of face attacks by the interpreter. This is not a great surprise, either, in view of previous research reported in Chapter 4. As noted by Mason (2004: 93), in community interpreting, "[t]he interpreter's mitigation of perceived threats to face is well documented […], whether the face redress is done for the sake of the speaker, the hearer or the interpreter herself." However, the simultaneous interpreter's role (almost devoid of the coordinating function, inter alia) makes for a different array of interpreting strategies, which I have tried to discuss

extensively and illustrate with numerous examples from the corpus. Chapter 6 is a direct follow-up, endeavouring to show a few diverse options of how this phenomenon of mitigation might be explained within the wide framework of translation studies.

The last issue I would like to explain here is the fact that I am not an EU interpreter myself. Understandably, I considered the idea of becoming one around the time Poland was entering the European Union, but decided against it, for a number of reasons, mostly personal, and, as of now, I am perfectly happy with this decision (although I do not preclude that I might want to take the accreditation tests at some time in the future). Therefore, the position of an EU interpreter is not an unfulfilled dream for me, and I have not set out on this research in order to vent my frustration by criticising the performance of those who have attained it. On the contrary, I have great respect for interpreters working for the European Parliament and the other EU institutions, whether they are Polish or of any other nationality. I am also far from claiming that any of the solutions affecting facework that I discuss in Chapter 5 are "wrong" from an ethical or procedural or any other point of view, or that I would have handled a challenge that this type of speech poses completely differently, and better, had I been in that booth at the time. For the benefit of potential readers who are not well-acquainted with interpreting, it seems necessary to briefly mention at this point that interpreters get to play by a completely different set of rules than translators; their work inherently involves great cognitive strain, and, therefore, transcripts of their oral output (larger fragments of which are provided in the Appendix, and shorter ones – throughout Chapter 5) should definitely not be judged against the standards of written translation.

Whether or not personal experience as an EU interpreter endows a researcher with a better position to analyse interpreting as practiced in plenary sessions of the European Parliament is, certainly, a complex question. As we will see in Chapter 2, many scholars who have engaged in research in this setting so far, and especially authors of more extensive studies, are, in fact, also a part of the EU interpreting services. Beyond doubt, both the insider and the outsider status have some advantages and disadvantages. For instance, as an outsider I obviously have to rely on information from other authors as far as the realia of work at the European Parliament are concerned, and I might miss some important organisational details that have a bearing on the interpreter's performance. On the other hand, a vantage point situated at a considerable distance gives me the benefit of detachment, and, hopefully, a less subjective perspective enabled by the lack of emotional

involvement with the participants (whom I do not know personally) or any loyalty to the scrutinised institution as such.

Having outlined the aims I wish to achieve and clarified my present position as a researcher, now it remains for me to hope that this book finds interested and reflective readership among the interpreting research community and, perhaps, also among pragmaticians. As I have already indicated, feedback (also criticism, naturally) is welcome, even more so because in spite of this book being finished, I still regard the project itself as work in progress, to be continued soon.

1. Multilingualism in the European Union

1.1 Introduction

Multilingualism of the European Union and the idea that all the official languages of its member states should have equal status go back at least to 1958, when Council Regulation No. 1 was adopted. The Regulation stipulated that all four languages of the six states signing the Treaty of Rome (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) would be official and working languages of the newly created European Economic Community. Certainly, it is impossible to know today whether the "Founding Fathers" had an inkling of the Union's growth over the decades to come, and how they envisaged the future of its languages. Thomassen (2009: 1) claims that "the institutions of the Union were never designed for such a large number of members." Anyway, the Regulation has been amended many times since 1958 to include the official languages of the newcomers, and today it enumerates as many as 24 languages. The biggest pool of new languages was added in 2004 with the accession of ten new member states and the introduction of nine new languages: this is often referred to as the "big bang enlargement" (Kent 2014). It has to be pointed out that while the number of languages rises linearly, the number of possible language combinations (which is also very important for translation and interpreting) rises almost geometrically. Consequently, the number of languages nearly doubled in 2004, while the number of language combinations rose from 110 to staggering 380.

Regulation 1/58 states that all the 24 languages are both "official" and "working," and there is a difference between the two functions. As explained by Gazzola (2006: 396), official languages are "used in communication between institutions and the outside world," whereas working languages are "used between institutions, within institutions

and during internal meetings convened by the institutions." Although in theory all the 24 languages enjoy equal status, in fact they do differ in their function as working languages in various EU institutions. I will come back to this issue in the course of this chapter.

Table 1 shows how the European Union (earlier named the European Economic Community and the European Communities) grew, with new member states and languages being added with every enlargement. The Treaty of Rome is taken as the starting point. The number of language combinations represents all translation/interpreting directions (e.g., Polish and English account for two possible combinations, Polish – English and English – Polish). Irish is an interesting case of a language that is hardly ever spoken as the mother tongue, with an overwhelming majority of Irish citizens having English as their first language. Although Ireland joined in 1973, Irish (also referred to as Gaelic) only obtained the official status in 2007 (cf. de Swaan 2007: 5).

Table 1. Member states and official/working languages of the European Union

Year	New member states	New official & working languages	Number of all languages	Number of all language combinations
1957	Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany	Dutch, French, German, Italian	4	12
1973	Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom	Danish, English	6	30
1981	Greece	Greek	7	42
1986	Portugal, Spain	Portuguese, Spanish	9	72
1995	Austria, Finland, Sweden	Finnish, Swedish	11	110
2004	Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak, Slovenian	20	380
2007	Bulgaria, Romania	Bulgarian, Irish, Romanian	23	506
2013	Croatia	Croatian	24	552

The number of official languages may rise further in the future, as currently five countries (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) have candidate status, and some other countries (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina) are also negotiating possible membership in the European Union. It is, however, unimaginable that any future

enlargement might be as huge as the one in 2004. Interestingly, English should actually stop being an official language if the United Kingdom leaves the EU following the Brexit referendum held in June 2016, as none of the other countries has it as its official EU language at present (a scenario which seems highly improbable, considering the crucial role English plays nowadays in all the EU institutions).

Certainly, there are many more languages spoken in the European Union than 24, both regional languages (e.g., Catalan, Basque, Sami, Welsh) and languages of immigrants from practically all over the world. Nevertheless, as a rule, each new member state can only add one of its official languages to the common list (cf. van Els 2005: 268). It is striking that some languages not on the list have many more native speakers than a few smaller official EU languages; for instance, Catalan is estimated to be spoken by about 10 million people (Zabalbeascoa et al. 2001: 110). However, this issue is outside the scope of our direct interest (for an extensive discussion, see van Els 2005).

The European Union is unique among international organisations in having such a large number of official languages. Although many international organisations are multilingual, they usually limit the number of their languages to just a few.[1] The United Nations, for example, operate in six official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish), and NATO as well as the International Monetary Fund in only two each (cf. Koskinen 2008: 28). Nevertheless, multilingual administration is not a phenomenon limited to international bodies only, as there are quite a few bilingual countries (e.g., Canada, Finland), and even some multilingual ones (e.g., Switzerland with four official languages and South Africa with eleven). Consequently, there are numerous national and international parliamentary assemblies using interpreting services in their daily functioning, and this is hardly a new phenomenon. The Belgian parliament, for example, has been using simultaneous interpreting since 1936, and the Swiss one – since 1948, although this is little known, as the Nuremberg Trial "has imposed itself as the founding myth of the profession" (Marzocchi 2015: 298).

De Swaan (2007: 9) distinguishes between two levels of institutional language use in the European Union: "public," present "most importantly [in] the European Parliament in plenary session, and the Commission in its direct dealings with the citizens," and "closed," present "especially [in] the meetings of Parliamentary committees and of the officials in

[1] The functions of such international organisations, however, are more limited than these of the EU: "some multinational bodies, such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, operate only at intergovernmental level with no legislative function" (European Parliament 2013: 4).

the European bureaucracy." At the public level, he points out, the full multilingualism is a fact, and there are two strong arguments supporting it: first, the languages acting as a symbol of autonomy of the member states within the EU, and second, the European citizens' need to be able to read, in the official language of their own country, the laws that are binding upon them. In addition, the European citizens should also be able to address any EU institution in the official language of their own country and receive a response in the same language.

Gazzola (2006: 396) enumerates the following EU bodies that endeavour to use all official languages (20 at the time) for their internal activities: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

At the closed level, where we can talk of working languages rather than official ones, "efficiency and convenience should and do count more heavily than in public settings" (de Swaan 2007: 11). As pointed out by Ammon (2006: 321), Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 provides for a possibility of limiting the use of all official languages, as it gives the EU institutions the right to stipulate, in their rules of procedure, which languages to use in specific cases. In practice, three languages come into play: English, French and German, with English clearly dominating. The number of working languages has been reduced by the European Commission, the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice (Gazzola 2006: 396–397). The European Central Bank, based in Frankfurt am Main, for instance, has restricted all its internal communication exclusively to English (van Els 2005: 269). However, institutions are unwilling to officially exclude any languages, and the choice of working languages is a matter of custom rather than formal declarations (Gazzola 2006: 397). For certain meetings, such as those of European Council working groups, interpretation is only provided on request, which means that delegations have to explicitly ask beforehand to ensure that they will be able to communicate in their native language (p. 394). In spite of the Parliament's image as the most multilingual EU institution, Kent's research (2014) involving interviews with Members of the European Parliament shows that many of them are frustrated at not having interpretation when it would be very much needed, that is, in certain formal as well as informal meetings outside plenary sessions.

Apart from the two levels distinguished by de Swaan (2007), even within EU institutions there is also the unofficial level, at which undoubtedly English plays the major role. "It has become indispensable for communication outside meeting rooms and for networking purposes: the famous corridor talks predominantly take place in this lingua franca"

(Reithofer 2010: 146). Consequently, English seems indispensable for any EU official[2]; and also many Members of the European Parliament, although in theory entitled to use their mother tongue in all settings,[3] feel that without at least basic knowledge of English they would not be able to work effectively (Kent 2014: 282–283).

Clearly, multilingualism works more than just on the institutional level. It also applies to individual citizens, and especially to foreign language learning, strongly promoted by EU institutions. European citizens' trilingualism has repeatedly been declared as an essential goal (e.g., European Commission 2005). Both the share of young schoolchildren participating in language education and the number of languages taught at schools have considerably increased in recent years (for details, see, e.g., Wodak 2010). This might also have some implications for the institutional level in the long run, for example by raising foreign language skills among future Members of the European Parliament, or by ensuring constant inflow of promising candidates to translation and interpreting schools, and, consequently, of highly skilled translators and interpreters to EU institutions.

1.2 Multilingualism: Blessing or curse?

Adding new official languages to the pool of the ones already used by EU institutions has hardly been smooth and seamless – for example, Sunnari (1997) describes problems faced by the European Parliament interpreting services due to the introduction of Finnish, at the time the most "exotic" working language ever. It was, however, first and foremost the envisaged huge enlargement of 2004 that sparked a big discussion on the mere feasibility as well as the advantages and disadvantages

[2] It is very telling that, on being elected President of the European Council, Donald Tusk (at the time the Prime Minister of Poland) immediately promised to "polish his English." Once he took office several months later, at the end of 2014, the Polish media widely commented (mostly favourably) on the level of English he presented in his very first official speeches rather than on their content.

[3] "[T]he principle of multilingualism in the European Parliament guards against unnecessary obstruction of the right of European citizens to stand for election to the European Parliament [...] Parliament's Rules of Procedure stipulate that Members may speak in the official language of their choice and that interpretation into the other official languages will be provided, thus respecting the democratic right to be elected to the European Parliament irrespective of one's language skills" (European Parliament 2013: 3–4).

of the Union's use of such a multitude of official languages, with contributions from politicians, economists, lawyers, linguists and translation scholars (Pym 2000; Phillipson 2003; van Els 2005; Ammon 2006; Gazolla 2006; de Swaan 2007 – to give examples from just the two last mentioned fields). At the stage of negotiations before the "big bang enlargement," it was far from obvious that all the languages of the candidate countries would eventually become official languages. As described by Judge and Earnshaw (2008: 154–155), the issue was seriously considered in two reports for the European Parliament's Bureau, prepared by Jean-Pierre Cot in 1999 and by Guido Podesta in 2001. The former recommended limiting interpreting in the European Parliament to either just one or a few languages. The latter went in the totally opposite direction, advocating that the principle of equality among the languages of both old and new member states should be upheld through the principle of "controlled full multilingualism" (which means that, apart from plenary sessions, "language profiles" should be drawn up for meetings, specifying which languages would actually be used). Podesta's recommendations were largely implemented and are reflected in the present system of translation and interpreting, to be elaborated on later in this chapter.

Although it seems highly improbable now that the number of EU official languages would be reduced, or that any new accession state might be refused the same status for their language, I will present some of the arguments that have been used by both sides of the multilingualism debate and also some solutions suggested as alternatives to having 20+ official and working languages.

It is, first and foremost, the EU institutions themselves that vehemently support multilingualism at the institutional level as it is practiced at present, supplemented by more and more emphasis on foreign language learning. In its 2005 *New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism*, the European Commission (2005: 2–3) states:

> The European Union is founded on 'unity in diversity': diversity of cultures, customs and beliefs – and of languages. […] It is this diversity that makes the European Union what it is: not a 'melting pot' in which differences are rendered down, but a common home in which diversity is celebrated, and where our many mother tongues are a source of wealth and a bridge to greater solidarity and mutual understanding. Language is the most direct expression of culture; it is what makes us human and what gives each of us a sense of identity. […] respect for linguistic diversity is a core value of the European Union.

In January 2007, the importance of maintaining linguistic diversity was further acknowledged by the creation of a Commissioner for Multilingualism (Leonard Orban from Romania was appointed to this office). With this, "the marginal position of the EU institutions' translation and interpreting activities in the institutional framework seemed to have shifted towards a more central one" (Duflou 2014: 86). However, already in 2009 the domain of multilingualism was entrusted to the Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism, and Youth.

Similarly to the European Commission, also the European Parliament expresses its commitment to multilingualism in many different channels, including its official website:

> The legitimacy of the EU institutions is based on their accountability, accessibility and transparency. Many citizens speak only one language, so the EU must ensure they have access to legislation, procedures and information in their national tongue and can communicate with all the institutions in any of the official languages. Each and every elected representative in the EP has the right to speak, hear, read and write in the official language of their choice. This helps guarantee the full and fair representation of all citizens by allowing us to be represented not by the best linguists, but by the best political representatives, while some of the best European professionals assist them with interpretation and translation.

From the outside of the EU institutions, strong support for their multilingualism comes, for example, from Phillipson (2003). The worst-case scenario that he envisages is the acceptance of English as a single working language, which would involve, among other disastrous results, marginalisation of speakers of other European languages and possible attrition of their languages. Paradoxically, the English language itself would not be served well by such a development, as it would evolve into "a simplified, pidginized but unstable 'Euro-English' that inhibits creativity and expressiveness, […] a language that is spoken with so much imprecision that communication difficulties and breakdowns multiply" (Phillipson 2003: 176). The author also warns against a hasty introduction of a two-tier language system that would favour a few languages over others. Interestingly, he sees Esperanto as a language that should be introduced as a lingua franca for drafting all EU legislation (that would, having been passed, be translated into each of the EU official languages) and as the only pivot language for interpretations (the role of a pivot language will be discussed later on). He argues that Esperanto is very easy to learn and can act as "an international

language that facilitates symmetrical communication between people from different linguistic backgrounds, and that does not threaten other languages" (p. 174). However, it is important to note that Esperanto is not meant to reduce the number of official languages as such, but rather to counteract the unjust hegemony of English and to facilitate translation and interpreting.

Full multilingualism with 20 and more languages has repeatedly been put to doubt for two main reasons: costs and feasibility. As for feasibility, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the system has already been functioning, mostly successfully, for more than ten years (some details are given in the next sections). Consequently, I will focus mostly on the costs, but it is definitely worth mentioning that the two biggest logistic challenges of the "big bang enlargement" were related to the shortage of qualified interpreters with language combinations including languages of the new EU members and the insufficient number of booths in available meeting rooms (Duflou 2014: 97). Both these problems required a few years' time to be adequately dealt with, and while the spatial arrangements markedly improved over a relatively short period of time, the interpreting services still face a challenge of recruiting interpreters for practically all "new" languages except for Polish and Hungarian (p. 98).

Up-to-date information on the total costs of institutional multilingualism in the EU is difficult to find, but the website of the European Commission gives the estimate of 1 billion EUR per year. This is roughly consistent with the data provided by the European Parliament website (also quoted by Apostolou 2013), where the total cost of translation in 2006 is estimated at 800 million EUR, and of interpretation in 2005 – at 190 million EUR. As the data is several years old and the number of official languages has in the meantime increased by four, we can assume that the total costs nowadays exceed 1 billion EUR annually, although some cost-saving measures have also been introduced in recent years (see, e.g., European Parliament 2013).

The costs in absolute terms seem to be taboo among keen supporters of EU multilingualism, who prefer to mention them in proportion to the EU's total budget and total GDP (less than 1% of the former and 1/10,000 of the latter, according to the former head of the Directorate-General for Translation, de Vincente 2011). It is very popular to give the per capita cost only, as does the head of the Directorate-General for Interpretation and Conferences: "The entire policy of multilingualism (i.e., translation of written texts, interpretation of speeches, and linguistic verification of legislative texts by lawyer-linguists) costs EUR 2.30 per European citizen per year. In other words,

the price of a cup of coffee is the price of democracy" (Cosmidou 2013: 130). As rightly pointed out by Pym (2008), this comparison to a cup of coffee, intended to make the expenditure sound trivial, is used over and over again; nevertheless, if we try to calculate the cost per page of output, it amounts to about 155 EUR – a staggering price, at least three times higher than any translation agency in Europe would charge. The average price per translated page as calculated by Phillipson (2003: 114) is even higher, 175.5 EUR. As for interpreting, similar estimates can also be made on the basis of the data provided by the European Commission (n.d. a) and the European Parliament (2013) for the year 2012. According to these documents, in 2012 the EC's Directorate-General for Interpretation provided 116,793 interpreter days while its functioning cost 129 million EUR, which gives the amount of 1,104 EUR per interpreter day. The European Parliament, in turn, needed 97,793 interpreter days, which cost 100 million EUR, giving the slightly smaller amount of 1,025 EUR per interpreter day.[4] The most recent available data for the Directorate-General for Interpretation (n.d. b) covers the year 2015 and mentions 94,224 interpreter days and the costs of 117 million EUR, resulting in 1,241 EUR per interpreter day and pointing to an increase in relative costs of interpreting in spite of a marked reduction of both the Directorate's workload and its total budget as compared to 2012.

Some of the expenditure on translation and interpreting is made not for the sake of communication as such, but for symbolic reasons only. The insistence on Maltese and Gaelic, as noted by Ammon (2006: 329), was caused solely by Malta's and Ireland's desire to uphold or possibly raise the prestige of their native languages, because both could have easily settled on English. In fact, the Irish did function in the EU for 33 years without having Gaelic as an official language, and even some Irish MEPs have not mastered it. Pym (2000) asks how many of the pages translated for the EU institutions are actually not read by anybody, and argues that we should perhaps take a more pragmatic approach instead of being prepared to pay any price for translations which merely have a symbolic value. On a similar note, Kent (2009: 57) claims that interpreting during EP plenary sessions is in fact "documentary interpreting" and "interpreters perform *for the show*"

[4] This, of course, is not the amount the interpreter is actually paid, but includes all the auxiliary costs. The daily rate of a freelance interpreter recruited by an EU institution is about 310 EUR for an inexperienced interpreter and about 400 EUR for an experienced interpreter (i.e., having worked for the EU institutions for at least 250 days). At the same time, the European Commission gives 718 EUR as the daily average cost of a freelance contract (n.d. b).

(original emphasis), while at the same time the real and very dire needs for community interpreting for immigrants within the EU are not fully met. Nevertheless, as rightly pointed out by Gazzola (2006: 401), it is extremely difficult to judge whether institutional multilingualism is too expensive: "While expenditures for language services are expressed in monetary form, how can 'equality' or 'prestige' be quantified?"

1.2.1 If not full multilingualism, then what?

In view of the high costs, it is only to be expected that many are in favour of cutting them by reducing the number of working (and sometimes even official) languages in the EU institutions. The excessive financial burden of multilingualism regularly comes to attention in plenary debates of the European Parliament, where some Members occasionally argue for a drastic reduction, even to just one language, unsurprisingly English.[5] On the other hand, in the plenary debates devoted to multilingualism, most participants express their support of the present status quo. It should also be noted that in spite of their perfect command of English, there was much pressure on the part of Irish and Maltese Members to ensure the full status of a working language to their mother tongues, involving ostentatious use of Gaelic and Maltese in plenary debates while it was not interpreted (interpretation from and into Maltese was not consistently provided right after Malta's accession due to problems in recruiting interpreters). Moreover, there are numerous pleas by Members to add new working languages, such as Catalan, Basque or Russian, which are the native languages of many EU citizens and also of some of their parliamentary representatives. Instead of dwelling on the divergent opinions of politicians, however, I would like to focus on some reduction plans put forward by linguists.

Ammon (2006), for example, argues against a single language, but believes that working languages should be chosen on the basis of numbers of their speakers (both native and non-native) within the EU and also of their international status outside the EU. These two

[5] For example, Charles Tannock repeatedly voiced his opinion on the topic, stating that "Parliament cannot sustain a political Tower of Babel – not least one demanding over EUR 1 billion in annual translation costs. I appreciate that, as an English speaker, I have a natural advantage in this House, but Parliament cannot allow boundless language proliferation at vast expense to European taxpayers" (20.11.2012).

criteria place English on the first position, French and German on the second position (with German having by far the biggest number of native speakers within the EU), and Italian and Spanish on the third position. In order to reduce the advantages of native speakers of the working languages against others, employees of EU institutions should be required to speak another working language beside their own native one (but would this also apply to Members of the European Parliament?). Furthermore, the costs of translation and interpreting (provided consistently in all formal and informal meetings) should be borne exclusively by these member states whose languages have the status of working ones (but would still all legislation be translated into all the official languages, and who would pay for that?).

Van Els (2005) discusses two possible solutions, both of them assuming that final, binding documents are to be translated into all the official languages. First, the number of working languages could be reduced to three, that is, English, German and French, but the native speakers of these languages would have to speak a different language than their own (while everybody else would be free to choose among the three). In this way, the imbalance between native and non-native speakers would disappear. The other and, in his view, a more realistic solution is to choose a single working language, the obvious candidate being English. In this case, everybody except native speakers of English would only have to learn one foreign language, and it would be very clear which one. As non-native speakers would considerably outnumber native speakers, the latter would have to give up the ownership of their own language, which would gradually evolve into a European English (the development also envisaged by Seidlhofer 2003).[6] Van Els (2005: 271) dismisses, as grossly exaggerated, the fears that any language might actually disappear as a consequence of losing its status as an EU working language: "the circumstances and important features that play a role in 'language death' are not in any way present in the context of the EU today."

Gazzola (2006) presents very meticulous calculations of costs for a number of options involving 20 languages. Besides the scenarios that

[6] To some extent, this English might already be a reality in the EU institutions. Members of the European Parliament interviewed by Kent (2014: 281–282) repeatedly use the phrase "Brussels English" and refer to it as a deficient variety, calling it "bad English," "awful English," "simplified, international: not a sophisticated grammar." Many scholars, however, criticise judging ELF (English as a Lingua Franca) against native language norms. House (2013: 282), for example, states that "ELF is [...] definitely not [...] some sort of pidgin or creole. Nor is it some species of 'foreigner talk' or learner language. And it is not BSE – Bad Simple English."

have already been described above, she also considers "asymmetric systems" in which translation and interpreting is provided from all the official languages into a limited number of them (one, three or six). In other words, this would allow everybody to express themselves in the official language of their own country, while the choice of working languages to listen or read in would be limited. This solution has its advantages, as the passive use of a foreign language is, without doubt, much easier to accept than being required to deliver speeches in that language. However, the results suggest that asymmetric systems are not much cheaper than the present one and the only way to considerably lower the costs is to drastically reduce the number of working languages.

Van Parijs (2007) observes that translators and interpreters tend to be biased against any action reducing multilingualism, as this would inevitably take away their income. Likewise, death of certain languages deprives linguists of their object of study, so they can hardly accept it stoically. To a large extent, I agree with his view and will therefore hold my judgment on the potential reduction of working languages in the EU. After all, it would be hard to deny that I appreciate interpretations delivered in the European Parliament as a member of "a small bunch of inquisitive scholars" who wish to "indulge their intellectual curiosity and write about them in academic journals" (Van Parijs 2007: 30).

1.3 Translation and interpreting for the needs of the EU institutions

Certainly, the services enabling the EU institutions to function in a multilingual system have evolved along with the institutions themselves, and also with the rise in the number of languages to cater for as well as with technological progress. While the diachronic perspective encompassing the changes these services have been undergoing might be interesting, for the needs of presenting the overall institutional background of my project I will focus on how translation and interpreting are provided nowadays (for a short history of the interpreting services, see Duflou 2014: 85–87). The data I rely on in large part comes from the websites of the bodies concerned and, in terms of numbers, might not always be completely precise and up-to-date. In particular, it may not take into account the workload connected with Croatian, the newest official and working language added in 2013.

As interpreting remains in the focus throughout the whole book, it is translation that will be given a more thorough treatment at this

point (to complete the description of elements that seem necessary as significant parts of the wide background, but will not be devoted much attention later). Interpreting will only be described in very general terms, as the next chapters are intended to zoom in on issues such as empirical research on interpreting in EU settings or interpreting norms.

1.3.1 Translation

Translation for the needs of the EU institutions is carried out by nine independent translation services that employ about 4,440 translators and produce over 4.5 million pages per year (de Vincente 2011). The institutions and the numbers of translators employed by them are shown in Table 2. All the services cooperate within the Interinstitutional Committee on Translation and Interpretation. Some of the translation work is also outsourced to external translation agencies, so in fact not all the translations for the needs of the EU institutions are done by their translation services (although all undergo some degree of quality control by these services).[7]

Table 2. Translation services of the EU institutions (after de Vincente 2011)

Institution	No. of translators
European Commission	1,750
European Parliament	760
Council of the European Union	650
Court of Justice	620
Committee of the Regions and European Social and Economic Committee	350
Translation Centre	110
Court of Auditors	100
European Central Bank	70
European Investment Bank	60

The biggest translation service, as we can see, is the one of the European Commission, which operates under the name of the Directorate-General for Translation. It is divided into over 80 translation units

[7] In 2013, 26% of translations handled by the Directorate-General for Translation were done externally (European Commission 2014: 10).

located in Brussels and in Luxembourg; there are also several field offices in various member states. The units and offices operate largely independently and are created for each official language, with some of the "bigger" languages having a few units dealing with texts belonging to a particular thematic realm (Koskinen 2008: 69). Within each language unit, individual translators usually specialise in a limited number of particular subjects, such as agriculture, trade, external relations or transport (European Commission 2014: 5–6). Considering that written translation is outside the main focus of this study, the work-flow at the DGT is too complex to describe here; however, see Svoboda (2013) for details.

The source language for the large majority of the translations done by the DGT is English, and its predominance is constantly rising. In 2004, English accounted for 62%, French for 26%, German for 3%, and other languages for 9%. In 2013, English already accounted for 81%, French for 4.5%, German for 2% and other languages for 12.5% (European Commission 2014: 7–8). As for the target languages, the breakdown is more even as all the legislation needs to be translated into each of the official languages. Still, the figures are more than twice higher than the average for English and slightly above the average for French and German, as many texts intended for the Commission's internal use are only translated into English or into those three languages (European Commission 2014).

In case of EU enlargement, the whole *acquis communautaire* in force (Treaties, secondary law, Court of Justice case law) needs to be translated by the candidate country, so that it can be published in its official language on the day of its accession. The EU services only revise the submitted translations and provide assistance through TAIEX, that is, Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument (see de Vincente 2011).

Apart from legislation, EU translators deal with a very wide range of texts, including press releases, policy statements, answers to parliamentary questions, financial reports, minutes, correspondence of various sorts and informational material intended for the general public, such as webpages and brochures (European Commission 2014: 5). The role of IT in the translation process is constantly on the rise. The translation services use the central translation memory to retrieve previous translations of phrases and passages reoccurring in a new source text. They have at their disposal an advanced machine translation system called MT@EC, which is available to all EU staff for quick translations that are only meant to give a basic understanding of a text. MT@EC also comes into use if translations are needed at

very short notice, which, however, always involves human post-editing. Terminology is managed by the interinstitutional terminology base called IATE (for more information about electronic tools, see European Commission 2014: 11–14).

Translations are normally carried out into the translator's native language. However, due to the huge number of required language combinations, they are often handled in relay, that is, in two stages. A text in a less popular language may first be translated into a widely known pivot language, and afterwards this translation functions as the source text for further translations into different languages. Naturally, this causes inevitable delays in availability of translations into "less known" languages, which many monolingual MEPs, not able to consult texts in English or in French, find quite frustrating, as it often leaves them very little time to prepare for meetings (cf. Wright 2007). If we scrutinise the plenary debates, we can easily find some complaints about missing documentation in languages like Portuguese, still not available even at the moment the proposal it concerns is put to vote. Translation of verbatim reports from plenaries into all the official languages (which was discontinued in 2012) required up to four months.

EU texts are presented not as translations and originals, but as language versions, which, in the case of legally binding documents, "form a single legal instrument presumed to have the same meaning in all the languages" (Biel 2006: 146). Koskinen (2001) notes that the lines between source and target texts are further blurred because during the drafting process of one and the same document several language versions may be in use. Moreover, the source text may subsequently be amended on the basis of its translation, as translators identify some problems in its wording (Kaduczak 2005: 39). As explained by Biel (2006: 146), "from the legal point of view, all language versions are equally valid and authentic and in case of interpretative doubts no version is more authentic than the other." This may have serious consequences if any discrepancies among them are detected. The analysis of the European Commission (2012a) enumerates several such occurrences, for example when olive oil producers protested against a higher amount of alkyl esters being allowed in extra-virgin oil (the number was mistakenly changed from 75 to 150 in translation), or a court case was started by a company claiming that a regulation on import of sour cherries was invalid because in the German version of the regulation the term *Süßkirchen* 'sweet cherries' was used. In practice, when adjudicating such cases, the European Court of Justice tries to establish the intention of the legislator by comparing all the language versions (European Commission 2012a, see also Biel 2006: 147–148).

Presenting EU texts as parallel "language versions" has obvious implications for the translator's visibility, which, in this context, is close to zero: "To produce the image that the institution speaks to you directly in many tongues, the translator's role needs to be effaced. […] Translating, as well as document drafting, is a collective and anonymous process where the institution bears the authority" (Koskinen 2011: 58).

Just like source and target texts "vanish," when discussing EU translation it is also difficult to distinguish source and target cultures. Koskinen (2001: 294) asks: "what is the source culture of, say, a document drafted in international English by a Greek official who has been living in Belgium for the past twenty years?" Trosborg (1997: 156) refers to EU documents as "hybrid texts" that "evolve as a product of various languages and cultures." Target cultures may be equally problematic, for example for languages that are used in several countries. Consequently, Koskinen (2001: 294) proposes to draw a distinction between intercultural and intracultural translation, the latter referring to EU translations addressed at readers sharing the institutional culture of the EU rather than at readers with external, national cultures.

The institutional EU culture without doubt exerts an important influence on terminology, as drafters of legal acts as well as translators are discouraged from using lexis that refers to legal concepts specific for a given country.[8] Texts that do not use familiar terminology, in turn, may seem too foreignised and meet with criticism from the target audience – Biel (2006: 157) gives the very telling example of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, criticising the translation of the Constitutional Treaty into Polish as clumsy and not adjusted to the Polish legal language. The same point is confirmed by Koskinen (2011: 58), who states that readers of texts produced in the institutional context rather than within the target language and culture often complain about "Eurojargon." The negative attitude of Europeans towards this kind of vocabulary is expressed in a number of derogatory terms, such as the already mentioned "Eurojargon" and "Eurospeak" in English, "l'eurobabillage" and "le brouillard linguistique européen" in French, "Eurowelsch" and "Eurokauderwelsch" in German (Sosonis 2005: 45), and "eurożargon" and "euromowa" in Polish. Incidentally, the same criticism applies to many spoken texts as well. For instance, Ligaj (2015: 342) sees the hermetic language of EU officials at various

[8] "EU documents have developed a specific language involving coinage of new concepts as well as new terms for the drafting of documents and for use in Community negotiations" – Trosborg (1997: 151).

levels as a code (not necessarily employed intentionally) signalising to outsiders that the speaker is superior because of his/her access to "secret knowledge" inaccessible to ordinary people. At the same time, he believes that using such language is, in fact, detrimental to the general perception of the EU as an institution with which citizens can identify.

As noted by Koskinen (2011: 58), except for the criticism regarding their lexis, EU translations are often perceived as very dense, too complex and difficult to read, but these are the features which they actually share with many original legal texts, as "officialese often remains officialese in translation." Trosborg (1997: 151) enumerates "reduced vocabulary, meanings that tend to be universal, and reduced inventory of grammatical forms" as the common characteristics of EU texts and points out that "hybrids reflect specific textual features (vocabulary, syntax, style, etc.) which may clash with target language conventions." Interestingly, the translated legislation may also exert a detrimental effect on the legal discourse in the target language. In the title of her recent book, Biel (2014) uses the telling term "eurofog" to describe the Polish legal language that has emerged after the accession as a result of a large inflow of translated EU legislation.

1.3.1.1 Constraints of EU translations

"While all translations are affected by some kinds of institutional constraints, 'institutional translation' refers to those occupying the extreme end of the continuum" (Koskinen 2011: 57). Even so, on the basis of the existing literature it is not entirely clear to what extent EU translations are constrained by certain explicit rules (see also Svoboda 2013 on this problem). As to the situation a few years ago, contradictory statements are made. According to Pym (2000: 3), "one of the standing norms of EU legal translations is that all language versions should correspond paragraph for paragraph, perhaps sentence for sentence, as far as possible," which disregards the fact that different languages favour different macrotextual structures, and reduces naturalness of syntax as well as general readability. Similarly, Trosborg (1997: 152) underlines the importance of identical layout, and states that "one sentence in the ST must correspond to one sentence in the TT," which forces Danish translators to produce very long sentences that are difficult to comprehend. On the other hand, Koskinen (2000: 58) claims that the rules governing translations are implicit:

> There are, for Finnish translators, […] no translator's style guides or other documents stating explicitly how the translators are expected to proceed. The more fundamental strategic choices are left to the individual translator to divine from the general 'climate' of the institution and previous translations. The collective and intertextual nature of EU translations then ensures that no translator will radically deviate from the general trend. Even if there are no clear strategic guidelines, the translators are not free to use just any strategy they happen to prefer. Instead of planned and carefully considered strategic decisions, there exists a rather haphazard code of practice that most translators would probably not have actively chosen but that now weighs heavily upon them.

On the basis of her later study on EU translation, nothing seems to have changed in this respect (cf. Koskinen 2008: 146).

At the moment of writing this chapter (early 2014), the website of the Directorate-General for Translation contains a wide array of prescriptive material, including the "Inter-institutional Style Guide" in various official languages (for writers as well as translators), and a brochure entitled "Guide for contractors translating for the European Commission" (for more details, see Svoboda 2013). Regrettably, the resources are hardly presented in a user-friendly manner: "it is rather a challenge for an external translator […] to find their way through the material, and it may be suggested to unify/sort the valuable information that the DGT offers on-line, to allow for more intuitive and effective search procedures" (Svoboda 2013). There also exist some in-house guidelines that are unit-specific – Svoboda (2013) briefly describes the ones that are used by the Czech Unit. Given the multiplicity of the resources, an overall translation policy is difficult to determine. As the resources for various languages differ considerably, some language-specific policies may also come into play. However, one field where certainly translators do not have freedom of choice is terminology, which has to be carefully checked in databases and used consistently both internally, that is, throughout one document, and externally, that is, throughout all EU legislation concerning a particular field (Biel 2006: 155).

1.3.1.2 Research on EU translation

The scholarly interest in institutional translation, of which EU translation is a prime example, dates back to the late 1980s, when Brian Mossop published two seminal articles on the topic (1988, 1990), based on English-French and French-English translations made on behalf of the Canadian Government. Already then, he made some important points about institutional translation (which may also apply to institutional interpreting, the focal point of this work). He argued that the translator's decisions are not taken autonomously, but rather in line with the aims of the specific institution employing the translator: "translation transforms meaning not merely in the sense of adaptation to certain target-language readers but in the sense of making the translation serve the purpose of the translating institution" (Mossop 1990: 345). Translating as an activity is inherently "contaminated" by the goals of the institution commissioning the translation (p. 345). However, the questions whether some changes to the original meaning are ethical, and what political goals they serve, should not, in Mossop's opinion, be completely avoided by translators, as they are still making conscious choices even while representing the institution (on Mossop's valuable input, see also the discussion in Koskinen 2011).

EU translation, with a particular focus on translation of legal texts, is definitely a prominent topic in today's Translation Studies, with many relevant publications appearing recently (e.g., Pommer 2012; Biel 2014; the contributions in the part entitled "Legal Translation in the EU" in Šarčević 2015). The field is too broad to attempt a comprehensive overview in a book whose main interest lies in oral rather than written translation. Therefore, I will allow myself the comfort of selecting the works whose focus is located close to my own and which feel particularly relevant. Two of these deal with translations of EP plenary speeches rather than documents.

Among research on EU translation, Koskinen's book (2008) stands out as particularly detailed and informative. What had initially been planned as a comparative analysis of translated documents and their source texts grew into a three-level research design, also focused on the institutional framework and the translators themselves. The case study, making use of various ethnographic methods, such as questionnaires and focus groups, is based on the Finnish Unit of the Directorate-General for Translation, located in Luxembourg. The results suggest, inter alia, that the translators are fairly isolated from other EC officials and they do not consider themselves an integral part of the institution;

however, they see it as their duty to serve the institution rather than national interests. Maintaining internal cohesion of the group working in the same unit seems more pronounced than the attachment of its members to the European Commission.

The issue of readability lies at the core of the translators' work. In opposition to what Pym (2000; quoted in the previous section) believes, the translators look for solutions that improve reader-friendliness of the text, and this seems to be the main norm they follow. It is visible both on the declarative level, when they talk about their work, and at the practical level, when their translations are analysed: "The problem of creating an affinity with the readers in spite of the institutional distance runs through all the three levels of analysis. […] even though the outspoken norm is towards readability, the institutional routines and processes enhance institutionalization" (Koskinen 2008: 149).

Schäffner et al. (2014) investigate institutional translation on the basis of three case studies, including one carried out at the European Central Bank (the other two are not EU institutions). Their interest lies in specific translation practices and characteristic translation strategies. The study combines an array of methods: comparative analysis of source and target texts, observation of institutional procedures and interviews with translators, reviewers and managers responsible for preparing translations. The results point to the huge role a central translation memory plays for the ECB, as its use is obligatory to ensure that all documents issued by the institution are internally and externally consistent and coherent. The translators are also required to follow style guides, namely the "Inter-Institutional Style Guide" that has already been mentioned in the previous section and, for English, a separate institution-specific guide. All this results in very little freedom of choice that the translators have when it comes to individual translational solutions. The translations are characterised by a high degree of "collectivity, anonymity and standardization," and the translator's "individual voice is totally subjected to the voice of the institution" (Schäffner et al. 2014: 508).

Another interesting, although less comprehensive study of EU translation is Calzada Pérez' analysis of European Parliament speeches and their translations (2001). The author takes into consideration all (52) English and Spanish speeches delivered on a single day (in 1993) and their translations into Spanish and English, respectively. The texts are analysed with regard to transitivity, and several types of translation shifts are identified, which mostly go in the direction of foregrounding material processes and agency (explicitation). The translations are not as literal as might be expected and they sound quite natural in the

target languages; nevertheless, the ideological nuances have often been changed without apparent reasons, and, as the author argues, as a result of the translator's unconscious decisions. In conclusion, the author calls for greater awareness, on the part of translators as well as translator trainers, of "the possibilities (advantages and dangers) of ideological intervention" (Calzada Pérez 2001: 235).

Loupaki (2008) analyses a 40-thousand-word corpus of original plenary speeches in English and French and their translations into Greek, focusing on "involvement strategies" emphasising the interpersonal connections between interlocutors, which include "among others, metaphors, direct speech, rhetorical questions, repetition of sounds and parallel syntactic constructions" (pp. 105–106). The involvement strategies present in the original are often neutralised in the translation: metaphors are replaced by non-metaphoric expressions, repetitions are omitted, and direct questions are replaced by indirect ones, while the changes are by no means motivated by the target language system. All this results in the target text appearing more detached. The author offers several plausible explanations for this phenomenon: the change in medium from oral to written, low priority given to these particular features when assessing translations (whereas terminology is much more important), and the translators' feeling that the function of the target texts is primarily documentary (increased by the temporal shift, as the translations are published several weeks after the original text was delivered).

1.3.2 Interpreting

Very aptly, Machniewski (2015: 386) describes the EU as an "already over 50-year-long conference on everyday life and future of Europeans" (translation mine). Interpreting for the needs of this huge conference is provided by three services, two of which enjoy the status of Directorates-General: the European Parliament's Directorate-General for Interpretation and Conferences, often referred to as DG INTE (about 430 staff interpreters), the European Commission's Directorate-General for Interpretation, using the abbreviation from its French name DG SCIC (about 600 staff interpreters), and the Court of Justice's Interpretation Directorate (about 70 staff interpreters). In addition, there are over 3,000 freelancers (the so-called Auxiliary Conference Interpreters or ACIs) with inter-institutional accreditation, who can be called on by

any of the Directorates if need arises (as is often the case). Accreditation tests are regularly organised for specified language combinations that are in demand at the moment (see European Union n.d. for the up-to-date information on the language profiles currently expected from candidates). The great majority of interpreting is carried out in the simultaneous mode using typical equipment, with interpreter booths and headphones for the audience. However, traditional consecutive interpreting (involving long turns and note-taking), liason (dialogue) interpreting and *chucotage* (whispered interpreting for the sake of up to three clients sitting next to the interpreter) are modes that occasionally also come into play for face-to-face meetings (e.g., between the President of the Parliament and official guests) or missions away from the institutions (cf. Marzocchi 1998: 61–62). Data on how often these non-SI modes are actually used is not available; anyway, candidates for EU interpreters are supposed to be able to work in these modes, too. Languages other than the 24 official ones are also sometimes interpreted, on occasions such as visits of guests from outside the EU, accession negotiations and foreign missions. Consequently, interpreters with Arabic or Russian as a foreign language (and native English or French) are currently sought (European Union n.d.), and knowledge of other non-EU languages, such as Japanese or Chinese, may also be considered an asset.

The Directorates-General additionally cater for the needs of the institutions that do not possess their own interpreting service; therefore, DG SCIC provides interpretation, among others, for the European Council, the European Investment Bank and EU agencies and offices in Member States, and DG INTE – for the Court of Auditors and the Committee of the Regions (Duflou 2014: 87). As the main EU institutions are scattered among Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, interpreters are required to travel extensively. Apart from encompassing the Language Units responsible for interpretation into each working language, the Directorates-General also perform all the auxiliary functions related to interpreting, such as technical and IT support, financial management, terminology, training, and assigning individual interpreters to particular meetings (p. 87).

Much interpreting is carried out directly between the source language and the intended target language, but the sheer number of languages in some meetings (including EP plenary sessions) often makes relay necessary, too. Relay, already mentioned when discussing EU translation, involves the use of another language as an intermediary: for example, instead of providing interpretation directly from Polish into Hungarian, there may be interpretation from Polish into German, and

then from German into Hungarian, with German acting as the so-called pivot language in this case (a target and a source language at the same time). The disadvantages of this two-stage method include an evidently prolonged time-lag as well as "the added complexity resulting from the doubling of an already complex process" that might be hypothesised to render relay "doubly prone to errors or losses of message integrity" (Čeňková 2015: 340). As explained by Graves (2013), preference is given to direct interpreting over relay, and therefore candidates for EU interpreters are valued for having possibly many working languages. Moreover, specially designed language courses (involving also stays abroad) are organised for both staff and freelance interpreters willing to add another passive language (i.e., a language to interpret from but not into; a C language, in AIIC's terms) to their combination, which normally takes about five years. According to the data provided by the European Commission (n.d. b), the staff interpreters of its DG SCIC work, on average, from four passive languages into their respective mother tongues. The highest number of passive languages is nine (mastered by one interpreter), and seven interpreters work from eight languages each. Even so, as pointed out by Duflou (2014: 99), in meetings with the full language regime (i.e., where all the 24 official languages are in use) the booths do not even come near to covering all the possible source languages directly[9]; in the example she analyses of a DG INTE "team sheet" for an EP plenary sitting, the highest number of languages (nine) is interpreted directly into French, while the Romanian and Bulgarian booths only interpret directly from English and French.

Apart from relay, *retour* (i.e., interpreting from one's native language into a foreign language that one has mastered at a level close to the mother tongue, or from one's A language into a B language, if we prefer the popular AIIC terminology that has also been adopted by the EU interpreting services; see European Union n.d.) is another method of interpreting treated as a necessary evil in meetings with large language regimes. Traditionally, "Western" translation scholars and interpreter trainers (e.g., Seleskovitch 1968/1978) have tended to believe that only simultaneous interpreting into the A language, one of which the interpreter has a complete mastery and a total feel, can result in high quality output. Consequently, interpreting into one's mother

[9] To provide direct interpreting from all possible 23 source languages in a meeting with the full language regime, in a team of three interpreters each member would have to master eight or (for one interpreter) seven passive languages, and these would all have to be different than the languages mastered by his/her boothmates. Such an arrangement seems hardy feasible.

tongue has consistently been favoured over *retour,* with the latter being sometimes considered as substandard and best to be avoided at all.[10] At the beginning, the EU interpreting services used to respect the rule that interpreters always work into their mother tongue. As reported by Kent (2014: 173–174), before 1995 *retour* was not in regular use and neither was relay, as the three interpreters manning each booth were supposed to cover interpreting directly from all the possible source languages (eight at the time). However, for some of the newer languages (starting with Finnish in 1995), it turned out that interpreters who knew them as a foreign language were too difficult to find. Consequently, some interpreters who have one of these less known languages as their mother tongue do interpret out of them into a foreign language, often acting as pivots for relay at the same time. When we look at the present needs of the EU interpreting services concerning language profiles of prospective EU interpreters (announced for the year 2016 with view to accreditation tests, European Union n.d.), we can see that for some A languages (i.e., Bulgarian, Czech, Maltese, Estonian and Croatian), it is enough for candidates to have just one B language and no C languages to be eligible for the test (although an additional C language is often mentioned as a strong asset). For most A languages with which new interpreters are sought after at present (except Danish, German, English, Spanish and Swedish), candidates with a B language (i.e., ones who can work in *retour*) are invited to apply.

As far as relay and *retour* interpreting methods are concerned, it should be pointed out that efforts to introduce their use on a larger scale met with vehement opposition from the EU interpreters themselves on the grounds that these modes are often not able to meet the same high quality standards as direct and B-A interpreting (see Gebhard 2001 for a clear position on this issue). Relay, according to Gebhard (2001), "remains a second-best solution as it unavoidably introduces delays in transmitting information and a loss in precision," while *retour*, especially combined with the role of a pivot for relay, exposes interpreters to excessive stress as they have to speak a language the nuances of which escape them, feeling not nearly as confident as when interpreting into their mother tongue. Moreover, also interpreters taking relay from a colleague working into B complain about an increased risk of information loss, and so do, according to Wright (2007), MEPs whose speeches are frequently handled in this way (e.g., the Portuguese). In

[10] Not everybody has shared this view, though, and empirical research has provided inconsistent results. For a detailed discussion of the so-called "directionality debate" dealing with this very issue, see, for example, Bartłomiejczyk (2006).

spite of all these reservations, both relay and *retour* became common in 2004 and have continued to be used extensively ever since. Although at the time *retour* was considered to be a temporary measure (until enough interpreters master the nine new languages as Cs), its widespread use is now accepted and considered both permanent and necessary (Duflou 2014: 99). The most frequent language to do *retour* into is English, whereas the pivot languages (i.e., those which serve as a basis for a further interpretation) are typically English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch and Portuguese (p. 101).

A few words are definitely necessary on the practical arrangements. Interpreters who work into the same language sit together in one booth,[11] which is always the same (i.e., having the same number and spatial position even in different rooms) and is often referred to by its target language as "the English booth," "the German booth," etc.[12] As the European Parliament has a rule specifying that at least three interpreters must be present in each booth for meetings with seven and more target languages (cf. Duflou 2014: 89), and there are 24 official languages, the number of interpreters needed for a meeting with the full language regime is at least 72 (provided the meeting is short enough to be covered by just one "shift"). During the monthly plenary sessions of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, about 1,000 interpreters are present in various meetings (Cosmidou 2013: 130). This is actually more than the number of elected Members of the European Parliament (even disregarding the fact that not all of them will be present at each plenary session). Similarly, it also happens that the interpreters in the booths outnumber all the MEPs and representatives of other institutions present in the hemicycle (i.e., the room where plenaries take place), which sometimes incites speakers to sarcastic comments, like the following, made on 18 June 2008 by MEP Christopher Heaton-Harris at the beginning of his plenary contribution:

> Mr President, I am already thinking of my press release and I think I shall start by speaking 'to a packed House' – although maybe I should just say speaking 'to a packed interpretation booth.'

[11] *Retour* is an exception, because the interpreter rendering a speech out of his/her mother tongue into a foreign language will not go out of his/her usual booth to join the colleagues in another booth, but rather switch the outgoing channel of his/her current booth from the default one to the one assigned to the target language s/he is temporarily using.

[12] The same names are also often used to refer to a specific Language Unit as a whole.

> I appreciate the interpreters for staying on, missing their lunch and listening to these things.

The communicative set-up in a meeting conducted in all 24 languages is very complex. It departs very far from the simple model in which a message goes from the speaker to the interpreter, and then from the interpreter to the addressee. First of all, any speech may be listened to on the floor (and also on-line) in the source language as well as in any of the 23 interpretations.[13] Some of the speakers (as well as listeners) may be native speakers of the language they use, and some may choose to speak or listen in a foreign language (with varying skills of expression or comprehension in the given language). Moreover, the use of relay complicates matters even further, as in fact not all the interpreters are working with the same source text – as described earlier, for some, the source text will be an interpretation provided by a colleague in a different booth, acting as a pivot. Occasionally, even double relay may be used. Last but not least, as reported by Duflou (2014: 176–182), also other interpreters occupying the same booth are often perceived as listeners, and potentially very important ones (for example, for novice interpreters, about whom senior staff might write a favourable or unfavourable report), whose preferences might be taken into consideration when choosing an interpreting strategy.

As pointed out by Van Dam and Zethsen (2013: 234), the employment terms and remuneration of EU interpreters are subject to the collective agreement negotiated by AIIC, the International Association of Conference Interpreters. In fact, this agreement applies to freelance interpreters and specifies conditions such as the daily fee, which is linked to the remuneration of an EU official of a particular grade, reimbursement of travel expenses, or cancellation of contracts. The agreement also ensures that the working conditions of freelancers are not worse than those of staff interpreters, which, in turn, are regulated by Staff Regulations. However, as noted by Duflou (2014: 89), there are some important differences in the status of staff and freelance interpreters as regards "job security, career structure and task profile."

Unlike translations, interpretations are clearly identifiable as target texts rather than originals, and they definitely do not have equal status with their source texts. Whenever interpretations are made available to the general public (e.g., on the Internet), they are accompanied

[13] To avoid confusion, the interpretations into a certain language are always broadcast on the same channel, independently of the room being used. For instance, German is heard on channel 1, English on channel 2, and Polish on channel 17 (Kent 2014: 177–178).

with information to the effect that the interpretation is intended to facilitate communication amongst participants in the specific meeting and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Listeners are referred to the original speech or its written translation (if it exists; see the next chapter on the verbatim reports and their translation) as the official version. On the basis of the EU-AIIC agreement mentioned above, recordings made available to the public also have to include "a disclaimer stating that the interpreter declines all liability for any errors or omissions in the interpretation, with respect to the content of the original words spoken or the information on which they were based, or any losses caused by the use of the interpretation" (Article 27b; available at http://aiic.net/page/3540).

2. Interpreting for the European Parliament

2.1 The European Parliament as a source of naturalistic data

Before the day and age of the Internet, naturalistic data on simultaneous interpreting was difficult to obtain. While a single speech with its interpretation could have been recorded from TV, the best way to compile a large corpus of such data was to actually work as an interpreter at a given conference and ask everyone involved (organisers, speakers and interpreting colleagues) for permission to record material and use it for scientific analysis (as described, for example, by Pöchhacker 1994, extensively analysing material from the 36th World Congress of the International Council for Small Business held in Vienna in June 1991). Certainly, this constituted a major hurdle for observational research, firstly, because not every researcher is an active interpreter, and secondly, because not always permission to record the proceedings can be obtained – be it for the reasons of confidentiality or the negative attitude of interpreters, many of whom feel vulnerable to possible criticism involved in analysing their output (see, e.g., Gile 2000). Even if all the relevant consents are granted, the researcher may meet with obstacles of a technical nature that make the recording process very difficult (as reported, among others, by Diriker 2004: 56–59). Last but not least, the knowledge that their interpretations would be used in research might, to some extent, influence the interpreters to behave differently than they would in other circumstances (on the researcher's possible interference, see, e.g., Schjoldager 1995 and Diriker 2004: 52).

Since the advent of the Internet, observational research has been becoming easier as more and more interpretations are available on-line. For example, nowadays, in order to study TV interpreting, the researcher does not have to know the exact timing of events that will be broadcast and to program recording equipment in advance: the relevant

speeches together with their interpretations can often be downloaded even some time later from websites of TV channels. Similarly, many conferences have their own websites with live streaming as well as the possibility to download some speeches as audio or video files after the conference (although not always both the source text and the interpretation are available). As far as on-line interpreting data are concerned, however, the website of the European Parliament must be considered a real treasure for interpreting research, not comparable to any other source of naturalistic material.

As already stated in the previous chapter, the European Parliament can be regarded as the most multilingual of all the EU institutions, since it operates on the daily basis with 24 working languages.[1] It needs about 100,000 interpreter days per year (European Parliament 2013). We certainly should remember that in fact most interpreting assignments take place outside the plenary and without the full language regime, but it is exactly the plenary sessions that act as "the icon of multilingual European democracy" (Kent 2014: 163) and receive the lion's share of attention from scholars engaged in interpreting research.

The head of the Directorate-General for Interpretation and Conferences Olga Cosmidou (2013: 129) paints an idyllic picture of the European Parliament as "a temple of multilingualism" and "the exact opposite of the Tower of Babel, where people spoke different languages but did not understand each other – it is the 'anti-Babel'; it is lively, interesting, and fascinating" (p. 130). In principle, all the plenary speeches can be watched via the website of the EP, either in real time or afterwards (with rare exceptions due to some technical problems). At the time when the majority of data for this study was downloaded (2014), original speeches delivered since January 2008 were available together with their interpretations into all the other working

[1] This number does not include sign languages. During the parliamentary term 2009–2014, seven interpreters for the Hungarian Sign Language were employed additionally, to meet the needs of the deaf MEP from Hungary, Ádám Kósa (see Kent 2014: 41). As he was also elected for the next term 2014–2019, the Hungarian Sign Language continues to be used in the European Parliament. Another deaf MEP elected for the 2014–2019 term is Helga Stevens from Belgium, who is a native speaker of the Flemish Sign Language, but also fluent in British and American Sign Languages (as she states in an interview of 3 October 2014, available at http://www.europeanvoice.com/video/interview-with-helga-stevens/). The practical arrangements for sign language interpreting are slightly different than for spoken languages, of course, as the interpreters do not sit in booths and do not make use of the typical equipment.

languages at the time of their delivery.[2] This makes for seven years' worth of interpreting material by the end of 2014, with new material being added with each parliamentary session. Of course, the videos are not published for the sake of researchers, but rather so that European citizens can exercise democratic control over their elected representatives. Nevertheless, as a side effect, interpreting research has been provided with a very valuable source of naturalistic data. The speeches can be watched on-line or downloaded; the latter option is useful if we need to have a single video with two audio tracks representing the original and the interpretation into a particular language (e.g., to examine ear-voice span). A simple method of creating such a video is described by Liontou (2013).

The database, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/plenary, has many obvious advantages (see also Monti et al. 2005 and Bendazolli 2010). First of all, we must consider its sheer size. In the years 2005 to 2012, the number of working days with plenary sessions ranged from 50 to 65 per year (full-day or half-day sittings). On average, plenary speeches total about 430 hours per year.[3] As to the share of official languages spoken in plenary, Table 3 reproduced from a 2013 report prepared by the Committee on Budgetary Control

Table 3. Languages spoken in the plenary over the period of 3.5 years, from September 2009 until February 2013 (European Parliament 2013)

Language	Minutes	Share [%]	Language	Minutes	Share [%]
English	26,979	29.1	Slovak	1,573	1.7
German	12,556	13.6	Swedish	1,338	1.4
French	8,841	9.5	Finnish	1,108	1.2
Italian	7,908	8.5	Danish	805	0.9
Polish	7,115	7.7	Bulgarian	612	0.7
Spanish	5,357	5.8	Lithuanian	476	0.5
Greek	4,528	4.9	Slovene	450	0.5
Romanian	2,831	3.1	Gaelic	265	0.3
Hungarian	2,596	2.8	Latvian	239	0.3
Dutch	2,570	2.8	Maltese	195	0.2
Portuguese	2,495	2.7	Estonian	109	0.1
Czech	1,651	1.8	Total	92,597	100.0

[2] Under Rule 182 of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure, the plenary debates should always remain on the website during the current and the next parliamentary term and be preserved in the records afterwards.

[3] Calculated on the basis of the data in Table 3.

of the European Parliament should give us a good idea (although due to its timeframe, it still does not include the newest official language, Croatian). Not surprisingly, English is dominating, but still its share is less than one third (which is very modest in comparison with the share of English as the source language for translation at the DGT, already mentioned in the previous chapter: 81% in 2013). Smaller member states obviously have fewer MEPs, but even so, the data suggest that certain nationalities (e.g., the Nordic ones) are more likely to choose a language different than their mother tongue as their means of expression.

During each plenary session about 1,000 interpreters are on hand to cover all the official languages. The range of topics includes all the fields regulated by EU legislation and is therefore very wide. Some speeches (e.g., those celebrating important anniversaries, awards, etc.) are more general and some are strictly technical. Their length varies from one sentence to 20–30 minutes, with most of the speeches falling between 2 and 6 minutes.

Secondly, as a source of data, the database is truly egalitarian. The website can be accessed with equal ease by seasoned researchers as well as complete beginners, for instance students looking for material for a BA thesis in interpreting studies. It can be used for large-scale research projects and very small case studies, like Bartłomiejczyk (2012), which focuses on a single interpreter's interventions in just one short speech. With egalitarianism also goes transparency, as everybody can access the source and target texts analysed by a particular scholar and check the plausibility of his/her results and conclusions.

Thirdly, the database is searchable according to a few useful criteria, including date, speaker and keyword. However, not all the search criteria that might be important for interpreting research are available; for example, it is not possible to search for speeches in a particular length range or originally delivered in a given language, not to mention parameters such as speaking speed.

Fourthly, as speeches and their interpretations are routinely recorded and placed on-line, the observation does not exert any influence which could change the processes involved. Both speakers and interpreters might certainly realise that their output can undergo some scholarly scrutiny, but they are in no position to predict either which material will be selected or what research questions will be put forward. Observational research of this kind does not require any co-operation on the part of the subjects or the physical presence of the researcher in Strasbourg or Brussels. Certainly, product analysis might also be supplemented with some valuable process data obtained from the

interpreters involved, for exemple, interviews or retrospective protocols (as, e.g., in Monacelli 2009 or Kajzer-Wietrzny 2013), but this is hardly obligatory and in many cases even not necessary. Moreover, in order to obtain process data, the interpreters would have to be informed in advance that their output would be scrutinised.

Last but not least, to set off the fact that much interpreting research is carried out on interpreting students and therefore cannot claim to reflect the professional practice (see, e.g., Shlesinger 1998: 2), any study based on material from this database is undoubtedly carried out on well-qualified professionals working in homogeneous and relatively predictable conditions. All EP interpreters, whether they are staff or freelance,[4] have to undergo a strict selection procedure, checking both their interpreting skills and their background knowledge about the European Union. All the interpreters have to pass accreditation tests to become eligible for recruitment, and those wishing to be permanently employed participate in open competitions for available posts.[5] Moreover, considerable experience in interpreting other EP meetings is needed before an interpreter actually begins to interpret plenary sessions: "interpreters get to work in EP plenary meetings only after they have been recommended by their head of booth as being ready for plenary assignments, which as a rule happens only after several years" (Duflou 2014: 131).

The interpreters' working conditions and workload are governed by a set of precise rules defining, for example, the minimum conditions to be met by the booths. However, it is rather surprising that, as pointed out by Apostolou (2013: 104), there is no specific code of professional ethics applying to interpreters working for EU institutions (although many of them may be members of professional associations which possess their own codes, such as AIIC).

[4] In 2011, 52.26% of interpreting services were provided by staff interpreters, and 47.74% by freelance interpreters (European Parliament 2013).

[5] As pointed out by Duflou (2014: 92), "Quality standards are maintained […] by strictly controlling access to employment for interpreters (through staff competitions and ACI accreditation tests)." The pass rate of accreditation tests is around 30%, and of competitions even lower – 20–25% (p. 117). Within DG INTE, as she further explains, the accreditation tests are treated as the main tool for quality control, whereas ongoing quality monitoring by heads of Language Units and senior staff interpreters is seen rather as a formality "intended only to confirm that an interpreter is performing adequately and only in rare cases to report serious shortcomings and deal with them" (p. 92). On the other hand, in the interviews Duflou conducted with EU interpreters, the accreditation tests were often described using the "driving license metaphor," that is, the interpreters treated them as a proof of meeting some minimum standards and a basis for further extensive on-the-job learning.

Admittedly, analysing material in whose recording the researcher did not participate has also its disadvantages. For example, without specialist software it is sometimes difficult to determine whether or not two interpretations were delivered by the same interpreter. There is also no possibility to know whether the interpreter had the transcript of a particular speech in advance and, if that was the case, how much time was available for preparation. Another very important question is which language version was the actual source text for a particular interpretation. As already explained in the previous chapter, due to the steep rise in the number of official languages, many language combinations are handled in relay, which means that the interpreter is not listening to the original speech, but to an interpretation delivered by a colleague from a different booth who knows the source language. For interpretations from some "widely used" languages, like English, German or French, we can, however, safely assume that they are done directly from the original. In case of doubt, information as to which interpretations were direct and which relay can be obtained from the head of the relevant language unit (personal communication from Rita Cappelli).

In addition, the EP website also offers a database of verbatim reports in all the official languages (available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/debates.html). Each speech is put on record in the original language. However, it must be noted that in spite of their name, the reports are not, in fact, word-for-word, that is, the texts are normally smoothed out to remove, for example, contractions (such as *don't* or *gonna*), false starts and unfinished sentences, the syntax is also sometimes changed to more standard (see also Monti at al. 2005). In spite of this, the verbatim report constitutes a good basis for transcription of a source text, as putting back all the "imperfections" omitted by the verbatim reporter certainly takes much less time and effort than transcribing the source text from scratch. There is also the convenient possibility to search the database, and not only according to keywords, but also to any word contained in the text, which may prove very useful for some research (see Bartłomiejczyk forthcoming).

Until July 2011, except for being written down, each speech was translated into all the other official languages (which took up to four months). In 2011, the Bureau of the European Parliament decided to limit translation of verbatim reports to English only, with a view to cost reduction. This move was widely criticised as going against the principle of multilingualism by favouring one language over all the others. Finally, on 20 November 2012, amendments to the EP's Rules of Procedure were voted through to the effect that verbatim reports

would be published as multilingual documents containing all the contributions only in their original languages. This change does not, in fact, have detrimental effect on interpreting research, as written translations obviously differ a lot from interpretations of the same text and therefore cannot serve as a basis for transcription of interpretations. However, it may put some additional burden on interpreters, who must realise that now the only option for citizens wishing to consult a speech in a language they do not understand is to watch the relevant video and rely on the simultaneous interpretation, in spite of the disclaimer stating that it does not constitute the authentic record of proceedings. MEPs also have the possibility to ask for an extract they are interested in to be translated in writing into any of the official languages.

Having elaborated on the usefulness of the widely accessible online databases, which are the primary sources tapped for my own research described in this monograph and elsewhere (Bartłomiejczyk forthcoming), I must also mention EP interpreters themselves as valuable providers of data for interpreting research. The frequently deplored unwillingness of professional interpreters to participate in research seems to be contradicted or at least put to question as regards this particular group by studies analysing material obtained directly from EP interpreters and involving a high degree of cooperation with researchers. Some studies are based on introspective material from interviews or questionnaires (Kent 2009; 2014; Van Dam and Zethsen 2013; Duflou 2014), some even on input obtained in experimental conditions (Kajzer-Wietrzny 2012; 2013). Occasionally, freelance interpreters working for EU institutions engage in research more deeply than just in the role of participants, thus becoming informed "practisearchers" (Vuorikoski 2004; Duflou 2014).

2.2 Input for interpreting: Some characteristics of EP plenary discourse

Plenary sessions account for only a part of the workload of EP interpreters and constitute a quite different, more formal and more demanding setting than, for example, meetings of political groups or committee meetings, which, for any given topic, take place at earlier stages of the legislative process. Marzocchi (1998: 69) describes them as "[t]he apex of an interpreter's work at the EP, both in terms of peer recognition and in terms of effort." A detailed analysis of speeches produced by Members of the European Parliament and other speakers

taking the floor during plenary sessions lies outside the scope of this book; however, I would like to provide some information on those aspects that may have a very direct influence on interpreting.

First of all, it must be pointed out that the plenary sessions are highly organised events. The detailed agenda (available to the interpreters) is drawn up in advance by the Conference of Presidents of the political groups.[6] Each sitting is chaired by the President of the European Parliament or one of 14 Vice-presidents, who always opens and closes the sitting and gives the floor to subsequent speakers. The chairing President is therefore the person who manages the turn-taking, because no microphone will be turned on unless authorised by him/her.[7] If the speaker departs from the subject or exceeds his/her allotted speaking time, the President may call him/her to order or even signal to the technician to turn off this speaker's microphone. It is also the President's role to admonish speakers who deliver their contributions too fast for the interpreters (see Bartłomiejczyk forthcoming for more details).

Most of the speakers are Members of the European Parliament, but the sittings are also attended by representatives of the European Commission and the European Council, who often make declarations or respond to questions put by Members. In fact, in one of the debates analysed by Beaton (2007: 103), whose research will be discussed more extensively later in this chapter, as much as 25% of the speaking time was taken up by the Council and 23% – by the Commission, which is by no means untypical. The floor is also often given to invited guests from outside the EU institutions, such as visiting heads of state (e.g., Joe Biden in 2010), religious leaders (e.g., Pope Francis in 2014) or laureates of the Sakharov Prize (e.g., Malala Yousefzai in 2013). The guest may sometimes speak in other language than the 24 official languages, which inevitably necessitates relay interpreting.

As compared to other EP meetings, plenary sessions are considered particularly demanding (and therefore normally not entrusted to novice interpreters) due not only to the media exposure and wider public

[6] "In the hemicycle/Plenary meetings, interpreters are provided with the program and know exactly the sequence in which everyone will speak and in which language" (Kent 2014: 257). However, the same author admits that the same MEP, fluent in at least two languages, may choose to speak different languages on different occasions, which is hardly predictable by the interpreters (p. 258). See also Duflou (2014: 102) on code-switching by some speakers even within one and the same speech and on possible difficulties in identifying a source language the interpreter does not master and, consequently, in choosing the correct channel as the source for relay.

[7] Occasionally, during particularly heated debates, speakers may try to shout without the microphone although they have not been given the floor.

interest, but especially to the great variety of languages actually spoken on the floor and the quick succession of speakers. As explained by Duflou (2014: 246), the additional cognitive load often results in interpreters taking shorter turns in the booth than the customary ones lasting about 30 minutes.

Individual speaking time during plenary debates may be very short if many Members have asked for the floor, and speakers from smaller political groups are especially affected by this. The detailed rules on time allocation are laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (Rule 149), and this is how they are briefly explained on the EP's website, under the heading "The plenary in action":

> Speaking time in the Chamber is allocated according to the following criteria: a first fraction of speaking time is divided equally amongst all the political groups, then a further fraction is divided among the groups in proportion to the total number of their members. MEPs who wish to speak are entered on the list of speakers in an order based on the numerical size of their group. However, a priority speaking slot is given to the rapporteurs of the committees responsible and to draftsmen of other committees asked for an opinion.

In practice, the political groups decide on how to distribute among their members the speaking time granted to the group, which varies a lot. A large political group may have up to five minutes, while a small group may only have one minute (Vuorikoski 2004: 79). On the basis of the table provided by Beaton (2007: 102), we can see that in her corpus almost all speakers in fact exceed their allocated speaking time. Most of the speeches fall within the 2–5 minutes range, while the only speeches longer than 10 minutes are delivered by the representatives of the Council (the longest speech by far, over 21 minutes) and the Commission.

As pointed out by Vuorikoski (2004: 79), the strict limits on speaking time exert a crucial influence on the content of the speeches as well as the manner of their delivery: "speeches […] are written and recited at a fast rate […] this rule may also explain why the speeches tend to be extremely dense regarding their information content." A similar observation is made by Marzocchi (1998: 70), who also enumerates other detrimental consequences of oral delivery of written texts, such as unnatural prosody, reduced redundancy and complex syntax. Monti et al. (2005) estimate the average speaking rate in the plenary at about 150 words per minute. In their classification of speeches according to the delivery rate for the needs of the EPIC corpus, speeches up to 130 words per minute are considered slow, between 131 and 160 words

per minute – medium, and above 160 words per minute – fast. As the authors explain, these reference values do not apply in other contexts, as at an international conference organised in Italy, for instance, a speech delivered at 150 words per minute would be considered fast. The optimal speed of source text delivery for simultaneous interpreting was determined experimentally by Gerver (1969/2002) as lying within the range of 95–120 words per minute, which is generally confirmed by interpreters (cf. Pöchhacker 2004: 129–130). Therefore, it can be safely assumed that a great majority of EP plenary speeches is considerably faster than could be considered comfortable for interpreting. According to Marzocchi (1998: 70), the "ridiculously short" speaking times result in speeds that are sometimes so extreme that they force the interpreters to switch off their microphones. We have to remember, however, that the delivery rate is only one of the many factors that influence the difficulty of a source text – the one that is probably the easiest to measure and compare (as opposed, for example, to information density).

As an expert on multilingualism rather than on interpreting, van Els (2005: 274) assumes, very optimistically, that speakers generally take into account that their output is to be interpreted:

> experience suggests that people who are familiar with this situation [simultaneous interpreting] – because they are aware of the horrendously difficult task that confronts the translator – modify their linguistic usage, consciously or subconsciously, in order to oblige the translator. For example, they speak in short sentences, avoid metaphorical expressions and jokes, and tend towards less oblique forms of linguistic usage.

Quite to the contrary, Gebhard (2001), speaking from the perspective of a seasoned EP interpreter, calls the EP plenary "a nightmare of technically complex, politically sensitive speeches usually delivered at break-neck speed." Cosmidou (2013: 131), having comparable experience, enumerates issues such as reading from a prepared transcript which was not made available to the interpreters, using language-based jokes and citing fragments of literary works. A similar picture also emerges from the interviews with EP interpreters conducted by Kent (2009, more details in the next section). Enjoying the fresh perspective of a total outsider (as an American scholar), Kent (2009: 57) has the impression that communication among the participants of the sitting is far from being the primary goal of speakers: "Although described as 'debate,' the speeches given by Members during plenaries are mainly directed to consumption by home country audiences via the internet, television and radio rather than as engagement with colleagues who are in the same

room."[8] This view is partly shared by Loupaki (2008: 106), who notes that besides being addressed to those present in the room, "speeches are equally – and sometimes chiefly – aimed at potential voters." Marzocchi also notes lack of spontaneity and little interaction among speakers participating in the plenary, but he attributes these features primarily to the organisation of work at the EP, where real discussion takes place in other types of meetings that get scarce public exposure (cf. Footnote 8). The plenary, in turn, is "more like a review of each group's position than a forum where positions are taken, confronted or modified" (Marzocchi 1998: 70).

Interestingly, Wright (2007) suggests that behaviours of speakers in the multilingual environment of the EP fall into two very distinct patterns. On the basis of her interviews with MEPs as well as observations of their interventions during plenaries, she postulates the existence of two groups of speakers (although with no information as to the relative sizes of these groups). One group strives to consciously adjust their output to the needs of non-native listeners, presumably also interpreters, by using plain and clear language. The MEPs both declare it explicitly when interviewed and can be observed doing what they preach. The other group, in fact often evaluated as arrogant by representatives of the first group, comprises the "militantly monolingual" (Wright 2007: 154), mainly English and French native speakers, who make no such effort at all. This attitude results, in the case of English native speakers, in a number of problems, such as "too many metaphors, archaic idiom, colloquialisms, rambling syntactic structures, a failure to articulate clearly and a tendency to speak very fast" (p. 153). In the case of French native speakers, the main hindrance seems to be their fondness of quotations from French classics.

My research (Bartłomiejczyk forthcoming) confirms that too high speaking rate is a frequent problem, leading to interpreters notifying the chair of the meeting about this by means of a button they press to activate a warning light at the chair's pulpit (the light turns on if at least two interpreters press their buttons; they may be sharing the same booth). It is the chair's role, in turn, to admonish speakers against too fast delivery, which some chairs are more willing to do than others. Interestingly, the analysis also reveals that occasionally

[8] As opposed to the interaction in other meetings: "The intended audience distinguishes the kind of talk that occurs in Plenary from communicating in Committees and Groups where MEPs argue and negotiate with each other over legislation (Committees) and decide upon strategy according to their political party platform (Groups)" (Kent 2014: 164–165).

(especially during voting times), it is the chair who speaks too fast and is, consequently, admonished for this by other MEPs.

Another very serious problem for interpreters is the fact that many speakers choose, as their means of expression, a non-native language (typically English) in which they do not have the necessary proficiency.[9] This is deplored, among others, by the head of the EP's Directorate-General for Interpreting and Conferences, Olga Cosmidou (2013: 131): "their English is a kind of 'Globish,' not intelligible to other English speakers, either because of the MEP's accent, or because of the expressions used, which are directly translated from the speaker's mother tongue and do not correspond to a natural English way of speaking." Kent (2009: 63) quotes some expressions used by her interpreter interlocutors to describe, with much frustration, the non-native English that they have to handle: "this ridiculous Pidgin English," "what they think of as English," "broken English," "primitive English" (2009: 63).[10] By contrast, Wright (2007) observes that many MEPs, especially from the newer member states as well as from Germany, the Netherlands and Nordic countries, have a near-native command of English as a result of long stays abroad and/or pursuing their education in English. The frequent use of non-native English (albeit without any reference to its quality) is confirmed, for example, in the corpus analysed by Cucchi (2010: 95), where 62 plenary debates held in 2006

[9] The reasons for this, as established by Wright (2007) by means of her interviews with MEPs, are multifarious. Some wish to speak in a language that will possibly be understood without mediation by a large number of listeners, either because they do not trust the interpreters to render their message faithfully or they do not want to expose many listeners to the discomfort of wearing headphones. Some report their desire to avoid relay, resulting in the choice of a language that will be interpreted directly. Interpreters, on the other hand, suspect a less noble motivation: MEPs' willingness to show off their knowledge of foreign languages (Kent 2009).

[10] However, in her later work Kent points out that the situation greatly improved over the period of about four years after she had held her initial interviews with EP interpreters in 2005, and she heard only one "bad English speaker" over several months she spent in the EP in 2008–2009: "During the earlier research period, many Members spoke English nearly as incomprehensibly as this Member, but they had either been discouraged from using English as a Lingua Franca, or had improved their skill" (2014: 186). She also clearly states, on the basis of extensive observation as well as interviews with MEPs, that they tend to choose their mother tongue rather than any other language, especially during plenary sessions, for a number of reasons: to be able to speak in the language with the greatest possible ease of expression, to give the media at home an opportunity to quote them in the original, and to demonstrate their national identity: "Language choices in the Plenary [...] are almost completely restricted by social and political pressure to speak one's national language" (2014: 269).

account for the subcorpora of 543,301 and 405,344 words in native and non-native English, respectively. Native English proved to be still prevailing, but non-native English might well be much more frequent than some other languages in their native varieties – in the same corpus, native Italian accounts for 170,300 words only.

As for all these problems caused by the speakers, efforts are made to limit them, for instance, by distributing leaflets to MEPs on how to successfully communicate through interpretation. The content of the leaflet is revealed in the following plenary contribution of Vice-President Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, delivered on 25 March 2009. Ironically, the fact that he is quoting the leaflet at the very end of the parliamentary term tells us that probably many MEPs, although already having much exposure to interpreter-mediated communication, do not heed the advice.

> Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, before giving the floor to the various speakers for this debate, I am going to allow myself – being, as I am, responsible for multilingual issues in Parliament's Bureau – to read you some advice from a leaflet prepared for new MEPs on how to speak so that the interpreting can be correctly done, and so that this miracle, without compare or precedent in any other institution, can continue to operate daily. These are not the tablets that Moses brought down from the mountain, but this is what it says: 'Speak at a regular speed, and not too fast. Speak in your mother tongue, if this is possible. Avoid changing language when you speak. Speaking is better than reading, but if there is no alternative to reading, make sure that the interpreters have the text. Clearly give references to documents. Articulate clearly any figure that is mentioned. Explain abbreviations that you use in what you say. Remember that jokes are difficult to translate, and talk to the interpreters. Also, when you are chairing a meeting, wait a moment before giving the floor to the next speaker so that the interpreters can finish the speech and change to the appropriate channel.' Thank you very much for your interpreting, and I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the interpreters, who make our work possible through their own, which is so complicated and so effective.

Furthermore, DG INTE has launched an awareness-raising campaign for chairpersons and speakers on the EP's intranet, with topics such as "How to make speeches in plenary available to interpreters" or "Advice on how to speak at a meeting with interpretation" (Duflou 2014: 107). The effectiveness of such measures, however, obviously depends on the willingness of the addressees first to read the information and then to apply it in practice.

On the other hand, it might be helpful to interpreters that most EP speeches are, to a large extent, predictable and therefore carry a big potential for anticipation and inference (which, as argued by Chernov 2004, are crucial mechanisms making simultaneous interpreting possible in the first place). This predictability manifests itself in several ways. First of all, the speeches belong to the argumentative genre and follow its conventions. Beaton (2007: 104) calls the formal structure of interventions "highly ritualised" and notes that it usually conforms to the rhetorical norms of parliamentary discourse. Vuorikoski (2004: 121) describes it as follows:

> A survey of the material shows that the EP genre reflects the traditional conventions of composing speeches. They consist of an introduction, the main body of argumentation indicating the speaker's stance, and the concluding remarks. Arguments are often presented utilizing identifiable rhetoric devices. They are based on values and beliefs that are shared by the audience. Throughout their argumentation, and particularly at the end of it, speakers perform identifiable speech acts.

One of the norms that are typically followed seems to be overall politeness, which is manifest, for example, in elaborate forms of deference to the previous speaker even though his/her views are heavily criticised (Beaton 2007: 104–105).[11] Calzada Pérez (2001: 224) evaluates this particular aspect as follows: "Debates in the EP constitute a relatively conciliatory and analytical genre, where divergence may be voiced but always in as moderate, polite and dispassionate manner as possible." In contrast to this general courteous tone, an occasional "outrageous expression" will, according to Marzocchi (1998: 66–67), often cause embarrassment in interpreters and be a likely candidate to become

[11] Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament specify that "Members' conduct shall be characterised by mutual respect, be based on the values and principles laid down in the basic texts on which the European Union is founded, respect the dignity of Parliament and not compromise the smooth conduct of parliamentary business or disturb the peace and quiet of any of Parliament's premises" (11.2). In addition, they seem to favour indirectness ("Members shall speak from their places and shall address the President," 162.2) and demand that contributions do not stray from the topic of the debate ("If speakers depart from the subject, the President shall call them to order," 162.2). My brief survey of relevant EP documents shows that this is probably the closest the EP gets to imposing the verbal behaviour expected from MEPs during debates, although language as such is not explicitly mentioned. The Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament, for instance, is not concerned with such matters at all (but rather with financial transparency, possible conflicts of interest, etc.).

"instinctively 'toned down,' at least on its first occurrence." Marzocchi advances two hypotheses to explain this phenomenon: interpreters are either guided by deeply rooted conventions that proscribe the use of certain expressions in parliamentary discourse, or they assume responsibility for the successful outcome of the communication they mediate. Either way, he notes, toning down original utterances goes against "the deontological commonplace concerning the 'invisible' interpreter" (p. 67).

Secondly, the EP discourse is characterised by a large degree of repetitiveness, which concerns certain phrases that might well be described as clichés as well as keywords. One of such keywords is, for example, *solidarity*, which collocates with the adjectives *European* and *multinational* (see Beaton 2007: 111–112). This is conducive to experienced interpreters building up a large repertoire of ready-made translation solutions, which may be worked out individually or copied from boothmates. Comparing experimentally obtained outputs of ten Danish interpreters regularly working for the European Commission and the European Council, Henriksen (2007) notes numerous examples of "formulaic language production": certain high-frequency phrases characteristic of EU discourse tend to be rendered in the same manner by many of the participants; moreover, individuals often rely on one and the same formula when transferring different (although close in meaning) source-text phrases. However, among the participants of the experiment (involving interpreting one EU-related text from English and one from German), there is also a distinct group of interpreters who seem to resist using such formulas, displaying a preference for more idiosyncratic solutions. Henriksen concludes that "[d]espite such individual inclinations, a closed system of linguistic uniformity is created and reinforced" that partly depends on the abundance of formulas in source texts and partly on "incessant linguistic and formulaic exchanges among colleagues" (p. 15) working together in the same booth.

Another factor that increases the predictability of the speeches is their intertextuality (see, e.g., Beaton 2007: 109–110). Overall, as noted by Duflou (2014: 104), "strong intertextual relations exist among the various forms of discourse used in these meetings [EU meetings in general]: speakers refer to a common body of EU legal texts and shared knowledge about the nature and history of the EU as a joint project." Interpreters are supposed to possess this shared knowledge, which is one of the elements required to pass the accreditation tests. In particular, as pointed out by Vuorikoski (2004: 80), the plenary debates are generally based on written documents, that is, draft legislation

available to interpreters beforehand.[12] Consequently, the interpreters scheduled to work during a particular debate are able to prepare accordingly on the basis of documents (which they definitely should not neglect, as consistency in terminology and usage with the written target language version will be expected by listeners; cf. Marzocchi 1998: 68). The interpreters have even a greater advantage if they also interpreted previously for the committees preparing the documents that are later discussed in plenary (Vuorikoski 2004: 80). However, it may sometimes happen that for some reason the interpreters fail to have received the documents or receive them so late that it is practically impossible to read them before the debate begins, which, naturally, is a considerable hurdle.[13]

Although the number of potential speakers is quite large, the pool of them does not change so often (the parliamentary term lasts for five years), and it is only to be expected that in the course of their work, interpreters do get to interpret the same speakers over and over again. This may play a significant role in preparing oneself mentally for what may come and considering possible interpreting strategies beforehand: "[M]any seasoned EU interpreters have at their disposal what one could call a mental database containing salient speech characteristics of speakers they have interpreted or heard before: accent, speed, register, articulation, degree of difficulty for the interpreter, etc." (Duflou 2014: 166). Certainly, this "mental database" can also enable some informed guesses about the content of the speech, as the interpreter may already know something about the speaker's default position on certain issues or his/her areas of interest.

Last but not least, most Members belong to one of the existing political groups and this very fact, additionally indicated by the place where they sit in the hemicycle, may give an important clue as to the opinions that they are going to voice and even, as noted by Marzocchi (1998: 66), as to the expected level of formality. However, as rightly noted by Beaton (2007: 105–108), MEPs' identity is inherently hybrid and in view of the weakness of the existing whipping system in the European Parliament, they might as well give priority to national or regional interests over the interests of their own political group. Marzocchi (1998: 65), too, points out that the political groups are not

[12] Nowadays, access to such documents necessary to prepare for a meeting is provided to interpreters through DG INTE intranet tools (Duflou 2014: 105).

[13] Duflou (2012: 154) describes the situation in which one of the Dutch interpreters indignantly informed the listeners that the discussed documents had not been provided to the interpreters, while her boothmate believed that this behaviour was unacceptable.

entirely homogenous as to the political stance of individual MEPs who belong to them. Outside the field of translation studies, this claim is confirmed, for instance, by Kreppel (2001: 187), who points to the role of national delegations within the political groups: "The common assumption that the development of the supranational party groups effectively surmounted petty nationalism is perhaps too optimistic."

Overall, we can see that the EP plenary discourse possesses some characteristics (many of them unique to this particular setting) that can exert crucial influence, both negative and positive, on simultaneous interpreting.

2.3 Research on EU interpreters

Before I turn to empirical research on interpretations delivered in the European Parliament, I would like to devote some attention to a research subfield in which the EU interpreters themselves are subjected to scrutiny. This kind of research used to be considerably less popular at the moment I was starting out with this book, but many new studies have appeared recently, including very informative doctoral theses defended in 2014 (Kent 2014 and Duflou 2014) and also my own article (Bartłomiejczyk forthcoming), which was initially intended as a part of this volume but strayed too far away from the main topic. Consequently, this section has expanded from a mere few paragraphs to the large size it has now. Most of the studies have already been referred to in previous sections, but they will now be discussed in a more systematic manner.

Kent (2009) and the two above-mentioned doctoral studies, by Kent (2014) and by Duflou (2014), bear some similarity to the excellent book by Koskinen (2008), discussed in the previous chapter in the context of EU translation, and assume an ethnographic position to look at interpreters rather than at the texts they produce (although Koskinen, in fact, scrutinises both the translators and their output). Despite the fact that the numbers of participating interpreters represent only a small proportion of the ones actually working for the EP, their views sampled by the researchers could well be quite representative.

One year after the big enlargement of 2004, Kent interviewed EP interpreters for each working language (a total of 65) about their perceptions of the communication in this specific institutional setting, and about the problems and challenges they encountered in their work.

The obtained material is investigated within the paradigm of critical discourse analysis. The overall picture the author paints is decisively grim, described in the article's very title as "a discourse of danger and loss," while the positive views expressed by the participants are derogatively called "promotional rhetoric" and summarised in the brief statement: "Much of the EP interpreters' discourse mirrors the European Union's public rhetoric about democracy and equality" (Kent 2009: 62). Apparently, the author also expected her respondents to somehow defend the very existence of the EP interpreting services and was not convinced that the "merely symbolic" value of their input justified the high costs: "conference interpreters […] have failed to generate proactive arguments as to the immediate or long-term value of simultaneous interpretation" (p. 62). The interviewer's attitude seems biased and it is difficult to evaluate what influence it might have on the interviews.

The main concern voiced by the interpreters and reported in the article is that speakers choose to speak English as a lingua franca rather than their native language, which has very detrimental consequences for interpreting. In particular, due to his/her poor knowledge of the language, the speaker's real intentions may not be clear to the interpreter, which is the "danger" referred to in the article's title, resulting in a loss of meaning. Therefore, through their unfortunate language choice, the speakers may effectively reduce their communicative efficiency. Another (but less acute) problem is fast reading of written speeches.

In her doctoral dissertation of 2014, Kent adds new dimensions to her previous research, and offers a more balanced perspective on the analysed interviews with interpreters, explaining the reported problems and frustrations by the immense change in the interpreters' routine caused by the huge enlargement of 2004: "Their discourse is an important summary of the growing pains of the EP's language regime" (Kent 2014: 182). The new and very valuable input of this dissertation includes a qualitative analysis of data from interviews with 55 MEPs and some EP staff on the multilingual functioning of the Parliament as well as data from field observations, conducted first and foremost outside the plenary, as the author considers other meetings to be where any negotiations and decisions actually take place, involving real communication among the interlocutors rather than performance for the show. Kent undoubtedly made the most of her extended stays at the EP as a Fulbright scholar, and although her dissertation may appear rather lengthy and at times repetitive or digressing from the main topic, it offers an unprecedented insight into the opinions of the participants of interaction in the EP in their various capacities. It can

also serve as an invaluable fount of relatively up-to-date information about the practical functioning of the EP's interpreting services, and has therefore been referred to copiously for the needs of this and the previous chapter. What is truly unique about Kent's research is that she is very actively trying to give some feedback to the scrutinised institution itself, offering all MEPs (through the Parliament's Bureau) a succinct research report including a number of recommendations on how to make a better use of simultaneous interpretation both as a speaker and as a listener.

It seems as if there is no homogeneous picture emerging from the diverse reflections MEPs, their assistants and other EP staff shared with the researcher; however, she attempts to draw some general conclusions: "the main finding from Members' talk about SI […] is their dual sense of *risk* and *loss* regarding communication in the EP" (Kent 2014: 461; original emphasis). The themes of complaint and blame, related to both interpreter errors (many of which are perceived due to judging interpretation according to the standards of written translation) and the loss of time inherent in the interpreting system, resurface over and over again in the MEPs' discourse on interpreting.[14] MEPs often fear losing control over the content of their contributions and thus resort to the use of a non-native language of wider diffusion (predominantly English) in order to reach a possibly wide audience without an intermediary: "MEPs' desire to control meaning, combined with a general distrust of simultaneous interpretation, leads to language use choices that are *monolingual in character*" (p. 462; original emphasis). At the same time, many MEPs realise very well that their power of expression is, to some extent, compromised when they choose to speak in a language different than their mother tongue. For instance, their rhetorical skills may suffer or, when the discussion is very technical, they may lack the specific vocabulary in the foreign language.

Some highly interesting findings emerge from Kent's observation of meetings. For example, she notes that mother tongue use tends to increase once the discussion gets more heated or the topic is especially

[14] It would seem that this loss of time is insignificant, especially if we compare simultaneous with consecutive interpreting. However, the interviewed MEPs describe some situations when it becomes tangible. Especially worrying are the complaints about problems related to voting; when many items are voted on one after another, MEPs who have to wait for interpretation to press the correct button are often confused. Inevitable delay also tends to get noticed when the speaker tells a joke and "waves of laughter" result: the first to laugh are those who listen to the original speech, the second – those who listen to direct interpretation, and the last – those who listen to relay interpretation.

controversial (such as sexual education). Another striking issue is the existing "social pressure to avoid the headphones and […] to minimize reliance on interpretation" (Kent 2014: 289), to the point that MEPs often refrain from putting on the headphones to listen to a colleague who is talking in an "exotic" language although obviously they do not understand the speech in the original, therefore showing lack of interest. This might partly explain why some MEPs choose to speak in a non-native language even though they do not feel comfortable doing so.

Duflou (2014) is another doctoral dissertation with an ethnographic approach drawing on interview and observational data, with the important difference that the researcher is an insider (a freelance EU interpreter in the Dutch Language Unit) and therefore has a distinct vantage point (unlike in the case of Kent 2014, we deal with both observation and participation here, combined in what the author repeatedly refers to as "observant participation"). The material for the study was systematically collected over a period of four years. The work focuses on conference interpreting as "a team activity, rather than a cognitive task performed individually" (Duflou 2014: 215), and in particular on the specific competence and skills the EU interpreters have to develop (beyond passing accreditation tests) to be able to work successfully for the EU institutions. What is taken into consideration is the social and institutional context shaping an EU interpreter's work rather than the results of this work as such: there is no analysis of interpreting output, although the interviewees sometimes refer to very specific problems pertaining to the source text rendition that they have encountered. Due to the author's in-depth practical knowledge of EU interpreters' work, also this thesis (along with Kent 2014) has contributed much of the information for the two introductory chapters of my book, as reflected in numerous references – in fact, the two theses can be seen as complementary to each other, presenting an outsider's and an insider's view on the same interpreting system. Interestingly, each of them considers different aspects to be worth of attention and zooms in on different issues.

The most detailed part of the dissertation is devoted to teamwork in the booth or, more specifically, to workload distribution among the so-called boothmates (i.e., two to four interpreters sharing the same booth), which is analysed on the basis of the teams providing interpretation into Dutch during seven different EU meetings. Who interprets what is a complex question, considering the large number of languages spoken in the meetings as well as the fact that the language combinations of the interpreters working in the same booth partly overlap. The assignment of texts to be handled by individual

interpreters is governed by the desire to distribute the workload fairly as well as the cardinal rule to avoid relay as long as the source language spoken on the floor is covered in the language combination of any of the interpreters present. Other (although less strict) rules also play a role, that is, the preference for working in half-hour turns which ideally end at round times (a full hour and a half past or a quarter past and a quarter to a full hour), the reluctance to change the interpreter during an intervention, the tendencies to let the most experienced member of the team handle the beginning of the meeting as well as to have one interpreter rendering all contributions of the chairperson. The negotiations about allocating turns are rarely conducted before the meeting commences, and therefore they must largely rely on non-verbal communication. In spite of all these intricacies, the analysis shows that in most of the cases the interpreters managed to achieve a roughly even distribution of on-mic time among themselves, and any failures to do so resulted from uneven distribution of the languages spoken in the meeting (i.e., a language mastered by only one of the interpreters was used predominantly).

There are also other intriguing insights on EU interpreters' teamwork in the thesis, not related to workload distribution. For instance, it reveals the major role of "eavesdropping in the booth" (Duflou 2014: 176), that is, the mostly overlooked fact that interpreters do not only perform for their clients, but also for their boothmates. The interviews show that interpreters often resort to solutions (both ready-made translations of individual phrases and interpreting strategies applicable to certain types of problems) that they acquire from their colleagues, which applies especially to novice interpreters teamed up with more experienced ones. As the author points out, this significantly contributes to the final shape of the target texts by giving rise to "a joint repertoire of 'set' translations, 'appropriate' approaches, do's and don'ts" (Duflou 2014: 181). Moreover, some interviewees, in particular novice EU interpreters, admit that they use elegant phrases and colourful idioms their colleagues are likely to appreciate although personally they believe that the clients are going to be puzzled or distracted from the message by such expressions. Also very interesting are the deliberations on giving and receiving help to and from boothmates, a highly sensitive issue, unavoidably reflecting the power relations between the interpreters involved.

As a whole, Duflou's thesis (2014: 304) shows very vividly "the many ways in which the competence required from professional interpreters in an EU context goes beyond individual linguistic and general knowledge and cognitive processing and text production skills" that are acquired by students within the interpreting programmes they graduate from and

checked during the accreditation tests they undergo to become eligible for employment as EU interpreters. All the complex situated skills, such as turn management in the booth, can only be fully mastered on the job. However, the author suggests a few ways in which interpreter trainers can facilitate their students' transition from interpreter training to real EU assignments, such as observation of authentic EU meetings aimed at making the students acquainted both with the typical procedures and the terminology, or providing possibly many opportunities to interpret in a team with a variety of boothmates.

In comparison with the two doctoral theses described above, Van Dam and Zethsen (2013) and Bartłomiejczyk (forthcoming) have a modest scope and use different types of data. The former article analyses the data obtained by means of an on-line survey from Danish EU staff interpreters and translators (23 and 63 participants respectively) employed by the EP and the European Commission. The authors investigate the self-perceived occupational status of the participants measured through questions reflecting five parameters: remuneration, education/expertise, visibility/fame, power/influence and, finally, importance/value to society. The bulk of the questions was closed, asking the participants to mark, on a five-point scale, the degree to which certain points applied to their work. For example, in the part devoted to visibility, one of the questions was formulated as: "How many of the people that you interpret [translate] for know who you are?," with the possible answers: "nobody" (1), "a few" (2), "some" (3), "most" (4) and "all" (5). Interestingly, the respondents were also asked about their perceptions of the outsiders' views on the interpreters'/translators' professional status, for example, the expertise the interpreters themselves consider necessary for their work (mean rating of 4.43) and the expertise others ascribe to them (mean rating of 3.91). In the last, open-ended question, the participants could freely comment on the topic of the survey.

Due to the widely recognised "glamorous" nature of conference interpreting, coupled with the highly prestigious, international work environment, the authors expected the EU interpreters to see themselves as "the stars of the translation profession" (Van Dam and Zethsen 2013: 229) and stand somewhere at the very top of the occupational status continuum. This hypothesis was disproved, as the mean general rating of their own occupational status given by the interpreters was only 3.39, that is, only slightly above the medium value of 3 on the 5-point scale (although still higher than the translators,' with the mean rating of 2.56). The parameter with which the interpreters (and, similarly, the translators) reported to be the most satisfied (mean rating of 4.65

for the interpreters) is their salary, which, for both groups, amounted to EUR 9,300–9,900 monthly, about twice as much as comparable professionals working on the Danish market can expect to earn.[15] This relation to the possible salary on the domestic market would certainly be even more advantageous for EU interpreters and translators coming from countries with lower average income rates, such as many of the newer member states, including Poland. As for visibility, for example, the interpreters generally felt they were "close to the centre of decision- or policy-making" (pp. 246–247), but, in spite of that, not particularly visible to others (3.00 on the 5-point scale, as compared to only slightly lower, 2.70, self-assessment of the translators in responses to this question) and only moderately appreciated by their clients (3.22 as compared to 3.02 for the translators). Influence their work exerts was rated even lower than visibility by both the interpreters and the translators: 1.91 and 2.06, respectively.

Although the interpreters felt that their work was quite important (3.70 as compared with 3.94 for the translators), in the additional comments one of them complained that the feeling of importance was diminished if the listeners were evidently not actively participating in the debate, but, for example, reading a newspaper instead. The authors add that in some conversations with Danish EU interpreters, another, similar issue emerged: many Danish MEPs do not make any use of the interpreting services provided by them and choose English instead, which makes the Danish interpreters feel useless. Whereas the former problem (apparent lack of interest in the proceedings) might spread across all language sections, the latter might be less acute for interpreters catering for the needs of MEPs from countries where the knowledge of English is less widespread than in Scandinavia.

Although, as already mentioned, Kent's studies (2009; 2014) seem to excessively focus on the negative aspects discussed by her interviewees while ignoring the positive ones, and Van Dam and Zethsen's study (2013) may have its limitations due to the research method itself (quantitative analysis of questionnaires supplemented with only a few additional, spontaneous comments from the respondents), both may shed some light on the attitudes of EU interpreters to their work. Namely, they suggest that their level of job satisfaction may not be as high as could be expected on the basis of factors such as ample remuneration, predictable and regulated work conditions and relative

[15] As regards the pecuniary aspect, Duflou (2014: 88) points out that "they [interpreters] are the only staff to be remunerated as grade 'A' officials who do not perform managerial and/or policy development tasks."

prestige among translation professionals – Kent (2014: 40) rightly calls interpreting for the EP "a pinnacle of professional achievement." It seems that mainly the attitude of the clients, that is, MEPs and other EU officials, is to blame for this. Much frustration is caused by the rise of English as an international language, which results in non-native speakers choosing inadequate English as their means of expression, and listeners preferring to figure out the meaning of English speeches by themselves instead of using the interpretation into their mother tongue.

Bartłomiejczyk (forthcoming) focuses on the interpreter's visibility and uses as its data all the contributions delivered in the plenary in the years 2005–2012, that is, over a period of eight years, as made available in the English version of the verbatim reports. Certainly, it would be impossible to analyse such an amount of data manually, so the search option offered by the database came in very useful. The aim was to find and examine all (or as many as possible) references to interpreters and/or their output made by the speakers – assuming that they would be rare, a large corpus of speeches was indispensable. The database was searched for occurrences of the words *interpreter*, *interpretation*, *translator* and *translators*, which rendered a manageable amount of material to be further scrutinised so as to determine which of the occurrences actually referred to the EP interpreters and their work at a particular sitting. This enabled me to identify 230 relevant units, some of them quite short, and some long and delivered by several subsequent speakers. Compared to the number of working days with full- or half-day plenary sessions during the whole period under analysis (483), this may lead to the broad generalisation that the interpreters evidently come to the speakers' attention roughly every other day.

Applying thematic analysis, the units were divided, according to their content, into several categories: Reminder, Criticism, Appreciation, Difficulty, Apology, Doubt and Miscellaneous (with some of the units falling into more than one category). Rather optimistically, and in contrast to what might be expected on the basis of previously discussed research, the positive category of Appreciation turned out to be the most frequent and outnumbered, with 70 occurrences, the two negative categories of Criticism (22) and Doubt (45), even if added together. In other words, the interpreters were thanked and praised more frequently than blamed for errors or mistrusted.

Also Reminder, with 43 occurrences, counted among the most numerous items. As reminders are produced, mostly by the President chairing the meeting, to rebuke speakers for excessive speed of delivery or otherwise failing to take into consideration that they are being

interpreted, they testify to the truth of the frequent complaint that the input for interpreting in plenary sessions is at times too fast (see, e.g., Cosmidou 2013; Kent 2009, already mentioned in Section 2.2 above). It is worrying that occasionally speakers openly refuse to take heed, declaring that they have a right to speak as quickly as they wish to or that they do not see any necessity for interpretation, as the source language, English, should be understood by everybody in the chamber.

Apart from the quantitative analysis, each of the categories is also analysed qualitatively, with numerous examples and some interesting conclusions. For example, it is noted that doubt in the faithfulness of the interpretation is sometimes expressed for rhetorical reasons rather than genuine, that is, in order to formulate a hedge somewhat similar to *if I understood you correctly* in unmediated discourse. In fact, in many cases it is hardly possible to determine if we deal with an expression of real doubt or just a hedge. Another intriguing category is Difficulty, which covers cases when speakers realise that some elements of their speech (such as a literary quotation, a linguistic joke, a colorful idiom) will cause translation problems, but they decide to use them nevertheless, in some way signalling that the relevant fragment may fall flat in the interpretation (which is often accompanied with an apology addressed at interpreters). As it comes to Apology as such, it is striking that speakers occasionally apologise to the interpreters for something that should actually facilitate interpretation rather than be a hurdle, that is, using their mother tongue instead of a lingua franca, or speaking ad lib, which points to these speakers' unawareness of the real requirements of interpreting.

2.4 Observational research on interpretations from the EP

In 1998, Shlesinger (1998: 2) made a case for corpus-based interpreting studies stating that "ideally, the notion of comparable corpora in interpreting should be extended to cover setting up three separate collections of texts in the same language: interpreted texts, original oral discourses delivered in similar settings, and written translations of such texts." Having such collections would allow, in her view, to single out some characteristics of interpretations as opposed to original speeches in the target language and as opposed to translations. Undoubtedly, the European Parliament lives up to Shlesinger's ideal as a setting in which the desired material could now easily be obtained.

The merits of interpretations delivered in the European Parliament as data for interpreting research were acknowledged by scholars long before their recordings became so easily obtainable. Marzocchi, a freelance EU interpreter himself, was probably the first to try to draw the attention of the interpreting research community to this setting in his 1998 article, describing the institutional characteristics of interaction at the EP which might well have bearing for interpreting and enumerating possible research directions, for instance investigating how culture-specific items are transferred in such a multicultural environment. Monti et al. (2005) describe the creation of the electronic corpus EPIC (with speeches and interpretations in English, Spanish and Italian) by their research group based at the University of Bologna at Forli. At the time, speeches and their interpretations were only broadcast live by the TV channel EbS, so in order to record originals as well as two interpretations at the same time, three video recorders were necessary. The analog recordings were subsequently digitalised and transcribed according to a set of conventions enabling comparison of source and target texts and carrying out searches according to many parameters. The corpus, created with the view of studying directionality, is still available online (at http://dev.sslmit.unibo.it/corpora/corporaproject.php?path=E.P.I.C.), but its state suggests the project of the website was abandoned at an initial stage. It comprises material (about 18 hours) from one session of the European Parliament held in February 2004, with information that four other sessions would be added later on. In fact, the corpus has been substantially developed since the creation of the website (personal communication from Claudio Bendazzoli), but large portions of material added to it later on are not available on-line.

Apart from a number of in-depth methodological studies concerning the issues involved in the creation of an electronic corpus (among which Monti et al. 2005 is probably the most comprehensive), EPIC has also generated a few articles reporting on empirical research, for example, Russo et al. (2006), Russo (2010), Bendazzoli et al. (2011). In Russo et al. (2006), interpretations into Spanish are compared with speeches originally delivered in Spanish in terms of lexical density (the ratio of content words to grammatical words) and lexical variety (the proportion of high frequency words versus low frequency words). The analysed subcorpora of EPIC comprise 21 speeches in Spanish, 81 interpretations from English into Spanish and 17 interpretations from Italian into Spanish. Contrary to the authors' expectations based on previous research on written translation, lexical density turned out to be slightly higher (by about 0.5%) for interpretations than for originals. The source language from which the interpretations were done did

not seem to play any role for lexical density, as the results were very similar for interpretations from English and from Italian. However, the expectations as for lexical variety were confirmed: interpretations into Spanish featured a higher percentage of high frequency words than speeches originally delivered in Spanish. In this case, a language-pair effect was observed, as interpretations from English (therefore, from a non-cognate language) were characterised by a much higher lexical variety than interpretations from Italian. Given the unexpected results concerning lexical density, interpretations into Spanish were also compared with their source texts, which revealed that the interpretations featured considerably lower lexical density (nearly 3% difference for English source texts and nearly 5% difference for Italian source texts). The authors admit that the sub-corpus of Spanish source texts might exhibit lower representativeness due to the fact that it contains one exceptionally long speech by a single guest speaker, which, in terms of duration, accounts for about one-fourth of this whole sub-corpus.

The study described in Bendazzoli et al. (2011) focuses on two types of disfluencies: mispronounced and unfinished words, as produced by original speakers and by interpreters in the whole EPIC transcribed at the time (119 original speeches and 238 interpretations). The starting hypothesis was that, due to the constraints of simultaneous interpreting, the number of disfluencies would be higher in interpreters' outputs and, secondly, that these disfluencies would remain uncorrected more often than in the case of speakers. The analysis revealed that, indeed, both types of disfluencies under study were considerably more frequent in interpretations than in original speeches made in the same language (for each of the three languages and irrespective of the source language). However, the comparison of interpretations with their source texts showed that, while the general trend was the same as described above, interpretations into English featured a lower number of mispronounced words than their source texts in Spanish and Italian, and interpretations into Spanish and Italian featured a lower number of unfinished words than their source texts in English. The authors hypothesise that this might be due to language-pair specific factors when interpreting between non-cognate languages (less interference). The second starting hypothesis was confirmed. Mispronounced words were generally not corrected and truncated words were generally completed, but the former trend was more visible for interpreters than for original speakers, whereas the latter – for original speakers more than for interpreters.

Spinolo and Garwood (2010) use EPIC to investigate how interpreters deal with metaphors. They consider three types of metaphors from

about 297 minutes of English, 59 minutes of Spanish and 93 minutes of Italian source texts and the corresponding interpretations into the other two languages. All in all, the corpus revealed 146 metaphorical concepts, 58 catachreses/idioms and 14 live (creative) metaphors. The interpreted versions were classified as substitutions with another metaphor, non-metaphorical paraphrases, literal translations and omissions. Catachreses and idioms in the corpus tend to be paraphrased, whereas live metaphors (although infrequent) tend to be translated literally. Metaphorical concepts, for instance phrases emerging from the concept of the EU as a building (e.g., *a stable framework in place for the next Parliament and Commission to build upon*), show no consistent pattern. Although some typical metaphors, such as *red tape*, were rendered very fluently, according to the authors, all types of metaphors seem to cause frequent problems to interpreters, which are manifest in filled and unfilled pauses as well as false starts. Interestingly, on some occasions, apart from using another strategy, interpreters resorted to addition of hedges (expressions such as *so to say* or *sort of*) mitigating the validity of translations with which they were apparently not entirely happy. The authors hypothesise that, although many metaphors in the corpus are easily understandable and would be unproblematic to render by means of a paraphrase, interpreters are generally not willing to "kill" a metaphor and they struggle to "find a solution that is as powerful in the TL as in the ST in order to respect the speaker's communicative intentions and achieve the same perlocutionary effect" (p. 208). The said perlocutionary effect on the addressee may include reactions such as amusement, sadness or anger, which are impossible to trigger with non-metaphorical language.

Russo (2010) reports on graduation theses based on EPIC that were defended at Forli. Apart from studies focusing on interpreting proper nouns and on additions, she discusses two theses that deal with pragmatics of interpreting and are therefore especially interesting in the context of the present research. Unfortunately, due to my lack of knowledge of Italian, I was not able to read them and have to rely only on what is reported by Russo.

Frabetti (2005) investigates mitigation on the basis of 24 English speeches (total length 91 minutes) interpreted into Italian. Mitigation is understood as "an expression of the affective presence of the speaker, indicating his/her degree of emotive participation in the exchange and towards the interlocutor" (Russo 2010: 44), which allows the speaker to protect both his/her own face and that of the addressee. The thesis focuses on mitigation not present in the source text, but added by the interpreter. The analysis revealed a few types of mitigation

phenomena. Prominent among them was the addition of hedges, and the most frequent one was *diciamo* 'let's say,' which creates "emotive distance between the speaker and his/her own utterances" (p. 44). The interpreters also manipulated personal pronouns and possessive pronouns to make a face-threatening act present in the source text less direct; for example, by replacing a pronoun (*your appointment of Mr X*) by a passive form (*X was appointed*), an outright personal accusation was removed. Mitigation often resulted in omission of criticism and impoliteness and is seen as the interpreter's active involvement aimed at protecting the face of both the addressee and the interpreter. However, this raises some doubts as to the interpreter's role, as his/her behaviour "may affect the emotional relationship" (Russo 2010: 45) between speakers and addressees.

Ravanelli (2006) examines verbal interpersonal features in original speeches and their interpretations. He adopts the conversationalist approach and analyses, in much detail, 14 English speeches (45 minutes) and the corresponding Italian target texts. Numerous features were taken into consideration, including direct appeal to the addressee, modulation (strengthening and mitigation) of the illocutionary force, digressions and parenthetical remarks as well as additional interpersonal features introduced by interpreters. As for the illocutionary force, the study revealed that the interpreters introduced both downtoners and boosters of several different categories. Lexical downtowners and boosters were classified as speaker-oriented (affirmative adverbs like *truly* or *honestly*, verbal phrases like *I believe*, *I guess* or *I suppose*), hearer-oriented (e.g., *as you know*, *if you like*) and content-oriented (e.g., *absolutely*, *totally*). Other types of detected modulations include prosodic features (emphasis, volume), syntactic transformations (rhetorical questions, question tags, impersonal forms) and discourse markers (e.g., *as you say*, *by the way*). According to Ravanelli, interpreters often enhance the interpersonal dimension of communication by changing the modality of texts, especially by stressing or weakening the speaker's commitment to his/her utterances. He also points out to instances of facework carried out by interpreters.

Certainly, EPIC is not the only corpus of speeches and interpretations from the European Parliament that has been used for observational research, although the transcription and tagging of other corpora is normally not as comprehensive. This results from the fact that individual researchers who compile such corpora pay attention only to those spoken language features that are relevant to their own project, whereas EPIC was intended to be more universal and, moreover, machine-readable.

Relatively large interpreting corpora from the European Parliament, compiled (and presumably also transcribed) by the authors themselves, lie at the foundation of a few interesting doctoral theses: Vuorikoski (2004), Beaton (2007), Kajzer-Wietrzny (2012) and Cappelli (2014).[16]

As a European Parliament interpreter herself for some time before undertaking scientific research into interpreting, Vuorikoski writes her thesis (2004) from the perspective of an insider, which is reflected by a detailed chapter on the practical functioning of the Parliament as a whole and its interpreting services in particular.[17] The corpus under analysis comprises 120 speeches recorded in 1996 plus their interpretations into three languages, the source and target languages being English, German, Finnish and Swedish. Under the assumption that "interpreters strive for maximum correspondence with the original speech, including maximum accuracy and faithfulness" (p. 90), the main aim of this comparative study was to explore the nature of non-correspondences between the source and target texts (omissions and semantic deviations). The author was especially interested in the question to what extent these non-correspondences hindered understanding and prevented listeners from getting the same message as those listening to the original.

Rhetorical analysis of the original speech preceded its comparison with the three interpretations. Source text fragments at which at least two interpretations deviated from the original were treated as problematic. The analysis revealed that the manner of source text presentation exerted considerable influence on the production of the corresponding target texts, with fast speech rate, syntax typical of written texts, high information density and figurative language as some of the main sources of problems. Consequently, Vuorikoski calls for greater co-operation with interpreters on the part of speakers. On the other hand, she also identifies interpreters' inadequate experience in working for the European Parliament as an important hindrance. The main shortcoming of Vuorikoski's thesis seems to be lack of any quantitative analysis to show the actual error rate, which might shed more light on interpreting quality than mere discussion of individual examples of non-correspondences. However, the study should definitely

[16] The sizes of the corpora are often difficult to compare, as various authors refer to the number of speeches, the number of words or the duration of the recordings, as the case may be.

[17] Especially the latter has changed considerably since then due to the rapid rise in the number of working languages in 2004. This is why predominantly other, more recent sources, such as Kent (2014) or Duflou (2014), were consulted when describing some practical aspects of EU interpreting in this book.

be given due credit as the first comprehensive analysis of interpreting in this setting, based on a large and undoubtedly representative, carefully compiled corpus.

Beaton (2007) analyses German speeches and their interpretations into English from three debates recorded in 2001, the total length of the source and target texts amounting to 74 minutes each. As the thesis focuses on the influence of interpreting on ideology, debates on topical political issues at the time (Middle East, EU eastern enlargement and combating terrorism) were selected for inclusion in the corpus. "EP institutional hegemony," defined as "a (temporarily stable) overreaching dominant ideology in the EP […], representative of a (temporary) hegemonic alliance," and "interpreter axiology," defined as "a system of subjective ethics and evaluation of the individual interpreter" (Beaton 2007: 195), lie in the centre of the author's interests. Three discourse features considered as the most representative of these two aspects are analysed in depth: intertextuality, rhetorical repetition and institutional self-reference in the form of metaphor strings. Before comparative analysis was carried out, each source text and target text was examined separately to find the occurrences of these three features.

As for intertextuality, the results suggest that it was generally weakened in the English interpretations, as references to other speeches in the debate and texts external to the debate were frequently omitted (especially when authorship was not explicitly acknowledged by the speaker). However, it is interesting that references to speeches by high-level EU officials, such as Commissioners or representatives of the Council, were usually retained.

Rhetorical repetition was analysed in a quantitative manner, taking into consideration various lexical realisations of three concepts: European Union, EU enlargement and candidate countries, and four key terms: solidarity, peace, democracy and freedom. Although the quantitative analysis was inconclusive, a qualitative analysis of lexical variants of the three concepts revealed that some were foregrounded or backgrounded in comparison with the source texts, with preference given by interpreters to highly institutionalised terms. Certain phrases were explicitated by means of such terms, for example, by adding *in the European Union* to the literally translated from German *direct aid*. As for the key terms, it is notable that they were sometimes used interchangeably, for example, the German word *Freiheit* 'freedom' was interpreted as *peace and security*. Evidence of explicitation was found also here, as sometimes interpreters added a second element considered as a strong collocate of the key term in question (e.g., *peace and freedom*, *democracy and the rule of law*).

The third part of the study, that is, the analysis of a few conceptual metaphors (e.g., EU IS A SHIP, ENLARGEMENT IS A JOURNEY), yielded the most definite results, showing that these metaphors, described as institutional ones, were strengthened in the interpretations. Sometimes the relevant metaphor appeared in the interpretation even before it was used by the original speaker, or it was not present in the source text at all. Some metaphorical expressions were explicitated, that is, rendered in non-metaphorical language, and some were translated literally although non-existent in the target language.

The overall results are construed as indicating a strengthening of institutional hegemony through interpreting. According to Beaton (2007: 194), her thesis sheds some light on interpreter agency, showing that conference interpreters "are not immune to ideological and hegemonic influence" and do not act as neutral conduits. Although the methodology of this study is more sophisticated than in the case of Vuorikoski (2004), the corpus size is considerably smaller, which may make the findings less reliable. The conclusions drawn from the data are sometimes not entirely convincing, for instance, when interpreters' self-corrections are seen as manifestations of interpreter axiology at play, or when repetitions of certain phrases are treated as a rhetorical device rather than the interpreter's "playing for time." On the whole, however, the study is highly interesting, also in relation to the topic of this book. It has also been followed up, by the same author, with another study focusing on ideology as transmitted in interpretations: Beaton-Thome (2013), which, although smaller in scope, seems sounder as it comes to explaining phenomena under investigation.

Beaton-Thome (2013) investigates all original and interpreted contributions in English and German to a debate on the possible resettlement of Guantanamo detainees in EU member states, taking place in February 2009. Employing Critical Discourse Analysis as the methodological tool, the author focuses on the wide range of lexical labels employed to describe the persons held at Guantanamo (e.g., *terrorists*, *criminals* or, on the other hand, *innocents*, *illegal detainees*), which more or less clearly reflect certain ideological positions of speakers. As she argues, "the interpreter cannot simply disentangle him or herself from this lexical negotiation but is forced to take an ideological stance, not necessarily their own, through lexical choice" (p. 394). On the whole, the range of lexical labels is more limited both in the English and in the German interpretations than in the original contributions, and Beaton-Thome looks at examples of how the interpreters' lexical choices contest some of the more controversial labels selected by the participants of the debate, for instance by omission of

enemy combatants, or rendering *Flüchtlinge* as *prisoners* rather than *refugees*. These cases suggest that the interpreters tend to select more "neutral" terms than the original speakers, making the ideological stance less pronounced. On the other hand, there are also examples of translational solutions going in the opposite direction, where the interpreter intensifies the speaker's ideological stance by explicitating something that was only stated implicitly in the original (e.g., the addition of *wieder* 'again' to the speaker's argument that individuals released from Guantanamo might engage in terrorist activities in the future, making explicit the speaker's belief that they actually engaged in such activities before being detained). Beaton-Thome (2013: 394) states very clearly that she does not wish to attribute all these shifts to willful ideological manipulation on the part of the interpreters, but to focus on the final effect by describing "what happens to ideologically significant lexical choice in multilingual settings when it is mediated by simultaneous interpreters."

Coming back to PhD theses, Kajzer-Wietrzny (2012) combines the question whether three frequently postulated translation universals (simplification, explicitation and normalisation) apply to interpreting with an analysis of individual interpreting style. In contrast to all the studies discussed above, the corpus used in this study is monolingual and the source texts are not examined in any detail. Potential interpreting universals are investigated on the basis of interpretations into one target language (English) from four source languages; two Germanic (German and Dutch) and two Romance (French and Spanish). The interpretations (totalling over 200,000 words, with every source language evenly represented) are compared with written translations into English of the same source texts (EP speeches as transcribed by verbatim reporters) and with a reference subcorpus of speeches originally produced in English.

Lexical simplification was examined in terms of repetitiveness, lexical density and the proportion of high frequency words. Compared with native English speeches, interpretations failed to show lexical simplification; on the opposite, they were more sophisticated. The mode of delivery of the original (spoken vs. read out) is hypothesised to exert considerable influence, as there was a noticeable trend for interpretations of unscripted and semi-scripted speeches to be more simplified. Explicitation was investigated by measuring the frequency of optional *that*, linking adverbials (e.g., *therefore*), and apposition markers (e.g., *that is*, *namely*). Only the first of these parameters corroborated the initial hypothesis that interpretations would be more explicit than native English speeches, and interpretations shared this

feature with translations. Normalisation was understood as higher frequency of lexical bundles (repeated strings of words) and fixed expressions typical of formal spoken English. Interpretations contained significantly more lexical bundles than native English speeches, but the tendency to rely on fixed expressions seems language-pair dependent rather than universal, as they were used more often when interpreting from Romance languages.

Output of two interpreters constitutes the basis for an analysis of interpreting style; both interpretations into English from various source languages (two and three) and non-interpreted discourse in English by the same individuals are taken into consideration. The samples of non-interpreted discourse were provided in interviews as extensive answers to the researcher's questions on the European Union. As the samples are relatively small, not all the parameters measured in the first part of the study could be examined. The overall results suggest the existence of many similarities between speaking and interpreting styles of the same individual.

Kajzer-Wietrzny's study (2012) raises some doubts concerning the reliability of monolingual corpora for interpreting research. If interpretations are to be compared with texts delivered originally in the target language, it needs to be demonstrated that the two sets of texts are indeed parallel. Otherwise, all seemingly significant results might in fact be generated not by the contrast between interpreted and original texts, but rather by some differences between the subcorpora under comparison. Although it is clear that the composition of the corpus was very carefully planned, satisfactory balance was not always achieved – for example, in the proportion of spoken and read-out texts (or their interpretations) in each subcorpus. Certain important features, such as delivery rate, were not taken into consideration. Especially unconvincing is the comparison of interpretations with non-interpreted discourse by the same interpreters, because the latter was produced under completely different conditions, calling for a different, more informal register.

Cappelli (2014) focuses on language-pair specific strategies in interpreting from Polish into Italian and is based on a large corpus comprising all the plenary speeches originally delivered in Polish and interpreted directly (i.e., not through relay) into Italian during the first half of 2009 and the whole 2011, which total 313 contributions and over nine hours of material for each of the languages. A survey conducted among EU interpreters working from Polish into Italian served to determine the typical difficulties they encountered and resulted in choosing long strings of nouns (such as *koszty podróży*

posłów i pracowników Parlamentu), representing a major syntactic difference between Polish and Italian, as the main research topic. The results show that interpreters strove to render all the elements present in the original and achieved close rendition in 34% of cases, making use of such techniques as transformation of nominal phrases into verbal ones or replacement of complete names by their abbreviations. Reduced rendition was slightly more frequent than close rendition (129 vs. 107 cases), but it involved some information loss only in about every fourth case. In the majority of cases, the omitted elements were easily deducible from the context or on the basis of the listeners' background knowledge, which leads the author to the conclusion that omission is usually applied not in a haphazard way, but rather as a consciously selected and well-planned strategy. Other options to handle strings of nouns detected in the corpus were: expanded rendition involving explicitation (8%), total omission (8%), divergent rendition typically resulting in a sense error (7%) and substitute rendition involving omission of some elements combined with explicitation of others (2%).

Smaller projects based on interpretations from the European Parliament include Nafá Waasaf (2007) and Liontou (2013), each of them devoted to an entirely different aspect of interpreting. Nafá Waasaf (2007) analyses a corpus of 15 speeches in English and their interpretations into Spanish (each 2–3 minutes long) delivered by British MEPs at the EP and the European Commission in relation to intonation, a relatively underresearched topic. More specifically, she investigates how speeches and their interpretations are organised into paragraphs, using acoustic analysis of pitch coupled with discourse analysis (the latter serves to determine where topic transition takes place). The results indicate that both original speakers and interpreters predominantly follow the typical intonational pattern described for monolingual communication, that is, high pitch at the beginning of a paragraph and low pitch at its end.

Liontou (2013) is devoted to language-pair specific strategies in interpreting from German into Greek. The corpus under analysis consists of just three speeches (each about 5 minutes long) and their interpretations. The strategies are identified through a comparative analysis of temporarily aligned source and target texts. The small-sized corpus enables the author to identify nine strategies, with only a few occurrences of most of them. Stalling accounts for 60% of detected strategic processing, although it is not defined clearly in terms of EVS length. The author concludes that only anticipation (17 occurrences) is clearly language-pair specific, as it results from syntactic differences between German and Greek. On the whole, any generalisations are

prevented by the limited size of the corpus and lack of reference to interpreting in any other language combinations.

Like the MA theses summarised by Russo (2010), the BA thesis by Skrzydlewska (2010), written under my supervision, constitutes a good example of how even beginners in the field of Translation Studies can make good use of interpreting material from the European Parliament for a small but valuable case study. Skrzydlewska analyses, as regards its quality, the interpretation from Polish into English of the inaugural address delivered by Jerzy Buzek as the newly elected President of the EP. She employs propositional analysis (the completeness score for the whole interpretation amounts to 85%) and also investigates logical cohesion, sense consistency with the original and presentation features, such as pauses, voiced hesitations, false starts and slips of the tongue. Performance of two interpreters (who changed roughly in the middle of the speech) is compared. Overall, the quality assessment is favourable, although individual errors are pointed out and there is a noticeable quality difference between the two interpreters.

As rightly pointed out by Bendazolli (2010: 60), speeches delivered in the European Parliament are also sometimes used as source texts in experimental studies, for example Bülow-Møller (2003) and Donato (2003). The former confronts Danish professional interpreters with a highly polemical debate in English recorded in the European Parliament. In the latter, English and German language versions taken from the verbatim reports database are interpreted into Italian by student interpreters with the view to investigating language-pair-specific strategies. Such studies, therefore, do not actually involve interpreting for the European Parliament and are outside the scope of this chapter.

2.5 A summary of research findings and existing gaps

Ethnographically-oriented research on interpreting for the EP and the other EU institutions seems to have managed to draw a coherent and detailed picture of this particular setting and its relevant participants. There are, undoubtedly, several aspects that set EU interpreting apart from other conference settings. Notably, in comparison with simultaneous interpreters active on the private market, EU interpreters appear to constitute an internally coherent group, highly qualified and very well-paid, but not necessarily fully satisfied with the professional

status they have achieved. Especially individual language units at specific EU institutions are presented as tightly knitted communities of practice, where members are likely to exert much influence on the work of their colleagues. The point which remains the most vague (due to inconclusive and sometimes contradictory findings) are the relations between interpreters and their clients, that is, predominantly Members of the European Parliament. On the basis of the existent research, it is not possible to unequivocally determine the degree to which speakers are prepared to cooperate with interpreters, that is, take the requirements of interpreting into consideration when preparing and then delivering their contributions. What is certain is that some speakers' uncooperative behaviours are likely to compromise both the output of interpreters on any particular occasion and their overall job satisfaction in the long term.

In contrast to interpreting at conferences, typical input in EP plenary sessions is characterised by huge linguistic variety (including non-native use of "big" official languages, which is also widespread at other events), breakneck speaking rates and a relatively high degree of predictability, related inter alia to the fact that the pool of speakers is mostly limited, although large, and that they tend to represent a few clearly identifiable ideological lines. Certain keywords and metaphorical concepts are likely to reappear over and over again, there are also numerous intertextual references to documents that, as a matter of course, are available to interpreters.

Given the high specificity of EU interpreting convincingly shown by ethnographic research, it is not clear whether findings based on material from this setting can actually be extrapolated to "conference interpreting in general." Much more research must probably be published before this dilemma is resolved satisfactorily, and a lot may depend on the type of research question that is posed (i.e., to what extent the particular phenomenon under investigation is context-dependent). Anyway, given the easy availability of plenary contributions and their interpretations into all EU languages, product-oriented research on authentic material from the EP still seems scarce. Beyond research by individual scholars (which only rarely is represented by more than a single study), there is hardly any methodological or thematic consistency to speak of, and, consequently, this type of research is very difficult to summarise briefly. On the whole, most studies probably underestimate the uniqueness of the setting, endeavouring to draw general conclusions about issues such as language-pair specific features or individual interpreting styles. Even more worrying is the modest size of some of the corpora, in particular the one used by Liontou (2013), which certainly does not show much

promise of reaching any reliable conclusions on the topic of interest (interpreting strategies, in this case).

Among the product-based studies that do not suffer from the weaknesses mentioned above, research by Anna-Riitta Vuorikoski and by Morven Beaton (later on Beaton-Thome) seems to have shed the most light on EU interpreting and deserves a special mention here. The former has actually set the bar quite high for research on EU interpreting with her doctoral thesis, but, disappointingly, did not continue with the topic afterwards. The latter, on the other hand, appears to have gathered scholarly momentum since completing her PhD in 2007, and it is undoubtedly her work that bears the most affinity to my own. Although the methodology that she has been using to date is only remotely related to the one employed in this book, her scholarly interests have a lot in common with mine, and it is my hope that our research might be seen as complementary in highlighting and describing certain pragmatic aspects of EU interpreting, even more so as each of us deals with different language combinations.

3. Pragmatic background: Face, face-threatening acts and facework

Having presented the European Parliament as the setting of my research and its interpreters as the producers of the material to be analysed, I also need to devote some attention to the pragmatic background underlying my scholarly endeavours. Two interrelated concepts, that is, face-threatening acts and facework, stand out as particularly important and will reappear constantly throughout the rest of this book. However, it is impossible to discuss either of them without focusing on face as a more basic pragmatic concept in the first place. The development of all three concepts over time will be outlined, including a brief survey of empirical contributions. Finally, the chapter will zoom in on facework in parliamentary discourse.

3.1 Beginnings: Goffman's observations on the nature of human interactions

Along with a number of others,[1] the concept of face, as it prominently features in modern pragmatics, originates from the seminal works of the American sociologist Erving Goffman, who first used it in the 1950s in some of his articles later published together in the book

[1] Such as participation framework and a set of its related concepts; see, for example, Domke and Holly (2011) or Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010: 196ff) for an outline of Goffman's influential oeuvre, of which only the part concerning face will be reported here. In interpreting studies, Goffman's participation framework has been successfully employed to investigate dialogue interpreting (e.g., by Wadensjö 1998; 2008).

Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (1967). Goffman admits, nevertheless, that the concept as such is not entirely his own invention, but partly bases on the commonsense, folk notion of face (see Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010: 141–194 for a detailed discussion) as reflected, in many languages, by idiomatic phrases such as *to save one's face* or *to lose face* (Goffman 1967: 9). Especially the Chinese concept of face exerted considerable influence on Goffman's thought (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010: 195). Across diverse cultures, face has for many centuries been associated with values such as "pride, honour, dignity, tact, respect and esteem" (p. 142).

Goffman (1967: 5) defines face as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact," where line is "a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself." He adds that "[f]ace is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes" (p. 5). In other words, it could be described as our self-image as reflected in the eyes of people with whom we interact. Goffmanian face does not belong to an individual, but is rather "something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter" (p. 7).

Maintaining face (or "being in face," to use Goffman's preferred phrase) is a necessary condition for self-confidence and feeling comfortable in interpersonal contacts, and this is only possible when the line taken by an individual is internally consistent and finds support from other participants of the interaction as well as from the situational context. On the other hand, a person will feel embarrassed, ashamed or confused when s/he is either "in wrong face" or "out of face." The former means that someone's line is inconsistent with the information about his/her social worth that emerges during the interaction, and the latter – that someone does not have any line that would be acceptable to other participants in a given situation. In both cases, the encounter is frustrating to the participant concerned as it has failed to "support an image of self to which he has become emotionally attached and which he now feels threatened" (p. 8). The participant may then resort to "poise," which is the capacity to suppress and conceal his/her negative emotions associated with losing face.

Face is described as "a sacred thing" (p. 19) requiring a ritual expressive order to sustain it. While being very precious to an individual, at the same time his/her face is vulnerable, precarious, always in a state of flux. It is not to be treated as a permanent possession, but rather as an item "on loan […] from society" (p. 10) that, at any time, may

be withdrawn from someone whose conduct is perceived as unworthy of the self-image s/he would like to project. Therefore, face becomes a social constraint, constantly forcing individuals to engage in certain actions and avoid others, even at a considerable cost. To maintain their face, people have "the responsibility to stand guard over the flow of events" (p. 9), so that nothing that is expressed by them should be perceived as inconsistent with their face.

Fortunately, in most interactions the participants do not only care about their own face, but they also feel uncomfortable when others lose face. As Goffman claims, every individual has empathy with others, and so s/he is "expected to sustain a standard of considerateness; […] to go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face of others present" (p. 10). The two rules of self-respect and considerateness that normally govern interactions mean that people tend to behave in such a way as to maintain both their own face and the face of others with whom they interact. At the same time, people are guided by defensiveness required to save their own face and protectiveness necessary to save the face of others. Consequently, the participants in any encounter generally accept their mutual lines and cooperate to maintain each other's face.

While the desire to maintain one's own face seems obvious, considerateness towards the face of others may require some further elaboration. According to Goffman (p. 12), there are numerous possible reasons for it, which may apply in different situations. A participant may be emotionally attached to his/her interactant and consequently also to their face. S/he may feel morally obliged to protect someone else's face, or treat this kind of protection as an action ultimately geared at maintaining his/her own image as a kind, compassionate person. Sometimes a participant may fear potential repercussions if others lose face and blame this on him/her. Finally, the face to be protected may be perceived as a shared one if both the participants involved belong to the same group (such as a family or a profession, for instance).

Goffman uses the phrase "threats to face" without providing a clear definition or specific examples of what verbal behaviour they might entail;[2] however, what permeates his essay is the sense that a threat to face constitutes, at the same time, a threat to the existing "ritual order" and is acutely felt as such by the parties involved. Threats to face are divided into three types, depending on the level of responsibility of the person who creates them (p. 14). Firstly, a threat to face can

[2] A few examples of non-verbal threats that may be gleaned from the essay in question include a rumbling stomach, colliding with somebody accidentally while walking in the street, and taking leave from the company earlier than might be expected.

be introduced unwittingly, without the intention to do so – this type represents what we often call *faux pas*. Secondly, the offender may act out of malice and threaten others' face fully on purpose. Apart from such clear-cut cases, a threat to face can emerge as a side-effect, not planned but certainly taken into consideration as a possible outcome of one's actions. Importantly, it is not so much the offender's genuine intention that assigns a threat to face to a particular type, but its perception by the other participants, so in pragmatic terms we would talk about perlocution rather than illocution here (on the difference between the two, see, e.g., Cap 2011: 62). When it comes to the subject and the object of such a threat, it is possible to threaten someone else's face as well as one's own (Goffman 1967: 15).

As already mentioned, when a threat to face arises, people are inclined to take steps to oppose it, which involves "face-work," or, in other words, "face-saving practices," largely conventional in nature. Face-work "serves to counteract 'incidents' – that is, events whose effective symbolic implications threaten face" and is defined as "the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face" (p. 12). Depending on the circumstances, face-work may be performed "by the person whose face is threatened, or by the offender, or by a mere witness" (p. 27). What counts the most is not whose face was threatened or who rushed to save it, but the final effect of performing successful face-work to everybody's satisfaction and maintaining the existing equilibrium. Terms such as diplomacy, tact or *savoir-faire* may be used to describe skillful face-work.

Avoidance is the first type of face-work Goffman discusses, and the one that is supposed to carry the least risk (pp. 15ff). At its simplest, it may consist in avoiding contacts which are likely to pose threats to face. If some kind of interaction with a potentially face-threatening opponent is absolutely necessary, it may be carried out through an intermediary rather than directly. In case a personal encounter as such is unavoidable, avoidance may be effectively implemented by keeping off certain topics or changing the topic immediately when the conversation is heading in an undesirable direction. Hedging claims about self (for instance by means of joking or excessive modesty in expressing any of them) may be seen as an avoidance process directed at preventing loss of face through being discredited. A jocular manner and ambiguity are also employed when making potentially disparaging remarks about others. Extending an advance apology before introducing what might be interpreted as a threat to face is another method of neutralising it. Last but not least, even if a threat to face occurs, the participants may choose to ignore it and pretend that nothing has happened.

The other type of face-work involves corrective processes, which must be preceded by an acknowledgement of a threat to face resulting in "an established state of ritual disequilibrium or disgrace" and calling for an attempt "to reestablish a satisfactory ritual state" (p. 19). Such an attempt, usually consisting of several steps, is called an interchange. It is crucial to point out that for Goffman all these steps function as moves, because face-work is ultimately seen as "the ritual game" (p. 23) whose rules need to be internalised by every human during his socialisation as a child.

An interchange begins with a challenge, that is, calling attention to the threat. What follows is an offering, normally on the part of the person who introduced the threat, to correct his/her misbehaviour. There is a number of conventional ways of making such an offering. The offender may, for example, claim that what has been perceived as a threat to face was not said or done intentionally, or that it was meant as a joke. S/he may also suggest that the offending remark was made on someone else's behalf. Otherwise, unless it was his/her own face that was threatened, the offender can shoulder the responsibility and try to "provide compensation to the injured" and/or "punishment, penance, and expiation" (p. 19) for oneself. Goffman does not expressly talk of an apology here, but it seems that this is what he has in mind. The third step consists in the offering being accepted by the other participants as a satisfactory means of reestablishing the ritual order and maintaining the faces of everybody involved, and the last – in the offender thanking the others for their forgiveness.

What has just been described is a model interchange, which may often be departed from. For instance, the other participants may hold on their challenge and wait for the offender to realise s/he has introduced a threat to face and make an offering of his/her own accord. Or, in some other cases, it may be a different person than the offender who makes an offering by tactfully providing a justification for the misbehaviour. In a less courteous interaction, the offender may continue with the threat to face in spite of the challenge, which can possibly force the other participants to retaliate with likewise behaviour or to withdraw from the encounter altogether, showing that they have taken offence.

Generally people co-operate in face-work, both facilitating it for their interactants and expecting to get the same kind of treatment from them. Goffman refers to it as "tacit cooperation in face-saving" (p. 29). Therefore, the ritual game tends to be a friendly one, with the contestants playing into each other's hands. If someone, for example, possesses an attribute that might easily be judged in a negative manner

(and is not readily visible), s/he might mention this unobtrusively at the beginning of the conversation when talking to strangers, so that they do not introduce a threat to face later by criticising this very attribute. Subtle and highly sophisticated face-work of this kind often relies on hints, innuendoes and ambiguities.

Exceptions to such cooperation do exist and are described as "aggressive use of face-work," where the encounter is comparable to "an arena in which a contest or match is held" (p. 24). Participants may intentionally introduce threats to face, expecting others to do the necessary face-work and hoping to make some gains for their own face, possibly while others lose theirs. For example, someone may offend others assuming that they will pretend not to notice this in accordance with the strategy of avoidance, or talk very disparagingly about oneself in order to force others to praise him/her. The main purpose is to show one's own superiority, preferably not only to one's opponent, but also an audience: "the winner not only succeeds in introducing information favorable to himself and unfavorable to others, but also demonstrates that as interactant he can handle himself better than his adversaries" (p. 25).

It is definitely a fitting tribute to Goffman and his work that more than half a century after his considerations on face appeared in print, and after so much has been written on the topic by various other authors, contemporary scholars within the field of pragmatics still refer to him copiously, and many (e.g., Watts 2003; Bargiela-Chiappini 2003) even call for a "return to Goffman." As pointed out by Haugh (2013: 51), "much of the past decade in pragmatics has arguably involved catching up with what Goffman originally observed more than fifty years ago, namely, that face is a rich, nuanced analytical metaphor."

3.2 Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness

Brown and Levinson's influential book (1987), first published as a long contribution to a collective volume in 1978, features politeness in its title; nevertheless, politeness as described therein must be understood as largely equivalent to Goffmanian face-work (cf. Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010: 214). The great merit of the book lies in the fact that, for the first time, its authors created an elaborate model that can provide a theoretical framework for empirical research. As noted by Watts (2003: 63), Brown and Levinson presented their views

on politeness (or facework) phenomena "in sufficient detail to allow them to be tested through application to real-language data," giving "extensive examples of the kinds of linguistic structures that are put to use to realise politeness strategies." Ample empirical research based on it (and some theoretical appraisals, too) actually appeared shortly after Brown and Levinson's theory had been published in 1978, and the 1987 re-issue of their seminal work includes an extensive introduction discussing certain issues that emerged in the meantime. Although raising a lot of controversy and criticism until today, the politeness theory developed by the two authors must be seen as "the milestone in the politeness and face research" (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010: 228).

Face is a central concept in Brown and Levinson's theory, and, although they claim to have derived their notion of face from Goffman (1967), in fact they significantly depart from his understanding of it (Watts 2003: 103–107; Leech 2014: 81), especially by construing face as belonging to an individual and by postulating its dual nature. Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) define face as "the public self-image that every member [of a society] wants to claim for himself," and they immediately add that it consists of two interrelated aspects: negative face and positive face. The former is described as "the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction – i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition," and the latter as "the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants" (p. 61). The two aspects of face are further discussed in terms of "basic wants" shared by all humans: "the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others" (negative face) and "the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others" (positive face) (p. 62). By analogy, the authors also distinguish between negative politeness and positive politeness, which cater for the wants of the negative and the positive face, respectively.

While the negative aspect of face and politeness seems clear and associated with what will most readily be recognised as polite behaviour in Western cultures (avoiding imposition on others), the positive aspect may require some elaboration. If we look for simpler explanations of the positive face than the definition quoted above, the authors also describe it as "the want to be approved of in certain respects" (p. 58) and clarify that "in general, persons want their goals, possessions and achievements to be thought desirable" (p. 63). Approval of some specific others will be particularly valued; for example, it means more if beautiful roses in someone's garden are admired by another keen gardener or someone's literary style is appreciated by other writers.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) strongly support Goffman's (1967) view that interactants do not just aim to maintain their own face, but they tend to cooperate in saving and possibly enhancing the face of every person involved in the encounter: "normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and […] it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each others' faces." They talk about a universal "social necessity to orient oneself to it [face] in interaction" (p. 62).

Basing on the Speech Acts theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969), Brown and Levinson (1987: 65) point out that certain acts "intrinsically threaten face," as they "by their nature run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or of the speaker." They refer to such speech acts as face-threatening acts, or FTAs for short. Considering "the mutual vulnerability of face" (p. 68), rational behaviour manifests itself, in most circumstances, in either avoiding face-threatening acts altogether or in taking steps to minimise the threat as much as possible. FTAs can be divided in two ways: according to the kind of face threatened (negative or positive) and according to whose face is primarily threatened (the addressee's or the speaker's), although, as we will see, these distinctions are not always clear-cut.

The speech acts in which the speaker indicates that s/he (possibly) intends to impede the addressee's freedom of action threaten the addressee's negative face. The speaker can put the addressee under pressure to do (or not to do) something by means of orders, requests, suggestions, advice, reminders, threats, warnings and dares. Perhaps less obviously, some pressure on the addressee can also result when the speaker makes an offer or a promise, because the addressee should decide whether to accept or reject it and, furthermore, s/he may feel indebted to the speaker. In a similar vein, when receiving compliments or praise, the addressee may assume the speaker wants something from him/her. Finally, any expressions of strong negative emotions (such as anger, hatred or lust) suggesting that the speaker might intend to harm the addressee also threaten the latter's negative face.

If the speaker indicates that s/he does not care about the addressee's feelings and wants, the speech act in question will threaten the addressee's positive face. In particular, this is the case with speech acts reflecting the speaker's negative evaluation of the addressee's personal characteristics, behaviour, possessions, beliefs, values, etc., which comprise complaints, reprimands, accusations, insults, disagreements, challenges and expressions of disapproval, criticism, contempt and ridicule. Also talking about bad news, taboo topics or highly controversial ones, such as politics or religion, can threaten the

addressee's positive face. Importantly, some speech acts (such as threats or requests for personal information) must be perceived as threatening both the addressee's negative and positive face at the same time.

The speech acts that threaten primarily the speaker's negative face include thanks, excuses, promises and offers, as well as responses to the addressee's thanks, apologies, offers or *faux pas*. The speaker's positive face will be threatened through apologies, confessions, admissions of guilt, self-humiliation, self-contradiction and some compliment responses. There are also non-verbal behaviours that will do damage to the speaker's positive face, such as uncontrollable laughter or tears or losing control over one's body in some way, for example by stumbling and falling down.

If the speaker decides to introduce a face-threatening act, s/he can basically choose between two ways of doing it: on record and off record. These two labels actually cover whole sets of what the authors refer to as "strategies for doing FTAs" (Brown and Levinson 1987: 68). Going on record means that the communicative intention of the speaker is clear to the other participants and unambiguous, as in *I promise to come tomorrow*,[3] which could hardly be interpreted any other way than as a commitment on the part of the speaker to actually come the next day to a specific place. Going off record, on the other hand, means communicating one's intention indirectly, in a way that will not allow the other participants to nail the speaker down as committed to one particular meaning of his/her utterance. In Bousfield's words (2008: 60), off-record strategies "theoretically allow the speaker to attribute more than one intention to the utterance." For example, *Damn, I'm out of cash, I forgot to go to the bank today* can be interpreted as a request to lend the speaker some money, but should this request be refused or challenged by the addressee, the speaker will easily save his/her own face by claiming that s/he was not actually asking for money, but just informing s/he did not have any or expressing his/her irritation at having forgotten to go to the bank. Off-record strategies are realised by means of "metaphor and irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautologies, all kinds of hints as to what a speaker wants or means to communicate" (Brown and Levinson 1987: 69).

In case of introducing an on-record FTA, the speaker can further decide whether or not to accompany it with some sort of redressive action. FTAs without redress (also referred to as bald ones) involve stating one's intention as directly, clearly, unambiguously and concisely as possible,

[3] Both the exemplary on-record and off-record FTAs here are repeated after Brown and Levinson (1987: 69).

that is, fully in accordance with Grice's Maxims of Cooperation (1975). This actually happens only in exceptional circumstances, for instance, when urgency or efficiency of communication are deemed more important than face wants, or when the face threat involved is very small, which is the case when the addressee is asked or advised to do something clearly in his/her own interest. Otherwise, redressive action is employed, which attempts to counteract the face threat and enhance the addressee's face by means of certain modifications and additions to the FTA, indicating that no damage to face is intended and generally, the speaker respects the addressee and his/her face wants. The redressive action takes the form of the either negative or positive politeness, already mentioned before. As pointed out by Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010: 216), they "strongly resemble Goffman's concepts of avoidance and presentational rituals."

Positive politeness minimises the face threat by assuring the addressee that his/her positive face wants are shared, at least partly, by the speaker, that s/he is accepted, liked and treated as a member of the same group. Even if some sort of criticism is expressed, it is not to be treated as having influence on the overall favourable assessment of the addressee. Negative politeness, in turn, focuses on convincing the addressee that the speaker will not interfere with his/her freedom of action, or will do so only to a minimal degree. The addressee should not feel as if s/he is coerced to do something. This can be achieved, inter alia, by means of "apologies for interfering or transgressing, […] hedges on the illocutionary force of the act" or "impersonalizing mechanisms (such as passives)" (Brown and Levinson 1987: 70). Negative politeness is often manifested in what the authors call "conventional indirectness"; for example some questions, such as *Can you pass the salt?*, are clearly interpretable as requests, and therefore they should be seen as on-record FTAs with redress rather than off-record FTAs.

To sum this argument up, Brown and Levinson distinguish five possible strategies for dealing with FTAs (starting from the most face-damaging option):[4] going on record without redress, going on record with positive politeness, going on record with negative politeness, going off record, and avoiding the FTA altogether. Apart from the risk to face that is inherent in every FTA and can be completely eliminated only if the last of the above strategies is chosen, there are certain

[4] It would probably be better to name them "superstrategies," as the authors further on describe more detailed "strategies" that are subordinate to these. Consequently, the lack of distinction between the former and the latter may easily lead to some confusion.

advantages or "pay-offs" associated with the use of every strategy. Going on record generally gives the speaker credit for clarity, efficiency, honesty and outspokenness, while possible redress may, to some degree, satisfy the addressee's face wants. Going off record, on the other hand, enables the speaker to avoid commitment to the FTA and the resulting responsibility as well as to satisfy the addressee's negative face wants to a greater degree than in case of negative politeness.

Selecting an appropriate strategy in particular circumstances requires a careful assessment of the weightiness of the intended FTA, including both risk to the speaker's face and to the addressee's face. There are three factors that need to be taken into consideration here: the social distance between the interactants, their relative power and the seriousness of the imposition. Each of them is susceptible to change according to the context of the interaction. As pointed out by Watts (2003: 88), "[o]ne of the major problems with Brown and Levinson's model is the degree of rational choice that speakers are expected to exercise in choosing an appropriate strategy."

Importantly, apart from the theoretical considerations on face and politeness as summarised above, Brown and Levinson also devote much attention to a description of how the politeness strategies they postulate are reflected in language. They give many practical examples from three languages: English, Tamil and Tzeltal, and list numerous more specific strategies used for off-record as well as on-record FTAs (including both positive and negative politeness). These strategies are formulated as "recipes" for particular linguistic behaviours: there are 15 off-record strategies, 15 positive politeness strategies and 10 negative politeness strategies. As I am mostly interested in FTAs directed against positive face, I will start with positive politeness here (although note that the positive politeness strategies can also be used to redress FTAs related to the addressee's negative face, for example, requests, and the other way round). For the sake of convenience, the strategies will be presented in the form of tables. All the "recipes" as well as examples (whenever provided) are quoted from Brown and Levinson; S stands for speaker and H for addressee (hearer).

The authors explicitly link the off-record strategies to Gricean Conversational Maxims (1975), pointing out that indirectness of FTAs results in violation of at least one Maxim in each case (sometimes the strategies can also be combined). Strategies 1–3 violate the Maxim of Relation, strategies 4–6 – the Maxim of Quantity, strategies 7–10 – the Maxim of Quality, and strategies 11–15 – the Maxim of Manner. In Table 6 below, the material in brackets presents the actual communicative intent of the speaker.

Table 4. Positive politeness strategies according to Brown and Levinson (1987: 103–129)

Positive politeness strategy	Possible realisations in English
1. Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods)	*Goodness, you cut your hair! (…) By the way, I came to borrow some flour.*
2. Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H)	*What a fantastic garden you have!*
3. Intensify interest to H	*I come down the stairs, and what do you think I see?*
4. Use in-group identity markers	Terms of address: *honey, mate, brother, buddy.* Use of regional dialect, jargon, slang.
5. Seek agreement	*Uhuh, really!?* (uttered as someone tells a story)
6. Avoid disagreement	Hedging opinions: *It's really beautiful, in a way.*
7. Presuppose/raise/assert common ground	*I really had a hard time learning to drive, you know.*
8. Joke	*How about lending me this old heap of junk?* (H's new Cadillac)
9. Assert or presuppose S's knowledge of and concern for H's wants	*I know you can't bear parties, but this one will really be good – do come!*
10. Offer, promise	*I'll drop by sometime next week.*
11. Be optimistic	*You'll lend me your lawnmower for the weekend, I hope.*
12. Include both S and H in the activity	*Let's stop for a bite.*
13. Give (or ask for) reasons	*Why don't I help you with that suitcase.*
14. Assume or assert reciprocity	*I'll do X for you if you do Y for me.*
15. Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)	

Table 5. Negative politeness strategies according to Brown and Levinson (1987: 129–211)

Negative politeness strategy	Possible realisations in English
1	2
1. Be conventionally indirect	*Can you post this letter for me?*
2. Question, hedge	*That's just how it is, it seems to me.*
3. Be pessimistic	*You don't have any manila envelopes, do you by any chance?*
4. Minimise the imposition	*I just dropped by for a minute to ask if you…*
5. Give deference	Honorifics: *sir, Mr President.*
6. Apologise	*I'm sorry to bother you…*

cont. tab. 5

1	2
7. Impersonalise S and H: Avoid the pronouns *I* and *you*	*That letter must be typed immediately.*
8. State the FTA as a general rule	*International regulations require that the fuselage be sprayed with DDT.*
9. Nominalise	*I am surprised at your failure to reply.*
10. Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H	*I'd be eternally grateful if you would… I could easily do it for you.*

Table 6. Off-record strategies according to Brown and Levinson (1987: 211–227)

Off-record strategies	Possible realisations in English
1. Give hints	*It's cold in here.* (Shut the window)
2. Give association clues	*Are you going to market tomorrow? … There's market tomorrow, I suppose.* (Give me a ride there)
3. Presuppose	*At least I don't go around boasting about my achievements.* (But someone else does)
4. Understate	*What do you think of Harry? Nothing wrong with him.* (I don't think he's very good)
5. Overstate	*I tried to call a hundred times, but there was never any answer.* (I apologise for not getting in touch)
6. Use tautologies	*You're men, why don't you do something about it?* (You ought to do something to live up to your masculinity)
7. Use contradictions	*Well, John is here and he isn't here.* (He's drunk)
8. Be ironic	*It's not as if I warned you or anything.* (I did, you know)
9. Use metaphors	*Harry's real fish.* (He drinks like a fish)
10. Use rhetorical questions	*What can I say?* (Nothing, it's so bad)
11. Be ambiguous	*John's a pretty sharp cookie.* (I mean it as an insult, not a compliment)
12. Be vague	*Perhaps someone did something naughty.* (I know who and what s/he did)
13. Over-generalise	*Mature people sometimes help do the dishes.* (You should help)
14. Displace H – the FTA is overtly addressed to someone else than the intended addressee.	
15. Be incomplete, use ellipsis	*Well, I didn't see you…* (I apologise for bumping into you)

As argued by Watts, Brown and Levinson's strategies should be seen as referring to facework rather than politeness as such. Depending on the context, linguistic realisations of each strategy can, but by no means have to, be interpreted as polite: "In reality, participants in verbal interaction either do not necessarily classify the prefacing moves as polite, or they find them appropriate to what the speaker wants to do and may or may not agree that they are polite, or they may even disapprove of them" (Watts 2003: 91). As Spencer-Oatey (2008a: 2) aptly puts it, "politeness is actually a contextual judgment." In a similar vein, some critics (e.g., O'Driscoll 2007) point out that Brown and Levinson completely disregard the role of context when discussing FTAs, although one and the same utterance could be seen as face-threatening or face-enhancing in two different situations.

Probably the most widespread, however, is the criticism of Brown and Levinson's theory as regards its postulated applicability across various cultures (suggested already by the very subtitle of the book: *Some Universals in Language Usage*).[5] Especially the negative aspect of face has met with much opposition, as it is believed to reflect "an Anglo-Western individualist and egalitarian focus on the supremacy of the individual's desires and right to freedom" (Leech 2014: 81). Numerous Asian scholars (e.g., Matsumoto 1988; Gu 1990) argue that in their more collectivistic cultures self is construed in terms of relations with specific others, and the sense of in-group belonging is stronger than the desire to act freely as one pleases. Consequently, facework in some non-Western cultures is not so much about strategic conflict-avoidance, but more about establishing and maintaining harmony (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010: 227). On this kind of criticism, see also Chen (2010), who offers a comprehensive overview of research into how pragmatics of "Eastern" languages is different than that of "Western" languages (also covering the aspects that may be seen as similar).

On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by Leech (2014: 81), the criticism itself should be seen as a tribute to Brown and Levinson: "[I]f they did not have the virtue of providing a rather explicit and detailed model of linguistic politeness, it could not be attacked so readily." Undoubtedly, their theory deserves to be described as pioneering and

[5] However, note that Brown and Levinson's position is not, in fact, absolutely universalist, as pictured by its many critics. Although they do claim that there are some universal principles governing interactions among humans everywhere, they also admit that "the application of the principles differs systematically across cultures, and within cultures across subcultures, categories and groups" (Brown and Levinson 1987: 283).

seminal, and remains "the most commonly discussed account of language and politeness" (p. 81).

3.3 Further scholarly interest in face and facework

Brown and Levinson's theory must definitely be seen as the main and direct inspiration for empirical research (where it very often functions as a theoretical framework) as well as a starting point for formulating new theories (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010: 228), even if some scholars actually denounce many aspects of Brown and Levinson's model, and tend to turn back to Goffman's more sophisticated concept of face. As pointed out by Haugh (2013: 51), "the focus has shifted from a narrow analytical focus on politeness to facework [...] more broadly," as politeness is generally no longer understood as equal to facework, but rather as one of its constituents (along with phenomena such as impoliteness or mock-impoliteness, which have also attracted much scholarly attention since). Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010: 212) talks about "the *face* studies 'boom' which started in the late 1980s."

This proliferation of face and facework studies may even seem overwhelming, especially for a newcomer to the field of pragmatics, like the author of this book (until now mainly active in interpreting studies). As my understanding of face and its related concepts for the needs of the research presented in the subsequent chapters does not actually go far beyond Brown and Levinson, I will only outline the most important theoretical developments here, with the caveat that the selection is highly subjective and the main focus is on studies that seem to be the most relevant for my research (e.g., the ones dealing with the concept of impoliteness). For a more thorough discussion of the theoretical developments, see Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010: 228–261) or Haugh (2013). For more examples of empirical research, see, for example, Bousfield and Grainger (2010). Research on facework in interpreter-mediated encounters shows the strongest affinity with my work, so this topic will be discussed separately (and more extensively) in the subsequent chapter.

3.3.1 Theoretical considerations

3.3.1.1 The Politeness Principle

For some scholars, it did not take very long after the first publication of Brown and Levinson's theory to follow up with their own contributions to the topic. Leech's approach to politeness (1983) definitely plays an important role, as, along with Brown and Levinson's model, it is one of the most often selected theoretical frameworks for empirical research. Watts (2003: 63) asserts that it is "very taxonomic, and a number of researchers have found it particularly useful in accounting for linguistic politeness in their data." Unlike Brown and Levinson's, Leech's model is hearer-centred rather than speaker-centred (p. 64). Leech very strongly links his model to Gricean Cooperative Principle and Maxims of Conversation (1975); he argues that politeness is one of the main reasons for failing to adhere to the maxims. For instance, if someone says something indirectly, s/he violates the maxim of manner (which calls for stating one's communicative intent briefly, unambiguously and straight to the point), but this choice of indirectness is very likely motivated by the fact that politeness considerations are given precedence over the maxim of manner.[6] Likewise, by telling a white lie speakers violate the maxim of quality (i.e., they deliberately say something that they know to be untrue), but their reason for doing so is the desire not to hurt the hearer's feelings, or, in other words, to maintain his/her face.

According to Leech, Grice's Cooperative Principle is not sufficient to explain many instances of real language use, and consequently he proposes the Politeness Principle to supplement it. The Politeness Principle tells us to "minimize […] the expression of impolite beliefs" and "maximize […] the expression of polite beliefs," where "[p]olite and impolite beliefs are respectively beliefs which are favourable and unfavourable to the hearer or to a third party" (Leech 1983: 81).

[6] Leech (1983: 94) illustrates this with the following example: If A asks 'Where's my box of chocolates?' and B answers 'The children were in your room this morning,' the response may seem inadequate in the light of the Maxims of Conversation. On the other hand, the reason for B's indirectness is his/her reluctance to accuse the children directly of having eaten the chocolates, and the answer may in fact help A discover what happened to the chocolates, so we should not assume that B fails to be cooperative.

The role of the Politeness Principle is "to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations" (p. 82) and therefore, it often overrides the Cooperative Principle, as these values constitute the necessary conditions for communication to take place at all. Another principle that Leech postulates is the Irony Principle, which prescribes that if we have to cause offence, we should do it in such a way as to avoid overtly breaking the Politeness Principle, and at the cost of a blatant breach of the Cooperative Principle (usually of the maxim of quality, by saying something which is obviously untrue).

By analogy to Grice (1975), Leech (1983: 132) also defines several maxims that make up the Politeness Principle: the tact maxim (minimise cost and maximise benefit to the hearer), the generosity maxim (minimise own benefit and maximise own cost), the approbation maxim (minimise dispraise and maximise praise of the hearer), the modesty maxim (minimise praise and maximise dispraise of self), the agreement maxim (minimise disagreement and maximise agreement between self and the hearer), and the sympathy maxim (minimise antipathy and maximise sympathy between self and the hearer). In each of these maxims, the first of the rules enumerated in brackets is always stronger. If faced with a breach of one of the maxims of cooperation, the hearer will search for the reason for it by referring to one of the politeness maxims.

Interestingly, Leech uses the terms positive politeness and negative politeness with a different meaning than the one they have in Brown and Levinson's theory. For him, negative politeness serves to minimise the impoliteness of impolite speech acts (such as criticising or blaming), and positive politeness serves to maximise the politeness of polite speech acts (such as congratulating or praising) (cf. Watts 2003: 69).

3.3.1.2 Impoliteness

It was undoubtedly an important step for facework studies to admit that people do not always struggle for social harmony, that it is not always in the interactants' best interest to maintain each other's face, and that impoliteness is not a marginal phenomenon, as was done by Culpeper (1996), who proposed a seminal model of linguistic impoliteness. According to Culpeper, impoliteness is likely to occur if there is an imbalance of power between the interactants (so the

more powerful one can behave impolitely towards the other one with impunity), or if they compete for something only one of them can achieve (e.g., for an elective office). Paradoxical as it may seem, also people who know each other well or are bound by intimate relationships tend to be more impolite towards each other than complete strangers. In equal relationships, impoliteness is likely to escalate – in other words, participants whose face is being damaged will likely retaliate with FTAs of increasing gravity. In some circumstances, this may even lead to physical violence.

Another interesting phenomenon discussed quite extensively in the same article is "mock impoliteness" or "banter" (p. 352). This is impoliteness that may be used jokingly, among friends, and is not intended to cause any face damage – therefore, it is not real, as it exists only on the surface. To use Culpeper's own example, having explained that he arrived late for the party because he had confused 7 p.m. with 17:00, he was called *a silly bugger* by a smiling friend, which did not cause him to feel offended and neither was it intended to. As mock impoliteness is actually employed to build social harmony, it would be more accurate to describe it as a politeness strategy than a type of impoliteness.

Culpeper's understanding of face is definitely broader than Brown and Levinson's, "not confined to the immediate properties of the self" (p. 361). The individual's face also includes some external components, such as his or her family, friends, professional circle, nation, etc. Consequently, attacks at someone's face do not always have to be centred on the person in question, but may, for example, consist in insulting his or her family members or compatriots. Culpeper also questions the idea that certain speech acts are inherently polite or impolite, independently of the context in which they occur (mock impoliteness is a good case in point here). According to him, this is an exception rather than a rule.

In spite of these differences, Culpeper's model actually mirrors Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness by presenting strategies which are opposites of theirs, and which aim at maximising face damage instead of preventing or minimising it. The five counterparts of Brown and Levinson's superstrategies (pp. 356–357) are as follows:

– bald on-record impoliteness – the FTA is direct, clear and unambiguous; moreover, none of the conditions specified by Brown and Levinson for performing such FTAs (an emergency situation, minimal imposition on the hearer, a great power imbalance such as between a small child and a parent) applies to the communicative situation, that is, face concerns are not irrelevant;

– positive impoliteness, directed at the hearer's positive face wants;
– negative impoliteness, directed at the hearer's negative face wants;
– mock politeness/sarcasm – the FTA is performed with redress by means of politeness strategies which, however, are in an obvious way insincere; and
– withholding politeness – politeness strategies are not used although they would be expected in the communicative situation in question, for example, someone does not thank for a gift s/he has just received.

Also by analogy to Brown and Levinson, Culpeper further proposes open-ended lists of possible "output strategies" (pp. 357–358) to perform positive and negative impoliteness, formulated in a similar way as their politeness strategies. Therefore, positive impoliteness may be realised by:

– ignoring the other, failing to acknowledge his/her presence;
– excluding the other from an activity;
– denying association or common ground with the other, also by maintaining physical distance;
– showing no interest, concern or sympathy for the other;
– using inappropriate terms of address to suggest less or more distance to the other than would be expected in a given relationship;
– talking to the other in such a way as to prevent him/her from understanding (e.g., by using jargon or in-group slang);
– seeking disagreement (e.g., by bringing up a controversial topic);
– making the other feel uncomfortable (e.g., by means of silences, inappropriate jokes, etc.);
– swearing, using abusive or profane language; and
– calling the other names.

Negative impoliteness strategies, in turn, include:

– instilling fear in the other;
– belittling the other (e.g., by being contemptuous, showing scorn or ridiculing the other);
– invading the other's space – literally (by positioning oneself too close) or metaphorically (by asking too personal questions or bringing up one's own personal issues);
– explicitly associating the other with something negative, using *you* and *I*; and
– calling the other's indebtedness to attention.

Having presented his model, Culpeper shows how it may be applied to conversational data using two examples: an excerpt from a documentary filmed in an army training camp and a dialogue between Macbeth and his wife from Shakespeare's play.

Although Culpeper was not the first linguist to focus on impoliteness (cf. Bousfield 2008: 83), his article stimulated widespread interest in the by then underresearched field. His model has been tested on observational data both by Culpeper himself (in some further studies he published, e.g., Culpeper 2005 or Culpeper at al. 2003) and by a number of other researchers (e.g., Bousfield 2008). At the same time, even before Culpeper, some researchers (e.g., Lakoff 1989) rightly note that the binary opposition polite – impolite is not sufficient to describe the complexity of human interaction, as some utterances can also be considered neutral in this respect. Therefore, Lakoff proposes to distinguish between politeness, non-politeness and rudeness, where rudeness is defined as intentional and confrontational non-adherence to politeness manifest in withholding politeness strategies when they are expected, and non-politeness, on the other hand, as refraining from use of politeness strategies when they are not expected. In more recent research, the term nonpoliteness is favoured by Leech (2014: 216) to refer to "utterances that have no politeness value of any kind." Watts (2003: 21) prefers to talk about politic behaviour (both linguistic and non-linguistic) that he defines as the behaviour which "the participants construct as being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction," whereas politeness and impoliteness go beyond the participants' expectations, either this way or the other. In another study pre-dating Culpeper (1996), Kasper (1990) highlights the role of intentionality and suggests a distinction between motivated and unmotivated rudeness, where the former is a deliberate behaviour intended to damage the other's face, and the latter results from the speaker's ignorance of the politeness norms that should be adhered to in a particular situation.

Another prominent pragmaticist focusing on impoliteness is Bousfield (2008), who defines it as "the communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts" (p. 72) that remain unmitigated although mitigation would be required and/or are deliberately boosted, for example by employing expletives. According to Bousfield, in order for impoliteness to occur, the speaker must act with the intention of damaging the addressee's face (so Kasper's unmotivated rudeness mentioned above would not count), and, at the same time, the addressee must perceive this intention (although not necessarily feel that his/her face has actually been damaged).

In his later works (2011; 2013; 2016), Culpeper's concept of impoliteness diverges from the notion of face, with more emphasis on the addressee's failed expectations rather than on the speaker's intention: "Situated behaviours are viewed negatively – considered

'impolite' – when they conflict with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be" (Culpeper 2011: 254). Many impoliteness phenomena, such as insults, clearly damage the addressee's face, but interlocutors also evaluate certain behaviours as impolite because they feel these infringe on some of their rights. These two types of impoliteness result in different emotional reactions: the former causes the addressee to feel hurt (which would be associated with damage to his/her face), the latter is more likely to cause anger (Culpeper 2013: 5–6). Impoliteness does not occur particularly often in everyday life of most people, but is highly psychologically salient and therefore receives a lot of attention, for instance from the mass media (Culpeper 2010: 3239).

Culpeper (2010: 3238) also notes that impoliteness can be divided into two types: semantic impoliteness and pragmatic impoliteness, which, however, are not to be seen as binary opposites: "(Im)politeness can be more inherent in a linguistic expression or can be more determined by context, but neither the expression nor the context guarantee an interpretation of (im)politeness." Although speech acts as such are not inherently impolite, Culpeper (2010; 2011) believes that there are some linguistic structures that tend to express (more semantically-oriented) impoliteness and calls them "conventionalised impoliteness formulae." The formulae, which rely on certain interchangeable elements, were worked out on the basis of large polls of diverse naturally occurring data (documentaries and pseudo-documentaries, talent shows, quizzes, tapped phone calls), taking into consideration factors such as interlocutors' reactions and judgments. The list includes several types of insults: personalised negative vocatives (e.g., *pig*, *you liar*), personalised negative assertions (*you are such a bitch*, *you are so hopeless*, *you can't do anything*), personalised negative references (typically beginning with *your* and relating to the target's body parts, etc.) and personalised third-person negative references expressed in the target's presence (Culpeper 2010: 3242). In addition, Culpeper enumerates pointed criticisms and complaints (*this is absolutely rubbish*), challenging or unpalatable questions and presuppositions (*Why do you make my life impossible?*), condescensions (*that's childish*), message enforcers (*listen here*), dismissals (*fuck off*, *get lost*), silencers (*shut up*), threats (*I'm gonna smash your face in*) and negative expressives (*go to hell*, *fuck you*) (pp. 3242–3243). A formula itself might sometimes not suffice for the addressee to interpret the message as impolite, but its offensiveness may be exacerbated by means of intensifiers such as certain modifiers (*such*, *so*, *fucking*), taboo words (*shut the fuck up* instead of *shut up*) or prosodic features and gestures. Intensifiers make

conventionalised formulae less ambiguous, ensuring the addressee is in fact offended (Culpeper 2011: 144).

As for pragmatic (or non-conventionalised) impoliteness, it relies predominantly on implicatures and can be divided into three subtypes: form-driven, convention-driven and context-driven impoliteness, depending on the main linguistic trigger. Form-driven impoliteness covers phenomena such as insinuations, innuendoes, digs, snide remarks and mimicry. It is partly similar to what Brown and Levinson (1987) describe as off-record strategies; however, an alternative "polite" interpretation of an utterance is "less likely or ludicrously implausible" (Culpeper 2011: 157). Culpeper also questions their belief that off-record FTAs are less severe than on-record ones, noting that "[o]ff-recordness in contexts where the impoliteness interpretation is clear seems not to mollify the offence; if anything, it might exacerbate it" (p. 160). Any attempt to cancel the message expressed indirectly will do the addressee even more harm, as what was only implied before will now be voiced directly. Convention-driven impoliteness is based on a mismatch between some features of an utterance that invite a polite interpretation and some that invite an impolite one. It covers sarcasm, teasing and bitter humour. The examples provided by Culpeper include *Could you just fuck off?* that combines conventionalised politeness and impoliteness formulae (internal mismatch, related to the message as such) and *Oh, hello, come in – very nice to see you again too!* uttered in response to a rude remark from someone who just came to the speaker's house (external mismatch, as the message is clearly inconsistent with the broader context). Context-driven impoliteness results from a clash of the speaker's behaviour with the addressee's expectations resulting from the context: withholding politeness, such as failure to greet someone or to thank someone for a favour, is a typical example. Context-driven impoliteness becomes manifest either through unmarked behaviour (where a politeness strategy would be in place, according to the addressee) or through lack of behaviour (for instance completely ignoring someone's contribution to a conversation).

On the whole, Culpeper's work on impoliteness (whose solid empirical basis has not been discussed here for reasons of space) stands out with its breadth and depth, accounting for diverse phenomena and placing a lot of emphasis on the context in which they occur. It is also characterised by an openly acknowledged evolution of views, which is visible, for instance, in how impoliteness is defined. The speaker's intentionality plays the major role at first, to be dethroned, at some point, by the addressee's judgment: impoliteness can therefore be concisely described as "a negative evaluative attitude towards behaviours

in context" (p. 195). This has very important consequences for empirical research: "for impoliteness items to count as impolite, they must go challenged" (Culpeper 2016: 436) – that is, the addressee must somehow acknowledge taking offence, be it by reciprocating it, by metapragmatic comments (such as *it was rude*), or by verbal or non-verbal symptoms of negative emotions (hurt, anger or humiliation).

3.3.1.3 Rapport management

The interactional (or relational) approach to face, represented, among others, by Spencer-Oatey (2008b), Watts (2003) and Arundale (2006), has evolved in opposition to the Brown-and-Levinsonian models. In this approach, as described by Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010: 235), "[p]oliteness and facework are considered […] in a broader, discursive, perspective. Face no longer belongs to an individual, but is conjointly created by interactants who form a certain relationship during social interaction." I will illustrate this with Spencer-Oatey's (2008b) ideas, outlined in an article first published in 2000.

Spencer-Oatey underlines that, apart from the obvious informative function, communication among humans involves the management of social relations, which she chooses to call rapport management, being not particularly willing to use either the term politeness or face to describe the concept. She also seems to put much more emphasis on long-term results of FTAs and possible responses to them, that is, the repercussions which are not limited to a given encounter, but continue to affect the relationship between the interactants for weeks or months thereafter.

Spencer-Oatey (2008b: 13) is interested in instances of language use aimed at building, sustaining and/or threatening social relationships (which is consistent with what other scholars call facework), but also in "the management of sociality rights and obligations, and the management of interactional goals," which makes rapport management broader in its scope than facework as described in previous studies. The management of sociality rights and obligations is associated with what people perceive as fair and appropriate in a given situation; the management of interactional goals, in turn, refers to the specific tasks or relational goals that interactants may have in mind when engaging in a conversation. If we wish to go into more detail as to the sociality rights and obligations (which may seem somewhat obscure), they result

from certain expectations that people have as to what should normally happen during interaction with others. What is expected is, on the one hand, equity, that is, being treated fairly and considerately, not being imposed on or taken advantage of or ordered about, and, on the other hand, association, that is, social involvement with others, the degree of which depends on the type of interpersonal relationship in question (p. 16). During interaction, people may feel that their face has been damaged through FTAs. Moreover, they may also feel deprived of their sociality rights, or they may perceive others as neglecting their obligations. Lastly, people may also believe that someone else hampers them in achieving their goals. In these three ways, the positive rapport is endangered by what the author refers to as "rapport-threatening behaviour" (p. 17).

Like Culperer (1996), Spencer-Oatey opposes the idea that certain speech acts are intrinsically rapport-threatening. For example, orders and requests may well be perceived as an imposition on the addressee's freedom of choice; nevertheless, this does not have to be the case. We may feel that our rights have not been infringed if we are ordered to do something that we anyway see as our duty, and we may feel honoured or even flattered that someone has asked us for help. Likewise, compliments can in general be regarded as face-enhancing speech acts, as they are intended to facilitate friendly relations between the speaker and the addressee. Nevertheless, if a compliment is felt to be too personal considering the nature of the relationship between the interactants, the addressee may feel that his/her association rights have been infringed by the speaker claiming too much intimacy.

In any interpersonal relationship, people assume an orientation depending on how they want the relationship to develop. They may wish to enhance the harmonious relations (rapport enhancement orientation), or at least to maintain and protect them (rapport maintenance orientation). They may also have no concern for or interest in the quality of the relations (rapport neglect orientation), or wish to damage or question the harmonious relations (rapport challenge orientation). The orientation significantly influences the choice of strategies to communicate with the other person, along with other factors, such as the context (e.g., message content, activity type), sociopragmatic principles (such as Leech's 1983 politeness maxims) and pragmalinguistic norms valid in a given culture.

The strategies for formulating potentially rapport-threatening speech acts can be analysed as regards three aspects: semantic components, directness/indirectness level, and upgraders/downgraders (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 22–27). As for their semantic components, speech acts

normally contain a head act carrying the main illocutionary force, which may be accompanied by one or more optional components, such as mitigating or aggravating supportive moves. For example, for mitigation, a request may be supplemented by a preparator, such as *I'd like to ask you something*, or a grounder explaining the reasons the speaker has to ask for a favour, such as *I missed class yesterday*. On the other hand, a request (or actually an order?) may be aggravated by adding a threat (*Move that car if you don't want a ticket!*) or an insult (*You've always been a dirty pig, so clear up!*). As for the directness level, a request might be expressed directly in the form of an imperative or other direct strategies, such as want statements (*I really wish you'd stop chattering*). Many languages, however, have a preference for conventional indirectness manifest in formulating what is really a request as a question or a suggestion (*How about…?*). Finally, the speaker can also make use of unconventional indirectness and resort to hints of varying strength, hoping that the addressee will interpret them as intended (e.g., *I'm getting a headache when other people are talking loudly* in certain contexts should really be treated as a request to speak down).

The upgraders (also referred to as intensifiers or boosters) increase the force of the speech act, while downgraders (hedges, downtoners) tone it down. Therefore, the effect of an upgrader or downgrader will depend on the character of the speech act they modify: an upgrader will maximise the negative impact of a rapport-threatening utterance, and make a rapport-enhancing utterance even more friendly. For instance, a request to the effect that the addressee should tidy up his/her desk may be accompanied by syntactic downgraders, such as aspect or tense (*I'm wondering if you can tidy up your desk?/ I was wondering if you could tidy up your desk?*), or by lexical downgraders, such as politeness markers or understaters *(Can you tidy up your desk, please?/ Can you tidy up your desk a bit*?). On the other hand, it may be accompanied by upgraders such as expletives or time intensifiers (*Tidy up your bloody desk!/ Tidy up your desk right now!*).

3.3.1.4 The Cultural Face Model

Last but not least, I would like to briefly consider the cross-cultural approach to face, which endeavours to account for the fact that facework (and face itself) is significantly influenced by cultural norms

and values – the issue that was notoriously neglected by Brown and Levinson. Theories situated within this approach include, among others, Ting-Toomey's (1988) Face Negotiation Theory, and Jakubowska-Bogdanowska's (2010) Cultural Face Model. I will focus on the latter, a model which "tries to explain the cultural variability of face both in its interpretation and management" (p. 259).

According to Bogdanowska-Jakubowska (2010: 263–265), face has a social as well as an individual dimension. The social dimension covers socially relevant characteristics of a person, such as age and sex, family ties, social status indicators and personal reputation. This dimension consists of the following three types of face: Moral Face (based on the individual's moral conduct), Prestige Face (reflecting the individual's social position) and Relational Face (emerging from relationships with others, dependent on the individual's interpersonal skills). The individual dimension, in turn, includes the Solidarity Face (resulting from the need for closeness to others and for in-group belonging) and the Autonomy Face (resulting from the need for independence, staying apart from others), which always coexist and compete with each other. The two dimensions and the five types of face are all present in every culture; however, their content may differ. To quote the metaphor employed by the author of the model, each face type is an empty container which may be filled with some culture-specific content. In the light of the previously discussed face theories, this is perhaps the most evident for the Solidarity Face and the Autonomy Face, as the former will be stronger in more collectivistic, and the latter – in more individualistic cultures.

As for facework, the Cultural Face Model (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2010: 265–267) assumes that it has a very broad scope and is at play, in one way or another, in any interaction, serving to negotiate the relationship between the participants. Negatively marked facework involves actions that threaten or damage the addressee's face (impolite or rude behaviour) and actions that threaten or damage the speaker's face (self-denigration). Positively marked facework, by contrast, involves actions that enhance the addressee's face (politeness) and actions that enhance the speaker's face (self-praise, positive self-presentation). Apart from these two types, however, there is also less conspicuous, unmarked facework, employed to maintain the addressee's and/or the speaker's face and, more generally, the status quo of the relationship between them. All three types of facework may be oriented at the social and at the individual dimension of face. Importantly, facework may also be realised by non-verbal means, that is, gestures, facial expressions and eye-contact, and by the absence of an action when it is expected

(e.g., failure to greet somebody we know, either verbally or non-verbally). These properties of facework are culture-general, but facework is also influenced by cultural factors as well as individual-level factors. According to Bogdanowska-Jakubowska, "[t]he choice of actions and linguistic structures that realize facework depends on the hierarchy of cultural values, the social norms, and the character of social relations specific for a particular culture" (p. 267).

The author proceeds to test the applicability of her model on authentic utterances coming from American and Polish culture, drawing the conclusion that the Moral Face and the Prestige Face in both the cultures show close affinity, while some differences can be observed as regards the Relational Face as well as the balance between the Solidarity Face and the Autonomy Face. Facework strategies employed by Poles and Americans turn out to be very similar.

3.3.2 Empirical research

3.3.2.1 Research methodologies

A discussion of empirical research in any field should probably start with at least a brief survey of the most popular methods used to collect and analyse data (examples of studies that use them, however, will be provided in the next section). A more comprehensive overview of research methodologies employed to study various pragmatic phenomena, including facework, is offered by Leech (2014: 247–260). As he points out, the data collection methods can be arranged on "a methodological continuum" (p. 248), with highly controlled, elicited, perception/comprehension data on one end of it and uncontrolled, authentic, production data on the other end.

While it would appear that observation of naturally occurring interaction without any interference from the researcher (i.e., the latter end of the continuum) is the ideal method for this kind of scholarly endeavours, we must remember about the inherent constraints. Namely, the ethical principle of informed consent means that researchers cannot record human subjects surreptitiously and scrutinise their output as they see fit for their project (even if they anonymise it). Asking potential subjects (or respondents, as they are usually called by pragmaticists) for

permission, on the other hand, can seriously influence their behaviour once they know what they say will be analysed afterwards (assuming that the permission is granted in the first place). This might have a less detrimental effect on formal speech, but it can easily be predicted that informal conversation is likely to become "less spontaneous and more self-conscious" (p. 260). Consequently, it might be argued that the existing corpora of "authentic spoken language" are not, as a matter of fact, fully authentic: even though the data is not controlled by the researcher, it may, to some extent, be controlled by the respondents. Discourse analysis or corpus linguistics can be applied to handle collected, and usually transcribed, observational data. With a great oversimplification, the former deals with a few discourse extracts that undergo very detailed scrutiny, and the latter with large amounts of verbal data that is typically searched and analysed with help of computer software, often in a quantitative manner.

At the other end of the methodological continuum lie multiple choice tests, in which respondents are asked to choose one among a few possible ready-made responses they might use in situations that they have to imagine on the basis of the questions. Alternatively, instead of choosing just one option, respondents may be asked to rank or otherwise assess (e.g., on a five-point scale) the provided responses in terms of their appropriateness, politeness, etc. The task is "far removed from the real language-use data that pragmatics in principle should investigate" (Leech 2014: 249); on the other hand, the obtained data is strictly to the point (i.e., relevant for a particular research question) and easy both to collect and to analyse.

There are also some popular research methods that occupy the territory somewhere between the two extremes on the continuum. The most prevalent, by far, is the discourse completion test (DCT), which shares the merits of the multiple choice test in being a very convenient method. It is also similar to the multiple choice test in formulating questions that describe fictitious situations respondents might find themselves in, with varying degrees of probability (which is particularly low if the respondent is asked to put him/herself in the shoes of someone they are not, for example, a company manager negotiating a deal). Possible responses, however, are not provided by the researcher: the questions are open-ended and the respondents are supposed to state, usually in writing, what they would have said in a given situation. Using the written medium to investigate what is supposedly spoken language is what DCTs are frequently criticised for.

Another fairly popular method, less constrained than the DCT, is the role play. Respondents are asked to enact a dialogue as if they

were experiencing a given situation. We can distinguished between the closed role play and the open role play here, with the closed variant being rather similar to the DCT, with the important improvement of using the spoken medium instead of writing (i.e., the researcher plays the role of one of the interactants and tries to elicit responses to controlled stimuli). The open role play, on the other hand, is considerably less controlled: two or more respondents interact freely, apart from the fact that the initial cue (i.e., the scenario picturing the situational context) will normally be provided by the researcher. The resulting conversations resemble real-life ones in featuring, quite often, multiple exchanges rather than a single response.

Obviously, the disadvantages the pragmatic methods have may, to some extent, be counteracted by triangulating various methods to get a broader perspective. For example, a test (whether multiple choice or discourse completion) might be followed by an interview to ask the respondent for his/her motives for particular decisions.

3.3.2.2 Various settings and research areas

This section, aiming to characterise briefly the major trends in the field, is, again, far from exhaustive. Given the recent abundance of empirical research on facework and related phenomena, it is clearly unfeasible to attempt to cover the subject in its entirety in a single book chapter; it would rather require a whole extensive monograph, with a bibliography going into hundreds or even thousands of items. Consequently, given the scope of this section, some works that a pragmaticist would consider groundbreaking will not be reviewed or even mentioned here. Likewise, the research that is referred to is not necessarily selected for its top quality, but rather as an endeavour to provide some representative examples.

First of all, it must be noted that empirical research relatively rarely sets out to analyse all instances of any facework identifiable in the collected material. More frequently, scholars prefer to focus on a given type or two/three somehow related types of speech acts, for instance apologies (Deutschmann 2003, an observational study based on the spoken part of the British National Corpus; Tanaka et al. 2008, exploring cultural differences between apologising in English and in Japanese by means of a DCT test) or compliment responses (Arabski 2004, employing a DCT to find out how young Poles

would react to various compliments, e.g., accept, reject or downgrade them; Spencer-Oatey et al. 2008, examining perceptions of various compliment responses among speakers of English and Chinese by means of a questionnaire with scenarios comprising a compliment and five possible responses, to be judged on their appropriateness, conceit and impression conveyed by the speaker).

As for settings, workplaces of all kinds have enjoyed great popularity, and observation of naturally occurring conversations seems to be the prevalent method in research of this type. A surprisingly large number of researchers have succeeded in obtaining permission to record material during various workplace interactions. Miller (2008) investigates conversations by Japanese and American employees (switching between English and Japanese) in two advertising agencies in Tokyo to look for instances of negative assessment. Graham (2009) examines hospital talk (of medical staff with various positions, such as physicians-in-training and registered nurses) on the basis of a recorded discharge rounds meeting, focusing on politeness strategies used to express opinions on patient care. Wasson (2000) employs conversation analysis to search for the ways in which cautiousness is expressed in American business meetings with a view to achieving consensus.

Political debates of various types, as highly formal events normally open to the public and frequently also broadcast, give ample opportunity to observe facework. García-Pastor (2008), for example, analyses sixteen electoral campaign debates in the US in 2000, focusing on interventions in which politicians directly address one another with certain face-threatening acts, namely on-record FTAs with redressive action. On the basis of her data, the author proposes a framework of face aggravating strategies directed against the hearer's positive face (such as conveying dislike for and disagreement with the hearer, denying him/her in-group status or diminishing the hearer's importance) and against the hearer's negative face (such as challenging the hearer or referring to his/her unfulfilled duties). The analysis shows that the strategies tended to appear in clusters that are called "negativity cycles" and resulted in highly impolite interchanges in which the candidates endeavoured to damage each other's face as well as competed for the floor and tried to control the topic of the conversation. Once started, impoliteness was likely to escalate. Apart from electoral campaign debates (also investigated by Galasinski 1998 and Blas Arroyo 2003, among others), political genres that have attracted attention of pragmaticists include broadcast interviews with politicians, panel discussions, public political statements, and, notably, also parliamentary debates (cf. García-Pastor 2008: 102). As facework in parliamentary debates lies at the very centre

of my research interests, I will come back to this topic in more detail at the end of this section (see 3.3.2.2.1).

Reality television often functions for researchers as an extremely convenient setting to observe informal conversations (although it is obviously questionable if participants in such shows actually behave and interact as they would were they not aware of being filmed). In a way similar to politicians, the participants typically compete with each other to some extent, so there is much room for conflict and verbal aggression. Consequently, the favourite focus here seems to be impoliteness, which can be illustrated with the studies by Culpeper (2005) or by Lorenzo-Dus (2009). Sometimes even purely fictional TV productions, such as sit-coms, provide material which researchers scrutinise for face-threatening acts and facework as they would real-life conversations. This tends to result in rather poor papers, like Ding and Hou's (2008) analysis of verbal conflict between two different mother- and daughter-in-law pairs in the popular series *Desperate Housewives*. The temptation to turn to film dialogues as a source of material seems particularly strong for authors of graduation theses.

Facework in intimate relationships, fascinating as it may be, can hardly be studied on the basis of recordings of naturally occurring speech, as this method would be too invasive for couples to accept. However, as shown by the thorough research review offered by Cupach and Metts' book (1994), a lot of information on sensitive topics, like establishing a romantic relationship, negotiating to have sex or voicing complaints to one's partner, can also be revealed by instruments such as surveys or interviews.

Recently, the problem with access to authentic data from face-to-face conversations has been partly solved (or rather successfully bypassed, as this mode combines some features of spoken and written discourse) by turning to on-line communication as an easily accessible source of material. This very fruitful trend can be exemplified by Arendholz's book (2013), focusing on message board communication, the study by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2013), exploring negative emotion patterning in on-line discussions concerning a possible Brexit referendum, or a highly interesting collective volume edited by Bedijs et al. (2014), which features some corpus-based studies analysing facework in contexts such as user's complaints in references for their CoachSurfing hosts (Dayter and Rüdinger 2014) or comments to a YouTube film showing a crying goalkeeper (Bedijs 2014).

Last but not least, there are two slightly related (as both involving pragmatics of more than one language and contrastive analysis) and very extensive research areas: facework in second/foreign language

acquisition and facework across languages and cultures. The former is a part of what is often referred to as interlanguage pragmatics, and refers to the problem of learning how to perform effective facework (e.g., how to politely ask for something or refuse an invitation) and avoid pragmatic failures in a language different than one's mother tongue. As pointed out by Leech (2014: 263), "[t]he sociopragmatics of politeness in two distinct cultures can be so different that what is normal in one language, if translated into another, may be face-threatening" either for the addressee or for the speaker; and even if not face-threatening as such, it may lead to misunderstandings as to the speaker's real intention.[7] Empirical research may set out to assess pragmatic competence of language learners at various levels, taking into consideration differences between the learners' mother tongue and the language being learned. For example, Hidalgo et al. (2014) investigate, by means of a DCT including three scenarios, how Spanish university students choose politeness strategies when expressing complaints, disapprovals and disagreements in their native language and in English, which is their language of instruction. While the strategies are more varied in Spanish, the students are already able to produce appropriate speech acts in English, employing more indirectness than in their native tongue. Schauer (2009), in turn, is a considerably more complex study, comparing pragmatic performance in the English language of German students learning English in Germany, German students learning English in the UK, and British students in the UK. The author investigates both the pragmatic awareness of her respondents and the production aspect (formulation of requests), using a video-and-questionnaire task and interviews for the former and an elicitation task with multimedia for the latter. The results of this research project, and, in fact, of most studies in interlanguage pragmatics, are rather predictable, or, to use Leech's phrase (2014: 273), "less than earth-shattering," as they confirm the intuitive hypothesis that a study period abroad helps to improve the learner's pragmatic proficiency.

Research on facework across languages and cultures, also referred to as cross-cultural pragmatics, is arguably even more popular than interlanguage pragmatics. This area is often connected with more or less vehement opposition to Brown and Levinson's (1987) "misguided" universalism, seen as "[t]he search for universals in language usage at the expense of culture-specifics" (Wierzbicka 2003: 67). Research may

[7] For instance, a Polish learner of English, when offered something to eat or drink, will often respond with *thanks*, which is a literal translation of Polish *dziękuję*. Afterwards, s/he is surprised on being handed over the food or drink which s/he believes to have just refused.

seek to contrast and/or compare the pragmatic systems of just two languages or, alternatively, offer a broader perspective by dealing with several languages, often coming from distinct language families and used by distant cultures (although in this case the range of speech acts types under consideration will usually be rather limited).

The former approach is represented, for example, by Jakubowska's book (1999), analysing various kinds of polite formulae in English and in Polish: terms of address, greetings and farewells, thanks, apologies, compliments, congratulations, good wishes, toasts and condolences (including responses to these speech acts that normally require a response). On the basis of data obtained from introspection, observation of naturally occurring conversations and a DCT, the author describes certain similarities as well as marked differences, which are highlighted as a source of difficulty for Polish learners of English, also reflected in their interlanguage. Such differences are visible, for example, in Polish responses to questions resembling the English *How are you?* (which exhibit a tendency to complain rather than to present a positive self-image), or in responses to compliments (which, in Polish, more frequently reject or downgrade the compliment). A similar range of analytic tools was employed earlier by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1989) in a contrastive study on praising and compliments in Polish as well as British and American English, and it is interesting to combine the two studies with the one by Arabski (2004) to see how the Polish pragmatics of these speech acts evolved over a relatively short period of time (but a very dynamic one for language change – see, e.g., Marcjanik 2007) to get closer to the Anglo-Saxon standards.

The latter approach may be exemplified by the study by Ogiermann (2009), which explores English, German, Polish and Russian requests by means of a DCT. The results show that, although basically the same strategies are in use in all the four languages, they considerably differ in the frequency of their application: for instance, direct imperative constructions were rare in English and in German (4% and 5% respectively), but quite frequent in Polish and in Russian (20% and 35% respectively), which leads the author to conclude that "in Slavic cultures, requests are not regarded as threats to the hearer's face to the degree that they are in Western Europe" (Ogiermann 2009: 210).

Importantly, apart from looking at intracultural interactions in various languages and cultures in terms of their differences and similarities, cross-cultural pragmatics also helps explain the reasons for some failures and misunderstandings in intercultural communication: each party relies on the pragmatic rules appropriate in the culture of their language of origin. This is why, for example, certain immigrant

groups might be perceived as "rude" in an Anglo-Saxon environment. Even when their English is judged as grammatical and unaccented, "they speak in what is perceived as a blunt, dogmatic and bossy way, they flatly assert their opinions and flatly contradict other people, and so on" (Wierzbicka 2003: 69). On a similar note, in the study by Miller (2008), already mentioned before, it turns out that certain misunderstandings between Japanese and American employees are due to the fact that the Japanese express their criticism in a very vague way as compared to what the Americans are used to. Consequently, an American employee was surprised to learn a few days later that his idea for an ad was rejected, as he had not interpreted his superior's negative assessment correctly during a meeting devoted to this very issue. By analogy, an American expressing negative assessment of his Japanese colleagues' work, although trying hard to sound indirect in accordance with the Japanese standards, was still perceived as too brusque.

3.3.2.2.1 Facework in parliamentary debates

Research on parliamentary discourse, highly salient in the context of my own empirical project, needs to be reported in some detail here. Over time, various national parliaments have become the subject of pragmatic analyses, for example in the special issue of *Journal of Pragmatics* (see Ilie 2010a for an outline) or in the collective volumes *Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse* (Bayley 2004) and *European Parliaments under Scrutiny* (Ilie 2010b). Certainly, only part of this abundant research deals with issues directly related to face (e.g., Tsakona 2011 on the use of irony by Greek parliamentarians). As far as I know, pragmatic studies concerning interaction in the EP usually take a comparative approach, presenting the EP against the background of a given national parliament (e.g., Plug 2010 on personal attacks in the Dutch and the European Parliaments, or Fløttum 2010, comparing a speech by Tony Blair presented before the British Parliament to another by the same politician presented before the EP). However, my interest is not limited to the EP context only. National parliaments, acting as prototypes of a parliamentary assembly, may well play an important role in shaping the linguistic behaviour of MEPs from specific member states as well as their expectations as to what constitutes legitimate parliamentary language and what goes beyond it. Taking into consideration the source and target languages of my

corpus, I am naturally particularly interested in debates at the national level conducted in (British) English and in Polish and in the potential differences between them. First and foremost, I need to consider possible discrepancies between the English and the Polish parliamentary discourse that would necessitate or at least justify a cultural adjustment as to the level of (im)politeness when interpreting from English into Polish, in line with Hatim and Mason's claim (1997: 67) that "the seriousness of an FTA is a cultural variable; it cannot be assumed that the same act would carry the same threat in different socio-cultural settings."[8] While, to my knowledge, there are no studies directly comparing the Polish and the British parliamentary discourses, I will endeavour to draw some conclusions from available studies discussing aspects of facework in each of these parliaments separately.

Plug (2010) is, in fact, the only study I have been able to find which deals with facework in the EP, and actually with a topic that is very relevant in the context of my research project: *ad-hominem* arguments, which predominantly amount to FTAs against the interlocutor's positive face. As defined by the author, "[a] personal attack, or *ad hominem* argument, is characterized by being directed not at the intrinsic merits of the opponent's standpoint or doubt, but at the person himself or herself," the goal of which is, first of all, to cast doubt on his/her "expertise, intelligence, character or good faith" (p. 311). The other two variants of personal attack question the opponent's motives and point out contradictions in his/her actions and utterances. The author highlights the untypical procedural solution of the EP that allows the MEP who feels to have become a subject of personal attack to make a "personal statement" so as to rebut any unjustified remarks related to his/her person, but only at the end of the discussion of the current agenda item. It is untypical in the sense that in other parliamentary assemblies (such as the Dutch one), it would rather be the chairing President's prerogative to react to such a personal attack, or to give the floor to the individual who has been attacked to react at once.

The study is qualitative in nature and limited to a few examples from each of the scrutinised parliaments; actually, two exchanges from the EP plenary are presented and analysed. In one of them, MEP Watson attacks Commissioner Patten with the rather clever metaphor: *you read from your script* […] *with your lips moving faster than those of a policemen giving corrupt evidence*. When Patten protests against being

[8] Some argue that such an adjustment would not be in place in conference interpreting. As the international context involves "tacitly shared norms" that participants have to acquire, "simultaneous interpreters are not expected to take the range of cultural backgrounds into account" (Setton 2006: 379).

compared to a corrupt policeman (in accordance with the procedure, at the end of the discussion), Watson offers to withdraw his remark, but only after pointing out that he was misquoted, as he had not been talking about Patten himself, but just his lips. The other exchange takes place between MEP Schulz and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi (outlining his plans at the beginning of the Italian presidency). Schulz accuses Berlusconi of not being able to introduce in his own country the reform he is proposing for the EU, and Berlusconi responds with a creative insult which subsequently attracted much attention of the media: *I know there is a producer in Italy who is making a film about Nazi concentration camps. I will suggest you for the role of guard. You would be perfect!* This raises such vehement protests from the audience that, against his initial decision to invite Schulz to react at the end of the discussion, and actually against the normal procedure, the chairing President gives the floor to Schulz immediately. However, Schulz's very brief response: *My respect for the victims of fascism prevents me from saying a single word about this*, puts Berlusconi on the defensive and results in his explanations that he was attacked first and his remark was in fact ironic, which the audience failed to understand. On the whole, this exchange shows that the attacker is also under risk of losing his own face due to an excessively offensive FTA, even though, as Plug (2010: 325) rightly notes, the EP Rules of Procedure may create the impression that personal attacks are rather profitable rhetorical moves. Plug's examples, although scarce, aptly show that the EP plenary discourse is not devoid of grave FTAs.

As far as parliamentary English is concerned, research has been undertaken mainly in the context of the British Parliament, as may be exemplified by Pérez de Ayala (2001), Harris (2001), Chilton (2004) or Bull and Wells (2012). These studies focus on Question Time as an event in which the debate is the most spontaneous (as the questions do not have to be tabled in advance, with the exception of the initial ones that trigger the debate).[9] Question Time takes place every day from Monday to Thursday for one hour and gives all British Members of Parliament an opportunity to question government ministers on matters related to their policy. It can be described as "the most adversarial of parliamentary genres" (Pérez de Ayala 2001: 144) and one that is inherently face-threatening, as the questioners hardly ever actually seek to obtain information or press the government for

[9] Question Time is not unique to the UK parliamentary system, it appears in a similar form in parliaments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India (Bull and Wells 2012: 31) and Sweden (Ilie 2004: 48). Also EP plenary sessions include separate Question Times with the Commission as well as with the Council.

action (as they are supposed to), their main objective being either to attack the government or to support it (p. 147), naturally depending on their political allegiance. Prime Minister's Question Time, taking place weekly for 30 minutes, is particularly face-threatening due to the vagueness of the initial questions and to the broad scope of possible attacks (Pérez de Ayala 2001: 150; Chilton 2004: 93). The questions themselves can contain face-threatening presuppositions; for instance, on 24 October 2007 David Cameron (Leader of the Opposition at the time) asked Labour PM Gordon Brown: *When is he going to give up his mania for state control and start trusting head teachers?* (Bull 2012: 89). As pointed out by Bull, such questions are in fact unanswerable, but the PM's evasiveness gives rise to further criticism from the opposition for "dodging questions." Among the four studies, Bull and Wells (2012) use the largest corpus, whose composition also seems to be the most carefully planned: they scrutinise 18 full Question Time sessions from 2007, with Tony Blair featuring as the PM in nine of them and Gordon Brown in the other nine (and David Cameron as the Leader of the Opposition in both cases).

All the authors agree that, paradoxically, Question Time is characterised by an intricate mixture of politeness and impoliteness: "negative politeness features, i.e. those which attempt *to avoid impoliteness*, appear to co-exist with the performance of deliberate threats to the hearer's positive face, i.e. acts which are clearly *intended to be impolite*" (Harris 2001: 463, original emphasis). Ilie (2004: 57) notes "a striking incongruity between the genuine expression of contempt […] and the ritualistic expression of respect for the targeted MP," which she aptly illustrates with the following utterance by PM Blair, addressed to the Leader of the Opposition: *I think that the right honourable gentleman's comments may look a little foolish when the results of the consultation are announced, if I may respectfully say so.* […] *this is about the only health service subject he dares raise – he knows that he has nothing to say about anything else*.[10] In Culpeper's terms (1996: 356), the politeness strategies used in this context qualify as mock-politeness.

Pérez de Ayala (2001) attributes this coexistence of rudeness and politeness to the rule of Erskine May's *Treatise on the Law, Privileges,*

[10] This style seems to be very deeply rooted in the British Parliament's tradition. For instance, Lloyd George (UK's PM during World War I) is known to have targeted his political opponent Sir John Simon with the following picturesque metaphor: *The right honourable and learned gentleman has twice crossed the floor of the House, each time leaving behind a trail of slime* (quoted after http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturenews/11519453/best-british-political-insults.html?frame=3259778, accessed 4 February 2016).

Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, which acts as an important constraint both for the form and the content of FTAs produced during British parliamentary debates. In particular, the *Treatise* protects the MPs' private face by its ban on personal allusions, which extends as far as to proscribe calling MPs by their names. Instead, the MPs should be referred to using their function, for example, *right honourable gentleman the Member for York*. The MPs' public face, on the other hand, is vulnerable to threats, but even these are limited by the rules imposed by the *Treatise*. One of such rules mitigates potential risk to face by stating that interlocutors should address the Speaker of the House rather than their opponent.[11] Harris (2001: 463–464) describes this as "a distancing strategy, which heightens the formality of the interaction in a way which is almost invariably associated with negative politeness." Questioners are also supposed to refrain from voicing their opinions or asking for a personal opinion, and forbidden to accuse their opponents of lying or to use insults (Pérez de Ayala 2001: 149). Consequently, the *Treatise* "becomes the greatest defender of Members' face" (p. 148). It is the Speaker's role to ensure that the rules are respected, by means of interrupting MPs who break them and demanding that they either withdraw or reformulate the offending question. Refusal to comply may result, in extreme cases, in expulsion from the Chamber. Therefore, even very grave FTAs are produced in such a way as to conform, at least superficially, to the rules of Erskine May, and impoliteness goes hand in hand with elaborate expressions of deference towards those whose face is in fact being demolished. Pérez de Ayala aptly calls this phenomenon "parliamentary institutionalized hypocrisy," as "anything – or almost anything – can be said, provided that it is formulated with the appropriate degree of politeness" (p. 150). Bull and Wells (2012: 32) note that MPs are often forced to use "considerable ingenuity to remain within the conventions of acceptable parliamentary language."

Chilton (2004) is the only one out of the four above-mentioned studies which, apart from FTAs, also considers face enhancement by members of the same party as the ruling one. All four offer qualitative analyses rich in examples illustrating how FTAs are produced in the House of Commons, and which of them are inacceptable (i.e., which have to be withdrawn or reformulated with the appropriate politeness strategies following the Speaker's intervention). Bull and Wells (2012: 32), for instance, list the following epithets that had to be withdrawn

[11] In theory, the same rule applies to the EP, too, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Its observance, however, is not enforced to a comparable degree as at the British Parliament, and therefore frequent transgressions are observable.

as abusive and unparliamentary: *blackguard*, *coward*, *git*, *guttersnipe*, *hooligan*, *rat*, *swine*, *traitor* and *stoolpigeon*. Pérez de Ayala (2001: 156), in turn, shows how an MP's bald on-record accusation that the minister *misled the House* meets with protest from the Speaker and is, subsequently, reformulated (so as to remain semantically identical with the original one) employing Brown and Levinson's (1987) negative politeness strategies of questioning/hedging, understatement and ellipsis: *May I ask the Minister instead whether he considers the evidence that came to light last week a contradiction to his job as Minister with responsibility for open Government?* An accusation to the same effect may also legitimately be formulated by means of cliché euphemisms such as *economical with the truth* or *terminological inexactitude* (p. 158). Also positive politeness strategies are frequently employed, that is, opposition MPs may claim common ground with the minister on some non-partisan issue (e.g., welcoming a foreign delegation visiting the House of Commons) only to rapidly switch to a serious FTA (as shown by Harris 2001: 465–466, see also Ilie 2004: 55).

In contrast to what Brown and Levinson (1987) postulate, during Question Time, politeness strategies are not used to avoid conflict, as conflict is the very essence of the event. Rather, they are employed to enable work and progress in spite of the inherent conflict (Pérez de Ayala 2001: 164–165). Since impoliteness is "sanctioned," that is, grave FTAs are undoubtedly expected to occur as a matter of course in this particular genre, Harris (2001: 466–467) wonders whether Prime Minister's Question Time meets the criteria to be construed as a series of ritualistic insults and therefore not genuinely impolite, but closer to banter (not meant to result in a breakdown of the relationship between the adversaries). A similar point is also raised by Ilie (2004: 52), who believes that "certain kinds of institutional rudeness, such as parliamentary insults, have acquired an acknowledged legitimacy that underlies ritualised confrontational encounters."

In addition to the qualitative descriptions, Pérez de Ayala (2001) also offers a quantitative analysis. It involves a count of FTAs and politeness strategies in a corpus of 29 exchanges (each related to a single initial question), containing 271 turns. There are, in total, 235 FTAs and 754 politeness strategies, accounting for the average of 0.86 and 2.78 occurrences per turn, respectively. Neither the FTAs nor the politeness strategies are further subdivided according to their type.

In Poland, parliamentary discourse after 1989 has to be considered as a completely new genre in comparison with its counterpart during the communist era (see, e.g., Kamińska-Szmaj 2007, Ornatowski 2014). After the first semi-free election, MPs were very quick to switch from the

previous obligatory approval of every plenary speech to "an increasingly broader range of attitudes and emotions: support, opposition, qualified support, approval and disapproval, solidarity, irony, ridicule, rejection" (Ornatowski 2014: 199). As we can see from this list, FTAs must have become an important part of debates. Kamińska-Szmaj (2007: 35) points out that the introduction of colloquial and even vulgar expressions into debates of the so-called contractual Sejm was fully intentional and served breaking the conventions associated with the communist past. She gives examples of this kind of language, which need to be quoted in Polish here to do justice to their register: *X łże jak pies* 'X is lying like a dog,' *wam chodzi o stołki* 'you care about posts,' *rząd rżnie głupa* 'the government is playing dumb,' *rząd kropnął się o głupie 40 bilionów* 'the government messed up the calculations by silly 40 billion.' Another important breakthrough was the emergence of spontaneous laughter as a frequent reaction of the audience to such linguistic behaviours.

In the Polish parliamentary practice, there are also equivalents of Question Time with government ministers (called current information and current questions) as communicative events that seem especially suited to both expressing FTAs and investigating them from a pragmatic viewpoint[12] – although I have not managed to locate any Polish studies specifically focusing on exchanges during such events. The Rules of Procedure of the Sejm do not place any constraints on the language that can be used during debates, and the only formal rule that may be construed as extending to linguistic behaviour comes from the MP Code of Ethics: *An MP should refrain from behaviours that may damage the good name of the Sejm. S/he should respect the dignity of others*. (Article 6, translation mine).

Any perceptive observer of the current Polish political scene (i.e., as of the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, after the Civic Platform lost power to the Law and Justice Party) would probably confirm that the Polish parliamentary discourse can sometimes become very impolite and face-threatening, and enumerate a few "colourful personalities" among Polish parliamentarians who are apt to make aggressive personal attacks against their opponents, not necessarily respecting their dignity in accordance with the MP Code of Ethics. However, there is also some linguistic research to prove the point. Polkowska (2014), for example,

[12] Unlike in the UK, *informacja bieżąca* does not take place on a regular basis, but has to be requested by a group of at least 15 MPs specifying the topic on which they require to be informed. The relevant minister's explanation is followed by a discussion. *Pytanie bieżące* to a specific minister can be posed by an individual MP, who has to specify the general topic of the question in advance.

is a highly relevant study on infringements of parliamentary ethics in the years 2001–2012, as ruled by the Commission on MP Ethics that is entitled to adjudicate in such matters. During this period, the Commission found Polish MPs guilty of infringements in 130 cases, out of which 91 concerned verbal behaviours.[13] As can be seen on the basis of the numerous examples the author provides, the utterances which the Commission considered unethical are, in fact, grave FTAs, mostly directed against individuals, but sometimes also larger groups, such as a political party as a whole. Many of the FTAs may easily be classified as accusations, for example, MP Palikot blames former PM Miller: *It is Leszek Miller who has got blood on his hands for these soldiers who died in Iraq and Afghanistan*, and MP Janowski accuses another MP: *Wiktor Osik and other MPs are implicated in business of western companies* (Polkowska 2014: 62; translations mine).

The author divides the offending utterances into a few groups, which, however, partly overlap (when, in a single utterance, multiple FTAs of diverse types are present). One group comprises accusations of dishonest conduct, which may amount to lying to the public, but also even to organising strictly criminal activity, as in the following utterance by MP Macierewicz addressed to PM Tusk: *This scandal is your scandal, because you created the mafia system which prevented arriving at the truth and justice in Gdańsk* (p. 63; translation mine). In another widely represented group, MPs cast doubt on the intellectual abilities of their opponents, calling them offensive names, like *imbecile* and *idiot*,[14] but also, less directly, referring to their statements with highly pejorative terms, such as *nonsense*, *bullshit*.[15] What can be questioned are also someone's education and sophistication (*primitive*, *lout*) or willingness to work (*lazybones*, *slob*). Sometimes, politicians suggest that their opponents are drunk or under the influence of drugs, as done by MP Miller, referring to hecklers trying to interrupt

[13] However, not all of the incriminating utterances were in fact made during parliamentary debates, as the Commission is also entitled to investigate alleged infringements of ethics in other public events, such as interviews for the media, press conferences, etc. The most severe punishment the Commission can impose amounts to a reprimand, which is made publicly known but has no further consequences, such as, for instance, depriving the MP of some of his/her remuneration.

[14] By analogy, Illie (2004: 76) points out that British parliamentary insults tend to target the opponent's intellect and wit, as these are the fundamental qualities expected of a politician.

[15] Ilie (2004: 59) describes this as "the attribution transfer strategy," where "instead of directly applying a negative qualifier to the targeted person him/herself, the insulting MP applies it (by transfer) instead to one of the targeted person's acts or statements."

his speech: *Madam Speaker, that stoned rabble is not able to stop me* (p. 64; translation mine). A frequent strategy to insult someone involves use of metaphors referring to Poland's tragic history, such as Holocaust, Adolf Hitler or collaborating with the enemy (be it Nazis or the partitioning powers in the 18th or 19th century). Labels such as nationalism and fascism are also resorted to, as well as suggestions or more straightforward accusations that certain politicians are in fact serving the interests of other states than Poland (especially Russia). The most extreme are the cases where speakers actually call for physical elimination of their opponents, such as the following utterance by MP Hofman: *Palikot has crossed the frontier behind which there is no more politics, but the guy should be hanged from the nearest bough* (p. 66; translation mine).

Although the number of infringements does not seem to be shocking considering the time span under analysis (12 years), we must remember that probably only the most outrageous FTAs come to the attention of the Commission and many others are overlooked. It is also notable that one utterance may contain numerous threats attacking diverse aspects of a person's face, as, for example, the following one by MP Niesiołowski: *I have to say that so much bad faith, innuendoes, lies, untruth and simple ignorance that you are kindly serving us with, in a boring manner, interrupting and correcting each remark all the time, surely deserves an award* (p. 63; translation mine). In effect, the addressee is accused of acting with ulterior motives, lying and inadequate knowledge, and criticised for speaking indirectly, boring the audience and lacking oratory skills, which amounts to six FTAs of varying gravity in such a short fragment. In addition, the speaker resorts to mock-politeness (*kindly*) and irony; however, it must also be noted that the whole utterance is preceded by what may be seen as a mitigating preparator, in Spencer-Oatey's (2008) terms. Other mitigating moves commonly employed by Polish MPs include, according to Polkowska (2014: 68–69), clearly marking one's utterance as a personal opinion, formulating an accusation in the form of a question and making an allusion instead of a direct statement. As far as the first of these strategies is concerned, I am inclined to disagree that it effectively plays the role that it is ascribed – on the contrary, both Brown and Levinson (1987) and Culpeper (1996) emphasise that the direct reference to the speaker's *I* (as well as the addressee's *you*) strengthens the face threat inherent in criticism. However, some of the punished MPs seem not to share this view, as, when trying to justify their behaviour to the Commission, they were arguing that what they had said was just a personal opinion (cf. Polkowska 2014: 68).

Polkowska also points out to the trend of using colloquialisms and vulgarisms, which may be illustrated by MP Biedroń's utterance *Madam Speaker Kopacz is kicking democracy's backside*, or, even more vividly, by the retort *fuck off* made by MP Pawłowicz to another MP from a different party (p. 67). Ożóg describes this phenomenon as follows: "Regretfully, it has to be stated that the Polish Sejm has, on many occasions, become the scene of scandalous linguistic exploits. Vulgarisms and insults fly here, sometimes very primitive utterances" (Ożóg 2008: 30; translation mine). He adds that the ubiquitous aggressiveness of the political discourse is evaluated highly negatively by a majority of Poles, according to surveys he conducted.

Beyond the infringements identified by the Commission of MP Ethics, the presence of very grave FTAs in Polish parliamentary debates is also attested by numerous examples provided by Polkowska (2004) and Ożóg (2013) (although neither of them focuses specifically on face issues), and by Kamińska-Szmaj (2007). Kamińska-Szmaj offers a comprehensive lexicon of Polish "political invectives" in use between 1918 and 2000, in which the entries are based mostly on the language of the press, but some of them do come from Sejm debates. She defines a political invective as intentional verbal behaviour aiming to publicly damage the face of politicians, which can be directed against individuals, groups, institutions or ideologies, and emphasises that offensive lexis is not an obligatory element of an invective, as its face-threatening potential can emerge from the context (Kamińska-Szmaj 2007: 57–58). She also points out that the communicative intent of offending the target is, in fact, secondary. The main aim is to influence the audience's beliefs and actions and to convince them that the speaker is superior to the target and that the invective actually results from the speaker's good intentions towards the audience (p. 60). It is notable that, in opposition to the classical view on FTAs, the target and the addressee are not always the same in the case of political invectives as described by Kamińska-Szmaj.

Ilie (2004: 54) notes that "English parliamentary debates are notorious for the very heated disputes that often turn into interpersonal verbal dueling" and that British MPs tend to seek confrontation rather than to minimise disagreement. In light of what has just been reported about the Polish parliamentary discourse, this statement could equally well be used as a description of the Polish parliamentary reality. Although, on the basis of the available sources reported throughout this section, it is impossible to attempt any quantitative comparison as to the frequency of FTAs in the British and the Polish parliamentary discourses, a qualitative comparison suggests that the Polish FTAs are

at least as face-damaging as the British ones. At the same time, most British mechanisms enforcing mitigation (such as the obligatory use of the 3rd person to refer to one's opponent) do not have their counterparts in the Sejm.[16] This does not mean that mitigation is never employed by Polish MPs making a face threat; however, it clearly does not have to be planned as carefully as in the House of Commons. Consequently, it might perhaps be considered a justified cultural adjustment if an interpreter rendering parliamentary discourse from Polish into English added some mitigating devices, but certainly not if the direction is the opposite, from English into Polish.

Apart from the literature that focuses on parliamentary discourse as such, certain cultural adjustments in interpretation might perhaps be predicted on the basis of studies comparing English and Polish politeness. Most of the pragmatic differences described in studies such as Jakubowska (1999) and Wierzbicka (2003), however, will not have a bearing on parliamentary discourse, as they relate to speech acts such as compliment responses or offering food to one's guests, which are hardly expected to occur in parliamentary debates. One area that seems relevant is opinion markers, such as *I think*, *I believe*, *I don't think*, which can accompany FTAs such as accusations and disagreements. Opinion markers can be seen as downtoners, as they result from "a desire not to put one's view too bluntly, and not to sound too abrupt and quarrelsome" (Wierzbicka 2003: 43). On a similar note, Jaszczolt (2013: 61) points out that the use of *I* accompanied by "a predicate pertaining to a non-factive mental state" is a detachment strategy "that allows the speaker to be truthful without improper commitment." Although opinion markers of this type do appear in Polish as well,

[16] Nevertheless, it might be argued that the Polish polite form of address *pan/pani* plays a slightly similar mitigating role, as, in strictly grammatical terms, the target of an FTA made in the Parliament will not be addressed with 2nd person singular, but rather with 3rd person singular. Any exceptions to this rule are rare in parliamentary discourse and perceived as extremely impolite. In addition, they are typically made off-mike and often not included in verbatim reports. For example, MP Krystyna Pawłowicz sued journalist Monika Olejnik for quoting her as having shouted *stul pysk* 'shut your trap' and *ty chamie* 'you lout' during a Sejm debate. The MP claimed she had not used these phrases as they were not present in the relevant verbatim report. However, the journalist won this case thanks to testimonies from other MPs confirming having heard Pawłowicz's highly unparliamentary remarks. The verbatim reports themselves also contain some examples, such as *przestań, to nudne jest* 'stop, this is boring' or *to siadaj, jak nie chcesz mówić* 'sit down if you don't want to talk' used by opposition MPs Niesiołowski and Kopacz, respectively, heckling PM Szydło (quoted after http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/ciii-prosze-wylaczyc-po-krystyna-pawlowicz-liderka-w-przerywaniu-poslom/cphze3, accessed 1 April 2016).

Wierzbicka (2003: 43) notes "the English preference for a hedged expression of opinions and evaluations" as opposed to "the Polish tendency to express opinions in strong terms, and without any hedges whatsoever." Therefore, omission of opinion markers when interpreting from English into Polish might be seen as justified, although by no means obligatory.

On the whole, the differences between FTAs employed in British and Polish parliamentary discourse as well as speech acts of the same types appearing in different contexts seem minor when compared with the similarities. Possible cultural adjustments in interpreting might go in the direction of strengthening the illocutionary force when transferring some FTAs from English into Polish, especially by omitting some hedges and making the statement more direct. When no such adjustment is attempted, listeners applying the Polish standards might perceive a face-threatening statement as somewhat less impolite and aggressive than originally intended.

4. Facework in interpreter-mediated interactions

The previous chapter has shown that the concepts of face, face-threatening acts and facework are highly salient in modern pragmatics, but at the same time they cause a lot of controversy and prove quite difficult to describe so as to remain unquestioned. As we have seen, the models described in the previous chapter take into account the speaker and the hearer as the main participants in interactions and tend to focus either on the speaker's communicative intent or on the hearer's perception of this intent (illocution or perlocution, to use more precise terms). Sometimes the presence of other possible participants is simply disregarded, but many scholars acknowledge, albeit in passing, that such presence may considerably alter the dynamics of interaction. Spencer-Oatey (2008: 36), for example, points out that "[f]ace management norms seem to be 'number sensitive,' in that what we say and how we say it is often influenced by the number of people present." Certain face-threatening acts, such as criticising, can have much more negative impact when performed with more people listening than on one-to-one basis.

The "view of the interpreter as an invisible translation machine" (Pöchhacker 2004: 194) characteristic of the conduit model of interpreting would preclude and actually proscribe any influence the interpreter might exert on mediated discourse. As described by Hoza (1999: 44), in accordance with this model "the responsibility of the interpreter is to convey each person's *words*," and s/he is not supposed to consider issues such as the wider social context of an utterance, the flow of the interaction, or implications of face and politeness.

However, at least since 1990s, the conduit model (its prescriptiveness inclusive) has been seriously challenged by empirical studies within various research paradigms, repeatedly showing that its proclaimed norms of invisibility and non-intrusiveness are rather a myth than reality, and that interpreters in fact do influence the messages they

render and play an active role as participants in the communicative event (e.g., Wadensjö 1998; Metzger 1999; Angelleli 2004). As pointed out by Diriker (2013: 27), "[i]n the research on community, court and sign language interpreting, the traditional notion of interpreters as 'conduits' and assumptions of neutrality, completeness and accuracy […] have been subjected to a critical reassessment." For conference interpreting, this reassessment started about a decade later and has also been in progress ever since (e.g., Diriker 2004; Monacelli 2009), although to a smaller degree than in liason interpreting.

In view of the newly reassessed interpreter's role, it would be unrealistic to expect that the presence of an interpreter mediating between the speaker and the hearer(s) will not have any influence on facework in the interaction. There are at least three obvious sources of this influence. Firstly, the very fact that the interpreter is present, and the resulting modifications of the communicative situation (such as radically different turn-taking patterns in a conversation) may change the way the primary participants act towards each other's face – which, however, would be very difficult to demonstrate empirically. Secondly, for a variety of reasons (including cultural adjustments and his/her desire to maintain a friendly atmosphere of the interaction), the interpreter may render the facework carried out by the primary participants somewhat differently than it is conveyed in the original. Moreover, the interpreter's own face may also be at stake, and it becomes a valid object of research once the conduit model is rejected.

Pöllabauer (2015: 158) notes that "issues of face have received scant attention in interpreting studies to date, though the concept has surfaced in works on other topics." I would add to that my observation that numerous examples of facework carried out by interpreters (on behalf of other participants or in their own capacity) surface in studies that do not employ the concepts of face or facework at all (the section on what I call incidental evidence of facework at the end of this chapter is devoted to this topic). The scholars who do refer to pragmatic facework models tend to choose Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory as their theoretical framework; the other two models employed in interpreting studies so far are Spencer-Oatey's (2008b) rapport management as well as Scollon and Wong Scollon's (2001) politeness model (cf. Pöllabauer 2015: 158). Apart from Section 4.4, this chapter will be organised around various interpreting modes, starting with broadly understood liason interpreting, as this is where facework has come under scholarly attention the most often. Whenever examples from corpora are quoted, they are provided in English only

(using the literal translations made by the respective author in the case of utterances originally expressed in other languages).

4.1 Facework in liason interpreting

4.1.1 Ad hoc interpreting as a point of departure

It is probably in the study by Knapp-Potthoff and Knapp (1987) that the concept of face appears for the first time in interpreting research. Using Brown and Levinson's model as their theoretical framework, the authors investigate politeness strategies in non-professional interpreting. The analysed material comes from an experiment involving seven conversations between Germans and Koreans, with a Korean student in her mid-twenties, fluent in both the languages, acting as the interpreter. In particular, the researchers are interested in how the ad hoc interpreter handles requests and "the verbal devices a speaker employs to soften the face-threat inherent in that act" (p. 187), as well as in what consequences for facework result from the interpreter's omissions and additions to the primary participants' contributions.

Interestingly, the authors assume that the phenomena they examine are, in fact, limited to non-professional interpreting: "[i]n professional and institutional settings, the function of an interpreter is comparable to that of a machine, rewording what is said in language A in language B and vice versa" (p. 182). In particular, they rule out that a simultaneous conference interpreter, working from a booth, should have any significant influence on the facework employed in the source text. Consequently, in their perception of the interpreter's role they clearly ascribe to the conduit model. However, they also mention that certain FTAs, especially in relatively distant cultures, might display culture-specific features, and it is not clear whether or not they see it as the (professional) interpreter's duty to modify such FTAs so that their impact should remain the same in the target language.

The authors note the difficulties in determining the reasons for some discrepancies between the source text and the target text. Not everything can be attributed to deliberate attempts on the part of the interpreter to mitigate what is said, that is, to "strategies for managing the situation without conflict and misunderstanding" (p. 190) – frequently factors

such as the interpreter's memory limitations or language problems may come into play. However, they rightly point out that additions can, more safely than omissions, be treated as the interpreter's strategic choices. Also such omissions that form systematic patterns are probably deliberate rather than accidental.

The German speakers' typical politeness strategies (claiming common ground, minimising the imposition by means of appropriate verb aspect and downtoning particles such as *schon* or *vielleicht*) are usually eliminated by the interpreter, unless placed within a single turn that contains no other propositions. Consequently, the German speakers may be perceived by their Korean interlocutors as less polite than they really are. On the other hand, the interpreter takes her own initiative to introduce certain politeness strategies that are not present in the source text, which, according to the authors, strongly suggests that she is "very much concerned with saving her own face" (p. 198). For example, she switches into the third person to distance herself from face-threatening utterances of the German speakers (such as a direct question about the interlocutor's age, which she clearly perceives as too personal), although normally she renders everything in the first person. The authors conclude that the interpreter's own face is apparently an important factor in the interactions they analyse, and they suggest the existence of two dangers that might threaten it. One results from the interpreter's identification with one of the primary participants; if this happens, a threat to the participant's face is also felt to be a threat to the interpreter's face (although, as rightly pointed out by Wadensjö (1998: 78), no adequate examples of this are offered throughout the analysis). The other threat results from the requirements and the expectations of the primary participants, who wish to be represented adequately and be granted access to the conversation.

Knapp-Potthoff and Knapp's study (1987), although not free from imperfections (of which its normative bias is probably the most striking), can definitely be seen as a pioneering one, in that it "does provide a number of pointers for future research, and […] suggests that politeness is a major factor in dialogue interpreting exchanges" (Mason 2000: 223). In fact, although this study is limited to the performance of only one bilingual acting as an ad hoc, untrained interpreter, some of the tentative findings are replicated later even in studies on high-profile professional interpreting (e.g., Duflou 2012 gives numerous examples of situations in which EU interpreters depart from the "first person norm" and switch into the third person; see Section 4.4). A similar study by Müller (1989), published shortly thereafter, also makes the same sharp distinction between a professional interpreter, envisaged

as a "voice *ex machina* from behind the scene" (p. 714) and a non-professional interpreter, whom the mode of "natural translation" allows much more leeway to engage in mediating between the interactants. Müller, however, emphasises that ad hoc interpreting often takes place between participants who partly know each other's language, as is the case for his material, where Italian immigrants living in Germany and Germans sometimes rely on the interpreter, and sometimes are able to understand each other without help.

Knapp-Potthoff (2005) maintains her interest in mediation of politeness by ad hoc interpreters with another, much more recent experimental study, in which three advanced students of English are asked to act as interpreters in a telephone conversation. The scenario of the conversation involves a speaker of German asking a speaker of English (both university teachers) to return to the library an overdue book that the former urgently needs (and is therefore face-threatening for the latter). In one of the three versions, the German speaker is considerably more impolite than in the other two. This marked difference undergoes "levelling of politeness" (p. 207) in the interpretations, which means that the polite versions become less polite, and the impolite version becomes more polite. This results from the interpreters' far-reaching omission of both politeness and impoliteness strategies. The author hypothesises that this effect might be inherent in interpretations, since some (im)politeness strategies are not easily accessible to language mediation. Consequently, she poses a very apt question concerning users' attitude: "Is the expectation of receiving politeness in mediated discourse the same for the primary interactants as in immediate types of discourse, or do they take into account that secondhand politeness may be 'worn-out'?" (p. 218).

Drawing no clear dividing line between unprofessional and professional interpreting this time (after all, its existence has already been put to doubt in the meantime by research reported in the next section), Knapp-Potthoff (2005: 216) notes that "any mediation of a face-threatening act potentially constitutes a threat to the mediator's face, too," as s/he may be held partly responsible for the illocutionary force of the act. Therefore, the typical strategy to save the interpreter's face is to use what she calls "explicit mediator performatives" (p. 216), which consist in reporting an FTA in the third person, for example *he thinks that* or *he asks you to*.

This study's innovativeness lies in going beyond the verbal aspect of the analysed material by devoting a lot of attention to laughter as a politeness strategy introduced specifically by interpreters. The participants in the experiment frequently resort to it as redress for FTAs

they are required to voice. As argued by the author, "by employing laughter as a politeness strategy, the mediator is freed from the burden of verbalising a politeness strategy in a given language" (p. 215), so it seems indeed to be a very handy compensation for omitted politeness, maintaining the faces of both the primary interlocutors and the interpreter at the same time.

4.1.2 Professional interpreting

It was probably the already mentioned domination of the conduit model that limited the interest in professional interpreting as an object of this kind of research until 1990s. Problems with access to authentic data (confidentiality issues, obtaining permission from all the participants and the institutions involved), which might have seemed insurmountable, certainly played a role, too. The topic of facework in interpreting, this time performed by professionals and observed in authentic legal and medical settings, returns to the stage in Wadensjö's book on dialogue interpreting (1998) that has often, very deservedly, been described as "groundbreaking" (e.g., Pöllabauer 2015: 159). Its descriptive approach is definitely new and at the same time very liberating, allowing the author to look at interpreting as it is, without devoting much attention to how it should be and in what ways it fails to live up to the normative ideal of "just translating," still practically unquestioned at the time the first version of the study was published in 1992.

Wadensjö (1998) uses discourse-analytic tools to investigate, in much detail, authentic interpreter-mediated conversations with speakers of Russian taking place at Swedish police stations and healthcare clinics. The very fact that she has managed to obtain such sensitive material, comprising 20 encounters mediated by five different state-certified interpreters, is unprecedented at the time. The researcher was present to observe the conversations she recorded and, whenever possible, the session was followed by an interview with the participants. Wadensjö's work is largely inspired by Erving Goffman's thought, but this is not limited to his concept of face, as other notions, that is, the participation framework and the social role, are given even more prominence. In particular, different aspects of the social role are emphasised: Wadensjö is well aware of the interpreter's normative role ratified by codes of conduct as well as taken for granted by institutions making use

of interpreting services and interpreters themselves, but she sets out to investigate the typical role instead, that is, typical behaviour of interpreters in real interpreted-mediated encounters.

Importantly, the analysis shows that many interpreters' utterances actually are not even supposed to reflect any original ones, but have the function of coordinating the interaction: "[i]n dialogue interpreting, the translating and coordinating aspects are simultaneously present, and the one does not exclude the other" (p. 105). Therefore, interpreters simply cannot avoid acting as both translators and mediators. The utterances that reformulate original ones (renditions) are divided into several classes: close, expanded, reduced, substituted, summarised and multi-part. Furthermore, the comparison of the interpreter's output with the original also reveals zero-renditions (i.e., omissions of content present in the original) and non-renditions (text fragments that are "analysable as an interpreter's initiative or response which does not correspond […] to a prior 'original' utterance," p. 108).

Instances of facework performed by interpreters surface throughout the analysis. For example, when a police officer asks an applicant for Swedish residence permit if she understands the difference between nationality and citizenship (and thus threatens her face by assuming her possible ignorance), the interpreter does not formulate this as a question but explains the difference instead. Wadensjö describes this situation as a clash between two of the interpreter's tasks: delivering a close translation and "establishing necessary conditions for a shared and mutual exchange" (p. 113), in which the interpreter decides to sacrifice closeness for the sake of good rapport between the interactants. Observing the same interpreter over the course of several sessions, the researcher notes that it is a part of her personal style to prevent any hostility between the interactants and to mitigate FTAs, even at the cost of putting the blame for misunderstandings on herself. The more risk of conflict there is, the more the interpreter goes to lengths to protect the friendly relations. According to Wadensjö, this strategy is not uncommon among interpreters, and it is manifest, for example, in the routine change of the more formal polite Russian form of address *vy* into the more friendly and less formal Swedish second person singular. The researcher assumes that more experienced and self-confident interpreters are less uncomfortable with possible conflict between the interactants and do not act overprotective, allowing the interactancts to sort out their differences instead of concealing them. "In 'protecting' interaction from potential 'disturbance,' you also prevent people from expressing their frustration, irritation and

anger, and you 'protect' their counterparts from learning about what others expect and take for granted," concludes Wadensjö (1998: 133).

Another interesting example relates to interpreting in a medical context. A young Russian man, worried that he might have contracted a venereal disease, is asked by a nurse about his symptoms. The man is visibly embarrassed and produces an utterance that is very long, fragmented, repetitive and does not actually contain the information the nurse expects. The interpreter, while waiting to hear some meaningful input, reassures the man with backchannelling noises and tells him not to be embarrassed (which are her own initiatives). At the same time, she does not report anything to the nurse for quite a long time, until the nurse becomes impatient and demands to be told what the young man is saying. The interpreter, then, addresses the nurse directly and explains that the patient has not produced a whole sentence yet. The situation is very complex: the patient wants to save his face, but the interpreter also has some concerns about her own face as a professional: "she must see to it that the primary parties' confidence in her as translator and coordinator is not jeopardized" (p. 177). In addition, the interpreter may also have other social identities, and the fact that she grew up in the USSR and is not used to sex matters being talked about as openly as they normally are in Sweden is visible at the beginning of the conversation; her hesitating and stumbling manner of speaking when rendering the nurse's question reveals awkwardness. Later on, she begins to talk in a more matter-of-fact way, like the nurse. The interpreter perceives many possible face threats in this exchange (to the man's face, to her own professional face, and to her own private face) and engages in facework, hoping to save them all. This is why she departs from the usual pattern of interpreted conversation and gets involved in separate exchanges with the participants.

In a review of the 1992 version of Wadensjö's study, Van Dam and Schjoldager (1994: 172) wrote: "the book reflects the whole range of features of the new paradigm in translation studies and may, therefore, be seen as a suggestion to other interpreting scholars of a way of carrying out interpreting research within this framework." Indeed, it has been a trigger for more research of a similar kind, stretching over a variety of settings. For example, Mason and Stewart (2001) employ the same, Goffmanian theoretical framework plus Brown and Levinson's politeness model, and a method of discourse analysis very similar to Wadensjö's, to investigate court interpreting (on the basis of an interpreter-mediated interrogation of a Hispanic witness from O.J. Simpson's trial) and interpreting in immigration hearings (on the basis of interviews of British immigration officers with Polish illegal

immigrants, about to be deported to Poland). In both cases, the researchers make use of televised material broadcast by TV stations. The interrogations inherently threaten the interviewees' positive face, as an attorney is trying to discredit the Hispanic witness as untrustworthy,[1] and the Polish immigrants are being pressed to admit that they lied to the immigration services on entry to the UK about their intended length of stay and that they have worked illegally.

In court interpreting, the interpreter is supposed to render all the statements as literally as possible. Taking into consideration the cross-linguistic differences in the realm of pragmatics (cf. Section 3.3.2.2 in the previous chapter), the researchers wonder whether this literalness might have a negative influence on the faithful representation of face threats present in original utterances, as "[a] literal translation may alter the illocutionary force of the utterance [...] and consequently affect its face-threatening or face-protective potential" (Mason and Stewart 2001: 56). In the analysed fragments, an FTA is aggravated through fairly literal interpretation only once, when the witness addresses the attorney with an on-record imperative, which is not marked in Spanish, but appears to be a sharp retort in the English version (and gets a laugh from the audience). However, in several other cases, when the witness actually attacks the attorney's face implying that his questions are unreasonable, the interpreter adds politeness strategies such as conventional indirectness or hedges to mitigate the face threat. When the witness is trying to protect her own face, various linguistic means she employs to emphasise her commitment to the propositions she utters (e.g., including pronouns in statements on her intentions, which is obligatory in English but marked in Spanish) would require adding a strengthening hedge to obtain an equivalent pragmatic effect in English, which the interpreter does not do. Similarly, she renders the witness's preface to a proposition as *I think*, although the witness actually expresses her firm belief that this proposition is true. The authors conclude that, although at times the interpreter seems aware of the cross-cultural differences between Spanish and English pragmatics, the illocutionary force of many statements is modified. Consequently, the witness is probably presented as less self-confident

[1] Rosa López is a friend of O.J. Simpson's maid (also working as a maid in the neighbourhood) and the only person willing to provide an alibi for Simpson, as she claims to have seen his car somewhere else at the time the murder was committed (cf. Pym 1999: 266). The communicative set-up of these hearings might seem somewhat strange, as Rosa López knows English quite well (she has stayed in the US for more than 20 years), but it is not her native language. Also some of the lawyers involved (including the judge) have at least a partial command of Spanish.

and knowledgeable than she appears to be on the basis of her original statements (p. 64).

The immigration office setting seems to put less stress on the literalness norm, which gives the interpreter more leeway to modify the facework so that it becomes culturally appropriate (pp. 64–65). However, the modifications tend to go in a completely different direction. The interpreter, clearly experienced and knowledgeable about typical questions that get asked during interviews of this kind, very often expands the questions asked by the immigration officer or even poses completely new questions of her own accord. Moreover, she tends to omit the politeness strategies used by the immigration officer, aggravating the face threat to the interviewee and leaving him or her much less opportunities to save face, for example, by changing off-record implicatures into bald on-record wh-questions. When rendering the interviewee's answers into English, the interpreter adopts a more formal register than present in the original, and omits the strategies intended to save the speaker's face, such as attitudinal markers employed to convincingly present an acceptable reason for staying in the UK.

What the authors fail to note, probably because the issue did not come across in the back-translation they rely on, is the interpreter's consistent use of the second person singular to render *you* in reference to the interviewees. To a Pole, this appears extremely face-threatening, as the situation obviously does not meet the criteria for reciprocal use of this form (the interactants do not know each other, the context is official). Consequently, the use of *ty* is clearly intended to be asymmetrical (i.e., the immigrant is not supposed to address his/her interlocutor in the same manner), which highlights a great power distance between the official and the interviewee. As argued by Marcjanik (2007: 42–43), asymmetrical *ty* addressed to adults situated much lower in the social hierarchy than the speaker is questionable for ethical reasons, as it fails to respect the hearer's dignity.[2] This problem actually illustrates very well the cross-cultural differences that Mason and Stewart focus on in their description of the O.J. Simpson interrogation: in contrast to English, Polish is a T/V language (see,

[2] My late grandmother was particularly sensitive to the use of asymmetrical *ty* as a face threat. She made a point of never addressing others with this form, and whenever she was addressed as *ty* by someone who intended to emphasise the power distance, she pretended to construe this as an invitation to a more friendly relationship and immediately addressed her interlocutor as *ty*, too. This was normally a very effective strategy to save her face by making the other person quickly switch to the polite form *pani*. Sometimes, the interlocutor was too embarrassed or perhaps too thick-skinned to do this, in which case the relation continued as a symmetrical one.

e.g., Duszak 2014: 208–209); therefore, the interpreter has to choose between the deferential form *pan/pani* and the pronoun *ty* (relying on impersonal forms all throughout the interview does not seem plausible). Whatever s/he does, the choice will have a bearing on defining the relation between the interlocutors, as, due to a systemic difference between the source and the target language, there is no neutral solution fully equivalent to the English *you*.

As I was told by Polish police officers, in an analogous situation in Poland, an interviewee would normally be addressed as *pan/pani*, unless s/he turned violent or disrespectful towards the interviewer, which would probably result in a switch to *ty*. Likewise, Marcjanik (2007: 41) argues that "a policeman addressing an interviewee as 'ty' demonstrates power and domination in this way" (translation mine). As the British immigration officer apparently does not intend to produce a threat to the interviewees' face by emphasising his superior status (the authors note that his attitude is neutral verging on friendly), the interpreter's choice strikes me as rather peculiar. On the whole, I would not agree with Mason and Stewart's (2001: 68) conclusion that in these encounters the interpreter "subtly affects the pragmatics of the interventions of the other two speakers" to the disempowerment of the illegal immigrants – there is nothing subtle in her modifications; in fact, she presents the official's utterances as significantly more hostile and leaves me with the impression that she wants to intimidate the interviewees. This leads me to conclude that analysing pragmatic phenomena in interpreting relying on back-translations, having no (adequate) knowledge of one of the languages involved, may not be the best methodological choice.

Asylum hearings represent another setting, similar to the immigration office, although in the previously described case the interviews were practically a formality, as it was clear from the beginning that the Polish immigrants would be deported. In an asylum hearing, in turn, it is not certain whether or not the refugee will be allowed to stay, as this depends on presenting a plausible and coherent statement about the dangers awaiting the asylum seeker in his/her home country (cf. Pöllabauer 2007: 40). This statement is evaluated by an asylum officer. The study by Pöllabauer (2007) is based on 20 authentic asylum hearings recorded in Austria, with interpretation between German and English (which is, more often than not, a refugee's foreign language, because they come from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan). As was the case in the previous study, the encounter is inherently face-threatening for the interviewee, taking into consideration that the information s/he is supposed to provide to justify his/her claims is often personal and sometimes even highly intimate. However, the interpreter's face may

also easily be threatened if one of the interactants questions either his/her ability to translate or impartiality (p. 42). Although the officer's face is seldom in any danger, it may also be occasionally threatened, for example, if the asylum seeker asks for a correction of the record.

Once more, the face-saving strategy of switching to the third person singular to clearly indicate the authorship of an FTA is in evidence. It is employed by the interpreter, for instance, in the awkward situation when an officer accuses an asylum seeker of fabricating the story of his persecution. Interestingly, on his way to the asylum office, this officer found on the pavement a piece of paper with the interviewee's name and details of his escape from his country written down. He therefore expresses his belief that the asylum seeker has in fact learned the whole story by heart and that it is untrue. The interpreter introduces the accusation in the following way: *The officer has the impression that….* Some FTAs are completely omitted by the interpreter, for example, a quite blunt order to be brief on the part of an officer, or *I tell you…* as a preface to an answer to a question which has been repeated several times on the part of an asylum seeker.

As far as attacks against the interpreter's face are concerned, the strategy that is consistently employed in Pöllabauer's material is to first render the FTA accurately and then add an explanation attributing the blame to another party. For instance, when an asylum seeker still does not understand a question after several attempts at a paraphrase, she gets impatient and says to the interpreter: *I don't understand your English, Miss*. The interpreter translates this literally and proceeds to add that English is not the interviewee's mother tongue, attributing lack of understanding to her poor linguistic competence.

Although most studies of interpreting in legal settings focusing on facework employ discourse analysis of authentic data recorded at various institutions as the research method (apart from the ones discussed above, e.g., Hale 2004; Jacobsen 2008; Lee 2013 are all concerned with interpreting in court), I would also like to mention an important experimental study. Berk-Seligson (1988) investigates how the use or non-use of politeness strategies (more specifically, polite terms of address) in the interpretation may change jurors' perception of witness testimonies. In a large-scale experiment with over 500 participants acting as mock-jurors, two versions of an interpreted Spanish-speaking witness's testimony were presented, one including the polite terms of address used by the original speaker, and one omitting them. There is a huge difference in how the participants evaluate the witness's trustworthiness, competence and intelligence depending on which version they heard. Interestingly, even the jurors who know

Spanish are negatively affected by the English interpretation without the politeness markers. These results clearly show that "the role of the court interpreter can be seen to be pivotal in shaping the impressions that listeners form of witnesses" (Berk-Seligson 1988: 411).

4.2 Facework in interpreting for the media

In comparison to liason interpreting, facework in interpreting for the media is still a very underresearched area (cf. Pöllabauer 2015: 158). The only study I am aware of, by Savvalidou (2011), investigates signed language interpreting from Greek into Greek Sign Language in the context of a TV-broadcast political debate between candidates for the office of Prime Minister, taking place shortly before the general election of 2009. The debate is inherently face-threatening for both the participants, as the clear purpose of each of the interactants is to maintain or enhance their own face while damaging the face of their opponent, with a view to convincing voters of one's superiority as a candidate for a high state office. FTAs such as contradiction, disagreement, criticism and disapproval are an expected part of the show. As pointed out by the author, the pragmatic impact of such an interaction is probably at least as important as the propositional content, and therefore an interpreter faces the challenge of conveying both at the same time (p. 88). However, the interpreter whose output is investigated is a native user of Greek Sign Language and possesses very extensive experience, including interpreting previous debates of the same politicians. Therefore, the initial assumption is that he should be able to handle appropriately both the politeness and impoliteness employed by the participants.

The analysis comprises the first 30 minutes of a 90-minute debate. Savvalidou focuses on omission, addition, substitution and paraphrasing as interpreting strategies that might influence the pragmatic layer of the target text, and, consequently, deaf viewers' perception of the candidates. It is demonstrated that some strategic choices of the interpreter undermine the facework employed by the politicians. For example, when one of the candidates raises the issue of an official from the Greek Ministry of Culture who tried to commit suicide after a financial scandal in his department and his extramarital affair with his secretary had come to light, the other tries to repel the attack by claiming it was a private matter, and remains very vague as to

the nature of the accusations against the official. The interpreter, however, does not render this politeness strategy accurately, as in his version of the response he actually mentions the affair (a case of addition). In a similar vein, the interpreter uses the word *lies* to convey a considerably more euphemistic phrase *far from reality*, making the face threat more serious (substitution). When one of the candidates asserts that, unlike his opponent, he does not claim to be infallible, the interpreter aggravates the threat to the speaker's positive face by mentioning *many mistakes* and making this statement resemble an apology. The above-mentioned examples suggest that the interpreter's rendition tends to be more direct and more face-threatening than the original statements; however, the opposite effect is also noticeable, especially in the case of omissions. For instance, an accusation by one of the candidates that his opponent is trying to deceive the citizens is not conveyed in the interpretation, although another one made in the same statement (that he makes empty promises) is rendered faithfully.

The study shows that "omission of crucial, presumably carefully chosen words of the primary participants, addition to them, substitution or paraphrase potentially result […] in a degradation of the (im)-politeness strategies used or in leading to the opposite outcome of what was intended" (Savvalidou 2011: 104). The author concludes that interpreters should pay more attention to the pragmatic layer of communication, and make more use of the large repertoire of (im)-politeness strategies offered by signed languages (including non-lexical ones, that is, facial expressions and body movements as opposed to signs). She emphasises that, against popular belief, signed languages are not poorer in this respect than spoken languages.

4.3 Facework in conference interpreting

Again, it can be said that in comparison to liason interpreting, conference interpreting remains an almost unexplored domain as far as research on facework is concerned (although there are more studies available than in the case of interpreting for the media). There are very interesting papers discussing facework performed by trainee interpreters (Müller 1998 on the simultaneous mode, as well as a series of articles based on the same experimental material, including Łyda et al. (2010) and Warchał et al. (2011) – the former and the latter on consecutive interpreting). Moreover, the book by Monacelli (2009) constitutes probably the first

comprehensive attempt to describe facework as happening in real conference settings making use of the simultaneous mode, and it has been followed by an excellent study by Duflou (2012), focusing on the very setting which lies at the centre of my attention – the EU institutions. Finally, Lenglet (2015) proposes to investigate conference interpreters' attitudes to FTAs by means of a questionnaire survey.

Müller (1998) is characterised by an untypical research design, involving at the same time students of interpreting as participants and an authentic conference setting. The source text is a contribution delivered, without reading from a transcript, before a real audience: a lecture by a French political journalist on the problems of Germany's unification presented at the Humboldt University in Berlin in 1991. The lecture is interpreted from French by three advanced trainee interpreters (taking turns). As the speaker is a foreigner taking stand on issues that may well be highly delicate for the German audience (and are very topical at the moment, so the listeners are likely to have strong feelings on some of the argumentation), he takes care to express any criticism of German institutions and their decisions in an indirect manner, employing face-saving strategies such as hedges and conditionals, typically a series of them each time an FTA of this type is produced. However, in the German interpretation the criticism appears either without any redress, or the redress that is employed is very scarce as compared to the original. Therefore, the student interpreters fail to transfer the face-saving strategies adequately, which is attributed to their perception of these strategies as significantly less relevant than the propositional content they modify. The students' strategic processing highly favours simplification: after all, omission of interactional meaning still results in well-formed, understandable utterances. The author also hypothesises that the face-saving strategies used by the French speaker might not have been recognised as such, but mistaken for hesitation markers. Another hypothesis is that in this case the interpreter may be more self-confident than the original speaker when expressing criticism, firstly, because the interpreter is German and is therefore talking about his/her own institutions (that s/he feels entitled to criticise), and secondly, because the authorship of the criticism is obviously attributable to someone else (so the interpreter does not feel responsible for the offensive potential and prefers to focus on what s/he is clearly responsible for, that is, clarity and comprehensiveness of the target text).

By contrast, the ingenious experiment described by Warchał et al. (2011) and Łyda et al. (2010) enables the team of researchers to explore multiple renderings of the same source texts, provided

by advanced interpreting trainees working in the consecutive mode from English into Polish. Both explicit FTAs (criticism) and face-enhancing utterances (praise) directed at the audience are investigated, for which the researchers use two sets of two texts (plus another text as a control sample). There are two important differences between the two sets. In one of them, the interpreters belong to the group that is addressed by the speaker (students of English at the University of Silesia), and the evaluation relates to both the source and the target language audience. In the other, the interpreters are faced with a text evaluating the Australian/British Olympic Team and are supposed to interpret for the Polish Olympic Team, so they clearly do not belong to the group of ultimate addressees; furthermore, the criticism/praise is not directed at the target language audience. Although the source texts were in fact carefully designed for the needs of the study (so that the criticism or the praise is always expressed very directly, with the speaker clearly indicating his own authorship of the assessment and consistently addressing his audience as *you*), they were presented to the student interpreters as authentic speeches. The ones criticising or praising students of English were supposedly recorded at the University of Silesia during visits of European Commission Coordinators for Student Mobility and for Human Resource Development, respectively.

The researchers analyse the recorded interpretations in terms of pre-determined "focal points" corresponding to the fragments where criticism or praise are voiced, and detect face-saving strategies employed by the interpreters that fall into four categories: use of passive and impersonal constructions, transformation of verbal clauses into nominal ones, change of deictic perspective and other forms of modulation. The study by Warchał et al. (2011) focuses on the deictic shifts, which occurred the most often. As argued by the authors, "[a]ny instance of manipulation of the deictic centre or a shift in the perspective on the totality of the speech event involves a change in the distance between the participants, which in interpreting tasks is often a signal of complex facework on the part of the interpreter" (p. 782). The qualitative analysis based on numerous examples is supplemented with quantitative data, which has not been the case for any observational study reported in this chapter so far. Admittedly, quantitative analysis seems much more feasible for an experimental study involving source texts composed by the researchers themselves so as to include exactly the features under investigation (and no such that would be likely to blur the picture), and multiple renderings of the same structures.

The deictic shifts in the analysed interpretations involve the following changes: first-person singular to first-person plural (*I* to *we*),

second-person to first person plural (*you* to *we*), and second-person to third person plural (*you* to *they*). For the first type of shift, exclusive *we* is predominantly used to present the speaker's assessment as coming from his institution rather than from him personally, whereas inclusive *we* (embracing the speaker and the audience) is used to minimise the distance between the parties. In the second type of shift, *we* is usually inclusive and, in most cases, serves to dilute the criticism (the responsibility is shared between the listeners and the speaker). The last type of shift is by far the most frequent in the corpus (72 occurrences as compared to 10 and 13 for the other two types) and is observed almost exclusively for the texts that evaluate students of English, that is, the group to which the interpreters belong. Interestingly, the shift is used both to deflate the criticism by presenting it as not necessarily referring to these individuals who listen to the speech (*you are too loud in the campuses -> students are too loud*), and to make the praise less direct (*you excel in teaching skills -> future teachers are doing great*). The latter is attributed to the tendency to avoid self-praise, characteristic of the Polish culture and manifest, for example, in compliment responses. The overall conclusion of this part of the study is that in-group loyalty of the interpreter is likely to be reflected, to a large degree, in his/her treatment of personal deixis. On the other hand, very direct blame or praise addressed at a group the interpreters could not identify with (i.e., Olympic sportsmen) and different than the target language audience was hardly modified in interpretations.

Another paper exploring the same experimental material, Łyda et al. (2010), focuses on agentless constructions (passive voice, nominalisation, and other impersonal forms), additionally including the gender factor into the picture. The authors point out that the Polish language possesses a wider range of agentless constructions than English, and that in both the languages such constructions typically have the function of "diluting the cause-effect relation" (Łyda et al. 2010: 195) by foregrounding the activity itself, while giving less or even no prominence to its doer. In fact, the source texts were composed in such a way that they did not contain any agentless constructions, but a small number of them appeared in the Polish interpretations. The only result which seems to show any significance for the "loyalty effect," similar to the one reported for the deictic perspective of the same texts, is revealed for nominalisations, such as *you persist in breaking the no-smoking regulations -> for instance smoking in places where smoking is prohibited*. These were mostly triggered by the texts addressing the group the interpreters belonged to, and produced predominantly by female participants. Therefore, the authors describe nominalisations

as an effective defensive strategy aimed at protecting the face of the audience, and, at the same time, of the interpreters sharing some of the blame or the praise with their audience.

In contrast to the two previously described studies, the book by Monacelli (2009) explores simultaneous conference interpreting as performed by professionals in authentic conference settings. As aptly summarised by Hild (2011: 251), the "monograph sets out to deconstruct myths of professional identity and to subvert existing sacrosanct norms regulating the interpreter's behavior." Monacelli's style could hardly be called transparent and the book is a difficult read, even more so with its very heterogeneous theoretical framework, some elements of which do not seem to be fitting to describe interpreting (cf. Hild 2011). It is also definitely controversial to start from an assumption that "self-preservation," or professional "survival," is the guiding principle of conference interpreters, given priority over everything else. This state of affairs is caused, according to the author, by the face-threatening nature of simultaneous interpreting, involving three possible scenarios. An original speaker may perform FTAs to both source- and target-language audiences at the same time, or an FTA may be limited to the target language audience. In addition, "interpreters may perceive an act as threatening his or her own face or jeopardizing professional survival" (Monacelli 2009: 83). The numerous threats to the interpreter's professional face include self-corrections, admitting mistakes, struggling to finish an utterance and very high delivery rate imposed by the original speaker (pp. 89–90). Monacelli is interested in all three types of FTAs as enumerated above and in interpreters' reactions to them, aiming to save both the target language listeners' and the interpreter's face. However, she notes that by mitigating an FTA, the interpreter also acts to protect the original speaker, as by producing an FTA the speaker may endanger his/her own face as well (p. 108).

The corpus used for analysis comprises 119 minutes of source texts and the corresponding interpretations (in Italian, English and French, mostly from Italian into English) provided by ten experienced interpreters and recorded during four different conferences in Italy (interpretation of one text per each participant). As the study focuses on shifts, in spite of incorporating quantitative analysis it cannot give us any inkling of how often mitigation and aggravation are applied, in other words, how many FTAs are modified in interpretation, and how many are transferred retaining their original illocutionary force. As the author herself states, all the analysed categories belong to facework, and there are three of them: stance, voice and face. Stance comprises shifts in personal reference in terms of changing the speaker's distance

(as has already been illustrated in this section on the basis of Warchał at al. (2011)). A total of 188 such shifts are present in the analysed target texts, of which 64% increase the distance to the text and, consequently, depersonalise it (e.g., *let me give you just one example -> an example should suffice*). Voice, as understood by Monacelli, comprises shifts in transitivity patterns (which include, but are not limited to, passive transformations and impersonal constructions, e.g., changing *the work I do* into *the work that one does*). Altogether, 94 such shifts are revealed, 54% of which show the trend towards minimising the involvement (and directness). Suppression of agency manifest in such shifts is seen as a face-saving strategy. The last category, face, is equaled with interactional politeness, and the analysis focuses on mood and modality (the speaker's commitment to what s/he is saying) as well as threats to face. For the former subcategory, there are 162 shifts, 69% of which work to reduce the illocutionary force (and therefore directness).

Threats to face, the subcategory which interests me most, are analysed in terms of their omission, addition, weakening or strengthening. In total, 163 shifts were detected, 57% of which mitigate the illocutionary force (i.e., omit or weaken FTAs). However, rather disappointingly, in the case of omissions, weakening and strengthening, the relevant results are presented cumulatively for speech acts that threaten the speaker's face (such as apologies and thanks) and can be seen as politeness strategies, and for speech acts that threaten the addressee's face (such as criticism) and can be seen as impoliteness strategies. Therefore, it is impossible to assess, on this basis, whether the target texts tend to appear more or less polite than the corresponding source texts, which would have been very interesting to know. Only additions are divided into these that express politeness by supplementing redress to FTAs (28 out of 53 cases, for example women who are explicitly called *agents of the atheist West* in the source text become merely *seen as* such in the target text) and these that add FTAs not present in the original (e.g., inserting the verb *divide* into the phrase *the political matters between our countries*, the countries in question being Israel and Palestine). When we consider the numerical results, both types of additions are almost equal in terms of their frequency in the corpus under analysis. On the basis of Monacelli's examples of additional FTAs, it seems to me that the threats are implicitly present in the source text and they are explicitated in the interpretation (on explicitation, see, e.g., Englund Dimitrova 2005) rather than arbitrarily added by the interpreter; therefore, we might see this phenomenon as a switch from an off-record FTA to an on-record FTA rather than addition as such.

On the whole, the overall trends for all three categories point towards decreased directness, the interpreter's greater detachment as compared with the original speaker and mitigation of the source text's illocutionary force. Although the results vary considerably for individual interpreters, the tendency to attenuate the speaker's threats towards the audience's face (through omission or weakening) is the most universal one. To complement the findings, Monacelli also carried out a debriefing session with the participants to follow up on some of their decisions, to determine to what extent they were made strategically. In particular, the respondents were asked to comment on two face-threatening situations in which the interpreters clearly stepped out of their "neutral" role. The answers confirm that such solutions are judged acceptable and reported to be acquired from senior colleagues during professional socialisation, which, according to Monacelli, shows the conscious and strategic nature of shifts resulting from the interpreter's facework. The author concludes her study with an explanatory hypothesis to the effect that an interpreter's behaviour is characterised by "dynamic equilibrium," described as "conscious action taken at decisive moments and turning points" and "the proactive management of inevitable structural (discoursal) shifts" (p. 147).

One of the many themes explored by Monacelli, that is, the interpreter's detachment, is also investigated by Duflou (2012), who, inspired mainly by Diriker (2004) (see next section for a discussion), looks for corresponding interpreter behaviour in her fieldnotes from participant observation as a freelance EU interpreter. While speaking in the first person on behalf of the original speaker is regarded as an obvious fact (without any viable alternatives) by EU interpreters explicitly asked to reflect on this issue, Duflou notes that in reality it is not uncommon for them to switch into what she calls "reporting mode" (which does not necessarily involve use of the third person singular, but always consists in stepping out of the original speaker's role, as will soon be illustrated by examples). Moreover, this behaviour does not seem to be perceived as breaking a norm by other interpreters present in the booth (Duflou 2012: 152).

Duflou provides a qualitative analysis of material comprising her fieldnotes made over the period of three years, enumerating the following contexts in which she has observed interpreters (working in the Dutch booth) switching into the reporting mode (pp. 155–156):

– reporting what is happening in the conference room, which may be undertaken for a variety of reasons, for example, to provide information to colleagues taking relay (*The speaker will continue in English*), to explain why the interpretation is interrupted (*The speaker*

is speaking without a microphone) or to render a remark expressly addressed at the interpreters themselves (*The chairman thanks the interpreters*);
– speaking about oneself in the third person (singular or plural) to save one's face, for example, to explain why the interpretation is discontinued (*The speaker's microphone isn't on, unfortunately the interpreters don't hear anything*), to point to the speaker as the author of a mistake (*The interpreter thinks the speaker made a mistake*), or to perform anticipatory facework envisaging some problems (*Unfortunately, the interpreters didn't receive the document*);
– adding *says the speaker* to distance oneself from a statement which contains a factual error or content with which the interpreter strongly disagrees;
– specifying who the original speaker is (*says Mr./Mrs. X*) when this might not be clear to the listeners due to rapid or overlapping exchanges or when the speaker's name was either not announced by the chair or initially missed by the interpreter; and
– addressing the listeners directly on one's own behalf, for example, to ask them for help in sorting out a problem (*Could you ask the X delegation to put the headphones a bit further away from the microphone?*).

In addition, the reporting mode includes some instances of phatic communication (explicitly referred to as "facework/politeness"; p. 158) between the interpreters and their listeners (*Good morning, Have a nice evening*), which, however, typically occur before or after the interpreting task and therefore cannot be unequivocally regarded as part of the interpretation as such. This type of facework seems to be directed at the interpreter's personal face rather than the professional one.

Duflou (2012) does not present her evidence to question the validity of the first person rule; instead, she explains that apparently this rule may temporarily be suspended when problems (technical ones or caused by the original speakers) need to be solved; frequently the problem also threatens the interpreter's face and requires some protecting moves. Consequently, instances of reporting mode are not seen as deviations from the fundamental rule, but rather as "complementary tools, needed to safeguard simultaneous interpreting in the first person mode in the messy context of real-life meetings" (p. 158).

In contrast to the research described so far in this section, Lenglet (2015) is not based on any observational material, but offers an interesting attempt to investigate norms governing handling of various types of FTAs in conference interpreting by means of a questionnaire (for more on the concept of norms, see Section 6.1). It is a small-scale

study, with participation of twelve experienced interpreters (seven of whom also working as interpreter trainers), five academics and five students graduating from a conference interpreting programme, carried out during a final exam in simultaneous interpreting in which all the respondents took part, in various capacities. With only 22 participants from various backgrounds, the results of the study can hardly be subject to any generalisations, but, as the author asserts, the main aim is "to identify methodological issues and to explore potential trends" (p. 244).[3] Although it is not entirely clear if the original questions in French were formulated similarly as in the English version presented in the article, the questionnaire appears not to confront the respondents with real-life examples of FTAs in source texts and the interpreters' reactions (as was the case in Monacelli's 2009 debriefing session), but to provide generic descriptions of "typical" face-threatening situations conference interpreters are likely to encounter and closed lists of possible responses (also in a descriptive form). Nine scenarios are included, some of them covering situations that threaten mainly the interpreter's face, and others – the primary participants' (the speaker's or the addressee's) face.[4] For instance, an accusation that a particular fragment in the interpretation was incorrect threatens the interpreter's face, an embarrassing aside made by the chair thinking that the microphone has been turned off – the speaker's face, and calling to order a conference participant who has overrun his/her speaking time – the addressee's face (in some of the scenarios, different participants' face may be at stake, to various degrees). The response options always include one that is compatible with the "conduit model" and one or more involving face-threat mitigation by the interpreter.

The main problem with the questionnaire as presented in the article is that the scenarios are quite abstract and that some of the descriptions seem to lead towards a particular answer. For instance, as to the problem of dealing with rudeness, the scenario is formulated as follows: "The speaker gets carried away and uses a rude term" (Lenglet 2015: 246). The formulation "gets carried away" is strongly evaluative and implies that the impoliteness was not fully intentional, which is clearly not true of many speakers who very carefully plan their face attacks (cf. Section 3.3.2.2.1 on parliamentary discourse). However, if rudeness

[3] At the same time, the author is trying to establish inter-group differences by applying statistical tests, which is rather surprising, considering the size of the sample and the groups.

[4] The author's assessment of whose face is threatened in particular scenarios is done only with the primary participants in mind, and, in fact, I have some reservations as to his assumptions.

is described as a lapse on the part of the speaker, respondents are less likely to opt for the "accurate" solution, that is, "Using a phrase which has the same rudeness in one's language" (p. 247), rather than any of the other two suggested responses, that is, employing a less derogatory term in the target language or suppressing the impoliteness altogether. Furthermore, "a rude term" seems very vague – is this, for example, an invective directed at the addressee, or, perhaps, an expletive having no clear target, or a vulgarism used for a humorous effect? Not to mention the level of rudeness as another unknown factor. Consequently, the answer will heavily depend on all the details that respondents have to supplement by themselves. On the whole, the design of the questionnaire leaves a lot to be desired, and the multiple-choice answers, while easy to deal with in a quantitative manner, heavily restrict the respondents' spontaneity and also the range of possible reactions.

Considering the methodological weaknesses of the analytical tool itself and the small size and high variability of the sample, the results must be treated with much caution. They suggest that the interpreter's active role, manifest in face-threat mitigation, finds considerably more support among all respondent groups than "accuracy," and that reactions to particular FTAs display marked differences (e.g., there are much stronger tendencies to liven up a monotonous speech, omit an embarrassing aside that was meant to be off-mike or attenuate impoliteness than to draw the audience's attention to an excessive speaking rate). As for the methodological input of this study, it seems that further research into interpreters' perception of facework in interpreting (a very promising path to take, provided sufficiently many respondents participate) has more potential if carried out on the basis of concrete examples gleaned from authentic data. Moreover, respondents' reactions to particular scenarios should probably be elicited either as assessment of real-life solutions or as open-ended comments on the desirable course of action.

4.4 Incidental evidence of facework in interpreting

So far, this chapter has been concerned with studies that explicitly refer to facework. However, it must be noted that evidence of what might well be construed as facework carried out by interpreters is also to be found in works that are not based on any face and/or facework theories and do not use the terminology involved. In fact, this is so frequently the case that all such studies are impossible either to trace

or to discuss within the scope of this chapter, and therefore I will limit myself to reporting on just a few, primarily related to political settings, as this is the field which interests me most.

Diriker (2004), one of the first serious attempts to challenge the validity of the conduit model in conference interpreting, illustrates my point perfectly (although is not related to politics). Actually, it is acknowledged as an important inspiration by both Monacelli (2009) and Duflou (2012), discussed in the previous section. Face is only used in Diriker's book in its first-order meaning,[5] in the context of speakers' strategy of saving their face after having said something inappropriate by blaming the gaffe on the interpreter. Nevertheless, the main focus of Diriker's research, that is, shifting the speaking subject, is exactly what is seen as a component of facework by both the above-mentioned authors. Diriker's analysis of authentic conference interpretations (of eight long contributions plus the following discussions at a conference devoted to philosophy) strongly suggests that shifts in the speaking subject typically reflect the interpreter's facework aimed at maintaining his/her face.

Perhaps the most extreme example of the interpreter abandoning the speaker's "I" to save his own face in Diriker's corpus is an attempt to repel a face-threat consisting in being blamed for mistranslation. The FTA is produced during a discussion following a paper, and the interpreter is twice accused (wrongly) of mistranslating a phrase (which probably results from seeking rapport between the speaker and the two participants who ask questions). Having partly interpreted into English the accusations expressed in Turkish (*The translation may be wrong, as the owner of the text I'm telling you the real translation*), the interpreter vehemently protests against them, using irony first and going on-record with a direct contradiction afterwards: *The translation may be wrong. Of course it is always the fault of the translator. Yes! I did use expressly the word madalyonun iki yüzü, which means two sides of the coin in Turkish. Oh my God!* (p. 110). His behaviour results in some commotion in the conference room, as the participants listening to the interpretation react with a laugh and exchange comments on the situation, while the Turkish speaker is visibly confused.

All in all, comparing the original contributions with the interpretations, Diriker (2004) has identified 58 instances of shifts running counter to "the widely held assumption and expectation that the person occupying the speaker-position (i.e., the 'I') on the floor would also occupy the speaker-position (i.e., the 'I') in the delivery" (p. 84). These shifts were

[5] That is, the emic notion of face as opposed to face as an academic concept – cf. Jakubowska-Bogdanowska (2010: 141).

distributed over the output of two interpreters working during a two-day conference on philosophy. As the author shows, the interpreter can assume the speaker position in three different ways (pp. 84–85). Firstly, s/he may do so explicitly, by inserting his/her own remarks in the interpretation (as is the case in the example above, with the interpreter directly contradicting the speaker). Secondly, the interpreter may opt for indirect delivery, by reporting, paraphrasing and inserting explanations about the source text (e.g., *the speaker apologises and starts again*, which takes the blame for an incomplete sentence away from the interpreter, clearly attributing it to the original speaker). Finally, s/he may also shift the speaking subject implicitly, by blending his/her remarks into what looks like the original speaker's position (e.g., by saying *excuse me* before a repair, which is ambiguous and potentially not very effective as a face-saving strategy, because the listeners are not able to determine if the correction was actually made by the original speaker or if it comes from the interpreter). Moreover, the research has revealed certain situations that tend to result in shifts, for instance apologies or mistakes either of the speaker or of the interpreter, inaudible or overlapping input, and quotations in a third language (these are clearly factors likely to pose a threat to the interpreter's professional face).

A very interesting case of failure to render facework so as to obtain the intended effect on the addressee is provided by Torikai (2009: 39–43) and concerns interpreting high-level diplomatic negotiations. The resulting consequences are indeed dire. In 1970, Japanese Prime Minister Sato and American President Nixon met to discuss several contentious issues. In particular, the Japanese were hoping to regain Okinawa under their administrative control, and the Americans were concerned with the issue of Japanese textile exports ruining their own textile industry, which could be helped by imposing voluntary quota on these exports by Japan. When Nixon raised the problem of textile exports, Sato replied in a typically evasive Japanese manner, as a direct refusal goes against the pragmatics of the Japanese language. It is unclear what exactly Sato said, and how it was interpreted into English, but political commentators are sure that it must have been one of the phrases that literally translate into English as *I will consider the matter in a forward-looking posture* or *I will deal with the matter in an appropriate way*. To a Japanese, it is obvious that such an answer reflects a face-saving strategy to express a refusal to requests and demands. However, the phrase was apparently rendered fairly literally in the interpretation, or even the illocutionary force of the "commitment" might have been increased (e.g., with *I will do my best*), and President Nixon apparently came out of the meeting strongly convinced that

the Japanese Prime Minister had promised him to curb the exports. Okinawa was afterwards returned to Japan, but nothing happened to the Japanese textile exports. Consequently, Nixon felt deceived and took very harsh measures to punish Japan for this, including an increase in import tariffs, dollar devaluation and a surprise visit to China to normalise relations. According to Torikai, this deep crisis in American-Japanese relations can be attributed, at least partly, to the interpreter's failure to make a cultural adjustment. The consequences might have been less dire had the interpreter chosen a more vague option to render Sato's facework, such as *I will do what I can* or *Let me see what I can do.*

Torikai's research is primarily based on five extensive interviews with elderly Japanese interpreters who worked at numerous diplomatic meetings over several decades after World War II, and a few interesting insights on facework emerge directly from the participants' accounts. For example, one of the interviewees, although clearly ascribing to the conduit model of interpreting on the declarative level and voicing his rejection of the interpreter's role as a cultural mediator, in fact admits having adjusted Japanese facework to the expectations of Anglo-Saxon target text's audience on some occasions. He did exactly that when interpreting Prime Minister's Obuchi Keizo's talk at a reception, in which the Prime Minister, according to the interpreter's judgment, exaggerated with belittling himself, calling himself metaphorically an old man running a small bar. While producing such a great threat to one's own positive face might be acceptable in Japan (where the modesty principle is stronger than in the West), the interpreter felt he had to consider the impression this would make on the listeners if translated literally. Consequently, he decided to mitigate the force of this statement in his interpretation, settling for *I am not yet a big shot.*

Another interpreter interviewed for Torikai's study recalls how the Japanese Minister of Agriculture made an aggressive statement during a crucial meeting on trade and economic affairs, and he softened it in his interpretation so that the American delegation did not perceive any FTA and replied in a neutral manner. Consequently, the negotiations continued to run along smoothly. The interpreter claims, however, that he did not mitigate this utterance intentionally, but that he simply did not perceive the face threat as such because of the overall friendly atmosphere of the meeting. When the true meaning of the Minister's words was later mentioned by someone from the ministry, the interpreter felt guilty and apologised to the Minister (although in fact omitting the face threat might have contributed considerably to the success of the meeting). When asked whether he would have rendered

the statement faithfully had he understood it well, even knowing that it would have been likely to offend the Americans, the interpreter replies in the affirmative. The original speaker's intent was to produce a face threat and solely he was responsible for this decision; thus, it should have been left in the interpretation. The interpreter attributes his mistake to lack of rapport between himself and the Minister, which prevented him from grasping the latter's communicative intent correctly.

Nogueira (2004) and Morin (2011) are both rather short articles, showing that facework carried out by interpreters on behalf of politicians is sometimes publicised by the media, and tends to arouse strong emotions and judgements both from the general public and from professional colleagues. The authors describe one case of facework each, and both the cases relate to interpreting state presidents.

Nogueira (2004) reports on the President's of Brazil visit in Namibia in 2003. Accompanied by his interpreter, the President was making a few spontaneous remarks in Windhoek, when he was interrupted by his interpreter with an ambiguous utterance that could be translated into English either as *Mr President, I cannot understand what you say* or as *Mr President, I cannot understand why you are saying this*. At this point, the President repeated the last phrase and added a comparison. Unfortunately, the author does not provide any information about the content of this particular fragment; he just explains that it could not possibly have been misunderstood by the interpreter, who, in spite of this, apparently decided that the President's words were politically incorrect and "provided what would usually be considered an inaccurate rendering of the first part of the comparison and omitted what would generally be considered a key term from the second" (Nogueira 2004). This fact was widely commented on by the Brazilian press, claiming that the interpreter corrected the President's *faux pas*, which would otherwise have offended the listeners.[6] A long discussion on Internet translation forums followed, where most of the participants agreed that the interpreter did a good job and acted in the spirit of patriotism, saving the state leader from imminent embarrassment. The author of the article, however, presents the opposite view, strongly believing that the interpreter's behaviour was inacceptable and condemning him in very negative terms: "If interpreters/translators willfully deliver a message different from the one conveyed to them, they are lying and that is that" (Nogueira 2004). According to Nogueira, the most that

[6] In fact, although a long time has passed since Lech Wałęsa was the President of Poland (1990–1995), there are many similar stories still circulating about his interpreters acting in a similar manner. However, I have not managed to find any of this "anecdotal evidence" in print.

an interpreter should do in such a situation is to use reported speech to distance oneself from the statement. In this case, the interpreter went far beyond his competences, preventing the foreign audience from hearing what the President really intended to communicate, and although he was employed by the President, he should have been loyal to both the parties involved. The task of averting potential awkward results should have been left to the presidential press office.

The case reported by Morin (2011) can, to some extent, be regarded as the opposite of the one described above. This time, the interpreter was blamed for causing embarrassment instead of acting to prevent it. The incident happened during Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's visit to Indonesia in 2008. Some time before the visit, the Australian government issued a travel warning to its citizens against visiting Indonesia. Referring to this warning, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said during a press conference: *I also tell you frankly that situation in Indonesia is good, normal, and improved*, which the interpreter rendered as *I do look forward to this advisory being lifted*. The Australian Prime Minister responded with a refusal, saying that Australia's National Threat Assessment Centre makes its own decisions. Directly after the conference, the President's spokesperson told the journalists there was a mistranslation, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister informed the Australian ambassador to Indonesia that his country did not mean to interfere and believed the travel warning was entirely Australia's business. The matter was also reported by the press in a similar manner, with harsh criticism directed at the interpreter. However, Morin looks at the incident from a different perspective, and asserts that if we consider the speech act theory, "the interpreter was right because he understood that the implied message behind the President's statement was a request to lift the travel warning" (Morin 2011). Before making the decision to render the remark as he did, the interpreter apparently considered the pragmatic differences between the source and the target language, as in the Indonesian culture it is customary to make requests indirectly. Consequently, all he did to the original message was to introduce a cultural adjustment, as the President's words were clearly a polite request to lift the warning rather than just an informative statement. Putting the blame on the interpreter was, according to Morin (2011), grossly unfair, "unjustified linguistically, pragmatically, and culturally." This case (just like the one described before) suggests that translating politicians' words as literally as possible is probably a safer option for interpreters, who are very prone to become scapegoats and publicly lose their own face as the result of a face threat produced by the original speaker.

However, Baker (2006) shows that also the literal approach has its pitfalls as regards facework. The article discusses an interpreted, televised interview with Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President at the time, conducted by Trevor McDonald, a well-known British journalist, in November 1990 (i.e., during the First Gulf War, about three months after the annexation of Kuwait and shortly before the coalition forces attacked Iraq in response). The interview takes place in Baghdad and the interpreter is an Iraqi national, interpreting Saddam Hussein's Arabic responses into English B (the President knows English well enough to understand the questions without assistance, and also to monitor the interpreter's performance).

The interpreting assignment is an extremely delicate one, not only because of the very tense political situation and the resulting adversarial stance of the interlocutors. Knowing the nature of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, the interpreter is probably struggling not only to maintain his face and his job (both might easily have been at stake in the two previously discussed interpreter-mediated events), but even his life as well. Not surprisingly, therefore, the interpreter is very cautious to render Hussein's words faithfully, he "deliberately sticks to the semantic meaning" (p. 45), sometimes to the detriment of the pragmatic meaning. This strategy is not very effective in conveying irony and sarcasm often employed by the President. For example, being reminded by the journalist of the warning by Mrs Thatcher that he will have to compensate for the damage caused in Kuwait, and asked if he treats this warning seriously, Saddam Hussein gives a sarcastic answer. However, as the initial conjunction is translated very literally as *in any case*, and the interpreter's tone is very grave, the sarcasm is not transferred into English. Had the interpreter used the phrase *oh well* instead, the impoliteness strategy could have been preserved: *Oh well, if Mrs Thatcher says anything like this seriously then we'll just have to take her seriously.* The interpreter's literal approach also results in typically providing several synonyms for key terms in an attempt not to miss out on any aspects of the original meaning, like in the following fragment: *we must choose or take or adopt a single criterion or a single standard*. This strategy fails in conveying the original speaker's facework by presenting him as hesitant,[7] whereas "Saddam Hussein comes across in Arabic as a very fluent and lucid speaker" (Baker 2006: 46).

[7] The connection between confident presentation and facework might not be immediately obvious, but, as Bull and Wells (2012: 45) note, in their public statements politicians seek "the opportunity to enhance positive face through displaying rhetorical skills." Baker's analysis clearly shows that this opportunity has been lost as far as the English-speaking audience of the interview is concerned.

Baker also notes that in other fragments, when the debate becomes especially heated, the interpreter visibly allies with the President and increases the illocutionary force of his statements by adding intensifiers such as *clearly* and *obviously* and employing repetition for extra emphasis. On the whole, however, the interpretation was hardly successful, as "[s]ome British viewers who have no access to Arabic and who watched this interview thought that Saddam was incoherent and paranoid" (p. 49), although this was far from the impression he made on those who were able to listen to the original version. It remains to be hoped that the interpreter escaped punishment, as under the existing constraints it is quite understandable why high quality interpreting, taking into consideration every nuance of facework between the interactants, was very difficult to deliver.

Similarly to Nogueira (2004) and Morin (2011), Seeber and Zelger (2007) describe just one case of a face-threatening utterance in a political context and make it a basis for an in-depth discussion of interpreter ethics. Their example comes from an international conference with the participation of several European and African heads of state, also featuring an Italian talk-show host playing the role of the chair. After a passionate speech picturing the deplorable fate of African children, the Italian chair comments on the speaker's lively gesticulation, jokingly asking if he had ancestors in Italy and finally adding: *if you were in Italy you could be the cop and direct the traffic*. This last remark is unanimously omitted by the four interpreters rendering the contribution simultaneously from Italian into other languages. Therefore, the situation seems somewhat similar to the one described by Nogueira (2004), but the authors' assessment of the interpreters' decision is radically different. As they argue, the modification of the original message is justified because "the interpreter may look beyond the words and their combined meaning and rely upon a third message component, i.e. the underlying speaker's intent" (Seeber and Zelger 2007: 293), and it is highly unlikely that the Italian chair actually wanted to offend the African head of state.

The omission of the offensive remark is discussed in terms of teleological and deontological ethics. The former is based on the envisaged consequences of actions, that is, an individual is supposed to do what is likely to bring the best possible results in a given situation. Rendering the remark accurately could easily have led to the addressee taking offence and leaving the conference early, and the speaker getting the blame for it; therefore, omitting the remark may be evaluated as a more beneficial option for everybody involved. An important caveat here is that "the interpreter can never be absolutely

sure about any speaker's intention, nor about the quantity and quality of the consequences his actions entail" (p. 295). Deontological ethics, in turn, is based on individuals' intentions, assessing the reasons for their actions rather than the consequences. If the interpreter wishes to do his/her best, but dares not guess the speaker's underlying intent and sees his/her own role, in accordance with the conduit model, as a mere conveyor of the message, the decision to transmit the remark faithfully is also justified even if the consequences are unpleasant. In practice, ethical decision-making usually involves both the perspectives. As we can see, in this particular case all the interpreters chose to act in the same manner, but the authors are very cautious in their assessment of this and emphasise that a different decision could also have been defended as an ethical one. They additionally advocate integrating discussions of such ethically challenging scenarios into interpreter training, so that students will be able to think them over with no time pressure or stress, which will enable them to make better and faster decisions when faced with similar dilemmas in their professional practice.

I would like to end this chapter with my own example of an FTA made in a diplomatic context that became aggravated in interpretation and later hit the headlines (that I already mention in Bartłomiejczyk 2012: 73). In December 2010, Polish President Komorowski visited the United States and talked to President Obama. Komorowski compared the relationship between the US and Poland to a marriage, and concluded this comparison with the remark *swojej żonie należy ufać, ale trzeba sprawdzać, czy jest wierna* 'one should trust one's wife, but one should check if she is faithful' (translation mine). This remark, as such, may be considered an off-record FTA, as the second part clearly implies that the trust that Poland puts in its alliance with the US is not unquestioning. It might also be construed as somewhat sexist, suggesting that it is women who are more likely to engage in extramarital affairs – although this sexist implication is probably more apparent in English, where political correctness would rather dictate the use of the word *spouse* in the first part and *he or she* or *they* in the second part of this sentence. Tactful or not, Komorowski's remark was certainly meant as a jocular general truth rather than a reference to any particular married couple. However, the interpreter made the rather unfortunate choice of the pronoun *you* (i.e., she addressed Obama with the phrase *your wife*), which can certainly express a general truth, but also makes yet another understanding possible: that Komorowski was casting doubt on Michelle Obama's faithfulness. It is not clear from Obama's reaction whether he became offended or amused; nevertheless, the Polish mass

media certainly blew this up out of proportion, blaming the interpreter rather than the President for the *faux pas*. Furthermore, instead of being quickly forgotten (as is usually the case with such incidents), the blunder became a hot topic again in May 2011, when President Obama visited Poland, but without his wife. The media speculations were that Michelle Obama decided not to accompany her husband because she felt offended by what had been said during Komorowski's visit to Washington.

This case, just like the one described by Morin (2011), shows that an interpreter working in a diplomatic setting does not always act as a kind of filter catching whatever may be insulting. S/he can also aggravate a face threat (perhaps inadvertently), especially one that is, in the original, made rather subtly and off record. Correctly judging the speaker's illocution and transmitting exactly the level of face threat that was originally meant is indeed key to the diplomatic interpreter's success, as "[i]nsulting a visiting President may be fine if it's intentional. But if not, it is careless and can be damaging" (from a memorandum by Rothschild and Sons Ltd. 1999, quoted by Ilie 2004: 45).

5. Empirical research: Facework in interpreting of Eurosceptic discourse

Now it is time to connect the dots. Having presented linguistic mediation in the European Parliament from a variety of angles, including existing research (in Chapters 1 and 2), as well as the pragmatic concepts of face-threatening acts and facework, with an emphasis on relevant empirical research and especially studies investigating parliamentary discourse and interpreter-mediated communication (in Chapters 3 and 4), I have hopefully paved the way for my own research questions: How do EP interpreters handle face-threatening acts? Do the constraints of interpreter-mediated communication enable plenary speakers to effectively damage their interlocutor's face, if this is their communicative intent? The studies presented in the previous chapter let me hypothesise that FTAs produced by original speakers will, to some extent, be mitigated in interpretation by means of a wide range of strategies, from straightforward omission of an FTA as a whole, to reduction of its illocutionary force manifest, for example, in adding downtoners or removing upgraders. However, this does not mean that the trend has to be universal, and I am also interested in translational solutions that closely reproduce an FTA or, possibly, aggravate an FTA already present in the source text or add a new one.

Discourse Analysis seems to be the most suitable method to approach naturally occurring material with a view to identifying FTAs in source texts and their renditions in interpretations. The three main characteristics of Discourse Analysis, that is, authenticity of data, operating above the sentence level and taking the context into account (Hale and Napier 2013: 119) all apply to my exploratory endeavours. Although it has mainly been used to investigate dialogue interpreting (cf. Hale and Napier 2013: 117; Mason 2015), Discourse Analysis is also a convenient tool to analyse simultaneous conference interpreting. I decided to start with a detailed

bottom-up analysis of a few interpreted speeches and their originals, with a view to establishing categories of analysis that could later be applied, top-down, to a larger corpus. Although I realise that pragmatic phenomena such as FTAs may be difficult to quantify, I would also like to explore the possibilities to go beyond qualitative analysis, constituting the mainstay of my research project.

Shlesinger (1989b) emphasises that what corpus-based interpreting research badly needs are, first of all, relevant corpora, sufficiently large and featuring multiple repetitions of phenomena under investigation. At the time she wrote her seminal article, such corpora were indeed very difficult to obtain, but fortunately this has changed over the years. As already illustrated in Chapter 2, the databases provided by the European Parliament offer ample opportunity to compile a large corpus of source and target texts in a variety of languages. The choice of English and Polish for this study was an easy one, obviously motivated by its author's linguistic skills (it is, undoubtedly, much easier to analyse the subtleties of one's native language and the strongest foreign language than to relay on third languages one feels considerably less competent in). Naturally, as shown in Chapter 1, the communicative set-up in EP plenary sessions is much more complex than in bilateral interpreter-mediated encounters investigated in studies reported in Chapter 4. Therefore, in the case of my corpus, individuals targeted by specific FTAs will only occasionally listen to Polish interpretations, and much more often to the English original (or some other interpretation). However, any time any Polish MEP, even though not addressed directly, might feel compelled to react to defend someone else's face – and in order to do so effectively, s/he needs to know the content as well as the illocutionary force of an FTA. At the same time, I cannot preclude that the consideration whether the person whose face is being attacked is listening (or might listen later on) to the particular interpretation may have some influence on the interpreter's output.

Since I am interested in face-threatening acts, and especially ones amounting to impoliteness, the main problem in corpus design was how to select source texts which would be possibly rich in them. Certainly, it would have been possible to choose parliamentary speeches at random, but as EP parliamentary discourse tends to be generally rather polite (cf. Calzada Pérez 2004: 224, quoted in Section 2.2), finding an appropriate number of FTAs would probably entail transcribing very large amounts of text, which is obviously laborious and time-consuming.

Considering that the project had to be completed within a pre-defined time framework, I decided to select contributions by certain English-speaking MEPs who would be likely to deliver numerous FTAs

in a relatively limited amount of text; by limited I mean such as could possibly be transcribed without hiring help and manageable to analyse manually over a reasonable period of time. But which MEPs to choose as the participants for the corpus? Inspiration came when I heard some journalistic comments on a plenary speech by Nigel Farage with which he "welcomed" Herman Van Rompuy as a newly elected President of the European Council in February 2010, and consulted the full text of the said speech afterwards. As this is where the study started, I will respect its chronology and begin with an analysis of this very speech (including facework-related issues in its Polish and German interpretations),[1] as it may well serve as an apt prototypical example of what exactly matches my research interests. In addition, this is meant as a pilot study that will both indicate some problems and limitations inherent in investigating the type of data I deal with and engage with a text as a whole, embedded in its communicative context, instead of focusing on isolated FTAs. The analysis of this speech will be preceded with some background information on the party Nigel Farage represents, with a special focus on the features that have a bearing on its parliamentary discourse.

5.1 United Kingdom Independence Party: A voice of dissent

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), whose most recognisable face (and current leader) is MEP Nigel Farage, is one of the few political parties around Europe whose explicit purpose of creation was to oppose their country's membership in the European Union (Baker et al. 2008: 102). Due to its focus on one single issue, it has sometimes been described as a "niche party" (e.g., Lynch et al. 2012: 733). It was formed in 1993 out of the Anti-Federalist League, which, in turn, had been established two years earlier to run in the 1992 British general

[1] I first discussed this speech and its Polish interpretation in Bartłomiejczyk (2012), but here, I take a broader and deeper analytical perspective, including a critical reassessment of some points made therein. It was only in 2016, and after having written the bulk of Chapter 5, that I realised the same speech also attracted the attention of Jeremy Munday, who, in the introduction to his fairly recent book (2012), uses it as an extended example of speaker's subjective evaluation and shows how it is treated in interpretations into several EU languages. However, although Munday quotes at least two-thirds of the original speech, he only focuses on interpretations of one sentence.

election with the view of opposing the Maastricht Treaty (Baker et al. 2008: 102). It is interesting to note, however, that UKIP has not been the only British party with this very agenda. Another one, although far less successful, was the Referendum Party created in 1995, which ceased to function after several years (Baker et al. 2008: 103). It was relatively recently that the issue prioritised by UKIP became very widely known under its present keyword Brexit, and it is certainly a measure of British Eurosceptics' success that the referendum they had been demanding not only became a reality in June 2016, but also resulted in the majority of voters (albeit a small one) backing the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The result of the referendum gave much media exposure to Nigel Farage all around Europe and beyond. Not widely known outside the UK until this moment of triumph, jubilant Farage stole the show in all the news, celebrating and commenting on the wisdom of the British voters.

This is how the party's website explains the reasons for UKIP's existence:

> UKIP was founded in 1993 to campaign for the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Not because we hate Europe, or foreigners, or anyone at all; but because it is undemocratic, expensive, bossy – and we still haven't been asked whether we want to be in it. […] We believe in the right of the people of the UK to govern ourselves, rather than be governed by unelected bureaucrats in Brussels […].

UKIP has held seats in the European Parliament since 1999, when thanks to 7% of the vote it won three (for its leader at the time Michael Holmes, the current leader Nigel Farage, and Jeffrey Titford). After the EP election in 2004, the number of UKIP MEPs rose to 12, and in 2009 – to 13, with UKIP coming second after the Conservative Party, with 16.6% of the vote. It was in May 2014, however, when UKIP scored its best result ever so far, defeating the Conservative Party, finishing in the first place, and taking 26.6% of the vote and 24 seats in the EP. In the same year, UKIP was also quite successful in local elections, winning 163 seats in local councils (whereas previously it held 35 seats).

Notwithstanding the impressive results in the second-order elections, until 2014 (when two seats were won in by-elections by UKIP candidates who defected from the Conservative Party), UKIP had never held any seats in the House of Commons. In general elections, it normally got a significantly lower share of the vote (2.3% in 2005 and 3.1% in 2010), which, under the British majoritarian electoral system, was not enough to obtain a single seat even though these results made UKIP

the fourth most popular party nationwide. In 2015, however, UKIP climbed to the third position with 13% share of the vote and won just one seat for Douglas Carswell of Clacton (Nigel Farage lost the fight for the seat of South Thanet).

Survey data from the 2009 EP election show that UKIP draws support from practically all social classes, its voters are predominantly male and they come from older age groups (Ford et al. 2012). Much better results in EP elections than in general elections may be explained by the fact that many supporters of the Conservative Party tend to "lend their votes" to UKIP during the former, while during the latter they vote Conservative (Lynch et al. 2012). Ford et al. (2012) make a distinction into two types of UKIP supporters: "core," who vote UKIP in every election, and "strategic," who only vote UKIP in EP elections either because they want to show their dissatisfaction with the EU (a concern not important enough to change their voting behaviour in general elections) or because they perceive their candidates as much more likely to succeed in an election under a more representative system.

UKIP is typically described as a populist, right-wing party (e.g., Abedi and Lundberg 2009: 72; Liebert 2012: 123; Dolezal et al. 2012: 52). Its programme is clearly characterised by the so-called hard Euroscepticism, which, unlike the soft version, not only opposes certain EU policy areas (e.g., the single currency), but condemns the whole project of European integration in the form in which it is being realised and demands its country's withdrawal from the EU (on the proposed distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism, see Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008: 2–3). This definitely does not preclude criticising particular EU policies, too; among the ones most frequently attacked by UKIP members are the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy (Baker et al. 2008: 103).

As already mentioned, in the EP the Members are supposed to form supranational political groups, and consequently UKIP has associated with various other Eurosceptic and right-wing parties (and individual MEPs sharing their agenda) to form groups subsequently named Europe of Democracies and Diversities, Independence and Democracy, and Europe of Freedom and Democracy. Since 2014, the group is named Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, and features the Italian Five Star Movement as the other major party, with its leader David Borelli acting as the group's co-president (together with Farage). These groups have also had some Polish members, including the League of Polish Families, which joined in 2004, when Poland entered the EU, and currently (parliamentary term 2014–2019) MEP Robert Iwaszkiewicz of the Congress of the New Right.

While Euroscepticism is undoubtedly the core issue for both UKIP candidates running for election and for their voters (Lynch et al. 2012), other problems important for the domestic political scene are also brought up. Immigration is especially prominent among them. However, even the perceived need to curb immigration is discussed in connection with the EU: as a member state, Great Britain is prevented from imposing controls on migration from other member states (Lynch et al. 2012: 751). In addition, UKIP advocates steps to fight supposed Islamic extremism (proposed ban of the burqa in public), stricter penalties for criminals, reduction of council tax, and greater use of referenda (Ford et al. 2012).

As UKIP's political agenda is clearly radically opposed to the mainstream pro-European attitudes represented in the EP, most of its members' utterances in the plenary might be seen as inherently face-threatening – after all, they can easily fit under the headings "seeking disagreement" and "denying association with others," that is, impoliteness strategies (Culpeper 1996). On the other hand, taking the nature of a democratic parliamentary debate into account, where divergent opinions are expressed as a matter of course,[2] criticising the actions and decisions of the majority is something to be expected from political opponents, and therefore, perhaps, not truly face-threatening, or at least not impolite.[3] In the context of political discourse, Laskowska (2008) proposes to differentiate between ideological utterances (which do not have to threaten the opponent's face) and aggressive utterances, which typically target the opponent's actions in their entirety and/or some qualities beyond the opponent's control (e.g., intellectual abilities, ethnicity, or genetic make-up).

Clearly, UKIP members' ideological utterances often become more focused and personal, meeting the criteria for *ad hominem* arguments as defined by Plug (2010) and directed either at a specific group of people (e.g., members of the European Commission or the British MEPs from the Conservative Party) or at a specific individual (frequently an EU

[2] Beaton-Thome (2013: 380) regards the EP as "one of the most ideologically open and porous of all EU institutions" and talks about "multivoicedness" of plenary debates.

[3] Cf. Culpeper's (2011: 254) definition of impoliteness as failure to comply with the politeness standards expected by the addressee in a given communicative context, and also Watts's (2003: 131–132) claim that "competitive forms of interaction such as political debate" are likely to "sanction or neutralise face-threatening or face-damaging acts." Culpeper (2011: 172) specifically mentions parliamentary debates as a context where impoliteness is "expected and sanctioned," as "parliamentarians are doing their jobs in using adversarial discourse to expose the truth." However, he also adds the reservation that "[i]t is not the case, of course, that anything goes" (p. 172).

official such as the President of the Commission or the President of the Council, a Commissioner responsible for a given realm, or another MEP from a different group). The target of an FTA may be addressed directly with *you* (possibly also with honorifics appropriate, or not, for his/her position) or referred to in the third person, sometimes interchangeably throughout one and the same speech. Both options are possible to attack individuals either present in the hemicircle at the moment of speaking or absent (when the FTA is probably made in the hope that it will reach the intended addressee anyway, for example, reported by colleagues or transmitted by the media). It is also worth remembering that political invectives do not always have to be personal (see, e.g., Kamińska-Szmaj 2007), as many of them are targeted at various EU institutions (including the Parliament itself), at the audience as a whole, or at a particular country (Germany and Belgium being UKIP's favourite scapegoats).

As pointed out by Lynch et al. (2012: 755), "success in European elections has raised difficult questions about the extent to which UKIP engages with the EP." Considering UKIP's programme, it might seem paradoxical that the party runs for the EP at all and delegates their representatives to participate in the Parliament's work (although, in fact, the party is frequently criticised by the press for its absenteeism). When challenged directly about this in the plenary debate on 21 November 2012 by Polish MEP Jacek Protasiewicz, Nigel Farage answered:

> There is a parliamentary tradition of MPs entering assemblies but wishing to use their position in the interests of secession. We saw it with the Irish nationalists in the 19th century. Indeed, Sinn Fein run for elections to the UK Parliament, and the Scottish National Party sit in the UK Parliament. We came here because we felt that the British public were not being told what was happening in Europe and how much it was costing. We have used our position here to try to get that information back to the British public. Given that now, by a majority of two to one, the Brits want to leave this Union, I would say that we are doing a pretty good job.

On the basis of this statement, it can be concluded that whatever the UKIP MEPs say in the plenary is directed, in fact, more at the home audience in the UK than at those present in the hemicircle, and home party allegiance as well as specific issues of particular importance for the UK might take priority over the supranational view of the political group. As already mentioned in Section 2.2, this is not necessarily a phenomenon unique for UKIP – see, for example, Beaton-Thome (2013: 380), noting that even some lexical clues in plenary speeches,

such as deixis, show that "the primary audience for the particular intervention does not consist of those present at the debate but of the (imagined and projected) national audience 'back home.'"

The focus on the national audience may have some very important consequences for interpreting: as the speakers are not particularly concerned about reaching listeners who are listening to the interpretations, they will not try to make their output interpreter-friendly. Therefore, they typically do not pay any attention to the speed of delivery, they will also not refrain from using rhetorical means that are difficult to handle in interpretation, but might make a good impression on the British audience (such as literary or historical allusions, proverbs or colourful idioms).[4] The general attitude to interpretation among UKIP MEPs (a necessary evil rather than something that needs to be taken into consideration when planning one's speech) may be illustrated by the following reaction to being requested to slow down for the sake of the interpreters by the chairing president, expressed by William Dartmouth on 9 June 2011:

> Mr President, I have great respect for you, but surely it is up to the speaker the speed at which he chooses to speak, and that should be the choice of the speaker. The speakers in this Parliament should not run the risk of having their speech wrecked by interruptions from the Chair on behalf of the interpreters. Could I put that point to you?

On another, similar occasion, the same MEP says that *the interpreters are paid employees and if they cannot keep up, that is their problem*. In the context of my research, this means that interpreting strategies such as omission and compression may often be used as emergency measures due to the constraints imposed by the speaker rather than as a conscious decision to mitigate a threat to face or to filter out politeness markers as having little relevance – and it will be practically impossible to distinguish between the two factors. In such circumstances, the best the analyst can do is to make an informed guess based on clues such as ear-voice span. However, whether intended by the interpreter or not, mitigation or reduced politeness will be the final result the user of the interpretation receives, and it is from his/her perspective that we can also look at the shifts that occurred.

[4] For instance, Godfrey Bloom's plenary contributions include proverbs such as *A fool and his money will soon be parted*, *Never lender or borrower be* and the following quotation from a wartime poem by Siegfried Sassoon*: 'He's a cheery old card,' said Harry to Jack, As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack, But he did for them both with his plan of attack*. Nigel Farage, on the other hand, likes quoting the Rolling Stones' lyrics.

I would like to make it clear, incidentally, that I certainly do not believe that either UKIP or, more broadly, the various Eurosceptic parliamentary groups of which it has been a member hold any monopoly on face-threatening verbal behaviours in EP plenary sessions.[5] Having listened to many debates on-line, I could provide numerous examples of MEPs from other parties all across the political spectrum resorting to similar communicative strategies. However, UKIP makes a good starting point, also because all their speeches are in native English and interpreting from English used as a foreign language does not, therefore, further complicate the analysis.

5.2 Of damp rags and grey mice: Nigel Farage's tirade of 24 February 2010

On 19 November 2009, Herman Van Rompuy, the Prime Minister of Belgium at the time, is chosen by representatives of 27 member states as the first ever permanent President of the European Council (previously, this office rotated semiannually among heads of state of countries holding the presidency of the Council). On 24 February 2010, he first appears before the European Parliament to present the results of an informal European Council meeting. In the speeches made on behalf of each political group that follow, the new President is usually courteously congratulated on being elected (apart from raising the current political issues, notably the Greek economic crisis, that are addressed as the main topic, sometimes quite critically). Suddenly, there comes one speech that contrasts very sharply with all the rest (note that "[i]f the threshold is set high on a scale of politeness, behaviour which seems impolite is likely […] to be taken as even more impolite"; Culpeper 2011: 206). In about two minutes, and against the background of ever louder protests from the audience (which occasionally result in the speaker's false starts and repetitions), Nigel Farage, the President of Europe of Freedom and Democracy, manages to construct a very heavy and direct attack against Herman Van Rompuy, with multiple face threats, many of which amount to insults. Ilie (2001: 260) describes parliamentary insults as "more challenging and more intense than

[5] In addition, UKIP politicians often become targets of insults themselves, in the EP and elsewhere. For example, in 2006 David Cameron said in a radio interview that they were *fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists, mostly* (available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturenews/11519453/best-british-political-insults.html?frame=3260070, accessed 4 February 2016).

reproaches, accusations and criticisms." She adds that there are three characteristic features of an insult as opposed to the other three types of speech acts: firstly, the emotional force of an insult exceeds its rational force; secondly, it reinforces stereotypical reasoning; and, finally, it inhibits further dialogue as a result of seriously undermining the opponent's image, position and authority. Elsewhere, the same author notes that parliamentary insults carry much entertainment potential for the audience and, at the same time, they function as effective silencers of the insulted, as "their degree of rudeness cannot be easily matched by an equally powerful reply" (Ilie 2004: 61).

The speech needs to be quoted in full to illustrate its actual offensive potential.[6] The text will also serve as a basis for the following discussion of the specific impoliteness strategies that the speaker uses.

> President of Europe – this long-awaited day. We were told that, when we had a President, we would see a giant global political figure: the man that would be the political leader for five hundred million people; the man that would represent all of us on the world stage; the man whose job was so important that of course, you are paid more than President Obama. Well, I'm afraid what we got was you. And I'm sorry, but after that performance earlier that you gave… And I don't want to be rude, but… but you know, really, you have the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk. And the question that I wanna ask… the question that I wanna ask and that we all gonna ask is: who are you? I'd never heard of you; nobody in Europe had ever heard of you. I would like to ask you, President: who voted for you? And what mechanism – oh, I know democracy is not popular with you lot – and what mechanism do the peoples of Europe have to remove you? Is this European democracy? Well, I… I sense… I sense, though, that you are competent and capable and dangerous, and I have no doubt that it is your intention to be the quiet assassin of European democracy and of the European nation states. You appear to have a loathing for the very concept of the existence of nation states; perhaps that's because you come from Belgium, which, of course, is pretty much a non-country. But since you took over, we've seen Greece reduced to nothing more than a protectorate. Sir, you have no legitimacy in this job at all, and I can say with confidence that I can speak on behalf of the majority of the British people in saying: we don't know you, we don't want you, and the sooner you're put out to grass, the better.

[6] All the transcripts of original speeches under analysis in this chapter are based on the verbatim reports as made available on the Parliament's website, but they have been checked against delivery and corrected whenever discrepancies were noticed.

The President of the European Parliament who chairs the session, Jerzy Buzek, reacts very mildly to this, just implying that the statement was rude in spite of Farage's declared wish not to be rude. After this brief remark, he apparently intends to let the matter pass and give the floor to the next speaker on the list, but MEP Martin Schulz asks to speak on a point of order and actually reprimands Buzek very severely for his inadequate reaction and failing to call Farage to order, as it is admissible to criticise someone's politics, but it is clearly too much to refer to the President of the Council as a damp rag. What follows is a short verbal scuffle among the three protagonists,[7] with Buzek explaining he did admonish Farage on earlier occasions, and Farage accusing Schulz of using insults himself, namely, comparing Farage's party to the Nazis when it supported the Irish "no" in the referendum. Van Rompuy refrains from commenting on any of the commotion at the moment, although later he says: *There was one contribution that I can only hold in contempt, but I'm not going to comment further.*[8]

As could be expected, shortly afterwards the incident attracted much attention from the media (whose reaction itself proves that the speech was indeed impolite[9]). The fragments that were quoted

[7] In this situation, it is not entirely clear who listens to which language version. Herman Van Rompuy is not wearing any headphones (except when Buzek uses Polish), so he obviously listens to the original contributions. Jerzy Buzek, on the other hand, could be relying on the Polish interpretation of the speech more than the original, as one of his ears is covered with headphones (when chairing sessions, including this one, in his output he switches between English and Polish). Martin Schulz's close-up is not shown in the video during Farage's speech, so it is impossible to guess if he listens to the English original or to the German interpretation. Anyway, his critical intervention is made in German.

[8] A few days later, probably having reconsidered the matter on the basis of the media reaction and consulted the verbatim report of the speech, Buzek summoned Farage to formally admonish him for his behaviour. When Farage refused to apologise to Van Rompuy and the Belgian people, Buzek imposed on him a penalty amounting to ten days' allowance as an MEP. After the meeting on 2 March 2010, Buzek commented: *I defend absolutely Mr Farage's right to disagree about the policy or institutions of the Union, but not to personally insult our guests in the European Parliament or the country from which they may come. His behaviour towards Mr Van Rompuy was inappropriate, unparliamentary and insulting to the dignity of the House. As a former member of the Polish Solidarity movement, I myself fought for free speech as the absolute cornerstone of a democratic society. But with freedom comes responsibility – in this case, to respect the dignity of others and of our institutions. I am disappointed by Mr Farage's behaviour, which sits ill with the great parliamentary tradition of his own country. I cannot accept this sort of behaviour in the European Parliament.*

[9] Cf. Culpeper's view that "[a] participant's […] or observer's evaluation that something was impolite […] gives us good evidence that impoliteness offence was taken" (Culpeper 2010: 3241–3242).

the most often (and which can therefore be evaluated as the most scandalous) are the following: *you have the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk* and *you come from Belgium, which, of course, is pretty much a non-country*. The former is analysable as containing two FTAs attacking the addressee's positive face, including what can probably be construed as his public image and leadership skills (*charisma*) as well as his physical appearance, which probably cannot be regarded as a typical point of criticism against politicians. As pointed out by Munday (2012: 5), who compares several different interpretations of this very fragment, Farage "uses parallel syntactic structures […] and analogies designed to be mocking and hurtful. The strong negative evaluation of the adjectives *damp* and *low-grade*, collocated with the nouns *rag* and *bank clerk*, here merely exaggerates the overall ideational negativity of the speech." Both the FTAs meet all the criteria to be classified as *ad hominem* arguments, as defined by Plug (2010), and also as parliamentary insults, as defined by Ilie (2001).

The latter extract focuses on Belgium as van Rompuy's native country, and thus attacks the addressee's face in its broader aspect (cf. Culpeper 1996: 362, discussed in Section 3.3.1). At the same time, the offensive potential of this FTA is amplified by the fact that it may threaten the face of every Belgian either present in the hemicircle or listening to the speech through the media, not just the individual face of the direct addressee, that is, Van Rompuy. This is something that Ilie (2004: 50) calls "an overlap of targets," which, typically, refers to a politician and his/her political party being attacked simultaneously.

The speech, two minutes long, is presented at a very brisk pace of about 161 words per minute (although not without some pauses for rhetorical effect at major points) and in a serious tone of voice. It starts rather innocently with irony, which could easily be taken at face value by someone who is not familiar with Farage's views and his style of speaking. In particular, the initial phrase might easily be misinterpreted as a polite term of address. The new President of the Council is actually first addressed directly in the fragment referring to his remuneration, which is compared to that of President Obama (this can be seen as an off-record FTA, as the clear implicature here is that Van Rompuy is paid much too much). The speaker remains off-record for quite some time, at first only implying that there is a striking contrast between the great expectations and the person who was actually chosen for the position. In the words of Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2013: 82), this fragment is meant to "set up a desired 'alternative reality,' so much needed in

confrontational discourse." The contrast is clearly spelled out with the attitudinal marker *I'm afraid*, and the use of *what* to depersonalise the addressee is another device clearly showing the speaker's negative attitude.

Starting from this moment, Farage builds up a fairly long string of redressive devices that is analysable, in Spencer-Oatey's (2008) terms, as follows: *I'm sorry* – an apology; *after that performance earlier that you gave* – a grounder providing some reasons for the harsh assessment that is to follow, and also an off-record FTA implying that Van Rompuy's performance during the present session was very poor; *I don't want to be rude* – a disarmer amounting to "blatantly superficial lip-service paid to politeness" (Culpeper 2011: 176)[10]; and *you know* – claiming common ground. This elaborate redressive action leads to a couplet of the gravest FTAs in the whole speech (whose illocutionary force is further strengthened by *really*), if we judge by the media reaction as well as by what is quoted later by Martin Schulz. Rather fittingly, Munday (2012: 5) refers to this fragment as "the major sound-bite." Therefore, the redressive action as a whole appears to meet all the criteria to be classified as mock politeness or sarcasm, in Culpeper's (1996) terms.[11] Actually, it may even aggravate the threat to Van Rompuy's face instead of reducing it: "the use of conventionalised politeness *strongly mismatching* a context in which a polite interpretation is not sustainable could end up exacerbating the impoliteness of the message" (Culpeper 2011: 193; original emphasis). This fragment can also remind us of the mixture of impoliteness and politeness characteristic of the British parliamentary discourse (cf. Section 3.3.2.2.1).

From the moment Van Rompuy is compared, albeit somewhat indirectly (Ilie's 2004: 59 "attribution transfer strategy" seems to be at play here), to a damp rag, the speaker's stance towards the addressee is completely clear. Farage also continues to address Van Rompuy directly with *you* as many as nineteen times (and with *President* and *Sir*, each of these honorifics once) until the end of the speech, with the exception of the phrase *I know democracy is not popular with you lot*, which is

[10] It bears a striking resemblance to "I hate to be rude" and "no offence" that are discussed by Culpeper among examples of implicational convention-driven impoliteness. He also comments on such declarations and their inherent insincerity as follows: "The point is that if the speakers really hated being rude and really intended to avoid causing offence they would not have proceeded with the second part of the utterance in the way that they do" (Culpeper 2011: 193).

[11] This is a clear-cut case considering the offensiveness level of the following FTAs, but in fact the borderline between "genuine" politeness strategies and mock-politeness frequently seems to be a fuzzy one.

directed at those present in the room who loudly voice their protests.[12] At the same time, the speaker explicitly uses *I* to refer to himself (eleven times throughout the short speech), which seems to highlight his own responsibility for what he is saying and strengthen the illocutionary force. Also note that Brown and Levinson (1987) and Culpeper (1996) assess impersonal constructions as more polite, and the explicit use of *you* and *I* in criticism as aggravating the face threat, so the numerous personal pronouns may reflect the overall high level of danger to face. Farage also uses exclusive *we* (eight times) to emphasise that he is speaking on behalf of others, too. In the last sentence, these others are specified as *the majority of the British people*, but it is not clear whether the same referent is valid for the remaining six occurrences of *we* (they could also easily refer, for example, to all the members of Europe of Freedom and Democracy, over which Farage presides).

If the fragment with multiple rhetorical questions (again, an off-record device) seems very easy to understand (and to interpret), the next one poses more difficulties because, in spite of the speaker's very negative assessment of the addressee (of which, by this moment, we have become acutely aware), two positive adjectives are used: *competent* and *capable*, which suggest praise. However, the third adjective here is *dangerous*, and we soon learn that Van Rompuy is going to use his positive qualities for an ignoble cause: dismantling nation states in Europe. This line of argument culminates in the second most quoted fragment throughout the speech (the FTA amounting to calling Belgium a *non-country*), and is preceded both by a phrase strengthening the illocutionary force (*of course*) and by a downtoner (*pretty much*). The sentence about Greece seems to be the most indirect one in the whole speech, avoiding blaming anyone for the country's troubles by means of an impersonal construction, but just suggesting that Van Rompuy may bear much of the responsibility (temporal relation is used instead of implied causal one). The final series of FTAs, in turn, is produced very directly, both on-record and without any redress.

As a result of a number of shifts which I will enumerate below (although the discussion is not exhaustive, as it will focus on the ones having bearing on face issues), the Polish interpretation of the speech makes a different impression than the original. Globally, this is reinforced by the interpreter's tone of voice, which does not match Farage's seriousness (compare with Culpeper's 2010 assertion that

[12] Actually, this amounts to a breach of Rule 162.2 in the EP's Rules of Procedure, quoted in Section 2.2 here, under which MEPs should address the President who is chairing the session rather than other participants of the debate.

"[i]nconsistent accompanying prosodic and nonverbal signs are likely to suggest that the impoliteness is non-genuine," p. 3243). The interpreter sounds amused (although she does not actually laugh), especially at some points, for instance when rendering Farage's declaration that he does not want to be rude. Is this the interpreter's strategy to distance herself from the original, to show that she does not share Farage's views? Or rather an attempt to soften the face-threatening potential with something akin to laughter? We have already seen laughter play this very function in the material analysed by Knapp-Potthoff (2005), discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 4.1.1).

Furthermore, certain elements that do not have their counterparts in the original have been added by the Polish interpreter. For instance, the use of honorifics is much more pronounced in the interpretation (six as compared to two) and they are more varied and elaborate (*szanowny panie przewodniczący Europy* 'honourable Mr President of Europe,' *panie prezydencie Europy* 'Mr President of Europe,' *panie przewodniczący* 'Mr President,' *szanowny panie Van Rompuy* 'honourable Mr Van Rompuy,' *szanowny panie przewodniczący* 'honourable Mr President'). Whereas it was easy to construe the very beginning of Farage's speech as a polite direct address, and it is thus not surprising that the interpreter inserted a honorific here, the remaining additional honorifics seem to account for what is sometimes referred as "padding," that is, adding material that is not supposed to bring any new content to enable the interpreter to continue speaking while planning the production of the next meaningful unit and/or lengthening the ear-voice span to obtain more content for better understanding (see, e.g., Setton 1999: 50). However, honorifics also serve as politeness markers, and in the context of severe and very personal criticism in which they occur here, they may hardly be construed as genuine markers of respect. Therefore, they undoubtedly add to the sarcasm of the speech. Likewise, after using two different honorifics at the very beginning, the interpreter comes up with something that could be described as an anticipatory summary of the whole speech: *No, nie witamy pana tutaj… witamy pana tutaj z pewnymi zastrzeżeniami* 'Well, we do not welcome you here… we welcome you here with certain reservations.' This "summary" was undoubtedly inserted on the basis of the interpreter's previous knowledge of the speaker and his views in general; however, the final version sounds like a gross understatement in the light of the insults that follow. Consequently, again this addition may be seen as increasing the overall sarcasm.

At the same time, due to the high speed of delivery imposed by the original speaker, the interpreter's additions entail some inevitable

omissions and compression of content. Some of the omitted elements may be seen as redundant and deducible from the context (e.g., *when we had a President*); most omissions, however, change the illocutionary force of the text. For example, the off-record FTA concerning Van Rompuy's supposedly too high remuneration is not included in the interpretation, and neither is the phrase *a giant global political figure*, which, in the original, is the superordinate element of a longer list of qualities building a contrast between the expectations people might have of a President of the Council and the actual person elected for this position. *Oczekiwaliśmy* 'we expected' instead of *we were told* again increases the sarcasm of the speech, or otherwise might be seen as introducing a threat to the speaker's face (i.e., admitting that he and his political group were too naïve).

Let us now look at how the interpreter rendered the two most scandalous fragments. The redressive action leading up to the unsparing criticism of Van Rompuy's charisma and appearance is handled with repetitions not present in the original; at the same time, the interpreter omits *you know* as well as the reference to Van Rompuy's speech earlier in the session as a justification for what is going to be said: *Przepraszam, przepraszam. Nie chcę być niegrzeczny, nie chcę być nieuprzejmy* 'I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I do not want to be rude, I do not want to be unfriendly.' These repetitions can be perceived in at least two distinct ways: as strengthening the illocutionary force of the politeness strategies employed here or as presenting Farage as more hesitant than he really is. Also the equivalent of *really* (*naprawdę*) is repeated twice. The first FTA is rendered with negation as *nie ma pan wielkiej charyzmy* 'you do not have great charisma,' completely abandoning the damp rag metaphor[13] that enraged Martin Schulz and hit the headlines afterwards, and mitigating the illocutionary force to a considerable degree. In comparison to the original, this statement sounds almost polite.

The second FTA is rendered as *wygląda pan jak taka… taki szary urzędniczek bankowy* 'you look like such a… such a grey bank clerk (diminutive),' which, in comparison with the previous one, is much closer to the original illocutionary force. The use of the diminutive form *urzędniczek* is quite ingenious here, as it includes in its meaning both the low status and the speaker's irony (see, e.g., Sarnowski 1991 on the use of diminutives in Polish to express contempt or ridicule). Therefore,

[13] Note, however, that it is impossible to determine whether the interpreter made a strategic choice to remove the extremely face-threatening expression, or simply did not grasp it. The latter is also possible, considering the high delivery rate and the fact that *damp rag* is not a particularly popular idiom or something one would expect in parliamentary discourse.

the phrase *szary urzędniczek bankowy* is apparently more offensive than *a low-grade bank clerk*, as the pejorative meaning is not inherent in the latter; it just results from the comparison of Van Rompuy's actual very prominent position with his humble looks. *Taki* does not appear to act as a downtoner here, but rather as a marker of the interpreter's hesitation (note also that its gender is corrected from feminine to masculine; possibly the false start is linked to the next phrase already planned by the interpreter). The use of the diminutive form could be seen as exhibiting the interpreter's creativeness in employing expressive means available in the target language but not in the source language to convey the speaker's negative attitude.

The interpreter is apparently not entirely happy with her rendering of the two original FTAs, as she adds a third one: *szara myszka* 'a grey mouse (diminutive),' which in Polish is an idiom not typically used to describe men, but rather unattractive, shy women. This addition appears, at first glance, to be a strange translation decision (although note that the idiom relates to both looks and charisma). Searching for possible motives behind it, I first reflected on some possibilities the Polish language offers to offend men by referring to them using the feminine gender, namely a set of pejorative dual-gender nouns (such as *niezdara* 'butterfingers' or *gaduła* 'chatterbox'). The speaker can choose between masculine or feminine gender of such nouns by making them agree with other words marked for gender, such as verbs, and although the nouns as such already carry negative meaning, using the feminine gender to criticise a man aggravates the face threat (cf. Laskowski 1999), probably by suggesting that the man in question lacks masculine characteristics. This could have led the interpreter to opt for this particular feminine idiom. However, another and probably more plausible explanation emerged when I tried to google out "Van Rompuy" co-occurring with "mouse": it turns out that in English, "grey mouse" is a nickname Herman Van Rompuy earned for his unassuming, camera-shy manner. It first appears in press articles commenting on his election as the President of the Council (some of them claiming that it is a phrase he had used himself), so the interpreter could well have encountered it before being confronted with this speech. Consequently, in her search for an FTA that would be fitting and not too offensive, she may have used her background knowledge to retrieve this nickname and translated it literally into Polish, regardless of the resulting gender inconsistency.

Overall, while the FTA referring to Van Rompuy's charisma is significantly attenuated, the FTA referring to his appearance seems to be slightly aggravated, and, finally, another FTA is added, based on the

one already "sanctioned" by the media and possibly accepted by the addressee himself. The slight aggravation of the second FTA and the addition of the third one may be intended as a compensation for failing to convey the illocutionary force of the initial insult. Nevertheless, the omission of the particularly biting damp rag metaphor probably reduces the offensiveness of this fragment considered as a whole, as the face-threat added with the aggravating shifts seems quite subtle in comparison to what was removed. Moreover, as shown, for example, by Marzocchi (2005b), "speakers like to re-cycle imagery," that is, picturesque metaphors have the tendency to reoccur during debates, as they are either repeated or further developed by subsequent speakers.[14] This happens also here, as the damp rag is soon brought up again by Martin Schulz, and this time finds its way into the Polish interpretation (provided by another interpreter), albeit without the adjective present in the German original: *nazwał go po prostu szmatą* 'he simply called him a rag.' As a result, Polish listeners are likely to become confused at this moment, as this is the first time they hear anything about a rag. Incidentally, we could also wonder if *szmata* in Polish is, possibly, more offensive than its English counterpart – after all, except for its primary meaning, it can also denote a woman of loose morals. This consideration might also lie behind the first interpreter's decision to refrain from using this particular metaphor (always assuming that she grasped this fragment in the original in the first place).

As for Belgium being called a *non-country*, we need to consider the whole line of argument leading up to this FTA. The interpreter starts with: *Słyszałem, że jest pan kompetentny i że jest pan niebezpieczny* 'I've heard that you are competent and that you are dangerous,' thus changing the authorship of the opinion Farage is explicitly marking as his own (*I sense*) to an unnamed external source, and omitting one of the positively marked adjectives (*capable*). The concessive relation introduced by Farage in the first sentence by means of *though* takes the form of *ale* 'but' and is, rather unfortunately, shifted to the beginning of the next sentence, undermining the logic of the speech. In the original text, there is indeed a contrast between the criticism expressed earlier and the surprisingly face-enhancing evaluation at the beginning of this fragment, and there is an implied causal relation between Van

[14] In Marzocchi's example, taken from the European Court of Justice, the saying *the proof of the pudding is in the eating* is rendered by a Polish interpreter by explaining the meaning of the metaphor rather than using the same image. However, the next speaker jokingly makes an intertextual reference to the pudding, which, consequently, proves very difficult to handle for the other Polish interpreter, who has, in the meantime, taken over the microphone.

Rompuy's competence and his intention to dismantle nation states and kill democracy (i.e., he is cunning enough to be able to actually accomplish it). In the interpretation, it is not comprehensible why there should be a contrast between Van Rompuy's competence and his sinister plans.

In the same sentence, a phrase which both strengthens the illocutionary force and highlights Farage's authorship (*I have no doubt*) is changed into an impersonal one, with even more illocutionary force (*z całą pewnością* 'with absolute certainty'). Likewise, what is described as Van Rompuy's intention in the original (whose implementation may perhaps still be prevented by heroic figures like Farage, the listeners might be persuaded to believe) is simply expressed with the future tense in Polish as something unavoidable: *będzie pan takim cichym zabójcą europejskiej demokracji i Europy państw narodowych* 'you will be such a quiet assassin of the European democracy and of Europe of nation states.' Notably, the highly face-threatening close equivalent of *quiet assassin* is preceded by a downtoner not present in the English version. *Mówi… jest pan tutaj bardzo skromny, ale* 'you speak… you are very humble here, but' at the beginning of the next sentence is, likewise, the interpreter's addition. Farage's subjective and therefore less face-threatening *you appear*, on the other hand, is substituted by more factual *jest pan* 'you are.' The strong word *loathing* is mitigated as *jest pan bardzo sceptycznie nastawiony do państw narodowych* 'your attitude to nation states is very sceptical,' but what is only a guess for Farage (*perhaps this is because*) becomes a certainty in the interpretation (*to nie jest dziwne, bo* 'this is not strange, because'). Finally, as the neologism *non-country* would sound very clumsy when calqued into Polish, the insult is rendered with a rather ingenious paraphrase: *pochodzi pan z Belgii, która nie jest godna miana państwa* 'you come from Belgium, which is not worthy of being called a country.' At the same time, both the upgrader (*of course*) and the downtoner (*pretty much*) by which this FTA is accompanied in the original are omitted in the interpretation.

Another shift related to FTAs consists in removing the FTA directly addressed at the protesting audience – the rather derogatory form of address *you lot*. What is left of it in the Polish interpretation is just the word *democracy*, inserted in a rhetorical question to Van Rompuy: *Jaki mechanism… jaki mechanism niegodny miana demokracji wyniósł pana na te wyżyny?* 'What mechanism… what mechanism not worthy of being called democracy has brought you to these heights?' At the same time, the off-record FTA suggesting that Van Rompuy should be removed (i.e., asking if there is any mechanism enabling his removal from office) is omitted, as the interpreter's version of this question

seems more like a paraphrase of the previous question (*Who voted for you?*). The same FTA, this time on-record, is repeated by Farage in the very last sentence of his speech with a colorful, rather colloquial idiom: *the sooner you're put out to grass, the better.* Also here, the interpreter mitigates the FTA by ascribing more agency to Van Rompuy himself, changing passive into active and increasing the formality of this fragment: *im szybciej nas pan opuści, tym lepiej* 'the sooner you leave us, the better.'

The above qualitative analysis of various shifts in the Polish interpretation of Farage's speech shows that the changes made by the interpreter are significant and far-reaching, although they do not show a uniform trend towards mitigation of impoliteness. The resulting picture is really complex, as we see that in some fragments that may be treated as single FTAs there are both shifts that weaken and strengthen their illocutionary force, and it is certainly difficult to state if such shifts cancel each other out, illocutionary force being hardly measurable.[15] The speech seems, however, considerably more sarcastic (due to added politeness markers) and therefore more indirect. In this aspect, it resembles speeches from the UK Parliament (in which, in the words of Ilie (2004), "[t]he insult's initiators do sometimes attempt to neutralise the harmful effect of the expression of contempt by means of the concomitant use of verbal tokens of respect," pp. 56–57) to a greater degree than could be said about Farage's original. Also some changes that limit Farage's personal engagement (*I sense, I have no doubt*) result in reducing directness, although, as mentioned at the end of Chapter 3, opinion markers are often seen as hedges (Wierzbicka 2003: 43). On the whole, I would risk saying that the Polish interpretation appears less face-threatening than the original English speech, mainly because the most insulting piece of criticism was significantly attenuated, but also due to other factors, such as the interpreter's tone of voice. I may therefore perhaps also advance the hypothesis that Buzek's calm reaction to Farage's words might have been caused by his listening to the Polish interpretation rather than to the original. Schulz's passionate reaction, on the other hand, might have resulted from his better grasp of the actual face-threatening potential of Farage's tirade. In this way, interpreting might have influenced the overall dynamics of this part of the debate. Although we cannot be certain if Schulz in fact reacted to the original speech or to its German interpretation, let us examine the

[15] This is a problem similar to the one that Pym (2007: 186) considers in relation to translation universals (see Section 6.4): if in the material under analysis there is just one shift going in the opposite direction than the rest, it could still outweigh all the others combined if it had more importance.

latter to see if the German interpreter's approach to FTAs is different than that of his Polish colleague.

As for the tone of voice, the German interpreter's tone matches that of Farage much more closely. There are few additions, and, unlike in the case of the Polish interpreter, they do not amount to whole sentences or phrases, but are limited to a very local level. In particular, it is noticeable that some emphatic particles, that is, *denn*, *eigentlich* and *mal*, were added copiously, for example in rhetorical questions such as *Wer sind Sie denn eigentlich?* 'Who are you?' As such particles do not have their equivalents in English, it is even difficult to show their presence in the back-translation. However, in German they seem absolutely necessary in a highly emotional text, as refraining from using them would make the target text too dry. Consequently, these additions seem to be fully justified as resulting from some pragmatic differences between English and German. In contrast to the Polish interpretation, no honorifics are added, in fact, one is omitted (*Sir*), and the initial phrase *Herr Präsident von Europa* is very similar to the English original in being interpretable either as a polite term of address or as an ironic description addressed to the audience rather than to Van Rompuy himself. In Polish, it would have been impossible to preserve this ambiguity, as the vocative (necessary for a term of address) and the nominative have different inflectional endings and, consequently, the interpreter had to settle on one or the other.

At the beginning, the German interpreter translates the text very literally,[16] maintaining a short ear-voice span. All the elements making up the list of expected qualities of a President of the Council are preserved, and so is the off-record FTA implied by comparing his pay to that of Obama. Shifts begin at the moment the contrast is revealed: highly sarcastic *well, I'm afraid* is rendered as a concessive relation expressed with *aber* 'but,' and the face-threat manifest in impersonal *what* being used to refer to Van Rompuy (which has been successfully handled by the Polish interpreter by means of a rhetorical question: *A co otrzymaliśmy?* 'And what have we received?') is omitted.

In the redressive action leading up to the damp rag metaphor, the illocutionary force of the first "polite" element has been strengthened by the addition of the intensifier *sehr* (*es tut mir sehr leid* 'I am very sorry'). Likewise, *wirklich* added to the next element works in the same way (*ich will jetzt wirklich nicht unhöflich sein* 'I really do not want to be impolite now'). *You know* is omitted, and *really* is rendered,

[16] There is, however, an obvious mistake in the number: five hundred instead of five hundred million.

more elaborately, as *ehrlich gesagt* 'frankly speaking.' On the whole, the redressive action seems slightly more polite than in the original, although, as we are aware (but not necessarily the interpreter, at this point), the politeness is soon going to be revealed as what it really amounts to: sarcasm. Once the damp rag comes like a bolt from the blue, the interpreter is visibly at a loss for words, which results in rapidly growing ear-voice span, repetition of *aber* and filled pauses. Finally, the interpreter settles on a very literal version of this grave FTA: *Sie haben das… das Charisma eines nassen Lappen*, at the same time completely omitting the other FTA referring to Van Rompuy's appearance. At this point, the interpreter has already fallen back quite far behind the original, and although after the first FTA he adds the connective *und* and stops for a moment as if to think about a possible translation of *a low-grade bank clerk*, he gives it up and connects this sentence to the next one: *und die Frage, die ich stellen möchte, ist…* 'and the question that I would like to ask is….' Therefore, it definitely does not look as if the FTA is omitted either because the interpreter did not catch it or because he opts for mitigation to save Van Rompuy's face. Rather, I believe that the time constraint plays the main role here: the interpreter apparently decides that catching up with the original has priority over retaining this particular face threat. On the whole, in comparison with the Polish version, the final effect is radically different: only one FTA out of neighbouring two is transferred, but, on the other hand, it is handled without any modifications (although, like in the case of the Polish interpreter, with obvious effort).

As Munday (2012: 5) points out, the second FTA in the couplet is, likewise, omitted by the French interpreter, whose version *vous avez le charisma d'une serpillière* 'you have the charisma of a floor-cloth' additionally lacks the adjective. Still, it is much more literal than the Polish interpretation. The Italian interpreter, on the other hand, uses a solution markedly closer to the Polish one for the FTA referring to Van Rompuy's charisma: *Lei cha un charisma di una persona incapace* 'you have a charisma of an incompetent person,' which Munday assesses as downplaying and explicitation. Unfortunately, from his discussion it is not completely clear what happened to the other FTA in the Italian version, probably it was also omitted. The Spanish version, in turn, includes both the FTAs and is fairly literal, according to Munday.

In the fragment homing in on Belgium, the German interpreter apparently fails to comprehend that the initial series of three adjectives actually contains two that suddenly praise Van Rompuy: he uses *unfähig* 'incompetent' and *gefährlich* 'dangerous' here. As noted by Munday (2012), an analogical mistake is made by the Italian and the Spanish

interpreters, who both use equivalents of *incompetent* at this point – let me reiterate that the Polish interpreter did not fall into this trap. Like his Polish colleague, the German interpreter afterwards translates *the quiet assassin of European democracy and of European nation states* very literally, but presents this as a fact (moreover, one already happening, as the present tense is employed) rather than Van Rompuy's intention. The next sentence obviously fails to transfer Farage's logic: *Sie stehen für das Konzept der Existenz der Nationalstaaten, weil Sie vielleicht aus Belgien kommen, das ist an sich so ein Nicht-Land, ehrlich gesagt* 'you stand for the concept of the existence of the nation states, because maybe you come from Belgium, which in itself is such a non-country, frankly speaking.' There are some serious problems with this sentence, beginning with the initial fragment, which must be seen as the very opposite of the original *you appear to have a loathing*, and continuing with the position of *vielleicht*, suggesting that Farage is not sure whether or not Van Rompuy is Belgian. Consequently, the German sentence strikes the listener as internally illogical. *Of course* is rendered as the final *ehrlich gesagt*, which seems to be the interpreter's favourite upgrader for the gravest FTAs. The downtoner *pretty much* is transferred faithfully, and the key phrase is translated element-by-element as *Nicht-Land*, which is a neologism making a very similar impression as its English counterpart. To sum up, due to the elaborate argumentation, both the interpreters have some troubles in following the logic of the original, but the Polish interpreter seems to have come ahead in this challenge, avoiding sense errors (although some cohesion-related issues do appear in her version).

Just like the Polish interpreter, the German one omits the FTA related to Van Rompuy's possible removal both times it occurs, although in the case of its second occurrence the colloquial style of the original is reflected more closely: *Je schneller Sie aus dem Amt verschwinden, desto besser* 'The sooner you disappear from the office, the better.' On the other hand, the German interpreter successfully handles the FTA addressed at the hecklers: *Ja, ich weiß Demokratie, das gefällt Ihnen überhaupt nicht gut* 'Yes, I know, democracy, you don't like it at all.'

On the whole, the two interpretations allow me to form some tentative hypotheses as to the interpreters' strategic processing of this particular speech. Each of the two interpreters seems to adopt a different approach, the German interpreter preferring strategies that promote coherence with the original and completeness (perhaps focusing his attention on its form, which does not, nevertheless, prevent occasional sense errors that are easily noticeable by the audience), and the Polish interpreter opting for more creativeness, both omitting and adding

considerably more than her German colleague. The Polish interpreter either does not feel obliged to represent the original message so closely and takes a more sense-oriented approach, intentionally departing from the surface form of the original, or, alternatively, she is forced to resort to strategies such as inferencing (reconstructing lost input fragments on the basis on the available context) and, possibly, even the more extreme parallel reformulation (inventing something that is plausible in the context so as to keep talking) by comprehension problems (for more details on these strategies, see Bartłomiejczyk 2006: 160–161 and Gile 2009: 201–211).

As for Munday's observations (2012), they are formed primarily on the basis of the short most offensive fragment (without the redressive action accompanying it); however, more language versions than here are taken into consideration (German, French, Italian and Spanish). For all these interpreters, the fragment in question clearly constitutes a challenge, which is confirmed by their hesitation. In all but the Spanish version, the strength of Farage's evaluation is reduced. Munday (2012: 5) tentatively attributes this to "the interpreters' concern to avoid the risk of exaggerating it [the FTA]" and he links this concern to the use of the first person, by which the interpreters "place themselves in the position of representing the speech act of Farage. They thus incur the risk that the words they utter may be taken to be their own subjective interpretations of the ST (source text)." Munday also notes that some of the interpreters resort to compensation, which they achieve by means of affective intonation and by inserting markers of negative evaluation at some points where they are not present in the original. The German interpreter's emphatic particles are seen as an example of this. Also the Spanish interpreter adds evaluative interpersonal markers: *¿Quién demonios es usted?* 'Who the devil are you?' and *usted no tiene ni pajolera idea* 'you don't have the foggiest idea,' although I do not quite understand for what these additions are supposed to compensate, as the Spanish interpreter is reported to have rendered the critical fragment faithfully.

Coming back to my own analysis, I am wondering at this point how much a quantitative analysis can tell us about the face-threatening potential of each of the two interpretations in relation to the original text. Let us first consider this on the basis of the short fragment which has already been described as the most offensive, containing two on-record FTAs that target the addressee's charisma and appearance. The FTAs, however, should probably not be considered in isolation to the redress leading to them, which, as already said, consists of four parts: apology, grounder (with an off-record FTA), disarmer and

claiming common ground. In the Polish interpretation, there are also four redressive elements, although not all of them correspond to the original ones, as there is a repeated apology and two slightly different disarmers, with no off-record FTA. Can we therefore assume that the redress has been rendered faithfully? Mere counting of politeness strategies suggests so. As for the on-record FTAs, there are three in the Polish interpretation, that is, the first original FTA has been mitigated, the second – aggravated, and the third is the interpreter's addition (*szara myszka*). The upgrader equivalent to *really* is repeated twice in the Polish version. Looking at this admittedly rather crude quantitative analysis, we are prone to assume that the Polish interpreter's version is more offensive than the original: after all, she added one on-record FTA while omitting one off-record FTA, and the mitigation and aggravation of two original FTAs seem to cancel each other out. The German interpreter, in turn, rendered three out of four redressive elements, strengthening two of them (by adding *sehr* and *wirklich*) and retaining the off-record FTA, and went on to transfer one on-record FTA faithfully and omit the other one completely. Therefore, in the German interpretation of this extract there is only one on-record FTA, compared to two in the original version and three in the Polish interpretation, which gives the impression that the German version is the least face-threatening one. This does not correspond to what I concluded earlier, when relying on the qualitative approach. Why? Should not the two approaches complement each other rather than contradict each other?

I am afraid that the explanative power of the quantitative analysis as presented above is severely limited as compared to the preceding qualitative analysis. The main problem here lies with the primitiveness of the quantitative analysis that I was trying to apply, namely, lack of sufficiently subtle distinctions among FTAs. It is clearly not enough to assume simply, in line with Brown and Levinson (1987), that an on-record FTA without redress is more face-threatening than one with redress, which, in turn, is more face-threatening than an off-record FTA. A grave on-record insult, even if preceded by ample redress, will still cause more damage to the addressee's face than a piece of more "constructive" criticism, expressed on record without any redress (which the damp rag metaphor illustrates vividly). An off-record FTA employing, for example, biting irony, may have a very big offensive potential in spite of its supposed indirectness; on the other extreme, some off-record FTAs are so subtle that they may fail to be perceived as such, either by the addressee or by the analyst. The politeness strategies, in this context, are also problematic – as I already postulated, when

accompanying very serious FTAs such as are at play here, they seem to qualify as mock-politeness and, therefore, off-record FTAs.

The research on parliamentary discourse reviewed in Section 3.3.2.2.1 shows that most pragmaticists shun the quantitative approach. I was hoping to find there a method of quantitative analysis of monolingual material that would be suitable, possibly with some modifications, to scrutinise source texts and corresponding interpretations. Harris's analysis, although limited to the qualitative approach, incidentally shows that on-record FTAs are relatively easy to count by dividing the relevant utterance into propositions; however, the classification of individual threats to positive face into specific speech acts, such as accusation, criticism, contempt, ridicule and challenge, is "open to debate" (Harris 2001: 464) as the categories partly overlap and are difficult to assign unequivocally to some FTAs. However, in the only study that does employ quantitative analysis, that is, Pérez de Ayala (2001), it is in fact carried out as crudely as my own, namely, by counting FTAs and politeness strategies, without further dividing them into types (obviously, this is done on a much larger scale as far as the material is concerned). In fact, Pérez de Ayala does not even try to account for any connections between the former and the latter here, that is, she does not consider that some politeness strategies might function as redress for FTAs, whereas others might stand on their own (which applies to both categories, actually). Showing the average frequency per turn (0.86 for FTAs and 2.78 for politeness strategies) does not seem to be particularly revealing, because, as the author herself admits, there are no studies offering a baseline of either for comparison. As there is no plausible way of measuring the face-threatening potential of FTAs against the face-enhancing potential of politeness strategies, the considerably higher frequency of the latter does not enable us to conclude that British parliamentary discourse is more polite than it is aggressive (and the author is far from making such a simplistic assumption). On the whole, the brief quantitative part of this study arguably does not contribute much to the knowledge of facework in British parliamentary discourse, in contrast to the detailed qualitative analysis.

Likewise, Monacelli's (2009) quantitative analysis of FTAs in interpretations (the only one that scrutinises authentic conference material, as opposed to more numerous experimental studies) is not particularly fine-grained. As I have already pointed out in Section 4.3, it does not even divide the FTAs into such that threaten the addressee's face (surely an overwhelming majority in any parliamentary corpus) and such that threaten the speaker's face (not a rarity in Monacelli's highly

diverse corpus, as we are led to believe by her examples). Consequently, the reader is not convinced whether the shifts that, predominantly, reduce the illocutionary force of FTAs, actually make the interpretations more polite and/or less aggressive than the corresponding source text.

Considering the above, the pilot study makes me abandon the plan for a quantitative analysis, at least for the time being, and focus first and foremost on a detailed qualitative scrutiny of several particularly face-threatening speeches and their interpretations. Hopefully, Straniero Sergio and Falbo (2012: 36) are right in claiming that "qualitative studies on modest-size or fully developed corpora are a launching pad for further quantitative analyses." Therefore, before embarking on a top-down analysis of a larger corpus, which may include some quantitative elements, I would like to proceed in a similar manner as in this section and describe holistically facework in four more interpretations of particularly face-threatening speeches. The choice has been made on the basis of the original speeches, without reference to their interpretations at this stage. Incidentally, each of the five speeches is interpreted into Polish by a different interpreter, three of them female (Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.5) and two – male (Section 5.4 and 5.6). As the larger corpus will only be in English and Polish due to logistic constraints, German interpretations will not be considered any further here (although my initial idea to compare interpretations into both the languages might be resurrected in later publications, subject to availability of financial and human resources to transcribe German interpretations).

5.3 Five years later: A hearty welcome to Donald Tusk

Having in mind what Ilie (2004: 61) said about the entertainment value of parliamentary insults,[17] YouTube, with its counter of viewings, seems a convenient tool to determine which speeches have been enjoying

[17] See also Culpeper (2011: 234): "Impoliteness […] can be designed as much for the over-hearing audience as for the target addressee, and that audience can be entertained." Culpeper enumerates five sources of pleasure that the audience can experience, some of them closely associated with *Schadenfreude*: emotional pleasure (arousal), aesthetic pleasure (admiration for creative skills involved in producing impoliteness and responding to it), voyeuristic pleasure (observing the private self that targets of impoliteness may expose), the pleasure of being superior (the target is in a worse situation) and the pleasure of feeling secure (someone else is being attacked).

much popularity and, therefore, might be seen as particularly face-threatening. Nigel Farage's welcome of another President of the Council, Donald Tusk, on 15 January 2015, has undoubtedly attracted a lot of interest: a clip with Polish subtitles has been viewed more than 2.6 million times in about 11 months. The communicative situation is, in fact, very similar to that described in the previous section: the newly elected President of the Council appears for the first time in the hemicircle to present to the chamber conclusions of a European Council meeting, and the responses usually include courteous congratulations to Tusk on being elected, and wishes of success for his term in office. Farage's speech, in contrast, offers very harsh criticism.

A potentially important difference, as far as interpreting is concerned, consists in the fact that this time the very person who is being attacked is listening to the Polish interpretation. As already mentioned, it is far from certain whether this should have any tangible influence on the interpretation, but, on the other hand – this cannot be ruled out. All of this is pure speculation, but, first of all, as a Pole, the interpreter might feel some in-group solidarity with Donald Tusk, and, as shown by Warchał et al. (2011), mitigation seems more likely to occur when interpreters belong to the group that is being verbally attacked. On the other hand, the interpreter as an individual is not devoid of political views and these, even inadvertently, might become manifest, for example, in certain lexical choices (cf. Beaton-Thome 2013). If the interpreter were an opponent of Tusk and his party, the Civic Platform, s/he would likely have a kind of "serves him right" attitude to this speech, as expressed by numerous Polish viewers of the YouTube clip, which might result in strengthening of the speaker's illocutionary force. Furthermore, looking at the issue from the addressee's perspective, the interpreter might wish to save Tusk's face and perhaps also his/her own and attenuate Farage's FTAs, or, alternatively, do his/her best to render them as closely as possible so as to give Tusk a chance to make a fitting retort. On the whole, the Polish interpreter may definitely have a stronger sense of acting as an intermediary between the speaker and the addressee here than in the case of the tirade directed at Van Rompuy; however, the implications of this might go in different directions and are hardly predictable.

As with the previously analysed speech, the original in full is necessary to facilitate a detailed comparative analysis:

> Mr President, first I would like to give my customary welcome to incoming Presidents of the European Council. I can see why they chose you. You are perfect. You're like the euro record that has got

> stuck in a groove – a completely out-of-date view of what Europe is, and clearly you've learned absolutely nothing from the results of the European elections.
> Now as you know, in the United Kingdom, immigration is the key debate. It is dominating political discourse within our country. And at the heart of that is the whole question of the free movement of peoples, but of course your debate is the other side of the same coin. Your debate is about emigration, and time and again, you've promised the Polish voters that young Poles would return to Poland. And at the same time, Mr Cameron has promised the British people that fewer Poles would come to us. Well, it turns out that you've both been wrong and that your country's been depopulated by two million people since you joined the European Union. And the reason is obvious. It's money, is it not? And you yourself prove the point. You're the newest Polish émigré, and you've gone… you've gone from a salary of sixty thousand euros to a salary of three hundred thousand euros a year. So, congratulations: you've hit the EU jackpot!
> But you've also scored a great victory without trying, because Mrs Merkel last week went to Downing Street. She spent a few days with… she spent a few hours with Mr Cameron, and Mr Cameron is now a big supporter of the free movement of people. 'Let me be clear,' he said, 'I support the freedom of movement.' So on that one you've won a great victory against Mr Cameron without having to lift a finger. But he also says that he will now restrict the benefits of EU migrants working in Britain. Now, in the past you've been very clearly opposed to this. And I wanna… Please answer me today, Mr Tusk: is it right that children who live in Warsaw should qualify for child benefits if their parents are working in London? Please clarify to me that point today.
> In some ways you face quite a tough test. Not with the UK – our leaders are a soft touch. But despite the Lithuanian lemmings, you've got the euro crisis, you've got a referendum on whether the EU… whether the UK stays a member and, of course, the appalling growth of attacks on Jewish people. I would put it to you, Mr Tusk, that the European elections showed us one thing: the voters in Europe want change. They want massive, wholesale reform, and I'm entirely confident that you're not the man to provide that.

This speech is longer than the previous one, 2 minutes 45 seconds, and slightly faster, presented at about 167 words per minute. The speaker is not interrupted by heckling, but – just once – by laughter and applause (when he calls Tusk *the newest Polish émigré*). Interestingly, the speech begins with an intertextual reference to the one made five years before (the ironic *customary welcome*), by which Farage signals, to anyone who has heard the other speech (possibly also the interpreters?), that he is

going to speak on a similar note. If someone is unaware of how Farage "welcomed" Van Rompuy, however, this clue might be misleading. But does Farage actually live up to the standard he set five years before and to the expectations that his audience might have, based on this introduction?

On the whole, this speech seems considerably milder than the one directed at Van Rompuy, because none of the FTAs are so personal as to criticise Tusk's appearance or charisma. Rather, Farage focuses on Tusk's supposedly old-fashioned views, his incompetence as the PM of Poland, having failed to keep his promise to stop economic emigration, and his inability to act as a driving force for radical reform in the EU. In comparison to the other speech, there is also considerably less redress that could specifically be linked to particular FTAs. Probably the most face-threatening is the fragment where Farage is accusing Tusk of choosing economic emigration himself, providing precise information about Tusk's income, and ironically congratulating him on winning a lottery with this, which implies that no personal merits played a role in his election as the President, and that he might be motivated by financial gain. This is also the fragment that attracted some attention from the Polish media. None of the FTAs therein, however, seems to go as far as to qualify as a parliamentary insult according to Ilie's (2001) criteria. Likewise, there is also nothing critical said on record about Poland and the Polish people (except the implied suggestions that their main concern in life is money, as well as that they are not welcome in the UK and the benefits they are claiming there are unfair) that would be comparable to Van Rompuy's native Belgium being described as a *non-country*. Nevertheless, the comment on *Lithuanian lemmings* (referring to Lithuania's adoption of the euro as of 1 January 2015, mentioned by Tusk in his speech as a positive sign of confidence in the euro and applauded by the audience) might be somewhat offensive to Lithuanians.

What is characteristic of this speech is that, apart from criticising Tusk, it focuses very much on UK's political agenda, and Farage is trying to kill two birds with one stone by attacking PM Cameron as well, especially by accusing him of being swayed by Chancellor Merkel, and, consequently, changing his views on freedom of movement to the detriment of UK's interests. Interestingly, migration is a topic introduced to this debate by Farage, not something Tusk highlighted in his speech, to which this one is supposed to be a reaction.

Donald Tusk actually uses one of Farage's favourite weapons to repel the attack, that is, sarcasm, when he says at the end of the debate that he is *impressed and satisfied* with Farage's contribution.

He also reminds the audience of the speech directed at Van Rompuy, which showed Farage as a paragon of *political and personal culture, as well as of political decency and elegance*. At the end of his retort, Tusk rather paternalistically encourages Farage to *keep it up*. He does not try to answer Farage's question about child benefits, which undoubtedly is not a rhetorical one, and he actually does not refer in detail to anything that has been said by Farage. Consequently, his retort makes an impression of one prepared in advance in anticipation of a very fierce attack, which, actually, turns out much more rational and less offensive than the one made against Van Rompuy.[18]

The Polish interpreter's tone seems irritating, because it sounds very much like a parody of the original speaker, with exaggerated prosodic features supposed to represent irony, such as prolonged vowels and, at times, very high pitch. I would describe this as overacting when compared to Farage's tone. Note, in relation to this, Culpeper's (2011: 161) assertion that mimicry is a type of implicational impoliteness: quoting "too much," including the original speaker's prosody and/or gestures, raises the suspicion of ridiculing him or her, and this is exactly what comes to mind here. The interpretation is fluent, with few false starts and practically no voiced hesitation or longer pauses. However, a monolingual listener will notice a few incomplete sentences, such as *tak naprawdę… przedawnione poglądy na temat tego, co Europa…* 'actually… outdated views on what Europe…,' which are not attributable to the original speaker. The upgrader at the beginning of this utterance, *tak naprawdę* 'actually' seems to be the interpreter's favourite filler, used four times throughout the interpretation, and having no counterpart in the original any time it is employed in the interpretation – although, apart from the case quoted above, it does not really modify any on-record FTAs.

As for honorifics, unlike in the previously analysed interpretation, none are added, and the direct address *Mr Tusk* is rendered as *panie przewodniczący* 'Mr President' both times it appears in the original. This is a justified decision, as both the English and the Polish versions are neutral in this context, that is, they do not strike as either rude or particularly polite. Addressing a person holding such a high position without mentioning this position would be considered impolite in Polish (cf. Marcjanik 2007: 45; Ligaj 2015: 357; Łaziński 2006: 88–92).

[18] Instead of Nigel Farage, it is MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke who stole the show during this debate, by claiming that *our enemies are in mosques, in the mosque of Paris, in the mosque of Marseilles*. Incidentally, although his speech was hardly comprehensible as read out in poor English, the Polish interpretation is very accurate, probably thanks to the fact that the text was submitted to interpreters prior to delivery.

In contrast, similar references to third parties who do not participate in the debate (i.e., *Mr Cameron*, *Mrs Merkel*) are transferred more closely as *pan Cameron* and *pani Merkel*, and not, by analogy, as *(pan) premier Cameron* and *(pani) kanclerz Merkel*, which would be seen as more typical (and decisively more polite) in a political speech in Polish – the forms with *pan/pani* in this context can actually easily be perceived as showing the speaker's irreverence (Łaziński 2006: 89–90). Apparently, the interpreter is less concerned with adjusting the honorifics to Polish standards in the case of politicians who are not addressed directly in this speech, and, obviously, would never listen to the Polish interpretation.

Surprisingly, the interpretation begins with *Tak* 'yes,' which is a rather rude way to take over the floor, at least in comparison to the standard honorific addressed at the chairing President of the Parliament that is found in the original speech and omitted here. The intertextual reference is lost; instead, more irony is added with the adverb *grzecznościowo* 'politely': *chciałbym grzecznościowo powitać nowego przewodniczącego Rady Europejskiej* 'I would like to politely welcome the new President of the European Council.' The following statement, ironic already in the original, is rendered very closely. However, the interpreter obviously has some problems with Farage's picturesque comparison that follows, and she comes up with a different comparison: *pan jest jak wzorzec z Sèvres tego, czym stara Europa jest* 'you are like the Sèvres prototype of what old Europe is.' The face-threatening potential of the two comparisons is difficult to compare; however, it seems similar. Surely, neither of them is insulting. The accusation about failing to learn anything from the election results is rendered closely as such; nevertheless, both the accompanying upgraders (i.e., *clearly* and *absolutely*) are omitted, and more neutral *zresztą* 'anyway' is added.

The politeness marker *as you know* (claiming common ground) is omitted from the beginning of the argument on economic migration from Poland to the UK, and so is *time and again*, which in the original strengthens the (by now) off-record accusation of making empty promises. The most face-threatening fragment on money and Tusk's remuneration is, in turn, rendered very closely, including the numbers and the ironic congratulations. *Rzeczywiście, to był jackpot europejski, udało się panu* 'really, this was a European jackpot, you succeeded' is a rather long rendering of *you've hit the EU jackpot*, and the part that on the basis of the back-translation appears to correspond to the original is not necessarily clear in Polish due to using the unassimilated loanword *jackpot* instead of the Polish idiom *wygrać los*

na loterii, which seems very suitable here. The added upgrader seems to account for the interpreter's padding, and the last part is probably added as a repair when the interpreter realises that her translation of Farage's idiom might not be understandable; indeed, the impersonal verb *udało się* introduces, in Polish, the element of sheer luck rather than personal merit or work involved in Tusk's election. Consequently, the face-threat inherent in the original idiom is transferred through other linguistic means.

The beginning of the fragment about Tusk's victory in the debate on migration actually won by Chancellor Merkel is rendered very closely, perhaps with too much reliance on the surface form, because *wielkie zwycięstwo bez próby* 'great victory without trial' does not really convey in Polish the sense that Tusk did not need to make any effort to win (which only becomes clear from the following context). What is highly interesting here is a very ironic sentence added after the one stating that PM Cameron has changed his views: *No proszę, jaka przekonująca była!* 'Well, well, so convincing was she!' – which looks almost as the interpreter's own comment, having no counterpart in the original. The additional FTA thus created, however, is not directed at Tusk, but at Cameron (and, perhaps, at Merkel as well).

Quite important for this speech is the fragment in which Farage is posing his question about child benefits, emphatically asking Tusk for an answer, both before and after the question. This must be seen as a threat to the addressee's negative face, trying to make him do something (declare his view). In the original speech, the question does not look like a purely rhetorical one, but one truly requiring an answer, the more so for its polite form (*please* is employed twice) and urgency (*today*). The interpreter begins this fragment rather unsuccessfully with an unfinished sentence: *Ale migranci pracujący w Wielkiej Brytanii… No właśnie. Wcześniej był pan temu przeciwny.* 'But the migrants working in Great Britain… Right. Previously you were against this.' This fails to convey the existing conflict between Cameron and Tusk on this issue and suggests, rather, that Tusk was against Poles emigrating to the UK to work there. The question is preceded by an imploration for an answer (*I proszę mi odpowiedzieć*, *panie przewodniczący* 'And please answer me, Mr President'), but instead of another polite imploration after it, which adds emphasis in the original, there is an ironic statement *No cóż, oczywiście będzie to trudne pytanie* 'Well, surely this will be a difficult question' that seems to suggest in Polish that the question indeed is a rhetorical one. Certainly, I have no reasons to claim that Tusk would have answered Farage's question if it had been marked more clearly as one requiring an answer in the Polish interpretation, but

leaving it without an answer seems more justified when we look at the Polish version than at the English one. It may sometimes be difficult to distinguish, in practice, between a real question as an on-record FTA to the addressee's negative face and a rhetorical question as an off-record FTA to his/her positive face, but the Polish interpretation of its immediate context definitely moves this question towards the latter option as compared with the original.

The question itself is formulated rather clumsily in Polish, but not as much as to hamper its comprehensibility: *Czy to, że dzieci mieszkające w Warszawie otrzymujące zasiłki socjalne powinny otrzymywać te środki, jeśli ich rodzice pracują lub też są bezrobotni w Wielkiej Brytanii?* 'Is this that children living in Warsaw receiving social benefits should receive these means if their parents work or are unemployed in Great Britain?' What is really notable for the facework here, however, is the interpreter's addition of quite a serious off-record FTA against Polish migrants in the UK, namely, that they claim child benefits although they do not even work. This is definitely not an FTA expressed originally by Farage, even off record, and the interpreter must have used it on the basis of her background knowledge about the whole migration debate between Poland and the UK rather than anything else (this rather resembles the *grey mouse* addition discussed in the previous section).

The FTAs referring to the weakness of British political leaders as well as the one on Lithuania's gullibility are both omitted by the interpreter. Ukraine is added to the list of challenges, probably because this was a prominent topic in Tusk's speech. The conclusion to be drawn from the European elections is completely mistranslated: *Otóż twarz Europy się nie zmieni* 'The face of Europe will not change,' possibly as a result of the interpreter's faulty inference on the basis of just one word: *change*. Finally, the last FTA, which is made bald on record in the original, its illocutionary force strengthened with *I'm entirely confident*, falls completely flat in the interpretation as preceded with redress instead: *obawiam się, że pan tego nie zapewni* 'I'm afraid that you will not provide this.' This is probably the most visible case in this interpretation where the interpreter considerably attenuates an FTA directed at Tusk, as throughout the speech she seems careful to adequately transfer the illocutionary force of threats to his face, as opposed to other FTAs, many of which are added or omitted in what appears a random manner.

On the whole, the interpreter's additions of FTAs having no counterparts in the original (Merkel's persuasiveness and Cameron's submissiveness, and unemployed Poles claiming child benefits in the UK) is probably the most interesting phenomenon in this interpretation.

As already stated, some FTAs are omitted too, but can the additions be seen as compensation for this? Especially if someone else's face is being attacked in the newly introduced FTAs? The way the interpreter deals with the only FTA to the addressee's negative face, that is, the direct question, is worth highlighting, too, as this is something that may potentially change the overall dynamics of the debate (i.e., the addressee might react differently depending on whether he perceives the question as a rhetorical one or not). Omission is the interpreter's strategy of choice to deal with both downtowners and upgraders of FTAs (the latter being more frequent than the former in the source text), probably treated as less relevant elements whose deletion is justified, taking the speed of delivery into consideration.

5.4 Non-congratulations to Martin Schulz

Another speech by Nigel Farage that I would like to analyse targets a person that he has had many a verbal scuffle with over the years: Martin Schulz, first elected to the EP in 1994. A member of the German socialist SPD and the leader of the parliamentary group named the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Schulz succeeds Jerzy Buzek as the President of the European Parliament, in accordance with the deal made by the major political groups at the beginning of the parliamentary term, namely in 2009. His election on 17 January 2012 elicits the following reaction from Farage:

> Well good morning Mr Schulz – President Schulz… I… I know it's my job to congratulate you but, given that we knew this result two-and-a-half years ago, as a result of a stitch-up, there really doesn't seem to be much point. I mean after all, nobody in Europe, whatever modern-day Europe, would ever have a big, powerful job that was decided by a full, open process. I'm sure Mr Barroso would agree.
> I was… I was musing this morning. I was thinking what kind of President Schulz are we gonna get. Are we going to get a dignified, calm… a figure that behaves like the Speaker of all great parliaments around the world, somebody who puts himself above politics and the nitty-gritty of the day-to-day arguments and is an ambassador, indeed a statesman? Or are we going to get the Martin Schulz we've got to know since two thousand and four as leader of the Socialist Group? You know the one I mean: snarling, angry, unable to control his temper, intolerant of anybody with an alternative point of view,

> somebody who is contemptuous when, in free referendums, people have the temerity to vote 'no,' somebody who is anti-British to his fingertips, and, and doesn't like free markets? I was wondering which one would we get. Well, your opening speech has.. has… has settled that question for me. And it's pretty clear: we're gonna have two-and-a-half years of political fanaticism from the Chair. I'll… I have to say: only a third-world country, only a banana republic, would want to have an overtly political President of a parliament, but it's what we've got.
>
> I may… I may represent the smallest group in this Parliament, Mr Schulz, but I can tell you that it's a group whose ideas and whose views are now being echoed by a growing number of citizens right across this continent. I'm sure you'd agree the opinion polls show it's kinda fifty-fifty whether people think this EU is a good thing or a bad thing. What we represent, sir, is not anti-Europeanism. That is not what it's about. We believe in nation-state democracy. We want a Europe of trade, we want a Europe of cooperation, we want a Europe that is responsible. We don't want a Europe that seeks to be a global superpower. We don't want a Europe run by Mr Barroso and the Commission, and the so-called community method.
>
> And I will do my very best to provide political opposition to your Presidency over the course of the next two-and-a-half years and I hope you give us a fair hearing. Thank you.

The debate is not devoted to any other issues than the election itself, so the preceding speeches by group presidents contain congratulations to Schulz, some remarks on the challenges he will have to face, and, frequently, also thanks to Buzek as the outgoing President and words of appreciation for the other two candidates, who, rather predictably, lost to Schulz. The speech by Barry Madlener (a non-attached MEP) that follows is also a critical one. In his response to all the speakers at the end of the debate, the incoming President thanks his colleagues for their kind words and also for *the less kind words*, not going into any details of the criticism he met with.

The speech is 2 minutes 45 seconds long, presented at a speaking rate of about 158 words per minute. Farage starts with a laugh while uttering the initial greeting and gets a laugh from the audience in return. Another laugh from the speaker comes just before *banana republic*, and at this point there is already more heckling than laughing in the hall. For the rest of the speech, Farage's manner is serious and poised, like on the previously reported occasions. Some of the rhetorical devices we have already seen in the case of the Van Rompuy speech are also employed here: for instance, building up an elaborate contrast by describing, in some detail, what kind of person would be desirable

to hold this position, followed by a description of Martin Schulz's character and political views, in very negative terms, or the use of *what* to depersonalise the target.

Unlike in the case of the previously analysed two speeches, the Polish interpreter is male. His tone of voice, I believe, reflects well Farage's manner of speaking, with no overacting and no flattening of its emotional appeal. However, there are quite frequent voiced hesitations, false starts and self-corrections in the interpretation, which are likely to spoil the audience's general impression.

Good morning, which is not a standard way of starting a parliamentary speech, is rendered faithfully with *dzień dobry*, which sounds equally out of place in Polish. The ironic *well* preceding the greeting is omitted by the interpreter, but the effect of irony is achieved through lengthening the vowels in the honorific *panie przewodniczący Schulz* 'Mr President Schulz,' and perhaps also by using the honorific *panie Schulz*, which, in contrast to English, is not neutral in Polish, as it conveys the speaker's attitude of either superiority or familiarity with the addressee (cf. Ligaj 2015: 357). In fact, although both are literal translations of their English counterparts, neither of the Polish honorifics employed here is unmarked. Marcjanik (2007: 110–111) points out that forms of address including both the position and the family name of the addressee are typically employed in conflictive talk, and they do not conform to the Polish politeness norm. The standard, unmarked form of address *panie przewodniczący* is used later on as a translation of *sir*, and the marked form *panie Schulz* reappears twice after the initial paragraph, once having no counterpart in any honorific employed by Farage, and once, again, corresponding to *Mr Schulz*. Likewise, *Mr Barroso* (mentioned in the third person rather than addressed directly) is translated literally as *pan Barroso* (in one case, and omitted in the other), which must be assessed as less polite in Polish than in English.

The refusal to congratulate the addressee contained in the next sentence is translated quite closely, including the reason for it; the only facework shift here consists in exchanging Farage's *really* for the downtoner *chyba*, marking lack of certainty. The next sentence in Polish, however, exhibits very significant differences with the original: *Nie zostało to rozstrzygnięte w otwartych wyborach przecież ogólnoeuropejskich, zgodzi się pan z tym* 'It was not decided in an open all-European election after all, you will agree with this.' This limits the FTA to Schulz himself, whereas in the original, more broadly, Farage targets all unelected EU officials at first and focuses on Barroso as the President of the Commission in the next sentence, eliciting a laugh from

the audience.[19] Apart from changing the target, seeking agreement with the addressee, a politeness strategy, is not exactly the same as direct irony employed by Farage in invoking Barroso's agreement: in this context, the interpreter's solution must be construed as mock-politeness.

In the next paragraph, Farage switches to talking about Schulz in the third person, which can be evaluated as a distancing technique. This switch is made later in the Polish version, as in the first sentence Schulz is still being addressed directly: *snułem refleksje na temat tego, jakim pan będzie przewodniczącym, panie Schulz* 'I was musing on what kind of president you are going to be, Mr Schulz.' The inclusive *we* used by the speaker to refer to himself and the whole audience (with the exception of Schulz, naturally) is not employed by the interpreter at this stage, either. The first part of the contrast, rather clumsy with its numerous false starts and filled pauses, sounds as follows in the Polish version: *czy będzie to pełen spokoju z takiej godności osobowość, witana, ponadpolityczna, witana na całym świecie z wielkim z wielką atenacją, mąż stanu* 'will it be a figure full of calmness with such dignity, welcomed, above politics, welcomed all over the world with great great deference, a statesman.' In spite of its clumsiness, this fragment manages to convey almost all qualities expected of a person to fill in this position according to Farage, except for mentioning that it is a standard established by parliamentary speakers well-known on the international arena and that a good speaker should not get involved in petty quarrels. The inclusive *we* appears for the first time in the interpretation only at this point: *Martina Schulza, którego znamy od roku dwa tysiące czwartego jako lidera grupy socjalistów* 'Martin Schulz, whom we have known since the year 2004 as the leader of the Socialist Group.' This fragment is translated very closely, and the following reference to the audience's assumed knowledge as a politeness strategy is also retained in the interpretation.

The negative, openly face-threatening part of the contrast is very elaborate in Farage's version; in fact, it consists of seven elements, each of them interpretable as a separate on-record FTA. The word *snarling* seems particularly face-threatening here, bringing to mind an animal, most probably a dog or a wolf, rather than a human being (on animal metaphors used as FTAs in political discourse, with the wolf playing a prominent role, see Adaszek-Waliszczak 2014). The Polish version is reduced to five elements: *agresywnego, niezdolnego do hamowania swoich zapędów, nieznoszącego słowa sprzeciwu, z pogardą odnoszącego*

[19] Barroso is present in the hemicycle throughout the debate, and also takes the floor to congratulate Schulz.

się do referendum ogólnoludowego w sprawach, na których ludzie się nie znają i przeciwnego wolnemu rynkowi 'aggressive, not able to contain his impulses, intolerant of a word of dissent, acting with contempt towards a nationwide referendum on matters on which people have no knowledge, and opposed to free markets.' It seems that two partly synonymous adjectives, *snarling* and *angry,* have merged into just one: *agresywnego* (failing to convey the animal metaphor present in the original), and that the accusation of being anti-British might have been evaluated by the interpreter as irrelevant for the Polish audience. The FTA referring to referenda seems unclear in the interpretation, as referenda on EU membership in individual member states are the main political postulate of UKIP and, consequently, Farage would never claim that ordinary people are not knowledgeable enough to participate in such a referendum: this would actually amount to a face-threat to potential voters. Alternatively, this newly introduced FTA may be construed as something reported by Farage as Schulz's view rather than his own, which seems more plausible.

Well as a redressive device as well as the phrase marking Farage's authorship of the negative assessment of Schulz's opening speech (*has settled that question for me*) are omitted by the Polish interpreter. The accusation concerning political fanaticism is impersonalised in the interpretation with a metonymy: *dwa i pół roku fanatyzmu politycznego ze strony fotela przewodniczącego* 'two-and-a-half years of political fanaticism from the president's chair.' *I have to say*, another redressive device, is strengthened by an additional adverb: *muszę tylko powiedzieć* 'I only have to say.' Both *a third-world country* and *a banana republic*, clearly politically incorrect in this context, are rendered faithfully in Polish. However, the face-threatening modifier *overtly political* (only implied earlier by describing an ideal speaker as *somebody who puts himself above politics*) is omitted, and the interpreter uses a vaguer phrase instead: *takiego przewodniczącego parlamentu* 'such a president of the parliament.' The impersonality of *what* is not conveyed, but the interpreter decides to use repetition for emphasis here: *ale my go mamy, my go mamy* 'but we have got him, we have got him.'

The next paragraph, again addressed directly to Schulz, focuses on face-enhancement on behalf of Farage's parliamentary group (EFD), repeatedly referred to as *we*. There is hardly anything face-threatening until the end of this paragraph, unless we count *I'm sure you'd agree* as mock-politeness, which is omitted by the interpreter, along with the whole sentence it precedes. The two last sentences, declaring what UKIP does not want, criticise the present EU's policy and, in addition, target Barroso as an inappropriate person to hold a position of so

much power. The repetition of *we don't want*, which serves emphasis in the original, is not employed in the interpretation, where the two sentences are merged into one: *Nie chcemy zatem Europy, która będzie taką super… takim supermocarstwem pod wodzą pana Barroso i Komisji jako taką zwaną tak zwaną metodą wspólnotową* 'We therefore do not want Europe that is going to be such a super… such a superpower under Mr Barroso's and the Commission's leadership as by means of the so-called the so-called community method.'

Rather untypically for our material, which, as has already been shown, abounds in FTAs to the positive face, the last sentence of the speech contains two threats to the negative face: the speaker's (an on-record commitment to act in a specific way) and the addressee's (an off-record request that Schulz should treat Farage's political group fairly, possibly accompanied with a suggestion that the newly elected President is not inclined to do this, expressed by very strong emphasis on the word *hope*). The Polish interpreter significantly changes this fragment: *Jesteśmy tutaj, żeby stanowić opozycję polityczną wobec pana przewodnictwa w ciągu najbliższych dwóch i pół roku i mam nadzieję, że się z tego wywiążemy* 'We are here to constitute political opposition to your presidency over the course of the next two-and-a-half years and I hope that we will fulfill this.' The emphatic personal commitment (*I will do my very best*) is consequently transformed into a collective one. Moreover, this commitment now seems very vague, it may also be construed as an explanation of the group's role in the Parliament, followed by a weak declaration of intentions that might or might not be fulfilled. Nothing in the Polish version suggests any facework endeavouring to influence Schulz's behaviour towards the EFD. Consequently, the ending of the interpretation is the fragment which departs the most from the original in terms of facework. When we consider that a similar thing (weakening the illocutionary force of the speech's final fragment) happened in the previously analysed interpretation as well, a hypothesis comes to mind that the interpreters' hastiness to finish possibly closely behind the speaker (in order to enable a smooth takeover by a boothmate) might have played a role in this.

Overall, in comparison with the two interpretations scrutinised in the previous sections, this interpretation strikes as devoid of any additions, of either longer fragments or even fillers (which, as we have already seen, are likely to modify the illocutionary force). When it comes to presentational aspects, the interpreter manages to achieve a closer match to Farage's tone than either of his colleagues; on the other hand, his fluency must be evaluated as considerably worse.

5.5 Godfrey Bloom: Too rough for UKIP

If Nigel Farage has become notorious for resorting to verbal aggression in EP plenary debates, certainly he is not the only MEP from UKIP to do so, although he has set the offensiveness bar quite high indeed with his tirade against Van Rompuy. But let us look at an MEP who actually got expelled from UKIP in 2013 (and finished the term as a non-attached MEP) as some of his utterances were deemed too offensive, and was awarded the Foot in Mouth Award by the Plain English Campaign for 2013: Godfrey Bloom.[20] He speaks in the hemicycle considerably less frequently than Farage, with many of his plenary contributions having the form of short retorts.[21] Bloom tends to focus on a set of quite specific topics. First and foremost, he is an economist and his specialty is to lecture the audience on economic issues (e.g., euro crisis, banking system and state debt) in a very patronising manner, as can be aptly illustrated with the following contribution to the debate on developments in the debt crisis touching Greece, Ireland and Portugal that he made on 11 May 2011. Other favourite topics on which he often takes the floor are the global warming, the existence of which he consistently denies (with vocabulary such as *sham*, *bogus* and *scam*), and women issues, where he can be counted to say something politically incorrect.

> Well, I am a baby boomer. I was born just after the war. We've had probably… we've probably had the longest period of peace and prosperity globally. I would say from that time I've put a little bit of modest money away so that I can hand something down to my family when I pass on – largely because I have never spent more money than I have earned. I have been prudent and I have worked moderately hard.
>
> Now it always seems to me to come as a complete surprise to politicians how countries get in debt. Let me explain, because I do not think you really understand it. It is because politicians consistently spend more money than they raise in taxation – more money than they can possibly raise in taxation – most of which, in point of fact,

[20] These were not utterances made in the EP, though. Among other incidents, he (jokingly) addressed female members of the audience as *sluts* at a conference, and threatened a journalist with physical violence. As for EP plenaries, in 2010 Bloom was expelled from the chamber for shouting *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer* to interrupt Martin Schulz's speech, and calling him *an undemocratic fascist* when asked to apologise by the President chairing the session.

[21] See the composition of the corpus, Section 5.8.

> they actually waste. The reason we are talking about countries which are broke – and they are broke – is because their ridiculous, ineffective, ignorant politicians consistently spend more money than they can raise. And then they borrow, and they borrow, and – worse – they then print money, because politicians and their central banks have a machine which prints money. If you do that as a private citizen, it is a criminal offence. You would go to prison for doing that, yet politicians and their central banks do it all the time.
> Let me explain to you that these countries are broke. And are broke because of their own stupid leadership and politicians. It is immoral – immoral! – to ask ordinary taxpayers of any country to pick up the tab for failed politicians and failed banks. They have defaulted. They are broke. For God's sake, let all of us admit it.

Bloom is talking at a rate of about 150 words a minute, in a confident and calm tone of voice until the last paragraph, when his manner becomes considerably more excited. He puts a strong emphasis on some words, such as *broke*, which seems to be his keyword for this speech, repeated five times and quite face-threatening in itself (as more straightforward and informal than its more typical equivalents in this context, such as *suffering from financial crisis*). Unlike Farage in the previously analysed speeches, Bloom is not addressing a particular individual here, or, for that matter, targeting a specified person as an object of his criticism. Nevertheless, all the fragments in which he addresses the audience directly undoubtedly are face-threatening to the listener, as s/he is clearly treated as someone with limited intellectual capacity who has problems with understanding very simple issues. Interestingly, he is also not referring to particular countries or politicians when criticising them severely; however, it is clear from the context of the whole debate which countries are meant. Strong negative evaluating lexis (*ridiculous*, *ignorant*, *ineffective*, *stupid*, *immoral*) is abundant, but the face-threatening potential of it is attenuated by the fact that the referents are not mentioned explicitly. Directly after this speech, Bloom takes a blue card question from MEP Goebbels, who asks him whether he is aware of UK's debt. The answer is as follows:

> Absolutely right. Absolutely right. I was not suggesting my politicians were any less stupid than anybody else. It is an absolute disgrace, and there was not even a debate in our national parliament on actually rescuing these bust banks. If you want to invest in bust banks, do so with your own money, not money from my old age pensioners in Yorkshire on ninety-eight pounds a week, you scoundrels!

Bloom takes the opportunity created by the question to criticise British politicians, too. The last sentence, however, uttered in an angry voice, is a direct address ending with an invective. It is not completely clear who the addressee is, most probably British politicians are meant, but it could also be the supporters of the same policy in the EP. *Bust* is another colloquial word with a similar function as *broke* in the previous contribution.

The Polish interpreter talks in a calm manner all the way throughout Bloom's contributions, she does not make an effort to reflect Bloom's switches to a more aggressive tone, but she emphasises certain words as he does. Her tone does not suggest a wish to detach herself from the views of the speaker by making any fun of him. There are few false starts, but what seems somewhat unpleasant to the ear (and not entirely matching the overall calm tone) are very loud intakes of breath. Occasionally, there are also some grammatical problems (such as *Parlamencie Europejskich*, where the noun is in singular and the adjective in plural, or the plural noun *bankruty* instead of *bankruci*) that do not hinder comprehension.

The beginning of Bloom's speech does not contain any on-record FTAs, but what the speaker is saying about his reasonable attitude to money, except for enhancing his own face, is building up a contrast with the attitude of careless politicians, to be presented later on. The interpreter omits probably the most important part of this contrast: *I have never spent more money than I have earned*, rendering the rest closely. The omitted part can be perceived as an off-record FTA, implying already now that not everybody is so prudent, and subtly conveying the speaker's sense of superiority. The first on-record FTA towards unnamed politicians, mitigated with the preface *it seems to me* limiting the speaker's commitment to his view, consists in stating that politicians do not understand the simple mechanisms of getting into debt. In the interpretation, however, this FTA is changed and it appears, consequently, that the speaker is making a threat to his own positive face by admitting he does not understand this phenomenon: *I zawsze się dziwię, dlaczego… jak mamy kraje, które mają zadłużenie* 'And I always wonder why… how we have countries which have debts.' Alternatively, and perhaps more plausibly in the context, the sentence in Polish could be construed as ironic.

The next sentence, which contains an on-record FTA against the audience's face as the speaker very openly accuses them of ignorance (*I do not think you really understand it*), is omitted by the interpreter. The explanation which follows is rendered quite closely, right until the fragment with three pejorative adjectives directed at politicians, which

exhibits significant shifts in Polish: *I kiedy mówimy o krajach krajach bankrutach, a to dlatego, że to są kraje śmieszne, w których politycy coraz rozdają wiecej, niż są w stanie zarobić* 'And when we talk about countries bankrupt countries, and this is because these are ridiculous countries, in which politicians gradually give out more than they are able to earn.' Firstly, the emphatic repetition of *broke* in the original is not transferred to the Polish version, and there is nothing colloquial about its Polish equivalent. Secondly, the number of face-threatening adjectives has been reduced from three to just one (*ineffective* and *ignorant* are therefore omitted), which mitigates the offensive potential of the whole series. Last but not least, instead of targeting unspecified politicians, the single remaining pejorative adjective is used to describe unspecified countries. This makes the FTA less personal, but does it at the same time attenuate its illocutionary force? Actually, it may be even more offensive to nationals of these countries, as they are likely to identify with their country as such, and not necessarily with their politicians. The fact that the countries in question are not named does not remove the FTA (although probably mitigates it), as it is clear enough from the context which countries are targets of this criticism. The face-threatening phrase *criminal offence* is omitted, although this FTA is rather indirect, only implying that politicians' actions are similar.

Let me explain to you, a good candidate for an impoliteness formula as described by Culpeper (2010, 2011) – a message enforcer akin to *listen here* – is rendered as *chciałbym przypomnieć* 'I would like to remind,' which is considerably less patronising and hardly face-threatening due to the omission of the object and to the use of a more neutral verb, not carrying the presupposition that the audience does not understand the problem. The face-threatening adjective *stupid* is translated faithfully and attributed, as it is in the original, to leaders and politicians. Once more, *broke* is not repeated for rhetorical effect, and neither is *immoral*. The latter is rendered by means of negation: *nie jest to etyczne* 'it is not ethical.' *Błędy polityków* 'politicians' mistakes' seems to be a phrase which merges *failed politicians* and *they have defaulted*, and *failed banks* do not appear in the Polish version. Consequently, the pejorative modifier *failed*, repeated twice in the original, does not have its equivalent in the interpretation. In the last sentence, the emphatic and highly colloquial upgrader *for God's sake* is replaced with *wreszcie* 'at last,' which also has a strengthening function, but makes this imploration sound more formal.

In the response to the question, the face-enhancing strong agreement with the previous speaker is flattened by lack of repetition and any adverb of degree (*oczywiście* 'certainly'). *An absolute disgrace*

is omitted, and so is the adjective *bust*, employed twice in the original to refer to banks. There is a serious factual error concerning Bloom's criticism towards UK's Parliament: *nawet nie było debaty w Parlamencie Europejskich* 'there was even no debate at the European Parliament,' making the FTA much more grave, as targeted at the institution where the present debate is taking place. Moreover, this error makes the next sentence interpretable only as unambiguously directed at the audience rather than British politicians: *Jeżeli chcą państwo ratować banki, to niech państwo robią z własnych pieniędzy, a nie z moich pieniędzy, które zaoszczędziłem sobie na emeryturę* 'If you want to save banks, do it with your own money, and not with my money, which I have saved for my pension.' If we do not consider its changed target, this sentence, devoid of the final invective, sounds significantly more polite in Polish, also due to the polite third-person plural imperative that would be unlikely in a very emotional exclamation. Moreover, the reference to elderly pensioners of Yorkshire and their modest income is supposed to enhance Bloom's face as someone who cares deeply about his voters, and this is foiled by the Polish interpreter.

On the whole, the Polish interpretation seems significantly less face-threatening than the original. The interpreter makes the target text considerably more formal by consistently avoiding any colloquial vocabulary that, undoubtedly, does exist in Polish (lexis such as *plajta, splajtować* or *spłukany* comes to mind). Bloom (an educated economist who would surely be able to express the same content in a different register) has definitely chosen his colloquialisms deliberately for a rhetorical effect: they are more face-threatening than euphemistic formal language (even more so, perhaps, by implying that sophisticated explanations would be above the audience's level), but, at the same time, they may be intended to present Bloom as someone close to the "ordinary people." The interpreter is equally consistent in her avoidance of repetitions, which, likewise, clearly serve the rhetorical effect of emphasis in the original rather than reflecting the speaker's hesitation or search for words. The FTAs targeted at the audience are omitted or attenuated, in particular, the pervasive feeling that Bloom is lecturing his listeners, whom he considers intellectually inferior to himself, is missing in the Polish interpretation. The only FTA towards the audience that has been added results from the interpreter's error (mistranslation of *our national parliament*, which might be attributed to the interpreter's failure to hear the adjective *national*). The FTAs targeted at unnamed politicians or countries are also frequently attenuated, but to a lesser degree than in the case of the ones directed at the audience.

5.6 Godfrey Bloom and the Chamber of absurdity, for which nothing is too stupid

As already mentioned in Section 5.1, UKIP in general perceives the EU institutions, including the Parliament, as useless, wasteful and undemocratic, and its declared goal of running in European elections is to obtain a platform from which to preach EU's imminent doom, of which the withdrawal of the UK is supposed to be the first step. Consequently, UKIP MEPs show very little respect for the institution to which they have been elected. It is probably Godfrey Bloom who makes his contempt for the EP the most conspicuous in his plenary contributions, habitually referring to it as *this place* and repeatedly presenting a vision of enraged citizens storming the Parliament's buildings and dragging out MEPs to execute them outside. He is also notorious for ending one of his speeches with the words *nothing is too stupid for this Chamber*[22]. Certainly, the audience as such may also be targeted, as we have seen on the basis of the previous speech, and the dividing line between the institution and the individuals who represent it is sometimes quite fuzzy. Bloom's repertoire of FTAs includes frequent appeals to his audience to *get real* or *come down to earth*, as he believes the Parliament is an assortment of incompetents: *cryptocommunists, anachronistic socialists, journeymen politicians, fringe greenies, a sprinkling of well-meaning housewives, and grandmothers exploring their new third age.*[23] Consequently, I would like to discuss a speech where the Parliament itself (although not exclusively) becomes the target of harsh criticism: Bloom's contribution to the debate following the presentation by the Court of Auditors of its annual report for 2007 on 20 November 2008.

> Thank you Mr President, it's Godfrey actually it happens, Godfrey Bloom and Independence and Democracy, to put you right on that. Well, Commissioner Kallas seems to have read a completely different document. I can assure him that as a UK PLC this simply would not do at all. If any UK PLC had filed accounts of this nature for 14 years, which have been completely unacceptable, and again this year – and I do not regard the Court of Auditors as having given this a clean bill of health at all, and I've read the document – if if

[22] Quotation from the debate on the safety and health at work of pregnant women and new mothers, 18 October 2010.

[23] Quotation from the debate on the financial supervision package, 22 September 2010.

> the Commission were a board of UK PLC directors I have to say they would now be in prison!
> Now, we have a situation here where this Parliament, if Parliament it is, which spends most of the year talking about bendy bananas, knobbly parsnips, standardisation of bottle sizes, and on Tuesday we're even voting on the standardisation of tractor seats, so this absurd organisation spends most of its year doing nothing very much of value. We only have one serious responsibility, and that is to hold the Commission to account on the budget. That is the most serious thing we can do; and it's gonna go through again for the fifteenth year on the nod.
> It's an utter disgrace, and let the British MEPs know I'm watching very carefully how they vote and I will make sure that it is known back in the UK what they do out here in oppose to what they actually say when they go home.

The speech is 1 minute 36 seconds long, with a delivery rate of about 160 words per minute. As previously, the speaker starts calmly, actually with a smile, and finishes in an angry tone, his speech gradually assuming more and more characteristics of "emotional talk."[24] Some phrases are emphasised very strongly, that is, *at all*, *prison*, *Parliament*, *tractor seats*. Bloom's first target is the President of the EP, Hans-Gert Pöttering, for mistaking his name (*Jeffrey Bloom*), and the correction is not all-too-polite. The next target is Vice-President of the Commission Siim Kallas, who, in his speech at the beginning of the debate, was trying to present the report as more positive for the Commission than it really is. Another target is the Commission as a whole, for its mismanagement. Then comes the series of FTAs directed at the Parliament (slightly attenuated by the use of inclusive *we*), and, finally, British MEPs are sternly warned against voting in favour of approving the Commission's accounts and later pretending they have not.

Several contributions later, MEP Bill Newton Dunn makes a counterattack against Bloom, who, according to him, *made a silly speech about 'knobbly carrots' or something and then walked out and did not have the courtesy to listen to the rest of the debate*. Dunn points out that Britain has nothing to be proud of, as the pension accounts of the British government have failed to be approved for 14 years. Siim

[24] Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2013: 86) describes it as talk "in which a speaker uses diverse prosodic clues (stress, pitch, intonation) and paralinguistic markers (facial expression, body movement) together with a specific verbal repertoire (expletives, interjections, swear-words, marked expressions such as intensifiers, evaluative expressions, etc.) to express feelings and emotions."

Kallas does not comment on Bloom's accusations in his final speech closing the debate.

The Polish interpreter's voice, again, does not reflect the changes in Bloom's tone as the speech progresses, and, generally, sounds calmer than that of the original speaker (especially because the interpreter avoids putting extra emphasis on individual phrases and speaks considerably slower). Filled pauses are very ubiquitous throughout the whole interpretation, and unpleasant to the ear. When comparing the transcripts, the interpretation immediately strikes as much shorter than the source text: indeed, it has 121 words as compared to 258.

The correction of the chairing President's mistake is neither impolite nor particularly obvious in the Polish interpretation. This is partly caused by the previous interpretation of the name in the President's invitation to take the floor (by another interpreter) simply as *pan Bloom* 'Mr Bloom,' without any first name. The beginning of Bloom's contribution is then rendered as *dziękuję, pan Godfrey Bloom, grupa Independence i Democracy* 'thank you, Mr Godfrey Bloom, Independence and Democracy group,' which, in the absence of any preceding mistake in the Polish version, appears more like the speaker's self-introduction than a correction, albeit slightly marked for its use of *pan* before the name. It is not clear to the listener, though, why this introduction is made at all. The standard polite honorific directed at the President is omitted, but so is the emphatic repetition of Bloom's first name, the ironic *actually it happens*, and, in particular, the face-threatening phrase highlighting Pöttering's mistake, that is, *to put you right on that*.

The first FTA directed at Kallas is rendered as follows in Polish: *pan wiceprzewodniczący Kallas przeczytał zupełnie inny inne sprawozdanie* 'Mr Vice-President Kallas has read a completely different different report.' The interpreter has adjusted the honorific downgraded by Bloom (who addresses Kallas as *Commissioner*), consequently making the reference more polite than in the original. Moreover, the sentence is less marked for its irony, due to the omission of the downtoner *well* and the verb *seems*, marking the subjectivity of the utterance. In fact, it is only in its broader context that the Polish sentence can be perceived as ironic. The sentence starting with *I can assure him* is omitted, too, making the Polish version less personal.

The comparison to a British PLC is preserved, but simplified and compressed: *firma brytyjska tego typu sprawozdania przez czternaście lat nie mogłaby składać* 'a British company would not be able to submit reports of this kind for 14 years.' Consequently, the negative assessment of the Commission's accounts over the years, made very expressly in the original (*would not do at all*, *completely unacceptable*) is only implied

in the interpretation, and also the emphasis on the fact that the same thing happens again now (*again this year*) is missing there. The off-record FTA inherent in Bloom's declaration that he has read the report (i.e., many others present in the room and taking the floor have probably not even read it) is transferred faithfully. The following on-record FTA related to the Commission has undergone, however, a serious shift: *gdyby Komisja komisarz był w zarządzie spółki brytyjskiej, znalazłby się teraz w więzieniu* 'If the Commission Commissioner were on the board of a British company, he would now end up in prison.' With this, the face threat zooms in on just one member of the Commission; but, interestingly, the interpreter's initial plan was probably different, closer to the original, as shown by his self-correction. Although he is not mentioned by his name this time, it is obvious who is meant: the representative of the Commission present in the hemicycle (i.e., Kallas), whose face has already been attacked earlier in the same speech. The redressive device linked to this FTA in the original (*I have to say*) is not reflected in the Polish version.

Likewise, the fragment referring to the Parliament has been considerably compressed: *w tym parlamencie większość czasu mówimy o bananach, pietruszkach i innych drobiazgach, dzisiaj będziemy mówili o standardyzacji foteli w traktorach* 'in this Parliament, most of the time we talk about bananas, parsnips and other trifles, today we will be talking about standardisation of tractor seats.' The highly face-threatening qualifier *if Parliament this is* is omitted, and the inclusive *we* that may be seen as a redressive device is employed more consistently than in the original. The examples of trivial topics are both less numerous and less specific in Polish, and the interpreter resorts to a generalisation that replaces one of the examples (*bottle sizes*). The reference to *bendy bananas* appears particularly face-threatening in the English version, as at the time the regulation specifying the maximum curve of bananas was a laughing-stock, a symbol of EU's bureaucracy and its desire to control absolutely every aspect of life. The reduction of this phrase to just *banany* makes the connection harder to make for the Polish listeners. The source language phrase may also bring to mind the other meaning of *bananas* in English, that is, 'crazy,' which might be seen as an off-record FTA based on homonymy that would be very difficult to recreate in Polish, just like the comic effect of alliteration (intended or unintended by the speaker).

Another highly face-threatening sentence about *this absurd organisation* is considerably attenuated by means of an extreme generalisation: *to wszystko nie ma sensu* 'all this does not make sense.' The next sentence in Polish suggests that the Parliament's role is,

in fact, more prominent than claimed by Bloom, as it implies that the EP possesses some other important prerogatives apart from budgetary control: *najważniejsza sprawa, którą powinniśmy się zajmować, to jest rozliczenie Komisji w sprawie budżetu* 'the most important matter that we should deal with is to hold the Commission to account on the budget.' The highly colloquial statement on what is going to happen with the accounts is omitted, and, again, this is the information that, at best, can be inferred from the Polish interpretation: *jak wiadomo, piętnasty rok będziemy mieli do czynienia z hańbą* 'as it is known, for the fifteenth year we will deal with a disgrace.' As can be seen, the modifier *utter* used for the highly pejorative word *disgrace* is omitted in the interpretation, too.

Not surprisingly, the final FTA, clearly targeted at British MEPs (and possibly perceived as less relevant for those listening to any interpretation), is also considerably generalised and attenuated in the interpretation: *Ja będę sprawdzał, jak będą głosowali posłowie brytyjscy i co później będą mówili w domu* 'I will be checking how the British MEPs are going to vote and what they are going to say at home.' The suggestion that the MEPs are hypocrites who do and say something completely different is much stronger in the English version. However, it must also be noted that this fragment in the original version contains an FTA to the speaker's negative face, namely a commitment to inform the British public opinion about the British MEPs' implied double standards. This on-record FTA has disappeared from the Polish version and, again, may perhaps be seen as an off-record one, that is, the listener may suppose that checking how the MEPs vote is not only going to serve satisfying Bloom's own curiosity.

Out of the five interpretations analysed so far, this is the one that relies the most on compression, omitting much of the original message and often merging information from a few sentences into one (which means that the EVS is, at times, very long). This should not be attributed to the speed of delivery alone, as the speech is not the fastest one. The interpreter manages to achieve a high level of internal coherence, the Polish version is logical and presented in well-built sentences (albeit with a few false starts). On the other hand, as has already been mentioned, the overall positive impression of a monolingual listener is likely to be spoiled by ubiquitous voiced hesitation. What effect does all this have on facework? The Polish version is, on the whole, less face-threatening than the original, particularly to the Parliament as an institution (first of all due to the omission of *if Parliament this is* and *this absurd organisation*). Also the FTA directed at the chairing President has been completely omitted, and the warning addressed at

the British MEPs – mitigated. The only person whose face is attacked more severely in the interpretation than in the source text is Vice-President Kallas. Globally, the Polish version appears more polite due to its unagitated tone.

5.7 Preliminary conclusions

Out of the five speeches considered in this chapter so far, three (Farage's "welcome" of Van Rompuy and both contributions by Bloom) seem to have been considerably mitigated by the Polish interpreters (shifts that attenuate FTAs clearly outweigh those that do the opposite). The other two speeches display numerous shifts going in both directions (i.e., attenuation and aggravation) and are difficult to describe as either more or less face-threatening than the corresponding originals.

The detailed analysis of facework in five Polish interpretations of highly face-threatening speeches by two UKIP MEPs lets me draw some tentative conclusions as to which phenomena might be feasible to investigate top-down on a larger corpus, possibly also quantitatively, as opposed to the phenomena that seem too subtle for this. I will summarise my observations in a few points.

- The most frequent in the speeches under analysis are, as could be expected, FTAs (both on- and off-record) directed at the positive face of the addressee. As in the case of parliamentary debates we do not deal with one-to-one communication (which is the prototype considered by Brown and Levinson 1987), to be defined as the addressee (or, more specifically, the target) of an FTA, the individual in question does not necessarily have to be addressed directly with *you*; it is enough that s/he is among the audience in the hemicycle (or perhaps even among the wider audience reachable by means of the broadcast and/or the mass media). In a political context, the face of an individual has to be understood more broadly, in accordance with Culpeper's (1996: 361) view, and, therefore, attacks against institutions, countries or political parties the addressees represent (and probably identify with) may also be seen as attacks against their face.
- Threats to the negative face of either the speaker (i.e., a commitment to do something) or the addressee (i.e., trying to make the addressee do something, for instance declare his/her views or take a specific course of action) are relatively rare. Threats to the speaker's positive

face are practically non-existent in the analysed five speeches, unless we consider the risk to one's own positive face that results from attacking the face of others, especially in a very aggressive manner.

- Face-threat is omnipresent in the analysed speeches. However, some of it seems fully expected and justified in a parliamentary context, whereas some clearly must be seen as excessive, thus meeting Culpeper's (2011) criteria for impoliteness (i.e., eliciting opposition amounting to heckling, or metapragmatic comments from other participants) and, usually at the same time, Ilie's (2001) criteria for parliamentary insults. Therefore, impoliteness seems a more promising track to take when considering a quantitative analysis of a large corpus.
- Little of the impoliteness present in the speeches under analysis depends on conventionalised formulae (Culpeper 2010; 2011), but Godfrey Bloom (*you scoundrels, let me explain to you, it's an utter disgrace*) seems more likely to resort to them than Nigel Farage. Implicational impoliteness is widespread and often creative, based on linguistic means such as metaphors or sarcasm.
- Off-record FTAs are sometimes too vague to be identified beyond doubt. This is not the case with implicatures that are hardly hidden in sarcasm or rhetorical questions, but occasionally to arrive at the intended perlocution the addressee (and, likewise, the analyst) needs to read between the lines. Nevertheless, vagueness does not preclude high level of offensiveness (see, e.g., Leech 2014: 223).
- Both redressive devices (downtoners, politeness strategies) and upgraders (strengtheners) accompanying FTAs seem to be treated by interpreters as relatively irrelevant elements that can be omitted and added rather arbitrarily, for example, deleted when the speed of delivery is high and the EVS increases dangerously, or inserted as fillers when the interpreter wishes to gain some time to receive more input to analyse or to plan his/her own translational solution. At the same time, we need to remember that the status of the politeness strategies in the speeches under analysis is highly ambiguous: predominantly, they seem to qualify as mock-politeness (and, therefore, implicational impoliteness) rather than genuine politeness. Likewise, opinion markers raise serious doubts: do they actually aggravate the face-threat by making it more personal (as would seem on the basis of Brown and Levinson 1987 and Culpeper 1996), or attenuate it by limiting the speaker's commitment (Wierzbicka 2003)?
- Interpreting shifts concerning FTAs are both numerous and wide-ranging. Mitigation seems dominant, but sometimes also new FTAs are added by the interpreter, or the existent FTAs are strengthened, for instance, by adding upgraders. As we have seen, the interpreter

may also occasionally change the target of an FTA. Some shifts (including the one just mentioned) are difficult to evaluate in terms of aggravation vs. mitigation and raise important questions. In particular, considering the ambiguous status of politeness strategies and opinion markers mentioned in the previous point, how to assess the effect of their deletion or addition? Sometimes one and the same FTA may undergo several different interpreting shifts, even going in opposite directions (i.e., attenuating and aggravating), in which case it will be difficult to assess the overall effect, as it would be too gross an oversimplification to claim that such shifts cancel each other out.

- Mitigation can result from a variety of strategies. FTAs may simply be omitted (although an FTA that was presented on record in the original may still, in some cases, be inferable from the interpretation as an off-record FTA), or, alternatively, their illocutionary force may be attenuated by removing upgraders, using more formal and euphemistic language, "killing" face-threatening metaphors or making the statement less personal (avoiding *you* and perhaps also *I*).
- Presentational aspects such as the interpreter's intonation (as compared to the speaker's) may play an important role for facework (see, e.g., Leech 2014: 231 on the acoustic and articulatory features associated with impoliteness and Culpeper et al. 2003 on the role of prosody). However, they are difficult to analyse beyond the fully subjective level without specialist software measuring features such as pitch variation.
- To supplement my initial hypothesis on cultural adjustment of facework in the language pair under investigation, one additional area has emerged where, in fact, it does seem necessary. In Polish and English, the politeness rules concerning honorifics differ as to the inclusion of the referent's name and/or position. Literal translation of some neutral English honorifics into Polish may lead to additional face threats resulting from the addressee's perception of the honorific as infringing on Polish politeness norms. Note that Culpeper (1996: 357) enumerates using inappropriate terms of address as one of positive impoliteness strategies.

Considering the most feasible course of action to take when analysing a larger corpus of data, I see a twofold approach as the most promising: looking at face-threat signalised by personal reference and at impoliteness. I will start, naturally, with a description of the corpus itself, and then proceed to its analyses.

5.8 Corpus

Apart from the two UKIP MEPs already introduced in this chapter, to make the corpus more representative I have decided to add a third one, who would mostly present his speeches by reading them out.[25] This is a very common presentation mode in EP plenary sessions, but neither Nigel Farage nor Godfrey Bloom rely on it systematically (with the former always ad-libbing and the latter making sporadic use of prepared text, normally at the beginning of a speech that is later continued spontaneously). My choice is John Bufton, the first-ever UKIP MEP for Wales. Undoubtedly, Bufton is not such a "colourful personality" as either of the other two speakers, and a much less engaging public speaker. Most of his contributions are read out in a rather monotonous tone of voice; only occasionally does he speak ad lib (15 out of 74 speeches in the corpus), which invariably results in a more lively manner of presentation. His favourite topic is agriculture, in particular sheep and cattle husbandry.

As for the appropriate corpus size, in interpreting studies this is usually a compromise between the analyst's desire to maximise its size (and, consequently, the occurrences of phenomena under investigation) and minimise the time and effort devoted to transcription of oral data (as the subsequent analysis, even if fully manual, usually requires considerably less of both the commodities). Starting with material from 2008 (i.e., the initial date from which recordings of plenary sessions were available online at the starting point of this project), I have managed to cover five years' worth of plenary contributions of the three selected speakers, that is, until the end of 2012 (with the reservation that Bufton was only elected in 2009 and some speeches by Farage and by Bloom were not retrieved from the EP website due to technical problems). Except for the "welcome" of Donald Tusk, which falls outside the timeframe, the speeches analysed so far in this chapter are included in the corpus and will be taken into consideration in quantitative analyses (but will not serve as sources of examples, as they have already been thoroughly discussed by now).

The most important characteristics of my corpus are presented in Table 7. The total length of source language material is about 5 hours 13 minutes. If we include the corresponding target language material

[25] I do not claim that a corpus including contributions of only three MEPs from just one parliamentary group should be treated as representative of EP plenary discourse as a whole. However, I hope that it does possess some representativeness as far as the Eurosceptic plenary discourse is concerned.

Table 7. Composition of the UKIP corpus

Speaker	No. of transcribed plenary contributions	Length of transcribed plenary contributions	Approximate no. of words	No. of irretrievable plenary contributions
Nigel Farage	93	2 h 41 min 21 sec	27,500	9
Godfrey Bloom	51	56 min 13 sec	9,000	1
John Bufton	74	1 h 35 min 49 sec	16,200	0
Total	218	5 h 13 min 23 sec	52,700	10

(whose duration, for simultaneous interpreting, can be assumed to be nearly identical), the total length of the recordings in the corpus is about 10 hours 26 minutes. This compares rather favourably with the other existing authentic interpreting corpora compiled by individual researchers with a view to pursuing research questions partly overlapping with mine: Beaton (2007) analyses a corpus in which the source texts add up to 74 minutes, Monacelli (2009) – 119 minutes.[26] The total number of words in the original contributions is about 52,700 (as compared to 1,829 words in the five speeches that underwent qualitative analysis in this chapter so far, that is, the large corpus is about 29 times bigger). The total number of words in the whole corpus (including the source texts as well as their Polish interpretations) is about 92,300, the relatively smaller number of words in the Polish part reflecting both the interpreters' omissions and the fact that Polish, unlike English, does not make use of many function words such as articles. The average delivery rate of the original contributions is about 168 words per minute, which must be considered fast.

Naturally, involvement of numerous researchers and transcribers in creation of an interpreting corpus facilitates work and enables them to compile a more substantial one, as is exemplified by EPIC. At the same time, the obvious need to make such a corpus more "universal" imposes some unavoidable constraints, such as adopting common transcription and tagging conventions. As already explained at the beginning of this chapter, the corpus has been compiled in such a way as to obtain possibly many FTAs in English and their renderings in Polish, and therefore it is not a typical one, singling out contributions of selected

[26] A direct comparison with Diriker (2004) is impossible due to the author's lack of clarity on her corpus size: she repeatedly mentions 120 pages of transcripts, but never the exact length either in terms of minutes or in terms of number of words. From her description of the corpus, I assume that eight long speeches followed by discussions (about 50 minutes each) were being recorded, but some fragments of inestimable length were lost due to technical problems.

MEPs from numerous debates rather than including all contributions in a given language (or languages) from a limited number of debates, as is the case, for example, for Beaton (2007).

The longest speeches in the corpus are over 4 minutes long, the shortest contributions are questions and retorts slightly below 10 seconds. The great majority of plenary contributions fall between 30 seconds and 3 minutes, which is highly dependent on the time allocated to the speaker (some of the contributions that run above the limit are interrupted by the chairing President, who turns off the speaker's microphone). Most typically, one MEP contributes only once to a debate on a given topic, but for Farage and Bloom it is not unusual to take the floor even three or four times during one and the same debate, as they get involved in (often quite lively) discussions with other participants.

As for the ideological line of the contributions, a list of highly salient key terms and their collocates (provided in Table 8) should give us a good idea. The list is not exhaustive, as more advanced corpus linguistic tools would have to be used. However, none of the items is limited to just one idiolect; all of them appear in contributions by each of the three speakers. The list has been prepared in analogy to Beaton (2007: 111), who rightly notes that "rhetorical repetition of certain keywords [...] serves to reinforce the importance of the term and the value allocated to it." Among the four key terms identified by Beaton ("solidarity," "peace," "freedom" and "democracy"), only the last one appears salient in Eurosceptic discourse, although embedded in different contexts than in Beaton's material. Eurosceptic discourse as such probably deserves a more thorough analysis of this kind; however, even a cursory look reveals certain patterns of elements that are regarded positively and negatively.

Table 8. Key terms of Eurosceptic discourse

Key term	No. of occurrences in the corpus	Collocations	Examples of typical use in wider context	Cognates that appear with lower frequency
1	2	3	4	5
British	88	British people British public British taxpayers the British	[...] *it's time to put British interests first.* [...] *I think the British public are angry at the fleets of chauffeur-driven cars* [...].	Britain

cont. tab. 8

1	2	3	4	5
democracy	87	national democracy nation state democracy parliamentary democracy contempt for democracy to crush democracy to get (one's) democracy back	[…] *you are destroying democracy in Europe. National democracy and free markets would be a much better model.*	democratic undemocratic
money	83	taxpayers' money to throw money to print money	[…] *at the moment, all the bailout money has gone.* […] *politicians, central and commercial banks spend money they don't have.*	
referendum	61	free referendum democratic referendum to have a referendum to ignore referendums to vote no in a referendum	*The EU ignored the results of five referendums it didn't like.* *We must put the future of Europe to people in every Member State in free and fair referendums.*	
crisis	48	euro crisis eurozone crisis economic crisis financial crisis debt crisis	*Every time the European Union faces a self-made crisis, the response is always: more Europe.*	
failure	18	architect of (this) failure doomed to failure utter failure economic failure	*By any objective measure, the euro is a failure.*	to fail failing
bureaucrat	15	unelected bureaucrats ignorant bureaucrats	*The greedy bureaucrats just want your money.*	bureaucracy bureaucratic

Without speaker-recognition software, I have not been able to determine exactly how many individual interpreters contributed to the Polish part of the corpus. However, considering the fact that the original contributions are extracts from numerous sessions interpreted by various teams, I can probably safely assume that nearly all or even all the Polish

interpreters working regularly for the European Parliament (and only such would be employed for plenary sessions) within the timeframe of my project will be represented with some samples of their output. Relying purely on the imperfect judgment "by ear," I can distinguish the voices of about 20–25 individual interpreters.

Bendazolli (2015: 88) rightly points out that corpus-based research is often associated with automatic or semi-automatic analysis. At the same time, as noted by Adolphs (2008: 9), pragmatic phenomena are difficult to investigate in this way because "[o]ne of the main obstacles in analysing utterance function using a corpus-based approach is that we can search a corpus only for language forms, not for functions." Çelebi and Ruhi (2015) show that it is feasible to extract examples of impoliteness even from a very large corpus of spoken English, but this involves reliance on certain impoliteness markers (e.g., obscenities or structures such as *you are such a…*) pre-defined by the analyst. Obviously, as much impoliteness is very creative and not confined to conventionalised formulae (cf. Culpeper 2013), this method is not suited to the task of surveying any corpus for all instances of impoliteness. In the context of my corpus, the best candidate for automatic analysis seems to be the personal pronoun *you*, as others will mostly be addressed with criticism and blame. However, as I am, at least potentially, interested in all FTAs in my corpus, manual analysis appears to be a better option.

Certainly, the inherently ephemeral nature of spoken language means that any transcription will only provide a partial representation of what has really been uttered (see, e.g., Diriker 2004: 53; Cencini and Aston 2002: 47). In fact, for the needs of detailed discourse analysis as conducted in Sections 5.3–5.6, the transcripts were not sufficient, and I repeatedly had to consult the video recordings. Therefore, any analyst and transcriber clearly faces difficult choices on which features to include and which to leave out. The guiding principle is, in short, that transcripts have to be "relevant to the analysis purposes in terms of language structure and lexical and morphosyntactical characteristics" (Straniero Sergio and Falbo 2012: 32). As the EVS is not a major factor taken into consideration for the needs of this study, an aligned, two-track transcript of the source text and target text was deemed superfluous (and too time-consuming in relation to its envisaged explanatory potential). Instead, the English and Polish texts were placed side by side in two columns of a table and divided into semantically corresponding paragraphs for ease of comparison. Several extracts from the corpus (selected complete contributions by each of the three speakers accompanied by their

Polish interpretations) are provided in the Appendix in order to give the readers a better idea about the layout of the transcripts as well as about the content of the speeches (beyond what has already transpired from the quantitative analysis in Sections 5.2–5.6 and what will be shown in further examples in this chapter).

Just like for the source text transcripts appearing in this chapter so far, the verbatim reports available at the EP website constituted a very helpful basis for transcription of the original English speeches (spoken language "imperfections" edited out by verbatim reporters had to be restored to the texts). The existing Polish translations in the same database were, as could be expected, too far removed from the corresponding interpretations to be of any use. Consequently, the Polish interpretations were transcribed manually from scratch, with interpreters' intonation treated as the main punctuation guideline. As these were relatively easy to include and could constitute some clues as to interpreters' difficulties in processing, filled pauses were transcribed as "@," and silent pauses of more than three seconds – as "---." All false starts, repetitions, self-corrections and mispronunciations were represented in the transcripts. Inaudible fragments (very few) were marked as "xxx."

Back translations were only made of the fragments that were to be used as examples, for the sake of the readers who do not know Polish. However, it has to be noted that, although the translations were meant to be possibly close, features that do not have their counterparts in English (such as the distinction between less and more formal *you*) will not be captured.

5.9 Corpus analysis

5.9.1 Personal reference

In the light of the speeches analysed so far, personal reference seems to be one of the major features underlying face-threatening acts, which is clearly in line with Hatim and Mason's (1997: 68) claim, made in relation to audio-visual translation, that "pronouns of address are often the site for complex negotiation of face." Certainly, it is imaginable that some FTAs will be devoid of direct personal reference, as they may target other constituents of an individual's face than strictly personal ones (such as his/her country, political party, etc.) – let us remember

that face "includes all that the self identifies with" (Culpeper 2011: 25). Otherwise, an off-record FTA may purposefully avoid such reference. However, most personal reference found in UKIP speeches is related to speech acts such as criticising, blaming, ridiculing or belittling one's political opponents – interestingly, throughout the entire corpus, the only direct addressee whose face is consistently being enhanced is Hungarian PM Victor Orban, visiting the Parliament at the beginning and at the end of the Hungarian presidency. As shown both by previous research (Monacelli 2009 and Warchał et al. 2011) and in Sections 5.3–5.6, shifts in personal reference are frequent manifestations of the interpreter's facework.

Before I present interpreting strategies employed to deal with personal reference, a glance at personal deixis in English and in Polish seems necessary. To begin with, Polish is a highly inflectional language that often omits personal pronouns, as the meaning they carry in English can typically be decoded from verb or adjective endings. Therefore, what is described here as the *I*, *you* or *s/he* perspective will, in most cases, be expressed without pronouns in Polish.

Undoubtedly, the most difficult English personal pronoun to transfer into Polish is *you*. The problem that becomes apparent when comparing it with the Polish pronoun system is its huge versatility (see, e.g., Belczyk 2004: 35–38; Łaziński 2006: 57–60). Firstly, it functions as the pronoun for both 2nd person singular and 2nd person plural, which must be disambiguated before translation. This is an easy task in most contexts, but not always, as there are some instances in the corpus which do not seem clear even though the analyst has a much wider textual context to rely on and is not constrained by the cognitive limitations typical of speech processing in simultaneous interpreting.

Once the number is decided, the interpreter faces the decision on appropriate politeness level, typical of a T/V language. In singular, Polish offers the choice between two personal forms[27]: informal *ty* (plus verbs in 2nd person singular) and formal *pan/pani* (plus verbs in 3rd person singular).[28] This may seem very straightforward in the context

[27] If we disregard the archaic mixed form of the type *kup pan cegłę*, combining *pan/pani* with verbs in 2nd person singular, which is nowadays relatively rare and decisively marked, mostly employed for familiarity or irony. This form, however, is still imaginable in political discourse; not so long ago, it was regularly in evidence in the idiolects of two "colourful personalities" of the Polish political scene: Lech Wałęsa and Andrzej Lepper (cf. Łaziński 2006: 40–41).

[28] Many grammarians treat these forms as pronouns that are homonymic with nouns playing the function of honorifics and often used in terms of address (cf. Łaziński 2006: 15).

of a parliamentary debate, but note that the "obvious" formal form is incongruous with many invectives (i.e., it is quite unusual but still possible in constructions such as former PM Leszek Miller's famous dig at his political opponent *Jest pan zerem, panie Ziobro* 'You're a zero, Mr Ziobro,' but completely impossible with vocatives such as *łajdaku* 'you scoundrel' or *chamie* 'you lout'). Furthermore, the choice in plural is even more difficult, as all the three forms (listed in the raising order of their formality and politeness), *wy*, *państwo* plus verb in 2nd person plural and *państwo* plus verb in 3rd person plural, are imaginable in the context.[29]

In addition, apart from personal deixis, the English pronoun *you* is also commonly used for expressing general truths (generic or impersonal reading; cf. Hogeweg and de Hoop 2015), like in [...] *the point about democracy is that you engage in debate. You listen to what the other person has to say, you put it to the public and you accept the result* (which, in informal contexts, might be rendered quite literally with 2nd person singular in Polish, but requires the use of impersonal constructions in more formal ones).

Coming back to the corpus under analysis, it is a frequent face-threatening strategy on the part of UKIP speakers to, on the one hand, deny association with the audience as a whole or the EP as an institution (as well as with all the EU institutions, the EU as a political entity) by employing *you* where more pro-European politicians would be likely to use inclusive *we*.[30] On the other hand, they also consistently resort to the impoliteness strategies of using *you* to explicitly associate others with some negative aspects as well as using *I* to mark the authorship of their critical opinions (although, as already mentioned at the end of Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, the status of opinion markers is ambiguous and might largely depend on the epistemic stance expressed in the relevant opinion marker).

[29] To complicate the matters even further, there are also the gender-marked forms *panie/panowie* (plus either 2nd or 3rd person plural), but these are only used to address groups of homogeneous gender and therefore unlikely to be used in a parliamentary contribution.

[30] This is not to say that UKIP MEPs never use the inclusive *we* – sometimes they do, as in *we're not actually applying the rules of this place evenly* (note that the "disassociation effect" is still achieved here by other means, that is, the use of *this place* to refer to the EP). See also Bloom's speech analysed in Section 5.6.

5.9.1.1 Qualitative analysis

Tables 9, 10 and 11 contain examples of three distinct types of strategic moves employed to deal with personal reference that emerge from a search for recursive patterns in the corpus, namely deictic shifts, impersonalisation and omission.

Table 9. Deictic shifts

Example no.	Source text	Target text	Back-translation
1.	[…] *you were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, this great achievement.*	[…] *wygraliśmy Nagrodę Nobla, to ogromne osiągnięcie.*	[…] we won the Nobel Prize, this great achievement.
2.	[…] *you keep on taking that same drug that is doing you and the peoples of Europe so much damage.*	*Cały czas zażywamy ten sam narkotyk, który sprawia, że my, że obywatele Europy podupadają coraz bardziej na zdrowiu.*	All the time we take the same drug, which causes that we, that citizens of Europe lose their health more and more.
3.	*But he has got oil and he has got money so you all turned a blind eye, didn't you?*	*Ale on ma pieniądze, on ma ropę naftową, więc wszyscy przymykali na to oko.*	But he has got money, he has got oil, so all turned a blind eye on this.
4.	[…] *I had totally underestimated the complete fanaticism, Mr Barroso, of you, your college of Commissioners, and the European Central Bank.*	[…] *nie @ doceniłem fanatyzmu pana Barroso, całego kolegium komisarzy i Europejskiego Banku Centralnego.*	[…] I did not appreciate the fanaticism of Mr Barroso, the whole college of Commissioners and the European Central Bank.
5.	*Yes, I want you sacked, Mr Schulz, as well – I want you all fired!*	*Tak, pan Schulz też w ogóle straci pracę, no wszyscy stracimy.*	Yes, Mr Schulz will lose his job at all, too, well, we all will.
6.	*I have mentioned it to him before that this whole thing is a farce.*	*Mówiliśmy już, że to jest zupełna farsa.*	We have already said that this is a complete farce.
7.	*I will ask Mr Barroso and Mr Van Rompuy to tell me please – you're speaking in a couple of minutes – what is your plan B?*	*Szanowny panie Van Rompuy, panie Barroso, jaki jest plan B, czy mają państwo plan B?*	Honourable Mr Van Rompuy, Mr Barroso, what is the plan B, have you got a plan B?

Examples 1 and 2 show the shift from plural *you* to inclusive *we*. Note that in Example 1 actually the whole on-record face-threatening potential is vested in the distancing function of the personal pronoun

in the English version, so that the evaluative noun *achievement* is immediately recognisable as ironic. In contrast, the Polish interpretation is devoid of any on-record face-threat, and the speaker's negative attitude to the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the EU only becomes obvious from a much larger context (later on). In Example 2, on the other hand, the main face-threatening potential is carried by the metaphor of drug taking (which stands for deluding oneself) and is only strengthened by the use of *you*. Consequently, by shifting to *we*, the interpreter only mitigates the FTA but does not remove it completely. Either way, the shift to *we* is a very significant one, as, in Helmbrecht's (2002: 42) words, *we* is employed "to define explicitly and publicly social groups vis a vis their interlocutors and state membership in these groups." It might even be said that by changing the speaker's *you* to inclusive *we*, the interpreter imposes on the speaker an identity that the latter does not wish: "[t]o the extent that the speaker presents him-/her*self* as belonging to a group/collectivity, 'we' also represents aspects of the *speaker's self* or *identity*, namely those referred to by social psychologists as the 'relational' and the 'collective' self" (Pavlidou 2014: 5, original emphasis). On the other hand, the interpreter might also be seen as reinstating the speaker's factual identity – after all, nobody forced the UKIP MEPs to run in European elections and become a part of the Parliament, so denouncing this membership only symbolically, through the use of deictic perspective, might well be perceived as hypocritical.

Another shift applicable to plural *you* is to 3rd person plural, as illustrated by Example 3. Note that the pronoun is emphasised in the original by its repetition in the question tag, which is omitted by the interpreter.[31] *You* to *they* was the most typical shift detected by Warchał et al. (2011) in the interpretations of the speeches that addressed the group of which the interpreters were a part, and I can only agree with their observation that "[t]his manipulation results in criticism being deflected from its original target, the audience, to another group (not incompatible with the addressee), the blame for the state of affairs apparently laid on a third party, not involved in the communication event" (p. 786). It is difficult to speculate to what extent EP interpreters might identify with the EU as an institution, or the Parliament, for this matter, but a few examples of this shift are detectable in the corpus.

[31] Certainly, even if it had been translated into Polish, the question tag would not include any pronoun (*prawda?*, *nie?* or *nieprawdaż?* are imaginable in this context, out of the poor repertoire of question tags Polish possesses). See Wierzbicka (2003: 37–41) for a discussion of the immense popularity of tags in English as compared to Polish, where "the use of tags is, by and large, restricted to the situations when the speaker really expects confirmation" (p. 40).

In Example 4, the singular *you* addressed at President Barroso (unambiguously, as accompanied by the honorific) is shifted to 3rd person singular, making the accusation less direct (but still present, as the highly evaluative noun *fanaticism* is transferred accurately, albeit without the aggravating adjective). In addition, the possessive pronoun *your* emphasising Barroso's responsibility for the institution of which he is the head is replaced with a much more neutral adjective.

In Example 5, the deictic shifts are very complex. The same types of shift as we have seen in Examples 1, 2 and 3 (i.e., plural *you* to *we* and singular *you* to *he*) are both in evidence once again. Moreover, the speaker's *I* expressing directly his wish for something likely to be perceived as detrimental by the addressees (losing their prestigious and profitable positions, be it as heads of the EU institutions or as "ordinary" MEPs) disappears in the Polish version, which, therefore, becomes more like a prediction. Overall, the level of face threat in the Polish version is significantly reduced.

Example 6 shows a shift from *I* to *we* that, in this context, must be perceived as excluding the majority of the audience and referring to the speaker's parliamentary group or, more specifically, to UKIP. In addition, the utterance is impersonalised through removal of the object *to him* (referring to J. M. Barroso). This is a type of shift that would fit in Table 10 below, and I will return to the topic in a moment.

There are four typical routes that deictic shifts revealed in the corpus take: plural *you* to *we*, plural *you* to *they*, singular *you* to *s/he* and *I* to *we* (Examples 1–6). Very occasionally, the direction can be reversed, as shown by Example 7 (*he* to *you*). However, note the complexity of this extract: the original sentence is actually somewhat inconsistent, starting with 3rd person singular references to two specified people, and then switching into *you* directed at them both (in the clause that is omitted by the interpreter, perhaps as stating something that is obvious to the audience on the basis of the agenda), to finally employ the personal pronoun *your* to describe the B plan. On the whole, therefore, in spite of the "reverse" shift, the Polish sentence does not seem to be much more personal than the original one.

Table 10. Impersonalisation

Example no.	Source text	Target text	Back-translation
1	2	3	4
8.	*Well, you've decided to head off on the Titanic towards economic and democratic disaster.*	*Zdecydowano się, że Titanic będzie płynął ku katastrofie gospodarczej.*	It was decided that the Titanic will head towards economic disaster.

cont. tab. 10

1	2	3	4
9.	*In the end, you will have to face the reality* […].	*Ale koniec końców i tak trzeba będzie spojrzeć prawdzie w oczy.*	But in the end anyway one will have to face the reality […].
10.	[…] *by a majority of two to one, the British people now want us to leave this Union and not to pay you a penny piece.*	[…] *pięćdziesiąt procent Brytyjczyków prawie nie chce już ani ani pensa płacić za członkostwo w tej organizacji.*	[…] 50% of Britons, nearly, do not want to pay a penny piece for membership in this organisation.
11.	*He's been appointed by you guys.*	*Wyznaczyła go Unia Europejska.*	The European Union appointed him.
12.	[…] *you might, since you've taken office, understand that a significant portion of the United Kingdom's GDP actually comes from our financial services* (to a Commissioner).	[…] *od objęcia przez pana urzędu chyba pan już zrozumiał, że znacząca część @ PKB Wielkiej Brytanii jest generowana przez usługi finansowe.*	[…] since your entry into office perhaps you have already understood that a significant portion of Great Britain's GDP is created by financial services.
13.	*I have no intention of apologising, I have no intention of leaving this Chamber: you must have me escorted out, Sir!* (to the chairing Vice-President).	*Ja nie mam zamiaru przepraszać i nie mam zamiaru wychodzić z tej izby, będzie trzeba mnie wyprowadzić.*	I have no intention of apologising and I have no intention of leaving this Chamber, one will have to escort me out.
14.	*What a fine mess you've got us into. You have a 100% record for being wrong with every single prediction about the euro* […] (to J. M. Barroso).	*No i proszę w jakiej jesteśmy bigosie. Mamy stuprocentowe dowody, że źle @ złe były wszystkie przewidywania co do euro* […].	Well, well, what a mess we are in. We have 100% evidence, that wrongly @ wrong were all the predictions about the euro […].
15.	*You rebranded it as the Lisbon Treaty without conceding a single power; you bulldozed it through* […] (to J. M. Barroso).	*Ale zmieniło się, nazwało się to traktatem lizbońskim i z niczego się nie zrezygnowało i się to wepchało wszystkim.*	But one changed, one named it the Lisbon Treaty and one did not concede anything and one forced it on everybody.
16.	*Nick Clegg is so deluded he still thinks we can take the lead in Europe.*	*Niektórzy uważają jeszcze i mają taką iluzję, że mogą przewodzić Europie.*	Some still believe and have such an illusion that they can take the lead in Europe.

Impersonal constructions, which are mainly associated with passive voice and the universal indefinite pronoun *one* in English, have a wider range of realisations in Polish, including passives of transitive as well as intransitive verbs (e.g., *rozbito* 'one broke,' *biegano* 'one ran') and subjectless constructions with modal uninflected verbs such as *należy*, *trzeba*, *można* and *warto* (see, e.g., Łyda et al. 2010: 195–197). In both the languages under consideration (and many others, certainly), such constructions conceal the agent of an activity, or at least foreground the activity itself rather than its agent.

As we can see from Table 10, transformations which I have decided to gather under the umbrella term "impersonalisation" (whose meaning is broader than the one typical of grammarians, e.g., Siewierska 2004: 210–213) are commonly employed by Polish interpreters to deal with both plural *you* (Examples 8–11) and singular *you* (Examples 12–15). Passive constructions are represented very widely, *trzeba* – twice, and nominalisation – once (Example 12). However, not all the forms chosen by the interpreters are impersonal constructions in the strictly grammatical sense of the term. What I call impersonalisation can also be achieved by a variety of other means: deleting an (optional) object of a transitive verb (Example 10 and also Example 6 in Table 9), using an indefinite pronoun instead of the target's name (Example 16), or creating a metonymy by replacing a personal pronoun with the name of the institution the people referred to represent (Example 11). Example 11 is actually a very interesting one, as it shows that even a transformation from passive to active voice (the opposite of what we would expect in view of what has just been said) does not prevent the interpretation from becoming less face-threatening once the strictly personal reference is removed.[32] The institution most typically mentioned in such interpreting shifts (detected both for plural and singular *you*) is the Commission – not surprisingly, considering the fact that its President J. M. Barroso is obviously among UKIP's favourite targets throughout the whole corpus, and other Commissioners taking part in plenary debates often undergo severe face attack as well.

The effect that is achieved by means of impersonalisation (through any of the transformations listed above) seems to typically involve a shift of the FTA in question from on-record status in the source text to off-record status in the interpretation. In other words, the face-threat relies on an implicature in the Polish version. In most of the analysed cases, it is clear enough from the broader context (not included in the

[32] Possibly, the increase in formality achieved by the removal of the colloquial *you guys* could have played a role here, too.

examples for reasons of space) whose face is being attacked. As a result, many of the Polish fragments appear highly sarcastic; this is especially true of Example 15, with its unusually long series of impersonal verbs (vagueness supposedly employed as a politeness strategy, amounting to nothing more than mock-politeness).

Table 11. Omission

Example no.	Source text	Target text	Back-translation
17.	*If this was a company, the directors, or in this case the Commission, would all be in prison.*	–	–
18.	*How dare you! You transferred, the British Conservative Party, the regulation of the City of London to this place, and you fiddle about in your silly little committees having betrayed my country. You scoundrel!*	*Pani przekształciła @ --- Pani przenosi zwyczaje Partii Konserwatywnej tutaj do Parlamentu Europejskiego. To skandal.*	You transformed… You transfer the habits of the Conservative Party here to the European Parliament. This is a scandal.
19.	*In fact, you are going to meet lots of Communists over the next six months, including the boss of the Commission here, old Barroso, who was an advocate of Chairman Mao!*	*W ciągu kolejnych @ sześciu miesięcy spotka się pan z wieloma komunistami, łącznie z panem Barroso.*	Over the next six months, you will meet lots of Communists, including Mr Barroso.
20.	[…] *dear old Herman Van Rompuy, well, he's done a runner, hasn't he? Because the last time he was here, he told us we'd turned the corner, that the euro crisis was over and he hasn't bothered to come back and see us.*	*Pan Rompuy, podobnie, kiedy był u nas ostatnim razem powiedział, iż przeszliśmy już przez najgłębszy @ punkt kryzysu strefy euro.*	Mr Rompuy, similarly, when he visited us last time he said that we had already passed the deepest point of the Eurozone crisis.
21.	*Dear President, under Rule 110 of our Procedures, the Commission may, at any time, request of you to make a statement on an urgent issue.*	*Dziękuję bardzo, pani przewodnicząca. Zgodnie z artykułem sto dziesiątym naszego regulaminu, Komisja @ może być zawsze poproszona, żeby się wypowiedziała na temat kwestii pilnej.*	Thank you very much, Madam President. Under Rule 110 of our Procedures, the Commission may, at any time, be asked to make a statement on an urgent issue.

Another strategy that is frequently observable when we look at personal reference is omission; however, omission does not affect personal reference alone. For the needs of this section, I define omission as applying to at least one whole proposition, and therefore as a more comprehensive operation than, for example, the removal of an indirect object (which, as already said, is classified here as impersonalisation). Obviously, omission is likely to result in information loss, whether it refers to FTAs or other content of the source text. At the same time, from the interpreter's perspective, omission may easily stem from other considerations than reducing danger to face, such as evaluating certain elements as less relevant and therefore good candidates for deletion in view of the original speaker's high delivery rate (which is characteristic of all three speakers in the corpus), or simply failing either to hear or to understand a part of the original message (on various reasons for strategic and non-strategic omission, see, e.g., Gile 2009: 210; Napier 2004; Bartłomiejczyk 2006: 161). Also note that omission does not always have to be either fully strategic or completely subject to cognitive constraints, the two factors may well conspire to make the interpreter delete a particular fragment. In other words, the interpreter may consider both the fact that something is likely to offend the audience and the fact that trying to render it accurately might require a lot of his/her cognitive resources and, for instance, compromise the processing of another incoming unit or excessively lengthen the ear-voice span.

Here we see very clearly the basic difference that I have not explicitly addressed so far, the difference between mitigation as intended by the interpreter (used strategically) and mitigation as a phenomenon detectable in the target language version that the Polish audience receives (independently of the fact whether it was intended or not, the final effect). As the research method used in this study does not enable us any access to the interpreter's strategic processing, only the latter understanding of mitigation is a valid one. Although I sometimes do hypothesise that the interpreter has decided to reduce the existent danger to face, in any particular case a hypothesis is all that it amounts to, and this reservation seems especially necessary in relation to omission.

The fact that strategic omission may well be employed on purpose to attenuate the original message is acknowledged, for example, by Gile (2009: 210): "Omission can also be the interpreter's choice if something grossly inappropriate was said and the interpreter feels strongly that if reproduced, it will cause major harm to the speaker's interests and/or jeopardize seriously the intended outcome of the meeting." At the

same time, Gile expresses his doubts about the ethical implications of such omission.

Having the above considerations in mind, omission of whole fragments that include FTAs (such as in Example 17) is difficult to attribute unequivocally to the interpreter's desire to mitigate a face-threatening message. Example 18, where in the original an accusation addressed at another British MEP is placed between two impoliteness formulae, is a complex one. The first formula, that is, *How dare you*, is omitted, and the other one, *You scoundrel!*, is impersonalised and further attenuated by the use of a less emotionally loaded noun *skandal*.[33] The accusation itself is not rendered accurately, so we may suspect some comprehension problems on the interpreter's part (unsuccessful reconstruction from the context, on the basis of *the British Conservative Party* as the only element the interpreter has grasped?).

However, comprehension problems seem less likely in Example 19, where the detailed and highly offensive reference to Barroso was replaced by simple *pan Barroso*, which, as I already mentioned earlier, may be perceived as somewhat irreverent and ironic, but certainly not matching the impoliteness of the original (although, for obvious historical reasons, describing someone as a Communist in Polish may seem more face-threatening than in any Western language). Example 20 is a similar one, with the interpreter replacing the ironically friendly reference to the President of the Council with a more acceptable one (getting the name wrong, however) and completely removing one of the two accusations present in this fragment, which is actually repeated twice in the original, both times expressed in highly colloquial language: *he's done a runner* and *he hasn't bothered to come back and see us*. It is unlikely that the interpreter should miss both these phrases or misunderstand them, especially the latter, which contains very plain language. In the material under analysis, there are also some fragments in which omission is applied, very locally, to the FTA alone – in other words, the rest of the original message is transferred more or less faithfully. What I refer to are single lexemes or phrases that are charged negatively and carry all the danger to face in a given fragment, but do not constitute essential elements in

[33] This seems to be the standard way to deal with the word *scoundrel* by the Polish EP interpreters, which makes one wonder whether phonetic similarity perhaps plays a role in this. The word appears four times in the corpus, and is rendered twice as *skandal* and once using the adjective derived from this noun to form a paraphrase (*jaką skandaliczną działalność prowadzi ten człowiek* 'what scandalous activities are performed by this man'). It is once omitted, in Bloom's contribution analysed in Section 5.8.

terms of sentence syntax and can therefore be omitted. In Example 21, the speaker uses an inappropriate, very patronising adjective *dear* when addressing the female Vice-President chairing the session, instead of the standard honorific *Madam President*. The interpreter not only deletes this adjective, but also adds thanks for being given the floor. In such instances, the interpreter's facework becomes a more plausible hypothesis than omission resulting from cognitive constraints.

5.9.1.2 Quantitative analysis

Considering that, in the light of the qualitative analysis presented above, it is both plural and singular deictic *you* that seems most likely to undergo interpreting shifts, a quantitative analysis seems in place that can give us more information on the relative frequency of such shifts. Generic *you* has been excluded from this analysis, as have been face-enhancing uses of *you* that, as I assume, do not represent sarcasm (most typically *thank you* at the beginning or at the end of a speech) and these infrequent instances where *you* cannot be satisfactorily disambiguated as either singular or plural. The analysis so conducted revealed 492 occurrences of singular *you* and 277 occurrences of plural *you* in the corpus, whose renderings in Polish are presented in Chart 1 and Chart 2, respectively.

We can see that close renditions (represented by *pan/pani* in singular and by *państwo*[34] and *wy* in plural) are more typical of singular *you* (63.01%) than plural *you* (40.22%). Therefore, it can be concluded that FTAs directed against specified individuals are less likely to undergo mitigation in interpretation into Polish than FTAs directed against groups (although, certainly, a close rendition of *you* does not preclude mitigation of the FTA concerned by other means). At the same time, let us not forget that the effect of mitigation (resulting, as has been shown, predominantly from omission and impersonalisation) might have been caused, at least partly, by problems in disambiguating the English *you* as singular, plural or generic under the constraints of simultaneous interpreting rather than the interpreter's decision to engage in facework.

[34] No distinction was made between *państwo* plus 2nd person plural vs. *państwo* plus 3rd person plural in the final version of the analysis, as quite often the form *państwo* was not accompanied by a verb. Judging on the basis of the occurrences where a conjugated verb is present, the more polite form with 3rd person plural seems to be considerably more popular.



Chart 1. Singular *you* in Polish interpretations



Chart 2. Plural *you* in Polish interpretations

Omission and impersonalisation occur similarly often in plural, but in singular omission (only slightly less frequent than in plural) is twice as popular as impersonalisation. Deictic shifts account for 10.83% of plural *you*, and 3.66% of singular *you*. Consequently, we can see that when dealing with singular *you*, Polish interpreters are less likely to use impersonal constructions or to modify the deictic perspective than in the case of plural *you*, but omission does not seem to depend on the number.

In singular, close renditions are limited to the polite form *pan/pani*.[35] In plural, the more polite form *państwo* takes precedence over *wy*, but the difference in their frequency is not a big one. The choice between the two options seems indeed a difficult one: on the one hand, the formal parliamentary setting would require *państwo*; on the other hand, the high level of face threat may cause the interpretation to gravitate towards the less polite form. Quite apart from this pragmatic dilemma, interpreters might sometimes prefer *wy* simply because it is shorter and saves both time and articulation effort.

5.9.2 Impoliteness

I will now proceed to an analysis of all instances of impoliteness (understood in accordance with Culpeper 2011) in the source texts (including FTAs of sufficient gravity directed at institutions, countries or political groups the targeted individuals represent) and their renderings in the Polish interpretations. Both impoliteness directed at members of the audience present in the hall at the time of the debate and the wider audience possibly envisaged by speakers and reachable through the broadcast will be taken into consideration. Although the judgment as to what is impolite (i.e., what has likely caused offence) might to some extent depend on the analyst's sensitivity, let us not forget possible linguistic triggers (Culpeper's (2010; 2011) conventionalised impoliteness formulae) and the fact that the videos of speeches contain some very important clues, that is, the audience's reactions (heckling, applause and/or laughter by members of the same group and admonishment by subsequent speakers).

The qualitative analysis carried out so far has already revealed some recursive patterns in rendering of both FTAs and impoliteness by interpreters, which can be grouped under three superstrategies: close rendition, mitigation and aggravation. Certainly, these terms lack precision. For instance, it makes a big difference whether an offensive fragment is omitted altogether or just deprived of one

[35] Interestingly, the only cases in the whole corpus where the interpreter uses *ty* occur at the end of the decisively face-enhancing speech addressed to Victor Orban: *Obudź się, panie Orban, powiedz wszystkim, gdzie mają iść* […] 'Wake up, Mr Orban, tell all where they should go.' Consequently, the reason to switch into 2nd person singular here seems to be to show solidarity with the addressee, emotional support for his actions, rather than to offend him.

upgrader, and both such cases will simply fall under mitigation. In order to partly overcome this problem, I propose to divide mitigation into two types: elimination (where all face threat is removed, typically by means of omission) and attenuation.[36] By analogy, also aggravation needs to be divided into strengthening (where face threat present in the original is made more acute) and creation (where completely new face threat is introduced by the interpreter). Consequently, we have three superstrategies, two of which fall into two subtypes each – I will refer to the five entities at the lower level as facework strategies, to avoid confusing them with interpreting strategies that appear at a yet lower level. The model I propose is illustrated in Figure 1; note, however, that the list of interpreting strategies is not exhaustive and that one and the same interpreting strategy can be employed for different facework strategies. In other words, facework strategies draw from a common pool of numerous interpreting strategies. In addition, as shown in Section 5.9.1.1, some of the interpreting strategies could be further subdivided into different linguistic means employed to realise them: for instance, impersonalisation might be achieved through turning active into passive voice, omission of an optional object of a transitive verb, replacing a personal pronoun with an impersonal one, etc. This level has not been represented in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Facework in interpreting

[36] Until now, I have been using "mitigation" and "attenuation" interchangeably; however, from now on the former will be treated as a superordinate, more general term. The same applies to "aggravation" and "strengthening."

Certainly, this classification does not solve the problem of imprecision completely, as even if both the interpreting strategy and the facework strategy employed by the interpreter for two impolite fragments are the same (e.g., impersonalisation amounting to attenuation or omission amounting to elimination), the overall effect on how the speech will be perceived might be significantly different, depending on the level of offence originally intended by the speaker in each case. As I have already stated, illocutionary force as such is not measurable, so any quantitative analysis will necessarily involve an oversimplification of the issue of the interpreter's facework. However, it is my hope that it can at least give us some inkling as to prevailing tendencies.

In order to attempt a quantitative analysis of impoliteness as handled by the Polish EP interpreters, it seems reasonable to focus on larger units than FTAs. For example, in Section 5.2 we have seen in detail how the face attack against Van Rompuy was constructed, the most impolite fragment consisting of two separate FTAs (targeting the newly elected President's charisma and appearance) accompanied by a complex string of redressive devices that also must be seen as contributing to the general offensiveness of this fragment (as an obvious case of implicational impoliteness). As I have argued, dissecting this fragment into smaller elements for the needs of quantitative analysis of interpreting shifts did not make much sense. Among other reasons, the analysis conducted in this way failed to capture the difference between the Polish and the German interpretations that seemed quite marked on the basis of the qualitative analysis. Therefore, I find useful Culpeper's (2011: 195) notion of "impoliteness events" as larger entities: "constellations of behaviours and co-textual/contextual features that co-occur in time and space, have particular functions and outcomes, and are/can be discussed and remembered by participants after the event."

If we try to apply the notion of impoliteness events to the speech analysed in Section 5.2, I would suggest that it contains five (with varying gravity, certainly). Three are directed at Van Rompuy: criticising his charisma and appearance, accusing him of the intention to destroy nation states and democracy, and the final line, expressing Farage's hope that he will soon be removed from office. In addition, there is one event directed at Belgium (*non-country*) and another directed at the loudly protesting members of audience, that is, the angry retort accusing Farage's opponents of dislike for democracy. Out of these five, in the Polish interpretation two can be considered as rendered closely (the one targeting Belgium and the *quiet assassin*), and three are mitigated to various degrees. The omission of the retort

directed at the protesters constitutes the most radical shift and must be classified as elimination; the other two cases of mitigation meet the criteria we have defined for attenuation. If we take a similar look at the German interpretation, it scores close rendition three times (for the same two events as in the Polish interpretation plus the fragment the Polish interpreter eliminated) and attenuation twice (in line with the Polish interpretation). For the needs of a comparison of the interpreter's facework among different language versions of the same source material, we could also easily assign numerical values to each option: 0 for close rendition, –2 for elimination, –1 for attenuation, +1 for strengthening and +2 for creation. The Polish interpretation of this speech would therefore score –4, and the German one would score –2. Although imprecise, this comparison captures the overall difference between the Polish and the German interpretation the detailed qualitative analysis has revealed, that is, the fact that the latter was closer to the original in terms of its offensiveness. The identified impoliteness events in the original contributions have been marked (underlined) in the extracts in the Appendix in order to provide a better illustration of my analysis.

Occasionally, impoliteness events seem to be more diffused. What I mean is that the speaker returns to the same face-threatening behaviour directed at the same target several times throughout one and the same speech, a good example of this being the patronising manner in which Bloom lectures the addressees in the speech analysed in Section 5.5. Therefore, "patronising the audience" will be treated as just one impoliteness event in this speech, and one eliminated by the Polish interpreter, incidentally.

5.9.2.1 Qualitative analysis

I will start with a brief discussion of close rendition, as this is the superstrategy (and, at the same time, facework strategy) which seems the most straightforward. At the same time, here the interpreter is doing what s/he would actually be supposed to do in accordance with the conduit model of interpreting, that is, reconstructing the level of face threat intended by the original speaker. Several examples of fragments in which, according to my judgment, the impoliteness is rendered closely, are provided in Table 12.

Table 12. Close rendition

Example no.	Source text	Target text	Back-translation
22.	[…] *I happily am not a Conservative, therefore I do not have to vote blindly for complete nonsense.*	*Ja na szczęście nie jestem konserwatystą, więc nie muszę ślepo głosować za kompletnym nonsensem.*	I happily am not a Conservative, therefore I do not have to vote blindly for complete nonsense.
23.	*She married well: she married an adviser, and friend and supporter of Tony Blair and got put in the House of Lords.*	*Dobrze wyszła za mąż @ za przyjaciela i @ fana Tony'ego Blaira i trafiła do Izby Lordów.*	She married well, a friend and fan of Tony Blair, and she ended up in the House of Lords.
24.	*Well, President Barroso, you're certainly flexing your muscles, using the powers given to you by the Lisbon Treaty, which you pushed through using illegitimate means.*	*Panie Przewodniczący Barroso, no, pokazuje nam pan muskuły korzystając z kompetencji nadanych przez traktat lizboński, który przepchnął pan nielegalnie.*	Mr President Barroso, well, you are showing us your muscles, using the competences assigned by the Lisbon Treaty, which you pushed through illegally.
25.	[…] *it beggars belief that you and our President, Mr Buzek, can talk about the Solidarity movement, can talk about Poland getting its democracy back twenty years ago and yet here you are, surrendering the democracy and sovereignty of Poland to a failed European Union.*	*I pan jak i przewodniczący Buzek tutaj mówią o mówią o @ mówią o Solidarności, o Polsce, która odzyskała demokrację dwadzieścia lat temu. No i proszę, jednocześnie poddają się panowie i poddają pan panowie suwerenność Polski tej Unii Europejskiej, która przecież niesie niepowodzenie.*	And you as well as President Buzek talk here about Solidarity, about Poland, which regained its democracy twenty years ago. And here you are, at the same time you are surrendering yourselves, and you are surrendering the sovereignty of Poland to this European Union, which does carry failure.

It would appear that close rendition should mostly rely on literal translation, but in reality this is not so simple. Out of the four examples in Table 12, only Example 22 illustrates what can be described as literal translation. Literalness rarely works for longer fragments of texts, but often the shifts are small enough to preserve the level of face threat present in the original. For instance, in Example 23 the omission of *adviser* as one of three nouns referring to Baroness Ashton's husband does not actually attenuate the speaker's claim that she owes her success solely to her family connections. Likewise, the

replacement of the passive construction *got put* by an active verb does not attribute more agency to Baroness Ashton, as the verb used by the interpreter still emphasises her lack of merit, the chance factor involved in entering the House of Lords on the basis of an inherited title. Example 24, in turn, shows that departures from literalness may sometimes be necessary to render the facework accurately. First, the honorific is supplemented with the target's position, and this addition, as already mentioned several times, guarantees that the form of address is neutral (as is the English *President Barroso*). Second, a more literal rendering of the metaphor would not be fully understandable in Polish; note, however, that the image presented by the Polish metaphor selected by the interpreter is, in fact, quite similar to the original one (although perhaps slightly more suggestive of showing off rather than preparing for real work).

Example 25 is the most complex one here, as I would argue that in this one mitigation and aggravation cancel each other out. The mitigation is achieved by omitting the face-threatening phrase *it beggars belief* as well as the noun *democracy* mentioned as one of the values that Donald Tusk and Jerzy Buzek surrender to a more federalised EU. The aggravation, on the other hand, results from the interpreter's addition of a more personal phrase suggesting that they both give up in their efforts for Poland's good, and perhaps also from the omission of the possessive pronoun *our*, which, in the original, suggests the speaker's solidarity and sense of belonging to the EP (not very typical in UKIP speeches, as we have already seen). Moreover, in keeping with the Polish politeness rules, the interpreter refers to *przewodniczący Buzek*. On the whole, this fragment is quite far from literalness, but in spite of this I evaluate it as pragmatically equivalent.

The dominant interpreting strategy accounting for elimination is, without doubt, omission (Examples 26 and 27). I have already elaborated on omission and its possible relation to cognitive constraints in the previous section, so there is no need to replicate this argument now. Apart from omission, the strategy that seems to be at play in Examples 28 and 29 is parallel reformulation – I suspect some comprehension problems in both these cases. As we can see, the interpreter tries to contribute something in line with the speaker's general attitude while remaining possibly noncommittal, the latter goal precluding face-threatening behaviour. In Example 29, it is probably the word *democracy* that becomes the basis for the creation of the interpreter's own version; perhaps we even deal with a failed attempt to reconstruct the rest of the sentence from the context.

Table 13. Elimination

Example no.	Source text	Target text	Back-translation
26.	*You can smile, Mr Schulz, but you know nothing of financial markets or how these things work.*	–	–
27.	*Al Gore, snake oil salesman, crook!*	–	–
28.	*Athens and Madrid will become Dublin and Warsaw, but I suspect that before that time, ordinary folk will have cried enough and the parasites will have to head for the hills, as well they may.*	*Uważam, że i @ jednakże wydarzyło się już dużo @ niekorzystnych rzeczy @*	I think that and however, many unfavourable things have already happened.
29.	*I don't trust this place, which gives a veneer of democracy, which is largely made up of placemen.*	*Ja @ wierzę w prawdziwą demokrację.*	I believe in real democracy.

Table 14. Attenuation

Example no.	Source text	Target text	Back-translation
1	2	3	4
30.	*You are all very downbeat this morning. I thought this was gonna be a big, proud moment! It has taken you eight and a half years of bullying, of lying, of ignoring democratic referendums. Eight and a half years it has taken you to get this treaty through, and on first December you will have it.*	*Wszyscy są dosyć przygnębieni, a myślałem, że to będzie moment wielkiej dumy. Bo osiem i pół lat trwało kłamstwa, ignorowanie wyników demokratycznych referendum. Osiem i pół lat, żeby przepchać ten traktat. Pierwszego grudnia to się w końcu stanie.*	Everybody is quite dejected, and I thought that this would be a moment of great pride. Because eight and a half years lasted lies, ignoring the results of a democratic referendum. Eight and a half years, to push this treaty through. On first December this will finally happen.
31.	*Now they are gonna be, it would appear, subsumed by some sort of EU overseer, consisting no doubt of ignorant bureaucrats,*	*I teraz @ wydaje się, że jakiś regulator czy organ nadzoru europejski ma przejąć @ jego zadania i tak naprawdę to będą tylko półgłówki, @*	And now it appears that a regulator or a European overseer is to take over its tasks and, as a matter of fact, these will only be

cont. tab. 14

1	2	3	4
31.	*Scandinavian housewives, Bulgarian mafia and Romanian peg-makers. You know, frankly, I think you're gonna get on really well with each other.*	*gospodynie domowe i @ nie wiem, kto jeszcze. I naprawdę myślę, że @ doskonale w swoim gronie się będą mieli.*	halfwits, housewives and I don't know who else. And I really think that they will get on fantastically among themselves.
32.	*As the leaders of Europe have been bickering and squabbling and falling deeper into the mire, the newly-elected President should surely have jumped to attention and started to flex his muscles. But you have been about as visible as credit in the European governments' treasury.*	*My staczamy się w przepaść, ale nowy przewodniczący @ powinien coś tu zrobić. @ Wyjść @ w świetle reflektorów. Natomiast nie jest pan wiarygodny w tym działaniu.*	We are tumbling into an abyss, but the new President should do something here. Come out into the spotlight. You, however, are not credible in this action.
33.	*After the six months' farce of the Belgian Presidency, it is nice to see an elected Prime Minister from a proper country.*	*Po sześciu miesiącach belgijskiej prezydencji teraz cieszymy się z prezydencji właściwego kraju.*	After six months of Belgian Presidency, now we are happy about the Presidency of a proper country.
34.	*Your henchmen Olli Rehn, who is here today, I mean he dares to tell countries when they should and should not have general elections.*	*Dzisiaj jest z nami Olli Rehn, który śmie mówić @ krajom, czy powinny czy nie powinny organizować powszechne wybory.*	Today with us is Olli Rehn, who dares to tell countries if they should or should not organise general elections.
35.	*And indeed the Danish Bank – Saxo Bank – said that the Eurozone leaders are behaving like drug addicts and alcoholics.*	*Saxo Bank, Bank Duński stwierdził, że liderzy europejscy zachowują się jak osoby uzależnione od alkoholu i narkotyków.*	Saxo Bank, the Danish Bank said that the European leaders were behaving like persons addicted to alcohol and drugs.
36.	[…] *I saw for the first time even your own supporters shaking their heads. They don't believe in what you're saying. The European people don't believe in what you're saying, and I don't really think even you now believe in what you're saying.*	*Nawet miałem wrażenie, że właściwie nawet pańsk pańska pańscy zwolennicy niespecjalnie wierzyli w to, co pan mówił. Nikt właściwie nie wierzył w to, co pan mówił. Nawet nie wiem, czy pan sam w to wierzy.*	I even had the impression that actually even your your supporters did not particularly believe in what you were saying. Actually nobody believed in what you were saying. I even don't know if you yourself believe it.

Numerous examples of attenuation of FTAs containing direct personal reference by means of deictic shifts, impersonalisation and omission have already been provided and discussed in Section 5.9.1.1. However, Table 14 contains some more examples, this time with a broader context, covering whole impoliteness events. What is notable is that it is relatively rare for one single interpreting strategy to be employed for attenuation; usually interpreters opt for a combination of a few various strategies, with omission playing a very prominent role. In Example 30, the major strategy employed several times throughout the whole fragment is impersonalisation, enabling the interpreter to consistently avoid the plural *you* that appears four times in the original. Omission, however, is additionally applied to the highly pejorative *bullying*, and the adverb signifying high degree, *very*, is replaced by a more limiting one.

Example 31 mainly illustrates omission of items from a highly offensive list of potential members of a new EU body (in particular, no nationality is mentioned by the interpreter), accompanied by the generalisation signalising that the list is not complete. In the last sentence, the interpreter introduces the deictic shift to *they*, therefore masking the fact that the speaker obviously regards his audience as a group containing all the highly dubious characters mentioned in the previous sentence. Example 32, again, displays a combination of different interpreting strategies, starting with the deictic shift that might actually aggravate the face threat (*they* to *we*) and the omission of the negatively charged *bickering* and *squabbling*. However, what is very notable about this fragment is an unusual abundance of conventional metaphors (three) plus a very creative, highly sarcastic simile. Two of the metaphors are replaced by different ones in the target language (which seem quite fitting), and one is "killed" by explaining its meaning in a very general manner. The simile, however, is replaced by a sentence devoid of any sarcasm and suggesting, albeit unconvincingly, that the target (President Van Rompuy) is actually doing something, whereas the whole point of the accusation raised by the speaker is that the President is not doing anything at all.

Examples 33 and 34 show how attenuation can be effectively achieved by omission used very locally to delete negatively charged nouns *farce* and *henchman*. In Example 33, also the reference to the Hungarian PM that is made by the speaker to highlight the difference between Belgium and Hungary in favour of the latter is removed, which results in a very tepid target language version, only implying criticism directed at Belgium.

In Example 35, apart from the change of the target, we see euphemisation manifest in replacing the more face-threatening *alcoholics* and *drug addicts* with a milder paraphrase. Euphemisation is actually a quite common interpreting strategy, applied in particular to highly colloquial lexical items, as we have already seen in Section 5.5 with vocabulary such as *broke* and *bust*. The degree of attenuation obtained by replacing a single item with a euphemism is not particularly high, but, undoubtedly, this interpreting strategy can also be combined with others to create, possibly, a synergic effect.

Finally, Example 36 demonstrates how attenuation results from the addition of several downtoners that were not present in the original. Addition is an interesting interpreting strategy, as it apparently goes against the interpreter's interest by raising the cognitive strain and wasting precious time. Therefore, it seems that additions like these should provide very clear evidence of the interpreter's facework as opposed to his/her attempt to deal with the cognitive constraints. However, as I have already mentioned before, the material that is added often functions as fillers allowing the interpreter to continue talking while waiting for some more input that will hopefully facilitate comprehension.

Table 15. Strengthening

Example no.	Source text	Target text	Back-translation
37.	*Her appointment is an embarrassment for Britain.*	*To na pewno wielki wstyd dla Wielkiej Brytanii, że ją nominowano.*	It is surely a huge embarrassment for Great Britain that she got appointed.
38.	*And it is pretty clear that none of you have learned anything.*	*Szanowni państwo, nic się państwo nie nauczyli, nic się pan nie nauczył.*	Ladies and gentleman, you [pl] have learned nothing, you [sing] have learned nothing.
39.	*Well, it's a very odd kind of success, isn't it, and actually saying that frankly beggars belief and, I think, hardly makes you credible.*	*To bardzo dziwny sukces. I naprawdę prosz- uważa pan, że my w to uwierzymy? To jes- jest pan zupełnie niewiarygodny.*	It's very odd success. And really pleas- do you think that we will believe in this? This i- you are completely not credible.

Whereas addition only occasionally serves the facework strategies discussed so far, it appears to be, alongside omission, one of the major interpreting strategies employed for strengthening. In Example 37, what is added is an epistemic state upgrader and an intensifying adjective to accompany a negatively charged noun. Moreover, a verbal

construction replaces the noun phrase *her appointment*, which results in more directness, more agency being attributed to the decision-makers. The polite form of address directed at the whole audience added at the beginning of Example 38 would likely contribute to face-enhancement in most contexts, but, combined with the rest of the sentence, it must be seen as mock-politeness here. Another addition consists in the fact that the accusation present in the original (clearly referring to more than one person) is repeated once again by the interpreter and targeted at a particular individual – clearly President Van Rompuy, as he is addressed directly in the next sentence. The omission of the phrase *it is pretty clear that* might also contribute to strengthening, due to the presence of the limiting adverb *pretty*.

In Example 38, strengthening clearly relies mainly on omission. The interpreter deletes the hedge and the question tag from the first part, and also the opinion marker from the last part. The positive adjective accompanied by the limiting adverb *hardly*, which sounds sarcastic in the original, is replaced by the more straightforward opposite, negative adjective strengthened by the adverb *zupełnie* 'completely.' However, it is more difficult to evaluate in terms of face threat level the replacement of the statement *actually saying that frankly beggars belief* with a question directly addressing the target, which is clearly more personal. Even if this does not aggravate the offence, it probably does not attenuate it either, because the question is clearly a rhetorical one, with the rather obvious implicature that the speaker and some other members of the audience (possibly the whole political group he represents) are not going to be fooled by the target's words.

Creation of new impoliteness events by the interpreter is not in evidence throughout the whole corpus. This is not to say that the Polish EP interpreters never introduce FTAs of their own making – sometimes they do, and several examples have been discussed in the detailed qualitative analyses of the five complete speeches. As we have seen, the most typical (but certainly not the only one) way to do this is the failure to adjust the honorifics to the Polish politeness standards. However, none of the interpreter-generated FTAs is grave enough to qualify as an impoliteness event.

5.9.2.2 Quantitative analysis

Throughout the whole corpus, 293 impoliteness events have been revealed, which gives, on average, 1.34 event per contribution and one event per every 64 seconds of plenary talk. The distribution across speakers and contributions, however, is very uneven. The source texts by Farage account for 183 impoliteness events, by Bloom – for 89, and by Bufton – for only 21. By far, Bufton is the least impolite of the three speakers, which might partly result from the fact that most of his speeches are prepared in advance and delivered from script. Although Farage is the originator of almost twice as many impoliteness events as Bloom, considering the amount of text each of these MEPs produced (the proportion being about 3:1 for Farage), the frequency of impoliteness is somewhat higher for Bloom. Consequently, although in the period under consideration Bloom took the floor considerably less often than either of the other two MEPs, he was the one most likely to offend someone once he did decide to speak.

There are quite many speeches in the corpus (92, accounting for 42.2% of the total number of speeches) that, although not devoid of FTAs, do not contain any impoliteness events. The ones that do (126, 57.8%) normally feature from one to five such events. The record speech, by Farage, contains as many as eleven impoliteness events in five minutes, and targets mainly Baroness Catherine Ashton (the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and First Vice-President of the European Commission) and, unsurprisingly, Herman Van Rompuy.

A thorough comparison of each impoliteness event in English with its Polish version reveals the distribution of facework strategies as shown in Chart 3.

As can be seen, the most popular facework strategy by far is attenuation. Strengthening is rare, with less than 5% of occurrences, and close rendition occurs in slightly less than one case out of four. Mitigation altogether accounts for 72.7% of Polish renderings of impoliteness events. If we apply the scale I proposed earlier in this chapter (–2 for elimination, –1 for attenuation, 0 for close rendition and +1 for strengthening), the average score for an impoliteness event is –0.78, wchich is quite close to the value set for attenuation.

Considering facework at the level of a single impolite contribution, that is, one that contains at least one impoliteness event (126 out of 218, as mentioned earlier), the average score of a Polish interpretation is –1.82. Only one interpretation scores higher than the base level with +1,



Chart 3. Impoliteness events as rendered into Polish

and fifteen score 0 (which strongly suggests that strengthening is used almost exclusively as a compensation for mitigating something else within the same speech). Consequently, in 110 interpretations (87.3%) the facework score is negative, that is, the overall impoliteness level seems lower than in the relevant source text, showing the interpreter's mitigation. The detailed results of this analysis are shown in Chart 4.



Chart 4. Facework scores for individual interpretations into Polish

5.10 Conclusions

Whereas the detailed qualitative analysis of five speeches enabled me to draw some preliminary conclusions (Section 5.7) and to plan the corpus-based study accordingly, the very size of the corpus analysed thereafter allows me to make some tentative generalisations, with the caveat that the results obtained herein apply to the Polish Language Unit at the EP and should not be generalised too hastily to other settings or even other Language Units.

It seems necessary to point out that the preliminary conclusions remain valid, as none of them has been contradicted by the results of the corpus analysis, though we have to remember that many issues that emerged at that point have simply not been followed any further (some of them are undoubtedly waiting for their turn). While scrutinising the corpus at my disposal, I have focused on two rather broad aspects of facework: personal reference and impoliteness, including both qualitative and quantitative elements into my explorations. I have also proposed a multilevel model of the interpreter's facework in simultaneous interpreting and a simple scoring system for facework strategies, which may, hopefully, find some application also beyond this book.

I have described and illustrated with numerous examples a number of interpreting strategies affecting facework, with omission, impersonalisation and euphemisation, among others, playing prominent roles. There are two particularly important points related to these strategies. Firstly, many of the interpreting strategies are quite universal, that is, they may be employed for different facework strategies. In other words, the final effect on facework in the interpretation depends primarily on the status of the element to which a particular interpreting strategy is applied, for example the addition of a downtoner to an FTA will normally serve mitigation (unless it only highlights mock-politeness, which is also frequently the case), and the addition of an upgrader will cause aggravation. Secondly, individual interpreting strategies rarely appear in isolation. Rather, it is very common for interpreters to combine several different interpreting strategies to deal with a single impoliteness event. Moreover, not all of them have to steer the interpretation into the same direction of either mitigation or aggravation, which makes the overall picture even more complex.

As I have already explained when discussing the strategy of omission, relying exclusively on product-oriented research tools does not enable

the analyst to determine which interpreting strategies are actually used for facework management and which are used to alleviate the cognitive strain inherently related to simultaneous interpreting. Sometimes even both the aims interplay in the interpreter's mind, we might speculate. However, whatever reason drives the interpreter to select a particular strategy, the level of face threat will change as compared with the source text. This is the aspect at least partly accessible to product-oriented analysis and this is what I focus on in this study.

The mitigating effect of reduced directness is observable for personal reference, and it seems more pronounced for FTAs directed at group targets than for ones directed at singled out individuals. Shifts affecting personal reference tend to change the status of FTAs from on-record in the original to off-record in the interpretation. Interestingly, at no point in the corpus does the interpreter distance him/herself from the content of the speech by stepping out of the speaker's shoes, as was shown to occur, for example, by Duflou (2012).

The quantitative analysis of impoliteness events and their Polish interpretations appears very revealing: impoliteness clearly tends to get mitigated, but rather attenuated than eliminated completely. What is impolite in the original might sometimes be evaluated as merely face-threatening in the interpretation. This trend is illustrated both by the high relative prevalence of attenuation as a facework strategy (over 62% as compared with nearly 23% for the next most popular option, i.e., close rendition) and by the facework scores at the level of a contribution, which tend to be negative, but rarely reach very low values (see Chart 4).

Consequently, returning to one of the questions posed at the very beginning of this chapter, it appears that a speaker stands a good chance of damaging his/her opponent's face through an interpreter, but if offending the target (listening to the Polish version) is the desired goal, in order to achieve it, the speaker should probably take the filtering effect of interpreting into consideration and make the original statement more face-threatening than would be necessary to offend someone listening to the original. At the same time, extremely offensive moves, such as calling someone names, are very likely to get omitted. Casual observation of interpretations that do not constitute a part of the corpus (e.g., Polish versions of English contributions by the extremely Eurosceptic MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke) suggests that a feasible method to ensure interpreters' accuracy in rendering highly impolite material might be to provide them in advance with a written copy of the speech. Of course, this is a solution only possible for contributions that are actually prepared in advance and delivered from script.

As mitigation of impoliteness emerges as the most significant result of my analyses herein, I would like to devote the next chapter to a discussion of various ways in which this phenomenon can be construed.

6. Mitigation: Explanatory hypotheses

Having established that mitigation of impoliteness (and, more generally, face threats) is prevalent in the output of Polish interpreters dealing with Eurosceptic discourse, I would like to look for some plausible interpretations of this phenomenon. Hopefully, future research based on introspective data collected from the community of practice that provided the material analysed in Chapter 5 (conducted with ethnographic methods such as interviews or focus groups) can shed some light on interpreters' motivations in applying mitigation to this type of source text, and their assessment of particular solutions that rely on mitigation as opposed to those that do not. At present, my aim is to offer several tentative explanatory hypotheses of mitigation as an interpreting superstrategy (perceived here as a set of strategies applied with the aim of reducing or eliminating face-threat rather than to deal with the cognitive constraints associated with simultaneous interpreting):

- mitigation as a norm in conference interpreting;
- mitigation as (self-)censorship;
- mitigation as the interpreter's intervention; and
- mitigation as equalising.

None of these hypotheses seem to completely rule others out, rather they allow us to look at mitigation from different angles. An exhaustive discussion of each concept's development in translation studies (or even solely in interpreting studies) is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, short introductions will be necessary before I try to explain how the concept in question may relate to my findings.

6.1 Mitigation as a norm?

Scientific enquiry into norms in interpreting can be traced back to Miriam Shlesinger's relatively brief but seminal article published in the very first issue of the journal *Target* (1989b), where she proposes to apply the concept of norms that emerged earlier in relation to translation of written texts also to interpreting.[1] In translation studies, norms are defined as "the translation of general values or ideas shared by a community – as to what would count as right or wrong, adequate or inadequate – into performance 'instructions' appropriate for and applicable to concrete situations" (Toury 2012: 63). Although frequently devoid of concrete verbalisations, norms become manifest in target texts through "regularities of behaviour in recurrent situations" (p. 64), assuming that a given situation allows the translator for a choice among different options. Existing norms lead to the emergence of appropriate translation strategies, although 1:1 correspondence between the latter and the former is rare. Mostly, one and the same norm accounts for a number of different strategies, and, reversely, one strategy can be explained as resulting from adherence to different norms (p. 65).

Norms have a social existence and are internalised by novice translators through explicit instruction (both throughout formal training and "on the job") as well as acquired by observing and following patterns of behaviour of experienced colleagues and learning from their reactions to what others do – note that a breach of norms in particular tends to elicit negative reactions. Feedback from other participants of the communicative event (publishers, authors and readers) may also play a role. From this brief description, it should already be clear that the concept of norms is indeed very much suited to exploration of simultaneous interpreting, which is inherently a team activity and therefore very prone to emergence of norms as understood by Toury and, more broadly, Descriptive Translation Studies. At the same time, Shlesinger (1989b) raises some important reservations as to the feasibility of extrapolating norms from interpreters' behaviour in real-life situations, as interpreters' idiosyncrasies may be difficult to distinguish from general norms without large, authentic interpreting corpora. Creation of such corpora, in turn, is hindered by many obstacles (e.g., obtaining participants' consent to record and analyse material and the observer effect). In the absence of appropriate corpora,

[1] Actually, Toury did not restrict the applicability of norms to written translation only, but he clearly discussed them in the context of literary translation.

and considering the geographical scattering of interpreters who, for most part, only co-operate with a limited number of colleagues, norms can be traced back to interpreter trainers in the few universities that offer programmes in conference interpreting.[2]

Shlesinger's contribution, very cautious and warning colleagues not to rush to theorise about the nature of interpreting norms, quickly triggered a response from Harris (1990), who, against Shlesinger's advice, postulates the existence of several very concrete norms, in particular what he calls the "honest spokesperson" norm. In accordance with it, the interpreter should "re-express the original speaker's ideas and the manner of expressing them as accurately as possible and without significant omissions, and not mix them up with their own ideas and expressions" (Harris 1990: 18). The norm formulated in this manner naturally seems to proscribe any mitigation of what the interpreter would consider "inappropriate." Other norms enumerated by Harris include speaking always in the first person (which is very convincingly challenged by Duflou 2012) and interpreting only into one's mother tongue (a highly contentious issue even then, and something that has simply proved not practicable in the context of the EU institutions, as explained already in Chapter 1). As pointed out by Marzocchi (2005a: 90), Harris's examples "actually represent different levels on a continuum between habits, preferences and socially sanctioned norms" and raise the question how to proceed beyond asserting the existence of interpreting norms (which, in itself, testifies to their psychological salience) to eliciting such norms from interpretations.

As the discussion on norms in interpreting gathers momentum, Schjoldager (1994: 85) tries to reconcile this concept with cognitively-oriented research, and she is definitely right in noting that "we shall always find it difficult to distinguish when the interpreting performance is a mainly norm-governed activity and when it is more determined by the processing conditions." She therefore postulates the existence of special norms that govern interpreters' behaviour under cognitive overload and, for example, let the interpreter decide whether or not to continue interpreting in spite of very high risk of inaccuracy. In another article, the same author conducts an analysis of experimental material obtained from trainee interpreters at various levels to finally postulate the existence of the following (quite controversial) norm: "[a]n interpreter is allowed to say something that is apparently unrelated

[2] This seems hardly applicable to today's reality in Europe, with a great proliferation of interpreter training programmes and lots of professional networking among active conference interpreters.

to the source-text item in question […] provided that s/he can say something which is contextually plausible" (Schjoldager 1995: 84).

According to Gile (1999), translation strategies and interpreting strategies fundamentally differ in that many of the latter are not necessarily norm-governed, but have the primary function of enabling the interpreter to cope with cognitive constraints. However, there are also certain norms (or rules) that influence the selection of appropriate strategies. Two of these norms focus on maximising, respectively, information recovery and the communication impact of the target text. Another one aims to minimise recovery interference, that is, reduce the present cognitive load with a view to preventing problems in processing another source text unit. As explained by Gile (p. 99), these three rules should in fact be described as "hypernorms" that can be broken down into a number of subordinate norms; for instance, maximising the communication impact might cover ensuring sufficient clarity of argumentation and expression as well as avoiding renderings likely to offend the audience. Particular settings may call for specific realisations of this hypernorm, such as finishing possibly close behind the speaker in TV interpreting. Importantly, Gile does not believe that large interpreting corpora are necessary for extrapolation of norms; he places a strong emphasis on extratextual sources instead: "such research is probably more efficiently done by asking interpreters about norms, by reading didactic, descriptive and narrative texts about interpreting […], by analysing user responses, and by asking interpreters and non-interpreters to assess target texts and to comment on their fidelity and other characteristics using small corpora" (Gile 1999: 100).

Coming to the setting which interests us most, Duflou (2007a) explains very clearly why EP interpreters, and in particular specific language booths, may be considered tightly knitted communities of practice that are very likely to produce norms. Members of the same language unit are routinely exposed to one another's output, but there is also much exposure to interpretations of other booths as interpreters take relay from them or listen in while not interpreting themselves (to pick up vocabulary in another working language, or just out of curiosity). It is, therefore, not entirely certain whether potential norms should be seen as operating at the level of the EP (or perhaps even a more general one of all EU interpreting services, as there is also some contact among them, especially through freelance interpreters who work interchangeably for different institutions), or as limited to particular Language Units (booths). Nevertheless, as I only have some evidence for mitigation in the output of Polish interpreters, I would be very cautious to generalise beyond the Polish booth. On the other

hand, probably not all norms are generated bottom-up in relatively small communities of practice. Marzocchi (2005a) suggests that some norms may span over a variety of different settings that can jointly be described as "conference interpreting" due to the normative influence of training institutions and professional associations.

Marzocchi (2005a: 96) also makes a very important point that the concept of norms reaches a "wider significance" as "it evokes the issue of *ethics*" (original emphasis), norms finding verbalisations in institutional discourses as well as in codes of professional conduct. However, both seem to have much more salience for liason interpreting (e.g., in court settings) than for conference interpreting.

6.1.1 EU institutional discourse on interpreting

As shown in Section 1.3.1.1, EU translators are able to identify a number of resources with advice on how they should proceed with their work and solve certain translational problems, much of which may have normative status. Material of this nature for EU interpreters seems much more limited. Interpreters can certainly also refer to the same resources as translators when they need to check some terminology, but as to interpreting strategies, they seem to be given much leeway. Duflou (2014: 132–133) describes the content of intranet pages of DG INTE and DG SCIC intended for beginner EU interpreters (not available to outsiders), and from her account we can conclude that what is presented there is mainly advice on practical matters, such as where to locate appropriate documents to prepare for assignments, how to find one's way around in EU buildings or what to expect in various types of meetings. Particular emphasis is given to the necessity of learning from more experienced colleagues while working together with them, both by emulation and through feedback they offer. This, naturally, may be highly conducive to internalisation of existing norms by newcomers.

The nearest thing to a code of professional ethics for EU interpreters that exists, according to my knowledge, seems to be the internal document published in 2012 by DG SCIC entitled *Ethics: A Practical Guide for Interpreters*. Although distributed per e-mail to all SCIC staff interpreters and freelancers with EU accreditation, it is not binding even on SCIC staff interpreters, but meant to be used for information purposes "to clarify the relevant standards, obligations and procedures"

(European Commission 2012b: 4). The guidelines, having a rather informal style, are mostly presented in the form of questions and answers. The document focuses on what Gile (1999) calls "behavioural norms" (as opposed to "linguistic output norms"), that is, everything that surrounds the activity of interpreting. Issues such as confidentiality, punctuality, dress code, booth manners, etc. are all given their due. However, the only fragment that refers in any way whatsoever to the interpreter's output deals with strictly presentational issues: avoidance of filled pauses, clear articulation and appropriate volume. Therefore, potential mitigation of offensive utterances is not included. What might seem interesting in the context of face attacks and impoliteness, however, is that interpreters are expected to refrain from producing them in their own capacity (in the social media, first of all). They are also reminded that they owe their loyalty to the Commission. The said loyalty should be kept in mind, for example, when giving a public presentation about the EU or taking round a group of visitors: "nothing you say should bring the EU into disrepute. A eurosceptic rant is not acceptable" (European Commission 2012b: 6).

Even if norms are not imposed in an official manner, they can be reflected in the meta-discourse of an institution – as shown, for interpreting, by Diriker (2009). It is therefore worthwhile to look for possible manifestations of such meta-discourse on the websites of the Directorates for Interpretation addressed at the general public.

On the website of DG SCIC, the section entitled "What is conference interpreting?" describes its tasks in the following way:

> Conference interpreting deals exclusively with oral communication: rendering a message from one language into another, naturally and fluently, adopting the delivery, tone and convictions of the speaker and speaking in the first person. It should not be confused with translation which deals only with written texts. […] International conferences are attended by people from different backgrounds and cultures, and speaking different languages. It is the job of an interpreter to enable them to communicate with each other, not by translating every word they utter, but by conveying the ideas which they express.

The Court of Justice's Directorate provides the following information:

> The role of the interpreter is not like that of the translator. Interpretation does not consist in translating a written text literally, but rather in faithfully transposing a message expressed orally from one language to another. The interpreter works in real time making

> communication possible between the speaker and the person for whom the pleadings are intended.

DG INTE does not have its own website, but its responsibilities are briefly outlined on the EP's website: "The main task of the European Parliament's interpreters is to render orally the speeches given by MEPs faithfully and in real time into all the official languages." In addition, the Directorate-General provides more details on the tasks of its interpreters on Facebook:

> Whereas translators deal with the written word, interpreters make sense of the spoken word. They understand what is being said in one language and render that same message accurately and almost instantly in another. Enabling communication and facilitating dialogue, interpreters act as a bridge between cultures and often find themselves at the very heart of the decision-making process.

As we can see, all the three descriptions emphasise the difference between translation and interpreting, which may not be quite obvious to laymen. All three, although in various ways, also describe interpreting as rendition of meaning and not words, rather in the manner of Seleskovitch (1968/1978) (deverbalisation: the interpreter understands the source texts, reduces it to meaning and re-expresses this meaning in the target language). However, many scholars (e.g., Gran 1989; Fabbro et al. 1990; Isham 1994) talk about two possible approaches to interpreting: meaning-based and form-based, which do not necessarily have to be related to quality (Isham 1994). Gile (2009: 209), while recognising that interpreting based on meaning is likely to optimise quality, also notes that "in case of fatigue or very fast speeches, when working in a cognate language pair, interpreters may give preference to what has been called in the literature 'form-based interpreting,' relying essentially on source-speech words and syntax to guide them in producing the target speech." The institution's meta-discourse does not acknowledge the existence of such a possibility, therefore, this strategy may be considered undesirable.

Two of the descriptions focus on the sense relation between the source and the target text, emphasising faithfulness (ECJ's Directorate) and accuracy (DG INTE), without elaborating on what either of these terms covers. Both the descriptions also underline the temporal relation. The first description, on the other hand (DG SCIC), seems to give more weight to the target text as such and the manner of its presentation, that is, fluency and naturalness. It is also the only one to highlight the fact that the interpreter acts as the speaker's *alter ego*, which is

manifest both by speaking in the first person, and by adopting the speaker's "delivery, tone and convictions." Therefore, it might be seen as unacceptable, for example, to polish the target speech so much that the speaker comes across as more sophisticated and convincing than he or she is in the original. It might also be evaluated negatively if the speaker's convictions, however extreme, outrageous or ridiculous for the interpreter, come across deflated or tinged with the interpreter's irony. Those are, of course, only some tentative (but hopefully justifiable) conclusions drawn from the meta-discourse, and not what is actually verbalised there. However, DG SCIC seems to be the only one among the three Directorates whose discourse is specific enough to be construed as taking an implicit stand against mitigation, whereas the stance of the other two Directorates on this issue cannot be gauged on this basis.

Duflou (2007b) offers some similar insights to mine, showing that many formulations (with deontic features such as model verbs) which appear to have normative status in fact do not refer to the output the interpreter is supposed to deliver. On the whole, if we look at the institutional discourse of the EU interpreting services addressed at the general public, it appears very general, often explaining what conference interpreting is or what skills and personality traits are expected of a "good" interpreter. Also the discourse addressed at the interpreters themselves, as far as I am able to assess it considering my limited access as an outsider, focuses on behavioural norms rather than offering normative statements applicable to the ethical dilemmas concerning the interpreter's facework.

6.1.2 Codification of norms outside the EU institutions

If there is any formal code of ethics to which many EU interpreters may feel some allegiance, the only plausible candidate seems to be AIIC's *Code of Professional Ethics*. AIIC is the only worldwide association of conference interpreters, and membership in it is, beyond doubt, associated with some professional prestige (as limited through a system of "sponsoring" by active members who have worked together with candidates and assessed them favourably). In addition, AIIC has done much for EU interpreters by successfully negotiating work conditions with their employer (for more information on the association and its work, see, e.g., Thiéry 2015). Marzocchi (2005a: 98) fittingly calls AIIC's *Code* "the generic appeal to faithfulness and professionalism."

Likewise, Diriker (2004: 30) describes this code as follows: "While the Code of the AIIC foregrounds secrecy, confidentiality, collegiality and integrity as some of the important constituents of 'due professionalism' in conference interpreting, it does not specify what constitutes an ethical interpreting performance." Consequently, this is definitely not a source enabling interpreters to answer specific questions on ethical and unethical behaviours as regards face-threat present in the source text they have to deal with.

Note that codes of conduct applying to liason interpreting tend to be significantly more specific. At the same time, unlike the AIIC *Code*, they are usually limited to specific settings and do not have the ambition to regulate the profession on a global scale. *The Code of Ethics for Interpreters and Translators* adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia includes, for example, the following norm: "Interpreters shall convey the whole message, including vulgar or derogatory remarks, insults and non-verbal clues, such as the tone of voice and emotions of the speaker, which might facilitate the understanding of their listeners" (quoted after Marzocchi 2005a: 98). Kalina (2015) attributes this higher specificity to a more urgent need to regulate the interpreter's conduct in view of the asymmetric nature of liason interpreting (i.e., one side of the mediated interaction clearly enjoying more power than the other).

As rightly noted by Kahane (2007), questions about the conference interpreter's ethical responsibility and potential moral conflicts related to issues such as transferring a solecism faithfully or replacing it with something more appropriate, more politically correct, tend to get asked predominantly by outsiders and by beginners. However, does this mean that insiders simply take the answers for granted?

6.1.3 Prescriptive literature

All in all, according to Marzocchi (2005a: 100), the lack of explicitly formulated codified norms is "a missing link, a grey area in the way the conference interpreting profession depicts itself." Nevertheless, such norms are likely to have been verbalised somewhere, and Marzocchi puts forward the following hypothesis, which I find very convincing:

> early scholarly writings on conference interpreting in Europe, written by recognized professionals and providing plenty of practical advice,

> did in fact replace an explicit translational norm in ethical discourse; they have since shaped the self-perception of conference interpreters in Europe in much the same way as explicit codes of ethics have done for court interpreting and other non-conference settings in the United States and elsewhere. (p. 98).

Kahane (2007) associates the beginnings of conference interpreting in 1950s with the emergence of "[t]he notion of the unsullied interpreter who extracts the essentials of the message and transforms them into another language without sharp edges and roughness in the interests of communication," which has been present ever since in the professional discourse. The "founding fathers" of the conference interpreting profession undoubtedly include interpreters who worked for the newly established United Nations and taught at universities offering first conference interpreting programmes. Some of them have tried to disperse their ideas more widely by publication of books with clearly didactic aims. In particular, it is Jean Herbert's handbook with the telling subtitle *How to Become a Conference Interpreter* (first published in French in 1952, English translation in 1956) that may have played a crucial role in shaping this notion Kahane writes about. In the book, aspiring conference interpreters are advised "to bring one step nearer to the 'golden mean' anything that wanders too far away from it" (Herbert 1956: 63). The author is, in fact, both categorical and explicit in recommending mitigation of impoliteness that is perceived as the speaker's lapse: "Certain offensive phrases which may go further than the speaker intended or realised should preferably be attenuated. An interpreter who fails to do so does not fulfill his real mission" (p. 62). Interestingly enough, Herbert does not speak about attenuation of impoliteness in terms of ethical dilemmas – the above quotations come from a chapter on "stylistic considerations." Moreover, he does not offer any advice on what to do when the offensiveness is clearly intended by the original speaker, and failing to account for cases of intentional impoliteness might easily be seen as encouraging interpreters to perceive any impoliteness as excessive in the elevated context of high-level international meetings. Indeed, it seems that interpreters, playing the self-appointed "sublime role […] as facilitators of dialogue or even messengers of peace" (Kahane 2007), have tended to stretch Herbert's recommendation to cover also such cases.

We may consider Herbert's manual, focusing on diplomatic interpreting as it was at the height of the Cold War, outdated and no longer a must-read among young generations of interpreters. But is there anything that has replaced it in its role as an introductory guide

spelling out the dos and don'ts of conference interpreting? I would say that Roderick Jones's *Conference Interpreting Explained* (1998) has done just that, and, as the author is an experienced EU interpreter himself, readers are likely to consider his advice most relevant in this very setting.

In fact, Jones (1998) devotes considerable attention to the problem of mitigation. On the one hand, he argues that "there are occasions when an interpreter may tone down comments to take the sting out of a meeting: repeating tactless or rude comments may in some cases be in the interest neither of the speaker, nor of the addressee, nor of the proceedings in general" (p. 21), which seems very much in line with Herbert's view as presented above. On the other hand, Jones admits that the issue is very controversial and proceeds to discuss it in much more detail than Herbert, emphasising that there is no hard-and-fast rule and the final decision in any given case always depends on the interpreter's personal tact. He presents two examples of situations that require making a decision of this type. In the first example, during multilateral negotiations one delegation accuses another of *blackmail*, and Jones argues this should be transferred accurately, as attenuation of the offensive term would deprive the accused delegation of the possibility to counter the attack adequately, and eventually even compromise this delegation in the eyes of others. In the other example, one party in a discussion reacts very emotionally to an idea put forward by their opponents by calling them *a bunch of imbeciles*. In this case, Jones recommends to convey the speaker's total opposition to the proposal, albeit without rudeness, as "a literal translation would poison the atmosphere and perhaps jeopardize the entire meeting," and the speaker "may well be biting their lip" (p. 22) the moment s/he made such an impulsive utterance. As illustrated by these examples, the interpreter is expected to consider both the speaker's guardedness (or lack thereof) and the general impact that face-threatening remarks might have on the communicative event, the success of which is, to some extent, also his/her responsibility, as the interpreter acts as a professional whose role is "to help people come together and understand one another" (p. 21). At the same time, the interpreter is given much leeway to exercise his/her own good judgment to decide case-by-case whether or not mitigation should be employed.

If we look at a very recent didactic text authored by a Polish interpreter employed by SCIC, that is, Ligaj (2015), it contains an interesting section devoted to political incorrectness (which is certainly not identical with impoliteness, but politically incorrect remarks definitely tend to be perceived as impolite). Ligaj recommends that,

as a general rule, the interpreter should first and foremost avoid offending the audience and opt for "safe" terms. The main reason for this, however, is not so much the desire to foster good rapport among the participants, but rather to save one's own professional face: "an interpreter playing with controversial terminology may simply fail to obtain another assignment. Especially considering the fact that a potential scandal will more likely be blamed on the interpreter than on the speaker (often a high-ranking one)" (p. 351, translation mine). However, Ligaj also mentions one important exception to this rule: when the speaker persists in his offending behaviour over larger text fragments, mitigation is not recommended, as the audience would get a false impression of the speaker's real intentions to offend someone or his/her lack of sensitivity. The author views such exceptional cases as extremely rare in the EU context.

In another article published in the same Polish book, the interpreter is advised to switch into the third person and add his/her metapragmatic comments (e.g., *The speaker is throwing abuse at his opponent, using words such as…*) when, during a debate, the primary participants use "unparliamentary" language (Nadstoga 2015: 376). In this way, the interpreter will be able to distance him/herself from such behaviour.

What can be concluded from the above discussion of didactic literature on conference interpreting is that there is, at least, room to accommodate mitigation as the interpreter's justified choice made for the greater good of the primary participants' rapport. Note the contrast that these arguments stand in to the following one, representative of the views held by experts and trainers in liason interpreting: "The interpreter does not act as a censor. It is the responsibility of the other parties to choose to put things in a particular way and, if they make unfortunate or inappropriate choices, it is they who must be held responsible for any consequences of communicative breakdown" (Gentile at al. 1996: 49). Making the interpreter the scapegoat for blunders others committed is seen as unacceptable, also in political contexts. Furthermore, the authors encourage interpreters to strive at educating their clients as to the interpreter's role (in accordance with the conduit model) so as to make them realise that the interpreter should not be expected to act as a "filter," and more attention should be devoted to careful planning of original utterances.

As we have seen in Section 4.1.2, liason interpreting in practice often does not live up to the ideals enshrined in its codes of conduct and didactic literature, but the norms verbalised in them are clear enough for the interpreter to know that mitigation is proscribed. What we deal with here is probably a clash of what Shlesinger (1999: 66)

calls "expectancy norms" imposed externally and "performance norms based on the interpreter's own perception of her role and of what she ought to do to fulfill it." In conference interpreting, there is obviously no such clash: if the interpreter feels obliged to perform facework to mitigate impoliteness, s/he will easily find an external justification for this course of action in didactic literature, and no proscription in the very general ethical guidelines that do exist. In other words, although mitigation of (intended) impoliteness is not presented as the conference interpreter's duty, there is clearly no expectancy norm that would decisively prohibit it.

To establish whether mitigation actually functions as a performance norm among EP interpreters (or at least the Polish Language Unit), ethnographic research is needed to see how it is evaluated by members of the relevant community of practice. As the initial study by Lenglet (2015) reviewed in Section 4.3 shows that too abstract scenarios and too general answers are not the best solutions to compile an adequate questionnaire to explore interpreting norms, the empirical study described in Chapter 5 can serve as a good basis to extract examples of a variety of authentic mitigating and non-mitigating translational solutions that could be presented to participants for assessment. To be able to claim some explanatory power, this assessment (not necessarily elicited through a questionnaire, as interviews and/or focus groups appear to be a more promising research tool) would have to include a much bigger number of scenarios than used by Monacelli (2009) in her debriefing sessions (just two) and, certainly, be carried out with the participation of a representative group of interpreters.

6.2 Mitigation as censorship?

In translation studies, the notion of censorship has predominantly been raised in relation to literary translation (e.g., in the collective volumes by Billiani 2007a or Seruya and Moniz 2008), and it is most commonly associated with publishing (or, sometimes, decisions to refrain from publishing) translations of foreign works under various totalitarian regimes: in Nazi Germany, Francoist Spain, countries of the Communist bloc (including Poland), contemporary China, etc. As explained by Merkle (2010: 18), "[t]he subfield of censorship and translation explores extreme manifestations of the influence of ideology on translations." She adds that censorship can in fact leave its mark on various modes

of translation, including audiovisual translation and liason as well as conference interpreting (also Ben-Ari 2010: 159 mentions this, albeit in passing). Nevertheless, I have not managed to find a single publication that would be devoted specifically to censorship in interpreting, and the fact that the newly published *Routledge Encyclopedia of Interpreting Studies* (Pöchhacker 2015) does not include an entry on censorship is also very telling. Censorship is simply not among concepts that have been employed to any perceptible degree by the interpreting studies community by now.

In the most typical context of literary translation, censorship can be defined as "the manipulatory mechanisms used as an assault on original texts in order to alter their meaning and exclude the reader from the choices made in the Source Language" (Keratsa 2005) or "an act, often coercive and forceful, that – in various ways and under different guises – blocks, manipulates and controls the establishment of cross-cultural communication" (Billiani 2007b: 3). The pejorative wording present in both the above definitions shows very clearly that in democratic societies the phenomenon is usually viewed as repressive, unjustified and disrespectful both of the source text and the target language audience. On the other hand, censorship of some content (such as sexually explicit descriptions, brutal violence or expressions displaying contempt for certain vulnerable social groups) may also be perceived as a means of protecting others, especially children, from possible moral harm. As pointed out by Allan and Burridge (2006: 20), censorship is in fact omnipresent: "there exists no comprehensive society […] that does not censor some kinds of behaviour – by custom if not by law. The problem for any human society is how to constrain censorship in order to allow for maximum expression of personal freedoms without these subverting the common good."

Censorship is based on social taboos, and although these are prone to change over time and also from place to place, no society is completely free of them, including what we think of as modern, democratic, Western societies. As rightly noted by Chamizo Domínguez (2009: 429), "[p]erhaps it is old-fashioned to burn or stone to death violators of taboo, but it is also certain that one must observe the taboos of one's own society if one tries to aspire to social respectability or hold any post in any political party or trade union, for instance." The sheer number and diversity of entries in Holden's *Encyclopedia of Taboos* (2000) can give us an inkling as to the power of taboos, and, as the author explains, the most typical topics associated with taboos worldwide include "incest, cannibalism, food, sex, pollution and death" (p. ix). Various religions have sustained their own taboos over centuries,

and many of these have survived until today and do well, as over and over again we hear of extremists ready to punish transgressors with death. Political correctness can accurately be described as a form of censorship that thrives on modern-day taboos such as sexism, racism, xenophobia, discrimination of the disabled, etc., and while its proclaimed aim is to prevent offence to various vulnerable groups, some of the linguistic means to achieve it are often perceived as controversial and resulting in absurdities (cf., e.g., Chamizo Domínguez 2009).

Allan and Burridge (2006: 24) draw a distinction between censorship and censoring. For them, the former is institutionalised, that is, imposed by political authorities and implemented by censors, whereas the latter applies to individuals putting constraints on their own and others' tabooed behaviour. Certainly, if we respect this distinction, mitigation as performed by EP interpreters cannot be described as censorship; after all, we have seen clearly in the previous section that there are no official normative requirements that would impose on the interpreter the duty to purge the source texts they deal with of offensiveness. EP interpreters are not censors in any official capacity. Nevertheless, the majority of scholars use "censorship" in either of the two meanings, perhaps additionally specifying that it is either "institutional" or "individual" censorship that they mean (e.g., Billiani 2007b), so I will also opt for this term with its more universal meaning.

An important sub-type of censorship is the so-called self-censorship that refers to controlling one's own utterances (as well as non-verbal behaviours) so that they comply with certain standards of politeness, political correctness, tact, decency, etc. These standards can result from the individual's own beliefs of what is appropriate to say in a given context (which, inevitably, will be shaped by the relevant social norms and taboos) or from his/her decision to conform to officially imposed censorship to avoid trouble (e.g., an author writing a text to be published in a country that practices institutional censorship might, *a priori*, refrain from including anything that would later be likely to be challenged by a censor, or try to express subversive content implicitly so as to reach his/her readership in spite of censorship[3]). As pointed out by Ben-Ari (2010: 135), "since self-censorship involves an implicit understanding of when and what control should be exercised, it is subsequently more subtle [than formal censorship]: in fact, it is so

[3] An interesting example of the latter approach is given by Tomaszkiewicz (2002), who discusses how Pope John Paul II self-censored his homilies to be presented during his first visit to Poland in 1979, and consequently the Polish listeners had to "read between the lines" to extract the subversive meanings. At the same time, translating the texts for foreign journalists required making these meanings more explicit.

deeply rooted a mechanism that it has become a term in psychology, meaning the agent in the unconscious that is responsible for censorship." In the same vein, Tymoczko (2007: 256) argues that formal censorship often proves much easier to circumvent than self-censorship, as the latter is "more pervasive and ultimately more responsible for limitations in translation than official censorship itself. It is interesting to see how people stop themselves from translating what they profess they want to translate in the manner they profess to want to translate it." Although admitting that some self-censorship is unavoidable, Tymoczko apparently deplores "the tendency of translators to buy into dominant views and to stop themselves from textual production suggesting difference or dissent" (p. 257), advocating self-reflexivity as the major tool to counteract it.

For Santaemilia (2008: 221–222), self-censorship is "an individual ethical struggle between self and context," and it is common for translators to "censor themselves – either voluntarily or involuntarily – in order to produce rewritings that are 'acceptable' from both social and personal perspectives." Santaemilia also speaks of "self-censorships" in plural as specific operations on the objectionable source text that the translator considers necessary to "safeguard their professional status or their socio-personal environment" (p. 223), the latter goal being completely in line with the typical view held by proponents of institutional censorship, which is always implemented, supposedly, "for the common good." According to Santaemilia, self-censorship in translation becomes manifest in "all the imaginable forms of elimination, distortion, downgrading, misadjustment, infidelity, and so on" (p. 224), occurring even in times and places that are very far from authoritarian. The translator's self-censorship may vary in its visibility from downright deletion of longer fragments of text to which the translator objects (Santaemilia gives the example of an over 1000-word-long digression containing a satirical comparison of holy mass in Los Angeles and in Ireland that was omitted in the 2003 Spanish translation of *Angels* by M. Keyes) to much more subtle translational shifts. However minor they might be, they result from "the manipulatory mechanisms projected onto source texts in order to alter their meaning or their contents, pervert their identity or divert their ideological messages" (p. 245). Self-censorship may come in disguise of the translator's own ethical stance based on his/her religious beliefs, ideological position or even stylistic considerations (p. 246), whereas in fact it stems from "(unconfessed) feelings of uneasiness, embarrassment or disgust" (p. 244).

Under most circumstances, most people are not willing to offend others, polite or at least neutral behaviour being the option that seems

to be normally built-in during individuals' socialization as children. This is the view commonly held by the pragmaticians whose contributions were reviewed in Chapter 3, including those who focus on impoliteness in their work (e.g., Culpeper 2011, who argues that it is precisely its rarity and exceptional status that give impoliteness its psychological salience). Likewise, Allan and Burridge (2006: 2) point out that face concerns play a crucial role in everyday interaction, and "[b]y default we are polite, euphemistic, orthophemistic and inoffensive; and we censor our language use to eschew tabooed topics in pursuit of well-being for ourselves and for others." Therefore, we may safely assume that most interpreters generally behave in this manner while interacting with others on their own behalf. It may not be so easy to reject this attitude, on the spot, while speaking on someone else's behalf, especially considering that the interpreter only has but split seconds to overcome his/her deeply rooted habits and overwhelm the internal "gatekeeper" responsible for self-censorship. It is the very speed with which the process of simultaneous interpreting takes place that may effectively prevent any self-reflexivity the translator might engage in, as Tymoczko (2007) suggests, while working on a written text. Also the facts that the interpreter is immersed in the communicative context, at least partly visible to the primary participants, and employing his/her own voice and his/her mother tongue to utter the target language message may all create emotional constraints that are much more difficult to overcome than in the case of written translation. All in all, the interpreter is likely to bring the message s/he is transferring closer to his/her own politeness standards. Incidentally, similar politeness standards might generally be observed by the original speaker, who, in all probability, also needs to overrule an internal monitoring mechanism to be so rude in public: "People censor their behaviour so as to avoid giving offence, except when deliberately intending to offend" (Allan and Burridge 2006: 238).

Under political regimes that employ institutional censorship, this censorship is likely to shape preventive self-censorship practised by authors and speakers. This is the kind of self-censorship that Cook and Heilmann (2013) name "public," as opposed to "private." In the former, "individuals internalise some aspects of the public censor and then censor themselves," whereas the latter depends on "what an individual regards as permissible to express publicly" in the absence of any relevant official censor (p. 179). In parliaments, freedom of speech for deputies is guaranteed, but even under most democratic systems it is partly limited by others' freedom not to be offended, which is reflected in parliamentary rules of procedure, with more or less precise regulations on this topic. It has transpired from some examples discussed in

Chapter 5 that, in fact, the EP as an institution sometimes practises punitive censorship of impoliteness – after all, Nigel Farage had to pay a fine for his speech demolishing Van Rompuy, and Godfrey Bloom was expelled from the chamber for offending Martin Schulz by alluding, very transparently, to Germany's Nazi past. This kind of censorship might, to some degree, also influence (i.e., strengthen) the interpreter's self-censorship, by offering guidance to the effect that certain degree of impoliteness is clearly perceived as excessive by the institution as such.

Apart from being face-threatening for the majority of the audience, and sometimes downright impolite, the speeches in my corpus are also characterised by a very strong ideological stance that is far from the mainstream views that the EU interpreters routinely convey. This political unorthodoxy may also meet with some disapproval from the interpreter's "internal censor." The interpreter is likely to feel some allegiance towards the EU institutions that employ him/her; actually, as I mentioned in the previous section, DG SCIC requires that their interpreters show loyalty towards the European Commission by refraining from voicing Eurosceptic views in public (European Commission 2012b). Although it is not to be excluded that some interpreters share at least some of UKIP's opinions (they might, for example, personally doubt in Van Rompuy's charisma or Schulz's impartiality), they are unlikely to want the dissolution of the EU or their country's withdrawal from it, as this would clearly cost them their well-paid and prestigious job. Therefore, self-censorship might also partly result from the interpreter's lack of identification with the political stance of the speaker and inability to fully step into the role of someone expressing different political views. Ideologically motivated translation shifts are normally discussed within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g., Beaton 2007; Gumul 2011) and go beyond the scope of my work; nevertheless, I would like to mention them as, possibly, another factor to be taken into consideration.

I am also wondering if there is anything that might make Polish interpreters more susceptible to self-censorship than others. Although this is, admittedly, a far-fetched hypothesis, growing up in an Eastern bloc country with institutional censorship and a repressive state security system (which, we may assume, is the experience most of these interpreters share, with the exception of those too young for this and those who were brought up abroad) might also instill someone with the belief that certain topics are better not raised in public.[4] Clearly,

[4] I remember from my own childhood, for example, how information about the Soviet Union's real role in Poland's history was suppressed. I was about six years

vehement criticism of those in power (individuals holding state offices, the party invariably nominating them, or the sinister Soviet Union) was a strong taboo then, broken by most only in the presence of people who could be trusted to remain silent. Although long gone, this was a kind of system likely to limit the outspokenness of the citizens having the misfortune to live under it – and early influences tend to leave marks on one's linguistic behaviour that are hard to erase later on. As pointed out by Cook and Heilmann (2013: 188–189), there are "cases in which an individual gradually internalises public censorship," which may result in the individual continuing to censor his or her behaviour even though the external censor no longer exists.

Had the interpreter completely subscribed to the conduit model of interpreting, s/he would have been absolved of any ethical responsibility for the offence potentially caused by an accurate interpretation. Nevertheless, would this be enough to overcome the self-censorship? Let us remember that it operates both at the conscious and, perhaps even to a greater degree, at the unconscious level, and the latter might be difficult to control even if speaking in someone else's capacity. Considering that taboos are very deeply rooted and breaking them requires some conscious effort, the taboo against offending someone (and, perhaps, especially someone situated very high in the social hierarchy, a person holding a high official position) seems strong enough to take its toll even if the interpreter is generally trying to behave like "the speaker's ghost," to use Kopczyński's (1994) metaphor.

old, and drawing a picture of a soldier. I informed my grandfather he was Russian, because "they were our friends." He definitely looked uneasy and started to explain, but the conversation was quickly cut short by my mother, claiming it was not a good topic to discuss with children. It was not until many years later, and long after my grandfather's death, that I learned about his experiences as a conscripted soldier at the beginning of World War II. He was detained and disarmed by Soviet soldiers who attacked Poland from the east, and subsequently taken prisoner by German soldiers. Even as an old man, he still blamed the Soviet soldiers who had taken his gun away. Had he had his gun, he claimed, he would have been able to defend himself from the Germans. Moreover, in 1920 my grandfather was in Piłsudski's army, successfully fighting the Soviet invasion of Poland (he had lied about his age to get conscripted) – another tricky topic that he was not supposed to raise in front of his little granddaughter, let alone in public.

6.3 Mitigation as intervention?

Whereas the construal of mitigation as self-censorship emphasises the potentially unconscious nature of shifts introduced by the interpreter, the notion of "intervention" highlights the interpreter's involvement as an active agent, consciously making decisions to change some aspects of the source text, possibly for ideological reasons. The term "interventionist translation" mainly appears in the context of feminism and postcolonialism and their rejection of translation practices that conform with the dominant, oppressive systems (see, e.g., Brownlie 2010). Also in the field of interpreting studies, and especially as regards liason interpreting, "there are a number of academics who see intervention as political, and the interpreter's presence as gatekeeper will either further dominant power relations, or if 'empowered' may help safeguard the less powerful" (Katan 2011: 46).

Numerous scholars see the translator's intervention as something unavoidable and omnipresent; for example Maier (2007) calls the translator an "intervenient being," noting that both the translator affects the situation s/he is immersed in and this situation affects him/her, to the point of causing some physical ailments, not to mention acute psychological stress (Maier focuses on the situation of translators and interpreters in war-torn Iraq). Certainly, the answer whether or not intervention is something inherent in translation (perhaps a translation universal; see next section for an explanation of this notion) depends on how broadly the concept is defined. As pointed out by Ayyad and Pym (2012: 91), "shifts are everywhere, always, and some degree of intervention is probably also everywhere, at least to the degree that every translation is always an attempt to improve the source text by extending its understandability."

House (2008: 16) defines intervention in translation as "a manipulation of the source text beyond what is linguistically necessary," failing to acknowledge that specifically for interpreting, some manipulation might also be necessitated by cognitive constraints. She regards the issue from the ethical point of view and sees cultural adjustment to the expectations of the target language audience (if these evidently differ from those of the source language audience) as the only justified form of intervention, believing that the translator's interventions undertaken "for ideological, socio-political or ethical reasons, however well-meant they may be in any individual case, are generally risky undertakings" (p. 16) that translators should shun as a matter of course. Her stance is that the translator is never in a position

to know what is better for his/her audience and what this audience would actually prefer; moreover, the translator's "good" intentions may meet with different reactions, depending on who judges them.

Ayyad and Pym (2012) argue that the notion of intervention is ascribed too many different understandings by various translation scholars, for instance by the contributors to the collective volume entitled *Translation as Intervention* (Munday 2008). These are often very broad, which could certainly also be said about House's (2008) definition as quoted above. Some authors, such as Munday (2012), frequently employ the term to describe some translators' actions without defining it clearly – Munday seems to subscribe to House's (2008) definition, but he supplements it with "unconscious choices made by the translator" (Munday 2012: 20). As Pym (2011: 83) claims, "to become half-way meaningful, translator intervention should refer to sets of translation shifts […] that (1) are relatively patterned throughout a translation, (2) can be attributed to a conscious aim for which there is an external evidence, and (3) may be the result of individual or collective agency (so there may be more than the 'translator' involved)." The first condition is very straightforward and its fulfillment for mitigation of impoliteness in Eurosceptic discourse has been convincingly shown in Chapter 5, or so is my hope. As to the other two conditions, some more elaboration is offered by Ayyad and Pym (2012). Before I report on this, I would like to add that they also make another crucial point: to be regarded as a genuine intervention, a translational solution must possess a viable alternative that has clearly been rejected by the translator. This is true of practically every single case of mitigation as revealed in my research: the interpreter could always have opted for a more literal solution, if we assume that the original message was understood correctly.

As for the second condition, Ayyad and Pym (2012) explain that there must be some evidence of an agenda that motivates the translational choices, an identifiable reason urging the translator to act in a particular way. To use their example, when translating the so-called Roadmap, an initiative for peace in the Middle East, from English into Arabic, the translators chose solutions that can be back-translated as "(all) the Israeli outposts" (that should be dismantled). The Hebrew translations, in turn, do not make use of a definite article or a determiner, suggesting that some outposts may well remain in existence. This is most clearly in line with the political interests of either party.

In our case, the reason for intervention is perhaps not as well-defined as in the above example, but it might be simply the desire to reduce face-threat to all the parties concerned, including the interpreter

(which, actually, fits in very well with some perceptions of the interpreter's role as a peacemaker, facilitator of international dialogue, guardian of good rapport, etc.; see, e.g., Herbert 1956, discussed in Section 6.1). At the same time, we must also remember that in the specific setting of the EP, intervention in just one language version is not likely to improve the overall atmosphere of the debate all that much, as there are still 23 other versions to take into consideration, including the original. As regards my material, since the original is in English, a large part of the audience will not be using any interpretation at all. Additionally, in a great majority of cases, the target of a face attack will not be listening to the Polish interpretation. Consequently, perhaps it is the interpreter's face that may gain the most from his/her intervention.

The third condition, that is, agency, seems the most complex of the three. Collective agency, as Ayyad and Pym (2012) explain, refers to the fact that nowadays most translations cannot be perceived as the product of an individual translator, because they are shaped institutionally by internal guidelines, revisers, editors, etc. As for individual agency in the context of institutional translation, Schäffner et al. (2014: 494) point out that "agency means the extent to which translators can take their own decisions when they are constrained by institutional procedures and when the standardized 'voice' of the institution is the one to be heard." Certainly, an interpretation is different from a translation in that it always has one identifiable author; by its very ephemeral nature it cannot be corrected by others, authorised and so on. However, as argued, among others, by Henriksen (2007), interpreters from a given Language Unit can be seen as a very well-defined community of practice, in which certain translational solutions travel from one individual to another. They can hardly be traced back to a particular author, and in this sense we can talk about collective agency even in the case of our material. After Kinnunen and Koskinen (2010), Pym (2011: 175) defines agency as "willingness and ability to act," the aim of the action being to bring about change.

Kinnunen and Koskinen (2010) explain that the definition they give has been developed collectively during a panel discussion, and they elaborate on both the components. The former is "largely individualistic and psychological by nature"; it is also described as "linked to consciousness, reflectivity and intentionality, and […] not without some moral or ethical undertones" (p. 6). Ability, in turn, emphasises that agency is related to power, as even "[t]hose in subordinate positions may be able to convert their resources, however scant they may be, into some degree of control over their conditions" (p. 6). In the context of

my study, it might be concluded that the interpreters decide to take facework, which inevitably to some degree affects them personally and in their professional capacity, in their own hands, instead of leaving it to the discretion of the MEPs whose contributions they render. This would amount to an act of defiance towards the original speaker undertaken in the name of the greater good: saving the interpreter's face, and, perhaps, also the addressee's face.

As I have already stated many times before in this chapter, also in the case of intervention as defined by Pym (2011), more convincing evidence for both the interpreter's conscious causation and agency might be gained on the basis of research involving the participants' introspection, provided they were open enough to reveal their genuine motivations to a researcher.

More specifically, the notion of intervention in the context of interpreting has appeared in works of a few authors, among which Katan's discussion (2011) seems the most comprehensive. He describes several possible levels of intervention. At the strategic level, the interpreter intervenes to disambiguate and clarify an ill-formed source language message, which amounts to explicitation of what might otherwise be misunderstood or not understood at all by the audience. This level of intervention is definitely the least controversial. The next two levels, cultural and pragmatic, are so closely interlinked that it is difficult to find interventions that happen at one of them but not the other, Katan argues. As "[a]udiences intra-culturally have an out-of-awareness understanding for the type of discourse appropriate within a particular genre," the interpreter adjusts the message to the target language addressees' expectations in accordance with his/her assessment "to what extent normal communication style may be valued differently inter-culturally" (p. 40). This may involve giving the message culturally appropriate register or illocutionary force, or management of conversational maxim differences (e.g., the accepted way to reduce face threat in Japanese is to flout the Maxim of Quality, which might be treated as a lie by a Westerner if rendered closely). The interpreter may also sometimes supplement his/her interpretation by an explanation of what is probably meant by the interlocutor if a particular remark might be misunderstood due to cultural differences. Importantly, Katan notes that "[a]part from adapting or adding to the surface message, there are many cases of intervention that actually require withholding the message" (p. 43); for example, the frequent invocation to God in everyday talk of Muslims might seem offensive to Christians, many of whom believe that this should only be done in exceptional circumstances.

Next, there is the ideological level, at which the interpreter decides "not only to intervene on the text, but at a meta-level to intervene on the interpreting event itself," usually to ensure effective communication for all participants and to "redress the asymmetries in the communication process" (Katan 2011: 34). The interpreter might align with one of the parties, especially the one that is closer to him/her for linguistic, cultural or affective reasons (e.g., s/he may feel compelled to help a disadvantaged compatriot communicating with a representative of the authorities in the country both the interpreter and this person immigrated to). In some settings (e.g., business interpreting), the interpreter is actually often treated as a member of a particular team and expected to show loyalty to them and not necessarily to the other party. As we can see on the basis of Katan's discussion, ideological intervention is especially prone to appear in liason interpreting, as this is the mode covering many settings in which asymmetries of power between parties tend to be the greatest, and likely to be perceived as unjust and requiring more balance.

Finally, at the reflexive level, which Katan actually describes as a "meta-level," "the interpreter consciously decides how to consciously manipulate the original stance taken by a client to address the asymmetries of power" (p. 35). Therefore, the intervention as such might be made at the ideological level, but the important point here is that it is not something that just happens as a side-effect of a difficult, morally challenging setting, in the grey area between conscious decision-making and following one's "gut feeling," but a result of the interpreter's "activist' stance,"[5] his/her commitment to ensure, in the words of Inghilleri (2010: 154), "mutually effective dialogue oriented toward just outcomes." In practice, it might be impossible to determine whether an ideological intervention is reflexive or not, unless the interpreter openly reveals his/her agenda. Although there are some academics ready to endorse it (the most prominent among them being probably Mona Baker), this kind of intervention is very controversial as it goes blatantly against the bulk of existent codes of conduct and professional

[5] What I find particularly troubling about such approaches is that they tend to pass ethical judgments rather arbitrarily: it seems that, by default, the relatively powerless are always seen as "the good guys," the side whose cause the interpreter should espouse. It is not as simple as that, the powerless party may also clearly be a wrongdoer. An immigrant from Africa, for example, is not necessarily being oppressed by representatives of a nationalist Western state if the immigrant in question is a drug dealer interrogated by the police. If the interpreter is allowed to pick sides, then, why is s/he not be supposed to do this in accordance with his/her own moral assessment of each individual encounter, independently of the current power relations?

norms. Inghilleri (2012: 128) notes that "[r]eported manifestations of interpreter agency within present theorizations are viewed at best with caution, even where they have involved undeniably morally and ethically sound judgments."

In the very title of her article published in 2013, Baker calls translation "an alternative space for political action," and she further explains that she sees translation in general (including interpreting) as "not an innocent act of disinterested mediation, but an important means of constructing identities and configuring the shape of any encounter" (Baker 2013: 24). According to Baker, the vision of translators and interpreters as neutral and apolitical figures that have no impact on encounters they mediate is a mere fiction. In an interview with Andrew Chesterman (2008), she explains her views on intervention perhaps the most clearly, and as they are very unorthodox indeed, I would like to quote the relevant fragment in full:

> Sometimes the most ethical thing to do […] is not to speak on behalf of another at all – it depends on who this 'other' is and what they want you to say on their behalf; or what kind of 'narrative' a source text elaborates and whether you want to give that narrative currency and legitimacy in a different environment; or whether even if you agree with what the speaker or text says, in your judgment it would be unproductive to repeat it as is, because it would be misunderstood in the target context, or would cause unnecessary hurt and offence, or could be unfairly used against one party in the interaction, etc. All this is a form of intervention, one that any responsible translator will want to make use of at some point in their career. Intervention can also mean proceeding with the mediation, and being as 'faithful' as possible in 'speaking on behalf of another,' but at the same time distancing yourself from their ideas, even challenging them directly. (Baker and Chesterman 2008: 15–16)

When asked, in relation to this, how she envisages the relationship between translators and their clients, Baker replies that it should be based on mutual respect and, in principle, one should not work for an individual or an institution one does not respect and trust. If forced to do so by the circumstances, the translator/interpreter is justified in actively undermining the work of his/her client as a means of resistance. When working for a trusted client, in turn, the ethical thing to do for the translator is to inform this client of any intervention deemed necessary. In addition, the fact that a particular party is paying the translator does not mean that s/he owes his/her exclusive loyalty to this party, as "translators […] should not behave like mercenaries" (p. 17).

Although Mona Baker is probably the most outspoken on such issues, there also other scholars basically sharing her views, for example Moira Inghilleri (2012), who describes the ethics of impartiality as something interpreters hide behind, enabling them "to remain morally blameless, without responsibility for the outcome of the interaction, regardless of whether it results in an individual being wrongly imprisoned, or set free, deported or granted asylum, tortured or even killed" (p. 50).

If we look at the mitigation as revealed in my material in the light of Katan's (2011) description, the interpreters' interventions could be construed as either pragmatic or ideological, depending whether we see the impoliteness present in the original as a phenomenon situated purely in the personal dimension or choose to endow it with political meaning, as a consciously selected strategy to oppose the dominant ideology. If we choose the former level, it strikes me that the "cultural filter" component mentioned as an almost obligatory one by Katan is not present here: after all, at the end of Chapter 3 I have shown that a cultural adjustment of parliamentary impoliteness when transferring the message from English into Polish (amounting to attenuation) does not seem necessary, the Polish parliamentary discourse being at least equally face-threatening (if not more) for speakers' political opponents as its British counterpart. Again, this would point to the conclusion that these pragmatic interventions are, first and foremost, meant to save the interpreter's face rather than anyone else's.

If, however, the Polish interpreters' mitigation is to be seen as ideological, we have to consider the power relations between the interlocutors. Obviously, neither of the parties is nearly as disadvantaged and powerless as some interlocutors in liason settings. At the same time, there is a visible power imbalance, as we witness representatives of a minority opposition group verbally attacking, typically, the highest EU officials: Presidents of the Commission, Council and Parliament, Commissioners, etc. Looking at this situation through Mona Baker's paradigm, we would see speakers with relatively little power, standing for a minority discourse, trying to undermine the dominant discourse – an endeavour in which, probably, they should be assisted by interpreters giving them adequate voice in the other language versions. Instead, the interpreters side with the powerful, dominant discourse by undertaking interventions to save the face of individuals (and institutions) resisted by the speakers. This is a stance that is unlikely to be judged favourably, from an ethical perspective, by Mona Baker and her proponents. Actually, my findings might be seen as in line with Beaton's (2007), who repeatedly talks about EP interpreters strengthening "EU institutional hegemony" and suppressing the emergence of "interpreter axiology" –

although Beaton herself is not using the concept of intervention in her thesis in any sense different from "a parliamentary speech."

The dilemma whether we in fact deal, in Katan's (2011) terms, with pragmatic or ideological intervention might be resolved by broadening the scope of the material under analysis to include also sufficiently many instances of impoliteness and face threat produced by high EU officials and their political supporters towards minority political groups in the Parliament. Would they also be mitigated by the same community of practice (i.e., the Polish Language Unit) to a comparable degree? A positive answer to this question would mean that the interpreters do not focus on the power relations between the interlocutors, but rather on the unpleasant pragmatic effect, and that their interventions are, to all purposes, pragmatic rather than ideological. If, however, the interpreters would be shown as more willing to offend representatives of the opposition on behalf of the powerful than the other way round, this would strongly suggest that they indeed subscribe to the dominant ideology in the Parliament (leaving unanswered a possible further question about the conscious or unconscious nature of such allegiance).

6.4 Mitigation as equalising?

This is probably the simplest of all the explanations considered here, and one that would be enticingly convenient to accept, as it largely bypasses the difficult ethical dilemmas as well as the question whether or not impoliteness is mitigated consciously or unconsciously.

The concept of translation universals reflects the conviction, going back at least to 1980s, that all translated texts may share some special features that distinguish them from non-translated texts (cf., e.g., Chesterman 2011). In her programmatic article encouraging scholars to search for such features by means of corpus linguistic tools, Baker (1993: 243) succinctly defines translation universals as "universal features of translation, that is features which typically occur in translated texts rather than original utterances and which are not the result of interference from specific language systems." As the term "universals" sounds very categorical and implies that the features under consideration should occur consistently in each and every translation of every possible type, some scholars (e.g., Toury 2012) prefer to talk about laws instead, as "this notion has the possibility of *exceptions* built into it" (Toury 2004: 29, original emphasis). According to Chesterman

(2011), "the term 'universal' was perhaps an unfortunate choice in the first place," because "potential translation universals are often formulated as 'tendencies'" (p. 178). He also adds that some critics regard translation universals simply as characteristic features of poor translations. As rightly pointed out by Pym (2007), in works of most "universalists" it is not completely clear whether translation universals should also apply to interpreting, or, alternatively, interpretations are supposed to have their own distinctive features, different from written translations.

To say that something we have revealed in a corpus of whatever size and type is a translation universal amounts, in fact, to claiming that "the observed regularities are there *because* it is translation" (Toury 2004: 17, original emphasis). As explained by Chesterman (2011), the postulated generalisations about typical relations that hold between a translation and its source text include, for instance, explicitation, lengthening and interference. Of these three, it seems that empirical research has rendered the most support for explicitation (also in interpreting; see, e.g., Gumul 2015), whereas lengthening has been shown to depend more on the differences between the specific source and target languages than on the status of a text as an original or a translation. As for postulated typical differences between translated and non-translated texts in the same language (representing the same genre), for example some evidence has been found for simplification manifest in lower lexical density (relation of content words to function words) and lexical variety (type/token ratio) as well as a higher prevalence of high frequency items in translations as compared to non-translations (see, e.g., Laviosa 2002).

Coming to the specific universal I would like to focus on, in her another well-known article on translation universals, Baker (1996: 184) speaks of "leveling," which consists in "the tendency of translated text to gravitate towards the centre of a continuum," demonstrated in a relatively small comparable corpus of newspaper texts (containing translations and non-translations in English). Although this paper has given it much more currency among translation studies community, actually the concept, under a different name of "equalizing," goes back to Miriam Shlesinger's MA thesis (1989a) that Baker refers to, where it is formulated on the basis of an analysis of a bilingual corpus of interpretations from Hebrew A into English B and the other way round (a small one, consisting of four texts and their interpretations by professionals under real conference conditions). This thesis has never been published, but, conveniently, Pym (2007) summarises it in sufficient detail and discusses the results. Using a neat mathematical

metaphor, he talks about "the geometry of equalizing" that causes translations to have, at the same time, more X and more –X (p. 175). According to him, this is a phenomenon that many researchers tend to ignore, being so eager to claim just that translations have more X.

Shlesinger (1989a) focuses on the position of the source texts and their corresponding interpretations on what she calls "oral-literate continuum," that is, the degree to which texts (actually, here conference contributions delivered orally) possess characteristics typical of spoken or written discourse. Two of the originals are markedly more "oral," and the other two – more "literate," which becomes manifest, inter alia, in the oral texts displaying a lower degree of previous planning and more emotional involvement. The latter is particularly interesting in the context of my research, and depends on emphasising the interpersonal relations among participants as well as on a number of non-verbal features, such as prosody indicating points where decisions are being made. The hypothesis Shlesineger puts to test is that texts undergoing interpreting move towards the centre of the continuum, that is, oral texts become more literate, and literate texts become more oral. The results are inconclusive, as some conflicting tendencies are revealed, depending on the particular feature under consideration. It is, above all, literate texts that move towards the oral end of the continuum, but not necessarily the other way round. As for involvement, however, the oral texts do become more literate, that is, less involved, but the literate texts fail to become either more or less oral, namely, their degree of involvement does not change in any consistent way. In any case, the spectrum of involvement is reduced in the interpretations as compared with the source texts, that is, there is a tendency to reduce involvement if it becomes very marked.

Unfortunately, as we can see from the description above, involvement itself is defined very broadly, including both some features that may bear much resemblance to what I focus on (markers of interpersonal relations) and some that go beyond the scope of my analysis, that is, prosody. Moreover, interpersonal relations may be either enhanced or challenged, and, as far as it can be concluded from Pym's (2007) summary, this distinction is not taken into consideration in Shlesinger's study. However, the concept of equalising offers some obvious potential for extrapolation as to facework, namely to form the hypothesis that both face threat and face enhancement will tend to undergo reduction in interpreting. This would, in some sense, appear to be a "just" solution over larger and diverse stretches of discourse such as a parliamentary debate – although a participant is likely to forfeit some "upload" for his/her face, at the same time, s/he is equally likely to have his/her face

saved when someone launches an attack against it. This, theoretically, should make the final balance close to the initial one, always assuming that interpreters are fairly consistent in their equalising moves. The question remains whether primary participants are aware of the possible equalising effect of interpreting, and whether speakers sometimes try to counteract it by making the illocutionary force stronger than in unmediated discourse so that some of their pragmatic intent does get through.

In relation to politeness phenomena in interpreting, equalising was postulated by Knapp-Potthoff (2005) to explain the reduction of politeness strategies in her experimental material, as reported in Section 4.1.1. Testing this hypothesis on Polish interpretations of EP parliamentary discourse seems relatively easy: it would require broadening the material under analysis to include a comparable number of instances of face-enhancement produced in the source texts in similar circumstances. What comes to mind, for example, would be to investigate the whole debates referring to someone's election for a particular office (there are three speeches extracted from such debates undergoing detailed analysis in Chapter 5, referring to Herman Van Rompuy, Donald Tusk and Martin Schulz) to see whether there are any parallels between what happens in Polish interpretations of Farage's face attacks and their pragmatic opposites, that is, congratulations, expressions of appreciation and good wishes extended by other speakers.

As for possible reasons for the emergence of the equalising universal, "translators' desire to avoid risks: 'playing safe'" (Chesterman 2011: 177) could be proposed. At the same time, if the phenomenon of mitigating impoliteness is in fact due to a translation universal, it appears to preclude any need to pass ethical judgments on it. After all, if something happens as an inherent by-product of the translation process, often beyond the translator's conscious control, the feasibility of fighting it is highly dubious (even though it still might be seen as undesirable).

The main problem with postulating equalising as an adequate description for concurrent reduction of both politeness and impoliteness features in the target text is that it is far from certain whether we in fact can treat politeness and impoliteness as anything approaching balanced opposites, X and –X. On the contrary, a claim to that effect would probably entail a gross oversimplification. Culpeper (2011), among others, talks about much greater conspicuousness, psychological salience, of impoliteness as compared with politeness. Likewise, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2013: 78) argues that "[n]egative emotions are […] less controllable and potentially more revealing with regard to the mental

state and stance expression than positive emotions." Therefore, if we imagine a politeness continuum similar to the one Shlesinger (1989a) proposes for literateness, bringing a text from the vicinity of the impoliteness extreme closer to the centre by the interpreter is probably going to influence its perlocution much stronger than doing the same to a text from the vicinity of the politeness extreme.

7. Final conclusions: Possible avenues for future research

In Chapter 5, I have answered the main research question of this study and I now have good reasons to argue that what is most likely to happen to face attacks launched by British Eurosceptics in the European Parliament when they get interpreted into Polish is that their offensiveness will be reduced. At the same time, the shifts in facework introduced by Polish interpreters seem to be quite random: there is no discernible pattern that would let us predict which FTAs will be attenuated (and in what way) and which will be transferred as they are, or even, occasionally, aggravated. In other words, the original speaker will most probably be prevented from damaging the face of his target to the extent s/he has envisaged, but it is not an effect that can be relied on in each and every case.

As a matter of fact, the whole Chapter 6 is an attempt to wind up the research project as described in Chapter 5 with plausible explanations of the phenomenon of mitigation, which emerged from my research results as a set of strategies to attenuate FTAs and, in particular, the more grave ones amounting to impoliteness. None of these explanatory hypotheses has been selected as the most convincing one, each has met with some reservations and suggestions for validation by means of triangulating the results presented herein with future research using broader sets of data and/or other research tools.

Overall, although this is something of a cliché, I feel obliged to say that the study has generated more questions than it has managed to answer. Therefore, the most fitting thing to do at this point is to recapitulate these questions and chart possible paths for future research, at least some of which I do intend to follow personally in the foreseeable future. Many of them require resources or access to informants that I do not possess at the moment, so some choices will

have to be made subject to their availability rather than on the basis of the interest level of each question as such. Certainly, I will be happy and honoured if some of these paths are deemed interesting enough by other scholars who would like to undertake similar research.

First, there is still a lot of research potential left in the corpus that I already have at my disposal. Especially for the needs of the quantitative analyses, I have treated the interpretations as a fairly homogeneous product of a tightly-knitted community of practice. This might come close to the user's perspective, as clients are likely to see interpreting as a service that should be delivered consistently, without much variation as to the overall quality or to the strategies that are employed to render speakers' meaning. This is not to say, however, that listeners in the EP (or anywhere else, for that matter) cannot have their own preferences and do not notice any differences between individual interpreters – some of them certainly do, as is shown, for this very setting, by Kent's research (2009; 2014). My detailed qualitative analysis of five interpretations delivered by five different interpreters reveals marked differences that certainly go beyond the stylistic variety exhibited by the source texts. The study by Kajzer-Wietrzny (2012; 2013) illustrates the usefulness of stylometry for interpreting research, and indeed it seems highly interesting whether or not interpreters tend to have their individual approach as regards FTAs, some of them being more inclined to mitigate face attacks than others. The prerequisite for performing the kind of analysis that could shed some light on this is, of course, to unequivocally ascribe the target texts in the corpus to individual interpreters. As I stated before, I have been able to determine "by ear" for the five interpretations undergoing the qualitative analysis that they are delivered by different individuals (as their voices are distinctive enough). However, specialist voice recognition software would be necessary to attribute authorship of interpretations throughout the whole corpus.

Beyond individual differences, we might inquire about potential discrepancies in how male and female interpreters approach FTAs. The existence of certain gender differences in this regard is suggested by the results obtained by Łyda et al. (2010). Although these authors themselves call the relationship between gender and language a "slippery" one as the relevant findings of existent research (not related to translation of any kind) are disconcertingly inconsistent (p. 193), there is some linguistic research suggesting that women tend to employ less verbal aggression and more conciliatory, rapport-enhancing moves in their talk then men (e.g., Tannen 1990, one of very few linguistic works that became widely acclaimed bestsellers). It might therefore be hypothesised

that these tendencies will also show in interpretations and that female interpreters rendering male politicians' impoliteness might attenuate it to a greater degree than their male colleagues – this was actually suggested to me by a colleague as a reaction to my presentation of some initial results of this research at a conference. Nevertheless, I would not venture to put forward such a hypothesis on the basis of either my qualitative analysis covering outputs of three female and two male interpreters or a very cursory comparison of interpretations by men and women while preparing the transcripts. It seems to me, rather, that idiosyncrasies might play a more significant role. A search for potential gender-based differences would certainly pose less difficulties than one for idiosyncrasies, though, as in this case the interpretations could easily be divided into two groups "by ear."

There are also many linguistic features undoubtedly influencing facework that I have not explored in much detail so far but merely mentioned at some points throughout the qualitative analysis, some of which might possibly undergo quantitative analysis as well. In particular, I think about various markers of stance, neatly defined by Hyland (1999: 101) as "the ways the writers project themselves into their texts to communicate their integrity, credibility, involvement, and a relationship to their subject matter and their readers." Certainly, this definition could easily refer to spoken language, too, if we just substitute the word *writers* by *speakers* and *readers* by *addressees*. Hyland divides stance into three components: affect (expressions of personal attitude towards the content of the message), relation (anything that is connected with interpersonal relationships between the speaker and the addressee) and evidentiality (the speaker's commitment to the reliability and strength of the message). While facework is most obviously present in the second component, and this is also the component taken into consideration in my quantitative analyses, the other two components might also play a significant role. In Chapter 5, I have repeatedly mentioned downtoners and upgraders, whose presence might decrease or increase the illocutionary force of a statement. They are in fact cumbersome to analyse; we would have to start any detailed analysis by trying to establish exactly which linguistic forms do which, as in many cases this is far from obvious. Except for downtoners and upgraders, evidentiality is often expressed by various modal verbs. Stance is a very complex issue to analyse if we attempted to account for all the components at once, but it is also possible, certainly, to focus on just one of them at a time, as shown by the experimental study by Warchał and Łyda (2009), exploring evidentiality in consecutive interpreting. The results of their study suggest that this aspect of meaning might be

largely neglected by interpreters, as the markers are often omitted or rendered with markers in the target language whose value could hardly be described as equivalent.

Certainly, there also numerous features whose relation to facework might not be very direct and, consequently, also not strikingly obvious. One that comes to mind as a good candidate for closer scrutiny is metaphor. As pointed out by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2013: 87), metaphor is among the figures of thought which "are a useful methodological tool to uncover speaker's attitudes both towards the events portrayed in the utterances and towards the characters responsible for them." Indeed, most of the metaphors present in our corpus are negatively charged, which is epitomised in the damp rag metaphor. Except for occasional creative metaphors, there are also numerous conventional ones, like "EU is the Titanic." It would definitely be interesting to investigate what happens to metaphors in interpretations, possibly using an analytic method close to the one employed by Spinolo and Garwood (2010). Are metaphors rendered literally? Are they "killed," that is, explained using non-metaphorical language? Are they replaced by other metaphors in Polish? Are they omitted? On the basis of the analyses conducted so far, it can easily be hypothesised that all four options come into play; however, both their relative frequency and the particular solutions that are employed seem worth a detailed investigation.

Definitely, I have not yet exhausted all the possibilities that the corpus in its present form offers, but there are also a number of paths that I would not venture to take, promising as they are – for instance, any investigations of intonation patterns similar to Nafá Waasaf (2007) seem clearly beyond the scope of my scholarly skills.

Throughout Chapter 6, I repeatedly mentioned the potential of ethnographic methods, such as interviews or focus groups, which, in the context of EU institutions, has clearly been confirmed by Koskinen (2008) for written translation as well as Kent (2009; 2014) and Duflou (2014) for interpreting. This is the kind of research that, needless to say, requires extensive cooperation from members of the relevant community of practice. It seems that such cooperation might be easier to procure for researchers who are either active or at least former members of the community themselves, like Veerle Duflou and Kaisa Koskinen, respectively. However, the example of Stephanie J. Kent, a complete outsider (a sign language interpreter and researcher from the US) gives me some hope that ethnographic research might not be a domain reserved exclusively for insiders. Moreover, her research also shows that it might be possible to obtain data not only from interpreters (the idea

constantly recurring in Chapter 6, which probably needs no further elaboration here), but also from some users of their services. Gauging expectations of MEPs (and, possibly, other participants of plenary debates) in their capacities as, interchangeably, speakers or addressees, on the basis of several examples from my corpus, would surely give us much food for thought. After all, in the words of Garzone (2015: 282), "it appears evident that service users' beliefs about what a good interpretation ought to be like will contribute to shaping interpreters' professional norms." Asking users for an evaluation on the basis of concrete examples might, in turn, be more fruitful than inquiring about the importance they attach to certain largely abstract quality criteria (as has been done many times with various user groups, starting with Bühler's seminal study published in 1986). Whether British Eurosceptic MEPs themselves would be willing to offer their assistance in such a research project seems doubtful in the light of their prevalent attitude to interpreting as a dispensable and rather cumbersome service, as pictured in Section 5.1.

Although extending the corpus I have compiled for the needs of this book would definitely require a lot of my time and effort (or, alternatively, considerably less of both plus adequate funds to hire help), this prospect does not completely discourage me from considering some research questions that would entail some more transcription work first.

Another idea that I have already introduced in Chapter 5 is to compare facework in interpretations into a number of EU languages to see whether different Language Units, as separate communities of practice, favour different strategies to deal with FTAs. I have done this, on a very small scale, with just one speech in 5.2, supplementing the scrutiny of the Polish interpretation with a similarly detailed qualitative analysis of the German version and some brief observations by Munday (2012) on a few other language versions. Of course, in order to be able to make any generalisations, a much larger subcorpus of German (or possibly also other) interpretations would be necessary. Creating additional subcorpora mirroring the whole or even a substantial part of the present Polish data would be a labour-intensive endeavour. The analysis of such subcorpora, obviously, largely relies on the researcher's linguistic skills, as using back-translations prepared by others would entail the risk of missing some important details. Personally, I would be able to investigate German interpretations fairly thoroughly, but I would certainly need assistance of a native speaker of German to proofread the transcripts, at the very least. Therefore, I believe that this is a plan that might succeed in the future if there are, perhaps, other scholars with the knowledge of EU languages that I do not master

who would like to collaborate with me on such a project. I am taking this opportunity to invite them to contact me if they are interested in discussing this matter, and, possibly, joining efforts to gain a broader research perspective.

Finally, the present corpus might also be extended by adding more English source texts and their interpretations into Polish to see, firstly, whether impoliteness produced by other, relatively more powerful participants is mitigated to a similar degree as this by Eurosceptics. Validating this hypothesis would indicate that the Polish interpreters are guided primarily by pragmatic concerns rather than by their possible alignment with the dominant ideology in the EP. Another suggestion I have already made is to look at politeness strategies in other speeches within the same debates in search of possible equalising effects of interpreting.

The European Parliament has proven such a promising setting for interpreting research that I am confident even now that I will return to it soon in further publications, endeavouring to build upon the research project discussed here and to develop the knowledge of pragmatics that I have acquired throughout its preparation and realisation.

Appendix: Extracts from the corpus containing source texts and their interpretations into Polish

Speaker: Nigel Farage **Debate: Preparation of the European Council to be held on 10 and 11 December 2009 (25.11.2009)** **Duration: 05 min 05 sec**	
Well, good morning everybody. You are all very downbeat this morning. I thought this was gonna be a big, proud moment! It has taken you eight and a half years of bullying, of lying, of ignoring democratic referendums. Eight and a half years it has taken you to get this treaty through, and on first December you will have it.	Witam wszystkich. @ Wszyscy są dosyć przygnębieni, a myślałem, że to będzie moment wielkiej dumy. Bo osiem i pół lat trwało kłamstwa, ignorowanie wyników demokratycznych referendum. Osiem i pół lat, żeby przepchać ten traktat. Pierwszego grudnia to się w końcu stanie.
And of course, the architect of all of this, Giscard, wanted, from this constitutional treaty, for the European Union to have a big, global voice, but I am afraid the leaders have suffered from a collective loss of nerve. They've decided that they want their faces to be up on the global stage, not somebody from the European Union, and so we have got appointed a couple of political pygmies.	Oczywiście archiktem architekt tego wszystkiego Giscard chcą, aby ten traktat konstytucyjny dla Unii Europejskiej miał wymowę globalną. Niestety liderzy chyba stracili @ cierpliwości i stwierdzili, że oni chcą, żeby ich twarze, ich oblicze było widać na globalnej scenie. Nie kogoś z Unii Europejskiej, dlatego też Pigmeje polityczni zostali mianowani na to stanowisko.
The Kissinger question of who to call in Europe hasn't really been answered, has it? I guess the answer can only be Mr Barroso, because he is the only one that anybody in the world has ever heard of and is probably the big winner out of these posts. No wonder, Sir, you look so happy this morning.	Nie odpowiedziano na pytanie Kissingera, do kogo zwrócić się do Europy. Chyba jedyna odpowiedź brzmi: do pana Barroso, bo tylko o nim słyszano na całym świecie. On prawdopodobnie jest większym wygranym z tego rozdania, więc nic dziwnego, że jest pan tak dzisiaj zadowolony.

And we have a new president of Europe, Herman Van Rompuy. Doesn't exactly trip off the tongue, does it? Um I cannot see him stopping the traffic in Beijing or Washington; I doubt anybody in Brussels would even recognise who he is. And yet he is gonna be paid a salary that is bigger than Obama's, which tells you all you need to know about this European political class and how they look after themselves.	Mamy nowego przewodniczącego Europy, Herman Van Rompuy. Trochę @ to chyba taki przypadek. Nie widzę, żeby @ wiadomość o tym była na pierwszych stronach gazet w Pekinie czy Waszyngtonie. Nawet w Brukseli nie do końca wszyscy wiedzą, kto kim on jest. Ale on będzie pobierał pensję większą niż prezydent Obama. I to chyba wystarczy nam jeżeli chodzi o wiedzę na temat europejskiej klasy politycznej.
But at least he is an elected politician, unlike Baroness Cathy Ashton, who really is the true representation of the modern-day political class. In some ways she is ideal, is she? She's never had a proper job, and she's never been elected to anything in her life. So I guess she is perfect for this European Union.	Ale jest on politykiem, którego wybrano, nie tak jak baronessa Cathy Ashton, który jest prawdziwą reprezentacją nowoczesnej klasy politycznej. Jest idealna pod pewnymi względami, prawda? Nigdy nie miała właściwej pracy, prawdziwej pracy i nigdy nie została wybrana na żadne stanowisko, więc świetnie nadaje się na to stanowisko.
She's never been elected to anything and no one knows who she is! Even the Prime Minister was talking about Baroness 'Ashdown' as opposed to Ashton. I mean, no one has ever heard of her. She is even less well-known than Herman Van Rompuy! I mean, that takes some doing, doesn't it?	Nigdy nie wybrano jej na żadne stanowisko, nikt nie wie, kim ona jest, nawet premier mówił o @ Baroness Ashdown, a nie Ashton. Nikt o niej nigdy nie słyszał. Jest mniej znana nawet niż Herman Van Rompuy.
She's risen without trace. She is part of this post-democratic age. She married well: she married an adviser, and friend and supporter of Tony Blair and got put in the House of Lords. When she was in the House of Lords, she was given one big job, and that job was to get the Lisbon Treaty through the House of Lords and to do so pretending that it was entirely different to the EU Constitution. So she's good at keeping a straight face, and she vigorously crushed any attempt in the House of Lords for the British people to have a referendum.	@ Ona jest częścią ery postdemokratycznej. Dobrze wyszła za mąż @ za przyjaciela i @ fana Tony'ego Blaira i trafiła do Izby Lordów. Wtedy miała jedno główne zadanie: przepchnąć traktat lizboński przez Izbę Lordów. Udając, @ że to jest zupełnie coś innego niż konstytucja europejska, więc udało jej się jakoś zachować twarz pokerzysty. Nie pozwoliła, aby zorganizowano referendum w Wielkiej Brytanii.
So here she is: never stood for public office, never had a proper job, and here she gets one of the top jobs in the Union. Her appointment is an embarrassment for Britain.	Więc oto Cathy Ashton: nigdy nie miała prawdziwej pracy, a tu nagle trafia na najwyższe stanowisko w Unii Europejskiej. To na pewno wielki wstyd dla Wielkiej Brytanii, że ją nominowano.

Well, at least I've been elected, Sir, unlike her! She's not been elected, and the people do not have the power to remove her.	Ja przynajmniej zostałem wybrany, jej nikt nie wybrał i nie można jej usunąć ze stanowiska.
But just hear the next bit. There's something rather more serious than that. Cathy Ashton was an active member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. In fact, she was the treasurer of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament during a period of time when CND took very large donations and refused to reveal the source. What is known is that these donations were obtained by a man called Will Howard, who was a member of the Communist Party in Great Britain. Will Baroness Ashton deny that, while she was treasurer, she took funds from organizations who were opposed to Western-style capitalism and democracy? That question must be asked.	I proszę posłuchać następnego następnego komentarza. Cathy Ashton było aktywną członkinią Kampanii na rzecz Rozbrojenia Nuklearnego. Ona była skarbnikiem w tej Kampanii podczas pewnego czasu kiedy CND --- tu CND odebrała bardzo wysokie darowizny z nieznanego źródła. Wiadomo, że pochodzą one od Willa Howarda, który był członkiem Partii Komunistycznej Wielkiej Brytanii. Czy baronessa Ashton zaprzeczy, że kiedy była skarbniczką przyjęła fundusze od organizacji, które przeciwstawiały się kapitalizmowie w stylu zachodnim i demokracji? Trzeba zadać jej to pytanie.
And are we really happy that somebody who will be in charge of our overseas security policy was an activist a few years ago in an outfit like CND? If we really think that, frankly, we need our bumps felt!	Czy jesteśmy naprawdę zadowoleni z tego, że ktoś, kto będzie odpowiedział za naszą @ politykę bezpieczeństwa za @ kilka lat temu znajdował się właśnie w takiej sytuacji.
I don't think she is a fit and proper person to do this job. She has no experience and she must answer those questions. Did she take money from enemies of the West? That question must be answered.	Nie sądzę, żeby ona była odpowiednią osobą na te stanowisko. Nie ma @ doświadczenia. Chyba że odpowie na to pytanie: czy pobierała fundusze od wrogów zachodów. Na to pytanie musi odpowiedzieć.
Well, we have our two pygmies. We'll have the bland leading the bland, but I am not celebrating because they will press on with political union and, whilst our leaders may have saved face for the moment for themselves on the international stage, they've all betrayed their national democracies. The European state is here. We're about to get an avalanche of new laws because of this Lisbon Treaty and there is no question in my mind that there has to be a full, free, fair referendum in the United Kingdom to decide whether we stay part of this Union or not. I hope and pray that we vote to leave, but either way the people simply must be asked.	Więc mamy dwóch Pigmejów. Więc @ będzie @ taki @ będzie takie mdłe przywództwo. Nasi liderzy może na razie jakoś uratowali się przed kompro- kompromitacją na scenie międzynarodowej. Wszyscy zdradzili swoją demokrację międzynarodową. Państwa europejskie istnieją, pojawi się cały nawał nowych praw, nowych ustaw ze względu na traktat lizboński i na pewno trzeba będzie zorganizować sprawiedliwe i uczciwe referendum w Wielkiej Brytanii dotyczące tego, czy zostaniemy w Unii, czy nie. Mam nadzieję, że wyjdziemy z Unii, ale tak czy inaczej ludzi po prostu trzeba zapytać. Dziękuję.

Speaker: Nigel Farage **Debate: Question Hour with the President of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker (27.09.2011)** **Duration: 01 min 14 sec**	
Mr Juncker, as President of the Eurogroup, your detachment from reality is almost unbelievable. I mean you're behaving like a political ostrich, pretending none of it's happening. You just told us a few moments ago that Greece fundamentally has no problems, because she's a member of the eurozone. I mean, it's just deluded. You wrote recently that the euro's thirteen-year history is a success story. Well, it's a very odd kind of success, isn't it, and actually saying that frankly beggars belief and I think hardly makes you credible.	Panie Juncker, jako przewodniczący Eurogrupy jest pan wręcz nieprawdopodobnie oderwany od rzeczywistości. Udaje pan, że nic się nie stało. Kilka minut temu powiedział pan, że Grecja nie ma żadnych problemów właściwie, ponieważ jest członkiem strefy euro. No, to jest coś niesamowitego! Ostatnio napisał pan, że trzynastoletnia historia euro to historia sukcesu. To bardzo dziwny sukces. I naprawdę prosz- uważa pan, że my w to uwierzymy? To jes- jest pan zupełnie niewiarygodny.
I think it's about time that you and others in this room woke up to the fact that we are inflicting misery on millions of people through unemployment, through poverty, through a loss of democracy, and that it's an error to try and keep countries trapped inside the euro prison.	My tutaj wszyscy @ zarażamy @ trudnościami miliony ludzi, ubóstwem @ brakiem pracy @ i nie wolno tych ludzi prowadzić do więzienia euro.
The recent proposal is that Greece should write down her debts by fifty percent and remain a member of the eurozone. Surely, Mr Juncker, if that happens, the same would happen to Portugal and Ireland too. Do you think it's possible for any Member State of the euro to write down their debts and stay a member of the euro?	Ostatnio propozycja jest taka, że Grecja powinna obniżyć swoje zadłużenie o pięćdziesiąt procent i pozostać członkiem strefy euro. Oczywiście jeśli to się stanie, to to samo stanie się z Portugalią i Irlandią. Czy pan uważa, że to jest możliwe, żeby jakiekolwiek państwo członkowskie strefy euro, żeby obniżyło swoje zadłużenie i pozostało członkiem tej strefy?
Speaker: Nigel Farage **Debate: Preparation for the European Council meeting to be held on 22 and 23 November 2012 with particular reference to the Multiannual Financial Framework (21.11.2012)** **Duration: 02 min 11 sec**	
Minister Cameron heads to Brussels tomorrow – I think, on 'Mission Impossible' – but it is a remarkable debate, the thing that the European Union is talking about taking another trillion euros from European taxpayers, despite the fact that the accounts have not been signed off	Pan Cameron u-daje się tu do Brukseli na niemożliwą misję. Ale nasza debata w tej chwili jest niesamowita. Kolejne miliardy euro zostaną wyciągnięte z kieszeni podatników, pomimo tego, że @ Rada nie może porozumieć się już od osiemnastu lat. Jednak to wszystko @ jednak

for 18 years in a row. If this was a company, the directors, or in this case the Commission, would all be in prison. But never mind; Mr Cameron will go and he will argue for a freeze, or what he means by a freeze is the same over-bloated budget with increases for inflation. And that actually is the best the very best that he can achieve in these negotiations. I've no doubt that, when he comes home, with the UK taxpayer having an even bigger bill.	pan @ a Cameron uda się do Brukseli, ażeby walczyć o zamrożenie budżetu. Ale co to oznacza? To zachowanie tego samego rozdmuchanego budżetu, który jest gwarancją inflacji. I to jest najlepsze, co uda co może mu się udać osiągnąć w tych negocjacjach. Nie wiem, jak na to zareagują podatnicy brytyjscy, ale to się nie powiedzie.
But it won't work because the public mood in Britain is now very clear: what our taxpayers are saying is that enough is enough. No longer do we wish to pay money to Hungarian companies involved in projects that improve the lifestyle and living standards of dogs. And our patience has completely snapped at such cultural absurdities as the EUR 400,000 given to the Flying Gorillas dance troupe who, using their own language of 'rhythm, music and gibberish' – they would fit in here well, wouldn't they? – give performances such as the brilliant Smelly Foot dance, with an acoustic score that includes some 'spectacular belching.' No, I'm not making it up.	Nie powiedzie się, ponieważ dla opinii publicznej w Wielkiej Brytanii jest jasne. Dosyć oznacza dosyć. Nie chcemy już płacić pieniędzy firmom węgierskim, które realizują projekty na rzecz poprawy stopy życiowej psów. Podczas gdy @ nasi nasza cierpliwość się wyczerpała. @ daje się to także Wydaje się to także @ na @ wydatki kulturalne takie na przykład jak zespół taneczny goryli, podczas gdy --- ii ku ku uciesze gawiedzi. Tutaj ten przykład @ podaję państwu bez żartów.
And I think that the British public are angry at the fleets of chauffeur-driven cars, at the extravagant buildings and the never-ending travelling circus that is the European Parliament. We pay GBP 53 million a day to be a member of this organisation for no benefit whatsoever.	@ Nasza opinia publiczna jest przerażona, jest oburzona @ na przykład praktykami tego obwoźnego cyrku, jakim jest Parlament Europejski. Wydajemy miliony euro dziennie, ażeby być członkami tej organizacji, która nikomu nie przynosi żadnych korzyści.
Mr Cameron, when you come back from this Brussels summit, why don't you accept my challenge and let's have a proper full debate on Britain and whether it is worth staying a member of this Union or not. The last opinion polls over the weekend show that now, by a majority of two to one, the British people now want us to leave this Union and not to pay you a penny piece.	A więc @ szanowny panie Cameronie, jeżeli przyjdzie przybędzie pan do Brukseli, to bardzo proszę rozpocząć debatę Wielkiej Brytanii na temat tego, czy w ogóle warto pozostać @ w ramach Unii Europejskiej. W tej chwili pięćdziesiąt procent Brytyjczyków prawie nie chce już ani ani pensa płacić za członkostwo w tej organizacji.

Speaker: Godfrey Bloom **Debate: Explanations of vote (16.01.2008)** **Duration: 01 min 01 sec**	
Madam President, [laugh] I know you actually share our views on this referendum because I know you personally want one yourself, because it would give legitimacy to this place. But leaving that pol- political difference aside, I happily am not a Conservative, therefore I do not have to vote blindly for complete nonsense. I can vote with common sense, and I voted against the Baringdorf report because I find the whole idea of the spy in the sky and satellites deeply distasteful distasteful and extremely frightening. @ I think it can only come to a long-term abuse. It's bound to happen – and I know our lady friend down here, who is all motherhood and apple pie, thinks it's absolutely absolutely wonderful – but of course we've got to look at the next generation and I am afraid I have a deep distrust of politicians. If they can abuse a power, they always do, and I see this as being absolutely no different, so I voted against.	Pani przewodnicząca, wiem, że podziela pani @ nasze zdanie na ten temat. --- @ Niezależnie od tego. @ Ja na szczęście nie jestem konserwatystą, więc nie muszę ślepo głosować za kompletnym nonsensem. Mogę @ głosować zgod- zgodnie ze zdrowym rozsądkiem. Zagłosowałem przeciwko temu sprawozdaniu, ponieważ myślę, że wszystko to jest całkowicie niesmaczne i przerażające. --- Myślę, że ten system będzie nadużywany i wiem zresztą, że koleżanka tutaj, która myśli, że wszystko jest ładne, piękne. Zdaję też sobie również sprawę, co jak będzie wyglądać sytuacja w przyszłości. Ja bardzo słabo ufam politykom. Zawsze nadużywają władzy jeśli tylko mogą i tutaj nie będzie inaczej, więc zagłosowałem przeciwko.
Speaker: Godfrey Bloom **Debate: Electronic communication networks, personal data and the protection of privacy (05.05.2009)** **Duration: 00 min 52 sec**	
Well, just a few observations, if I may, Madam Chairman. I don't trust the Commission; I don't trust the unelected bureaucrats behind the scenes who have meetings where I do not have any minutes.	... uwag z mojej strony, pani przewodnicząca, pani pozwoli. Nie ufam Komisji; nie ufam biurokratom w kuluarach, którzy spotkają, spotykają się, na takich spotkaniach, z których ja nie posiadam protokołu,
I don't trust this place, which gives a veneer of democracy, which is largely made up of placemen.	ja @ wierzę w prawdziwą demokrację,
This looks to me like it's editorial, political editorial control over things on the Internet – the new medium. The sort of thing that we condemn in China. I don't like it. It smells a bit to me. I don't know what is gonna go on behind the scenes, as the previous speaker just said, what deals are being done that we don't know about.	ale to tutaj wygląda na @ kontrolę z góry. Kontrolę internetu i coś takiego potępiamy na przykład w Chinach. Nie podoba mi się to. Śmierdzi mi to i tak naprawdę chciałbym wiedzieć, co się dzieje w kuluarach. Mówi o tym moja przedmówczyni. Przecież tam się dzieją pewne rzeczy, o których w ogóle nie wiemy.

We have perfectly good copyright laws. We have perfectly good data protection laws. That should be enough. I don't want any more control coming to this sinister and corrupt institution.	Posiadamy przepisy, doskonałe przepisy odnoszące się do @ ochrony naszych praw. Nie mogę pozwolić sobie tutaj na dodatkowe instytucje, które zżera korupcja.
Speaker: Godfrey Bloom **Debate: Outcome of the Copenhagen summit on climate change (20.01.2010)** **Duration: 01 min 12 sec**	
Well, Mr President, of course, you can tell I'm a sceptic because I don't dress like a scarecrow.	Cóż, panie przewodniczący, oczywiście można @ stwierdzić, że jestem @ sceptykiem, @ bo się nie przebieram za jakiegoś stracha na wróble i tak nie działam.
I fought my way through the blizzard in Copenhagen, like many of you did. Interesting, isn't it, that we've had the coldest winter so far on record in London for 30 years? It's the same in Poland, it's the same in Korea, it's the same in China. We've had the coldest temperatures in Florida, Arizona, Texas – the first snow in Texas, I think, for a hundred years. And of course, as Giles Coren of the London Times said, my goodness me, my goodness me, we simply don't get it – of course, of course that's what global warming is all about: we've got to get used to freezing temperatures.	@ Zastanawiałem się, co będzie w @ się działo @ w Kopenhadze, rzeczywiście padły rekordy niskiej temperatury w Wielkiej Brytanii, podobnie w Londynie, w Chinach wielki śnieg, @ na Florydzie mróz, @ w Teksasie chyba od stu lat po raz pierwszy spadł śnieg. No i cóż, tak jak przeczytaliśmy w @ New York Timesie @ no cóż, chyba nikt nie rozumie, o co tutaj się tutaj co się tutaj dzieje, po prostu globalne ocieplenie polega na tym, że będziemy zamarzać i się owijać.
Well, we've seen the Al Gore hockey stick, which is still, I gather, being shown in London state schools – Al Gore, snake oil salesman, crook! We've seen Professor Jones from the East Anglia University– crook! And now – you won't know about this yet because it's been kept out of the public domain – the New Zealand National Climate Database: and I have the figures here – all fraudulent. When are you all going to wake up? Scam, scam, scam!	@ Cóż, @ zastanawiam się, @ do czego to wszystko pro-o-owadzi. @ Profesor Jones z uniwersytetu się wypowiada i określany @ jest @ mianem szaleńca, który nie rozumie, na czym to polega. Mieliśmy dane z urzędu meteorologicznego z Nowej Zelandii i okazuje się, że to wszystko zostało sfał-szo-wa-ne, fałszerstwo, fałszerstwo, fałszerstwo!
Speaker: Godfrey Bloom **Debate: Female poverty – equality between women and men (08.03.2011)** **Duration: 01 min 12 sec**	
Well, there is a lot of self-congratulation going on here in the European Union on International Women's Day. It is my opinion that you've made a complete dog's breakfast of it. You talk about	No, tutaj sobie wszyscy gratulujemy dzisiaj. Moim @ moim zdaniem tutaj @ mówimy na przykład --- o urlopach macierzyńskich. Tak naprawdę coraz mniej kobiet w moim kraju @ ma @ pracę.

maternity leave. All that is happening with draconian maternity leave, Madam, let me tell you, is that fewer and fewer young women in my country are getting jobs because you'd have to be stark staring mad to employ a young woman if you have a small business. So you've done them no favours.	
We have equal opportunities for car insurance now due to another lunatic judgment by the European Court, which means that even if young women could get a job, they couldn't afford to drive to it because they have just had their car insurance doubled. And now you are talking about quotas. What kind of madness is this? Women who have worked all their lives to get to a position of responsibility in business – professional women – are being patronised on quotas. Now those women who have been successful will sit in a boardroom and people will look across that boardroom and say, are you a token woman or did you get there because you know your business? The whole thing is completely crazy and it is a tragedy that none of you have done a real job in your lives or you would understand this.	Tak więc teraz mówimy dalej o traktowaniu @ --- kobiet przez @ towarzystwa ubezpieczeniowe. Mamy orzeczenie Trybunału Sprawiedliwości. Teraz mówimy o kwotach. Co to znowu za szaleństwo? Kobiety, które pracowały przez całe swoje życie są traktowane protekcjonalnie. @ Przecież są kobiety, które z powodzeniem osiągały swoje stanowiska, a teraz przy okazji kwot będzie się wskazywało te kobiety palcami, że tutaj siedzą w zarządzie tylko dlatego, że jest kwota. W związku z tym powinniśmy o tym pamiętać.
Speaker: Godfrey Bloom **Debate: Conclusions of the European Council meeting on 24 and 12 March 2011 (05.04.2011)** **Duration: 01 min 29 sec**	
Mr President, it's interesting, I would like to go back to the Libya if I may. When did the political class and the great and the good suddenly catch up with the fact that Colonel Gaddafi is an evil man? When, since that wonderful photograph, Mr President, with you embracing him did you suddenly come to realize that he was a "wrong'un"?	Panie przewodniczący, to interesujące. Chciałbym wrócić do Libii, jeśli mogę. Kiedy klasa polityczna nagle @ zorientowała się, że pułkownik Kadafi jest złym człowiekiem? Kiedy, od tamtej pięknej fotografii z panem, gdzie się całujecie, zorientował się pan, że jest on złoczyńcą?
Because I can tell you that the victims of Lockerbie in Scotland and the victims of IRA atrocities in my country knew very well what sort of scoundrel this man was. But he has got oil and he has got money so you all turned a blind eye, didn't you?	Bo ofiary Lockerbie w Szkocji oraz ofiary IRY wiedziały bardzo dobrze, jaką skandaliczną działalność prowadzi ten człowiek. Ale on ma pieniądze, on ma ropę naftową, więc wszyscy przymykali na to oko.

Well, the chickens have come home to roost. But you know the most absurd figure in all this is the British Prime Minister, who stands there rattling his empty scabbard – having disestablished the Royal Navy, having disestablished the Royal Air Force – making threats from the sidelines, with no aircraft carriers, no nothing, and calls himself a Conservative but is just a superannuated schoolboy whistling in the dark.	No ale --- teraz wszystko się wydało. Ale wie pan co? Najbardziej absurdalną osobą w tym wszystkim jest brytyjski premier, który stoi @ i mówi o @ tym, co będzie, jednocześnie uniemożliwiając działanie marynarce wojennej, czy lotnictwie. Nazywa się konserwatystą, chociaż jest sz- szkolnym chłopcem, który m- mówi coś w ciemno.
You know we talk a great deal about violence against the people, we talk a lot about democracy. We have had a homicidal baboon in Zimbabwe for years now, and we do not do anything about it, do we? We do not care 'cause there is no money and there is no oil. That is so typical of this place: full of hypocrisy and humbug.	Mówimy o demokracji. W Zimbabwe już od wielu lat toczy się ludobójstwo, ale nic nie robimy, nic nas to nie obchodzi, bo tam nie ma nie ma ani pieniędzy, ani ropy naftowej. To bardzo typowe. --- Tutaj jest pełno hipokrytów.
Speaker: John Bufton **Debate: Outcome of the referendum in Ireland (07.10.2009)** **Duration: 01 min 09 sec**	
Thank you. The result of the referendum in Ireland at the weekend on the Lisbon Treaty is living proof that this Parliament is not democratic, honest or accountable. But who in here really cares? Well, I do. The fact that the Irish were made to vote twice proves that the EU has now become a dictatorship. If the vote does not go the way of the EU dictators, then they simply vote again and again until the right result is achieved.	Dziękuję. Wynik referendum irlandzkiego dotyczącego traktatu lizbońskiego pokazuje, że Parlament Europejski nie jest ani szczery, ani demokratyczny. @ Może nikomu nie zależy, ale mnie tak. To, że Irlandczycy głosowali dwukrotnie pokazuje, że Europa staje się dyktaturą. Jeśli nie… wynik głosowania nie jest taki, jaki podoba się dyktatorom europejskim, to się głosuje do skutku.
This is not fair and, in my view, morally wrong. The Lisbon fanatics in this Parliament will now go full steam ahead to create a new European superstate of five hundred million people. The injustice is that people in my country, the United Kingdom, were promised a referendum but denied one. The irony is that under the Lisbon Treaty there will be a full-time President. It is quite likely to be Tony Blair. The new President of the EU will be the Head of State.	Moim zdaniem jest to niewłaściwe, moralnie niewłaściwe. Fanatycy pewnie @ tutaj znajdujący się w tym Parlamencie będą cały czas teraz już pełną parą optowali za stworzeniem swoistej federacji z pięciuset milionami obywateli. A w moim kraju, w Wielkiej Brytanii, na przykład w ogóle nam zabroniono referendum. Prawdą jest, że teraz prawdopodobnie będziemy mieli stałego prezydenta Unii Europejskiej, prawdopodobnie Tony'ego Blaira. Będzie szefem rządu.

You cannot have two Heads of State and, since the EU takes precedence over national bodies, the EU President – perhaps Tony Blair – will take precedence over our Queen. The people of my country will not accept an unelected failure or anybody else taking precedence over our Queen. God save our Queen! Thank you.	A jak możemy mieć dwóch szefów rządu czy też dwie głowy państwa? Jeżeli stanie się nim rzeczywiście Tony Blair, to będzie w ogóle stał wyżej niż na przykład brytyjska królowa. Moim zdaniem nie możemy tego typu porażek zaakceptować. Niech Bóg @ ochroni naszą królową.
Speaker: John Bufton **Debate: Question Hour with the President of the Commission (15.12.2009)** **Duration: 00 min 28 sec**	
Thank you, Chairman, sorry, thank you, Mr President. The point I would like to make is that there are many people here today who have not had a chance to ask Mr Barroso questions. Given the huge salary that Mr Barroso is on, can he not spend another thirty minutes with us on a regular basis, to make this an hour and a half?	Dziękuję, panie przewodniczący. Ja chciałem poruszyć kwestię następującą. Wiele osób tutaj nie miało okazji zadać pytania panu Barroso. Czy biorąc pod uwagę tak duży popyt na pana Barroso, czy nie mógłby on spędzać z nami więcej czasu @ może dwadzieścia trzydzieści minut dłużej ---
The first thirty minutes were with the other group leaders. There are seven hundred and fifty Members in this place. I think thirty minutes is ridiculous. Can we not have an hour and a half? Mr Barroso, you are on a good enough salary, sir. Come here for ninety minutes, not sixty.	Myślę, że trzydzieści minut to naprawdę to naprawdę za mało. Gdybyśmy mieli półtorej godziny, to myślę, że pan Barroso mógłby, w ramach swojej pensji, być tu z nami przez dziewięćdziesiąt minut, a nie sześćdziesiąt.
Speaker: John Bufton **Debate: Placing on the market and use of biocidal products (21.09.2010)** **Duration: 01 min 08 sec**	
Mr President, the adoption of the report by Ms Klaß would undoubtedly see an explosion in rat populations, jeopardising sanitation in homes and on farms.	Dziękuję, panie przewodniczący, przyjęcie sprawozdania pani Klaus na pewno doprowadzi doo znakomitego wzrostu populacji szczurów.
Rats carry diseases such as e-coli and salmonella and can cause significant damage to property, in some cases, leading to electrical fires. Farms, especially, fall victim to rat infestations without effective pest extermination. Anti-coagulants are the most widely used method of rat poisoning and are by far the most effective, accounting for around ninety-five percent of rodent control.	Co zagrozi zagrozi naszym uprawom, poza tym spowo- przyczyni do rozpowszechniania się chorób takich jak salmonella. @ Nie da się zwalczyć problemu szczurów bez efektywnych środków deratyzacyjnych, bez trutek na szczury. One są najskuteczniejsze – dziewięćdziesiąt pięć procent kontroli tej populacji zawdzięczamy stosowaniu tych trutek.

In May, I directed a written question to the Commission requesting formal acknowledgement of the implications of a ban and sought a support framework for those affected, as well as indications as to possible alternative pest control.	Komisja powinna @ odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jakie będzie miało skutki zakazanie tych sytua- tych substancji.
The Commission stated they were open to discussion with the aim of ensuring that appropriate solutions were found. What kind of solution does the Commission propose? Has there been an impact assessment into the prohibition of anti-coagulants as rodenticides? Will there be a viable support framework, and have alternative rodenticides been identified? Thank you, President.	Komisja powiedziała, że jest oczywiście otwarta na dyskusje, że chce zagwarantować odpowiednie rozwiązanie, ale jakie rozwiązanie proponuje nam Komisja? Czy doszło do jakiejś oceny skutków @ jeśli chodzi o zakazanie @ trutek na szczury? Czy jest jakaś alternatywna droga, czy już ustalona, jaka to droga?
Speaker: John Bufton **Debate: Charging of heavy goods vehicles (07.06.2011)** **Duration: 01 min 16 sec**	
Thank you, President. HGV haulage is integral to the supply process essential to a good economy. If added charges are levied across Europe, the extra cost is ultimately filtered to the consumer.	Dziękuję, panie przewodniczący. Tak, rzeczywiście dobra gospodarka potrzebuje dobrego transportu. Dodatkowe koszty @ tak naprawdę poniesie konsument.
The UK Government is looking into HGV charges to bring us in line with Europe by 2015. We don't have a network of toll roads, nor do we lay additional charges on heavy goods vehicles after road tax. We face unfair competition from an increasing number of foreign trucks taking up more than their fair share of cross-border haulage. Foreign operators pay nothing to use our roads but UK diesel duty is as much as twenty-three pence a liter higher, giving competitors a fifteen percent advantage. However, under EU law, the UK cannot introduce a charge applicable only to foreign vehicles.	@ Rząd brytyjski przygląda się tym opłatom, ponieważ do roku dwa tysiące dwu- @ piętnastego musimy dokonać harmonizacji. My nie mamy płatnych dróg, w związku z powyższym, zagraniczne ciężarówki konkurują ze naszymi @ przewoźnikami, nie płacą na naszych drogach żadnych opłat. Pamiętając o tym, że my płacimy podatki drogowe, Wielka Brytania nie może stosować opłat tylko dla zagranicznych pojazdów. Nie pozwalają na to przepisy.
If this directive expands its capabilities, any move by the UK Government to introduce HGV charges will be overshadowed by an unwanted indirect tax which the Commission also reserves the right to make obligatory in 2013. As the proposals relate to taxation, it should	Wszelkie ruchy rządu brytyjskiego, jeżeli zostanie przyjęta ta dyrektywa, zostaną przytłoczone tym pośrednim podatkiem. Ta propozycja, ponieważ dotyczy opodatkowania, dotyczy kwestii fiskalnych, powinna wymagać jednogłośnej decyzji na poziomie Rady, je- są to podatki po-

require unanimity at Council level, yet the legislation is being ushered in via the transport provision of Lisbon. It is an underhand way of introducing indirect taxation and should not be voted through by anybody with a democratic bone in their body. Thank you.	średnie i nie powinny być głos- tsowanee ani wypierane przez nikogo, kto jest choć trochę demokratą.

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Magdalena Bartłomiejczyk

Face threats in interpreting: A pragmatic study of plenary debates in the European Parliament

Summary

This monograph focuses on pragmatic aspects of simultaneous interpreting, and is therefore intended both for translation scholars and for linguists interested in interlingual transfer of pragmatic meaning. Efforts have been made to avoid dense, strictly scientific language and the use of unexplained specialist terminology in the hope that the book might also appeal to practicing interpreters and interpreter trainees, although it should be noted that its character is descriptive rather than prescriptive. The main problem under discussion is how simultaneous interpreters handle face-threatening acts and impoliteness directed by politicians at their opponents, and the authentic material under analysis comes from plenary debates of the European Parliament, which are routinely interpreted into all the official languages of the European Union.

Chapters 1–4 are meant to set the scene. Chapter 1 presents the European Union as a multilingual institution, with a special focus on its translation and interpreting services. Chapter 2 zooms in on the latter, considering such features of plenary debates of the European Parliament that have direct consequences for interpreting, and also including an overview of existing research on interpreting for the needs of various EU bodies. Chapter 3 provides the pragmatic background to the study, shedding light especially on the crucial notions of "face," "facework," "face-threatening acts" and "impoliteness," while Chapter 4 reviews existing research on facework performed by interpreters in various settings and interpreting modes.

The author's empirical contribution is presented in Chapter 5, which scrutinises Polish interpretations of British Eurosceptics' plenary speeches, in particular ones that fiercely attack and possibly offend the speakers' political opponents. Five speeches undergo detailed discourse analysis covering all identifiable aspects of facework as performed by the original speaker and the interpreter, whereas a considerably larger corpus of source texts and the corresponding interpretations is analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively in terms of personal reference and impoliteness. The interpretations are searched, first and foremost, for signs of interpreting strategies at play during transfer of face-threatening input. Many of these strategies result in mitigation of the originally intended impoliteness. Chapter 6 develops this topic, endeavouring to find multifarious explanations of the pronounced trend towards mitigation by the interpreter within the wide framework of modern translation studies. Both this chapter and the final conclusions devote much attention to avenues for future research that would offer some possibilities of triangulating and complementing the results of the present study.

Magdalena Bartłomiejczyk

Zagrożenia twarzy w tłumaczeniu ustnym: pragmatyczne studium debat plenarnych w Parlamencie Europejskim

Streszczenie

Niniejsza monografia skupia się na pragmatycznych aspektach tłumaczenia symultanicznego i jest adresowana zarówno do przekładoznawców, jak i do językoznawców zainteresowanych międzyjęzykowym transferem znaczenia pragmatycznego. Autorka starała się unikać hermetycznego, ściśle naukowego języka oraz niejasnej terminologii specjalistycznej w nadziei, że książka może również zainteresować praktykujących tłumaczy ustnych oraz adeptów zawodu, chociaż należy podkreślić, że ma ona charakter opisowy, a nie poradnikowy. Głównym tematem są sposoby, w jakie tłumacze symultaniczni podchodzą do aktów zagrożenia twarzy oraz niegrzeczności wobec oponentów w wypowiedziach polityków. Analizowany materiał badawczy pochodzi z debat plenarnych Parlamentu Europejskiego, które są zawsze tłumaczone na wszystkie oficjalne języki unijne.

Rozdziały 1–4 stanowią wprowadzenie do zasadniczych wątków rozwijanych w pracy. Rozdział 1 przedstawia Unię Europejską jako instytucję wielojęzyczną, skupiając się szczególnie na służbach odpowiedzialnych za zapewnienie tłumaczeń pisemnych oraz ustnych. To właśnie tłumaczenia ustne awansują do rangi głównego tematu w rozdziale 2, który omawia aspekty debat plenarnych w Parlamencie Europejskim o pierwszorzędnym znaczeniu dla tłumaczy, jak również prezentuje przegląd wcześniejszych badań nad tłumaczeniami ustnymi na potrzeby różnych instytucji unijnych. Rozdział 3 omawia niezbędne zagadnienia pragmatyczne oraz wyjaśnia kluczowe terminy: „twarz", „czynności twarzy", „akty zagrożenia twarzy" i „niegrzeczność". Rozdział 4 natomiast referuje badania innych autorów nad czynnościami twarzy w przekładzie ustnym wykonywanym w rozmaitych okolicznościach i z zastosowaniem różnych technik tłumaczeniowych.

Badanie empiryczne stanowiące trzon niniejszej monografii przedstawiono w obszernym rozdziale 5, który poświęcony jest autentycznym tłumaczeniom symultanicznym na język polski wystąpień plenarnych brytyjskich eurosceptyków. Szczególnie interesujące w kontekście tej pracy są przemówienia, których autorzy w niewybredny sposób atakują swoich oponentów politycznych i potencjalnie ich obrażają. Pięć przemówień tego typu poddawanych jest szczegółowej analizie dyskursu, obejmującej wszystkie możliwe do wyodrębnienia aspekty czynności twarzy ze strony mówcy oryginalnego oraz tłumacza. Znacznie większy korpus tekstów oryginalnych oraz ich tłumaczeń symultanicznych stanowi natomiast podstawę do szerzej zakrojonej analizy o charakterze zarówno jakościowym, jak i ilościowym, skupiającej się na dwóch aspektach: odniesieniach do osób oraz niegrzeczności. Tłumaczenia są analizowane

przede wszystkim pod kątem strategii tłumaczeniowych zastosowanych w celu przekazania zawartych w tekstach oryginalnych zagrożeń twarzy. Wiele ze zidentyfikowanych w materiale badawczym strategii skutkuje mitygowaniem zamierzonej przez mówcę niegrzeczności wobec odbiorcy. Rozdział 6 kontynuuje i rozwija ten temat, przedstawiając w świetle współczesnej translatoryki szereg różnorodnych interpretacji ukazanego trendu ku mitygowaniu ataków werbalnych przez tłumacza. Zarówno ten rozdział, jak i wnioski końcowe poświęcają również wiele uwagi potencjałowi dla dalszych badań, oferujących możliwość triangulacji i uzupełnienia przedstawionych tutaj wyników.

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